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Jan. 30, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Debbie Jo Morrison v. Rodney Wayne Morrison

Texas Supreme Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-0053
• Judges: Bland

• Disposition: The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.2K)

• PDF

Disposition

The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.

Lead Opinion

                        by [Jane Nenninger Bland](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8305/jane-nenninger-bland/)

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0053
══════════

Debbie Jo Morrison,
Petitioner,

v.

Rodney Wayne Morrison,
Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued October 7, 2025

JUSTICE BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Family Code permits parties to a divorce to return to court to
seek enforcement of the decree. 1 A court exceeds its enforcement power,
however, if its order “amends, modifies, alters, or changes” the property
division in the decree. 2 Such an order is “beyond the power of the divorce

1 Tex. Fam. Code § 9.001(a).

2 Id. § 9.007(b).
court and is unenforceable.” 3 In this appeal, we determine whether the
trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction to enforce a decree when
one spouse failed to maintain property of the community estate. The
court of appeals held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction
because its order improperly modified the decree’s property division.
The court of appeals vacated the order and dismissed the case for want
of jurisdiction.
The line between enforcement and modification of a judicial
decree depends in large measure on the relief granted. The Family Code
permits relief to redress a violation of the decree, including a recovery of
damages from a breaching spouse’s assets resulting from breach of the
decree. 4 Redividing the property, however, is prohibited. 5 We hold
(1) the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the decree and to award
damages caused by breach of the decree; but (2) the trial court erred in
reallocating the proceeds from the sale of the marital home to the
aggrieved spouse without evidence of the property damages resulting
from breach of the decree. Because the trial court had jurisdiction to
order enforcement but erred in interpreting the decree and Chapter 9’s
relevant provisions, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
I
Rodney and Debbie Morrison divorced in April 2021. Their agreed
divorce decree requires the parties to sell community property, including

3 Id.

4 See id. § 9.010.

5 Id. § 9.007(a)–(b).

2
the marital residence and a workshop, and it governs division of the
proceeds from those sales. The decree allocates half of the proceeds from
the sale of the parties’ marital residence to each spouse. The decree also
awards Debbie 55.5% of funds recovered from bankruptcy proceedings
involving Rodney’s company.
The decree requires Rodney and Debbie to deliver designated
personal property to an appointed receiver within fourteen days. It
further orders Rodney to vacate and deliver possession of the marital
home and shop property to an appointed realtor for sale.
In the event that either spouse fails to comply with their delivery
obligations, the decree includes a provision requiring that the fair
market value of undelivered or damaged property be assessed against
the breaching spouse and “accounted for” out of the proceeds from the
sale of the marital residence:
IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that a failure to deliver
property awarded to the other party (or to be delivered to
the Realtor or Receiver) timely and in the same condition
as the property existed on the date of separation of the
parties, shall result in the award of damages (including a
redistribution of cash or other assets) and attorney’s fees to
the other party. If either party is ordered in this Decree to
turn over real and/or personal property in his or her
possession to the other party, to the Receiver or Real Estate
Agent, said property shall be delivered at the specified time
and in unharmed and undamaged condition. In the event
that either party damages, harms, or destroys any
property, or refuses to deliver the property as ordered, the
fair market value of the property shall be assessed against
that party (normal wear and tear and Act of God, excepted),
and that amount shall be awarded to the other party, and
accounted for out of the proceeds from the sale of the
marital residence.

3
Disputes over implementation of the decree arose. Debbie moved
for contempt and enforcement of the decree, alleging that Rodney had
damaged the parties’ property and had refused to deliver multiple items
of personal property to the receiver.
The trial court held several hearings over the next year and a
half. 6 During that time, the court’s registry received payments totaling
$850,434, consisting of proceeds from the sale of the marital home
($449,254.96), the shop ($140,392.68), and personal property
($47,083.58), together with funds received from the bankruptcy
proceeding ($213,702.78). The trial court permitted Debbie to withdraw
her allocated portion of these funds as the decree provides. The court
denied Rodney’s motion to withdraw his allocated portion. At the time
of the trial court’s ruling on Debbie’s motion for enforcement,
$384,351.71 remained in the court’s general registry account and
$46,286.38 remained in a receivership account.
The trial court granted Debbie’s motion for enforcement. It found
thirty-six violations of the decree, including damage to the marital home
and the failure to deliver items of personal property to the receiver. 7 The
trial court made no findings as to the fair market value of the missing
items or the diminution in fair market value of the real property
resulting from Rodney’s violations. Nevertheless, the trial court
awarded Debbie $449,254.96 in damages, an amount equivalent to 100%

6 A mandamus action prolonged the proceedings. See In re Morrison,

No. 12-22-00001-CV, 2022 WL 598681 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 28, 2022, orig.
proceeding). The issues in that case are not before the Court.
7 It also found that Rodney committed three violations of the order
appointing a receiver.

4
of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home. Debbie also received
attorney’s fees, court costs, and reimbursement of a portion of the
receiver’s fees. In total, the trial court awarded Debbie $722,725.33. 8
In partial satisfaction of its enforcement order, the trial court
made $377,713.35 from the court’s general registry account payable to
Debbie. The court also awarded Debbie the balance of the receivership
account and Rodney the personal property he had failed to deliver.
Rodney appealed, arguing that the trial court exceeded its
enforcement jurisdiction in redividing assets previously awarded by the
decree, including the reallocation of the proceeds of the sale of the home
entirely to Debbie. 9 The court of appeals agreed, holding that the trial
court impermissibly modified the decree’s property division in violation
of Family Code Section 9.007 by redividing the proceeds from the sale of
the marital home under the guise of enforcement. 10 The court vacated
the trial court’s order and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 11
We granted Debbie’s petition for review.

8 The trial court additionally ordered the distribution of $6,638.36 from

the general registry account to Debbie, representing the remainder owed to her
from the bankruptcy excess funds.
9 712 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2023).

10 Id. at 124.

11 Id.

5
II
The primary issue is whether the trial court’s enforcement order
is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 12 Because Section 9.007
provides that a trial court exceeds its enforcement power when the court
redivides property inconsistent with the decree 13 and the order in this
case reallocated the proceeds from the sale of the marital home to
Debbie, Rodney contends that the order is void. Debbie responds that
the divorce decree itself provides that the fair market value of missing
or damaged assets may be “accounted for” from the proceeds of the sale
of the home and thus the trial court’s reallocation of the proceeds
entirely to her merely enforces the decree rather than modifies it.
A
Chapter 9, Subchapter A of the Family Code governs suits to
enforce divorce decrees. 14 Section 9.001 permits parties to a divorce
decree to “request enforcement of that decree by filing a suit to
enforce.” 15 The rendering court “retains the power to enforce the
property division,” 16 including through Section 9.006 the power to

12 Subject matter jurisdiction “refers to a court’s authority to adjudicate

a case.” Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003) (citing Dubai Petroleum
Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000)). We review questions of subject
matter jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Cent.
Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. 2024).
13 Tex. Fam. Code § 9.007.

14 Id. §§ 9.001–.014.

15 Id. § 9.001(a).

16 Id. § 9.002.

6
“render further orders to enforce the division of property.” 17 In doing so,
the court may award a money judgment for damages resulting from a
violation of the decree 18 as well as “reasonable and necessary attorney’s
fees, court costs, and expenses” associated with obtaining enforcement
relief. 19
Section 9.007, entitled “Limitation on Power of Court to Enforce,”
restricts the trial court’s enforcement powers. 20 A trial court may not
alter or change the substantive division of property in the divorce decree
via an enforcement order:
(a) A court may not amend, modify, alter, or change the
division of property made or approved in the decree of
divorce or annulment. An order to enforce the division is
limited to an order to assist in the implementation of or to
clarify the prior order and may not alter or change the
substantive division of property.

(b) An order under this section that amends, modifies,
alters, or changes the actual, substantive division of
property made or approved in a final decree of divorce or
annulment is beyond the power of the divorce court and is
unenforceable. 21

17 Id. § 9.006(a).

18 See id. § 9.010(a) (“[T]he court may render a money judgment for the

damages caused by that failure to comply.”)
19 Id. § 9.014.

20 Id. § 9.007.

21 Id. § 9.007(a)–(b).

7
The limitations on a trial court’s power expressed in Section 9.007
are jurisdictional. 22 The language of the provision expressly limits the
“power” of the trial court. 23 The word “power” generally implicates
jurisdiction. 24 Further, we approved of a jurisdictional reading of Section
9.007 in Pearson v. Fillingim. 25 In Pearson, we observed that a trial
court “retains jurisdiction to clarify and enforce the property division
within that decree” but modification of the decree contrary to Section
9.007 is “beyond the power of the court.” 26 Accordingly, we held the trial
court “lacked jurisdiction to alter the original divorce decree.” 27 We
made a similar pronouncement in Dalton v. Dalton. 28
Though we interpret Section 9.007 as limiting the jurisdiction of
the trial court to modify the final decree, Sections 9.002 and 9.006

22 See Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363–64 (Tex. 2011); Dalton

v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126, 142 (Tex. 2018).
23 Tex. Fam. Code § 9.007.

24 See, e.g., Kazi, 12 S.W.3d at 76 (characterizing subject matter
jurisdiction as “a power” of a court); In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 518–19 (Tex.
2020) (Lehrmann, J., concurring) (“When we speak of ‘genuine subject-matter
jurisdiction,’ we speak of a court’s ‘power to decide the case.’” (citation omitted)
(first quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998); and
then quoting In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. 2010))).
25 See 332 S.W.3d at 363–64.

26 Id. at 363.

27 Id. at 364.

28 See 551 S.W.3d at 142 (quoting with approval Gainous v. Gainous,

219 S.W.3d 97, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)
(“Accordingly, we hold that section 9.007 is jurisdictional and that orders
violating its restrictions are void.”)).

8
acknowledge the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court to enforce it. 29
Those provisions grant “power” to the trial court to “enforce the property
division” and to “render further orders.” 30 Read together, Subchapter A’s
provisions permit enforcement of a decree while protecting its finality
against successive collateral attacks.
An issue arises when a court overreaches in attempting a
permissible enforcement of the decree. Under Section 9.007, a trial court
lacks jurisdiction to modify the substantive division of property but
maintains jurisdiction to enforce that division. While limits exist as to
what a court may do in the name of enforcement, those limits do not
deprive the court of all power to enforce the decree as the court of
appeals held. 31 Though “finality is uniquely important” in family law
cases, 32 so too is the power to enforce the decree. When a trial court
exceeds enforcement mechanisms available to it, it is those oversteps

29 See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 9.002, .006; Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899,

902 (Tex. 2009) (“The Family Code provides that trial courts may enter orders
of enforcement and clarification to enforce or specify more precisely a decree’s
property division.”); Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 139 (“Subchapter A allows post-
decree orders to enforce and effectuate the decree’s property division . . . .”); see
also Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1982) (“The general rule is that
every court having jurisdiction to render a judgment has the inherent power to
enforce its judgments.”).
30 Tex. Fam. Code §§ 9.002, .006.

31 See Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, 694 S.W.3d at 759 (“[W]e emphasized

that ‘the modern direction of policy is to reduce the vulnerability of final
judgments to attack on the ground that the tribunal lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.’” (quoting Kazi, 12 S.W.3d at 76)).
32 D.S., 602 S.W.3d at 512.

9
that are void and unenforceable. 33 The decree nonetheless remains
subject to enforcement suits. A court that exceeds its power to enforce
does not lose the continuing enforcement jurisdiction it otherwise
possesses. 34
Whether a trial court’s order constitutes improper modification
under Section 9.007 or permissible enforcement of the decree turns on
the text of the decree and the scope of the relief afforded in the name of
enforcement. In Dalton, for instance, the trial court entered a post-
decree qualified domestic relations order granting one spouse an
additional interest in the other’s retirement accounts to account for
arrears in support payments. 35 The divorce decree did not contemplate
such an assignment. 36 We held the order void as a modification
prohibited by Section 9.007. 37 Had the trial court awarded a money
judgment or a lien in the amount of the arrearage, it would not have
exceeded the scope of the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction to enforce
the decree, just as parties frequently sue to obtain a judgment and
garnishment for child support arrearages. Instead, the court redivided

33 Tex. Fam. Code § 9.007; see Pearson, 332 S.W.3d at 363–64 (holding

that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to redivide assets previously allocated
in the divorce decree but acknowledging that the trial court retained
jurisdiction to clarify and enforce the decree).
34See Herrera v. Mata, 702 S.W.3d 538, 543 (Tex. 2024) (“[S]ubject
matter jurisdiction is a claim-by-claim inquiry.”).
35 551 S.W.3d at 132.

36 See id. at 137.

37 Id. at 142.

10
retirement accounts that had been divided in the decree, exceeding its
enforcement jurisdiction. 38
Deciding whether the trial court had jurisdiction to render the
order in this case thus requires an examination of the property division
provisions in the Morrisons’ divorce decree.
B
Courts interpret divorce decrees as we do other judgments,
construing the decree as a whole and giving effect to all provisions. 39
Pertinently, the Morrisons’ decree allocates half of the proceeds from the
marital residence to each spouse. The decree also accounts for the
possibility of damage to the community estate before the assets are
divided via an enforcement provision.
The enforcement provision is important in two respects. First, the
parties agreed to a valuation method for damages caused by
noncompliance, requiring a determination of the fair market value of
damaged or missing property. In the event of damage or the failure to
deliver property, “the fair market value of the property shall be assessed
against that party.” Second, the parties agreed to a specific enforcement
mechanism for the collection of these damages beyond a bare money
judgment. Such damages “shall be awarded to the other party, and
accounted for out of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence.” 40
The decree thus provides that damages can be awarded as a set-off of

38 Id. at 132, 137.

39 Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 901 (citing Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d

444, 447 (Tex. 2003)).
40 Emphasis added.

11
the offending spouse’s award of the proceeds from the sale of the marital
residence, identifying an asset that a party may look to should the other
fail to comply with the decree. 41
The decree coheres with the Family Code and the trial court’s
enforcement powers. Rodney takes issue with the decree’s language
identifying the proceeds of the marital residence as an asset from which
to collect damages resulting from breach of the decree. He argues that
the provision amounts to a redivision of property because the decree
already divided the proceeds from the sale of the marital home. 42 Section
9.007 explicitly prohibits a trial court from “amend[ing], modify[ing],
alter[ing], or chang[ing] the division of property made or approved by
the decree,” and this Court has given effect to this prohibition. 43

41 The parties and the court of appeals characterize the provision as a

liquidated damages provision. We disagree with this characterization.
“Liquidated damages” is defined as “[a]n amount contractually stipulated as a
reasonable estimation of actual damages to be recovered by one party if the
other party breaches.” Damages, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). As
written, the provision does not stipulate a specific amount to be paid upon
breach. Rather, it provides a method for calculating damages and an asset such
damages might be paid out of (the marital residence).
42 Rodney also objects to the following language in the agreed-upon
provision: “shall result in the award of damages (including a redistribution of
cash or other assets),” arguing that it implies the trial court is empowered to
redivide assets. We disagree. Taken in context, the quoted language broadly
states what the provision aims to accomplish. The final two sentences of the
provision specify the terms and mechanics, which do not redivide the property
but instead identify an asset from which proven damages for breach of the
decree may be deducted.
43Tex. Fam. Code § 9.007(b). See, e.g., Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 449;
Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 142; Pearson, 332 S.W.3d at 364.

12
But the enforcement provision in the parties’ decree does not seek
redivision. Instead, it provides a mechanism for the collection of
damages resulting from breach of the decree. This is permissible under
Chapter 9. Section 9.006 broadly grants trial courts the power to enter
orders “to enforce the division of property.” 44 Identifying an asset to
collect from in the event of a breach is not a substantive modification of
the original property division but rather a means for the parties to help
enforce the decree’s obligations governing the winding down of the
marital estate.
The provision in this decree sets out a method for evaluating
actual damages in harmony with the statute. Section 9.010(a) provides
that “[i]f a party fails to comply with a decree of divorce or annulment
and delivery of property awarded in the decree is no longer an adequate
remedy, the court may render a money judgment for the damages caused
by that failure to comply.” 45 By calculating actual damages based on the
fair market value of property lost or the loss in market value due to
damage or delay, the decree effectuates Sections 9.006, 9.007, and 9.010,
streamlining the process for winding down the marital estate.
The decree identifies particular obligations during a limited post-
divorce window of time (here, until the completion of the sale of the
assets) and identifies a method of valuing and awarding damages. It
does not, as Rodney contends, confer jurisdiction to a trial court as the

44 Tex. Fam. Code § 9.006(a).

45 Id. § 9.010(a).

13
law forbids. 46 Nor does it cause the decree to be indefinitely
interlocutory. Importantly, the provision links the amount awarded for
enforcement to the damages resulting from the breach as Section
9.010(a) contemplates. 47
C
We turn to the trial court’s enforcement order. The trial court
awarded Debbie “an amount equivalent to 100% of the proceeds from
the sale of the house” as damages for Rodney’s noncompliance. In doing
so, it found that Rodney’s violations of the decree increased the cost of
placing the marital residence and shop on the market, reduced their fair
market value, and resulted in personal property being delivered to the
receiver untimely and in a different condition than it was on the date of
separation. The court did not, however, place a fair market value on the
losses caused by violations of the decree. That is, the trial court made no
findings of actual damages as both the decree and the Family Code
require. The trial court misread the decree by shifting the entire
proceeds from the sale of the residence to Debbie without determining
the reduction in the fair market value to the community estate resulting
from Rodney’s violations of the decree. An “accounting for” that
damage—as the decree provides—necessarily requires valuation of the
damages and the amount by which it reduced Debbie’s allocated share.

46 See Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, 694 S.W.3d at 760 (“We have long

held that parties cannot confer jurisdiction by agreement.”).
47 Tex. Fam. Code § 9.010(a).

14
Per the decree, that is the amount that the trial court may deduct from
Rodney’s share of the sales proceeds. 48
Thus, the trial court’s reallocation of Rodney’s share of the
proceeds from the sale of the home to Debbie without conducting a
damages analysis for his noncompliance does not comport with the
decree nor with Chapter 9. Both require that the amount awarded in an
enforcement order result from violation of the decree. 49

---

Because the trial court failed to determine the amount of damages
resulting from breach of the decree, its award of the entirety of the
proceeds from the sale of the marital home to the aggrieved spouse
exceeded its enforcement authority. Nevertheless, the court of appeals
erred in concluding that the error deprived the trial court of any
jurisdiction to consider the motion to enforce and render a proper
enforcement order. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’
judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

Jane N. Bland
Justice

48 The decree provides that “the fair market value of the property shall

be assessed against that party (normal wear and tear and Act of God,
excepted), and that amount shall be awarded to the other party, and accounted
for out of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence.”
49 See Tex. Fam. Code § 9.010(a).

15
OPINION DELIVERED: January 30, 2026

16