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Feb. 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Jeff Mankoff and Staci Mankoff

Texas Supreme Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-0132
• Judges: Lehrmann

• Disposition: The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and reinstates the trial court's judgment.

• Opinion

• Authorities (16)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (20K)

• PDF

Disposition

The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and reinstates the trial court's judgment.

Lead Opinion

                        by Lehrmann

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0132
══════════

Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange,
Petitioner,

v.

Jeff Mankoff and Staci Mankoff,
Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued September 10, 2025

JUSTICE LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the interpretation of the term “windstorm” in
a homeowners insurance policy and how a tornado fits into that
interpretation. Specifically, the parties dispute whether a policy
deductible applicable to covered losses caused by “Windstorm or Hail,”
which the policy does not define, unambiguously applies to damage
caused by a tornado. We hold that it does. We therefore reverse the
court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court’s summary
judgment for the insurer.
I. Background

In 2019, a tornado damaged the home of Insureds Jeff and Staci
Mankoff. Following the tornado, it “likely” rained for approximately two
minutes. The damaged property was covered by a homeowners
insurance policy issued by Insurer Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal
Exchange. Insureds submitted a claim for damages to their property,
but Insurer paid only a portion of the claim. Explaining that the tornado
qualified as a windstorm, Insurer maintained that the claim was
therefore subject to the policy’s $87,156 “Windstorm or Hail Deductible,”
which provided in relevant part: “In the event of direct physical loss to
property covered under this policy caused directly or indirectly by
windstorm or hail, the Windstorm or Hail deductible listed on your
Declarations is the amount of the covered loss for dwelling, other
structures and contents that you will pay.” (Emphasis omitted.) The
insurance policy does not define “windstorm.”
Insureds sued for breach of contract, alleging that the damage to
their home was not caused by a windstorm and that Insurer breached
the policy by applying the deductible to the amount owed on their claim.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment that turned on
the interpretation of “windstorm.” Insureds argued that “windstorm”
denotes a peril distinct from a tornado, while Insurer maintained that
“windstorm” is a broad term that unambiguously encompasses a
tornado. The trial court granted Insurer’s motion for summary
judgment, denied Insureds’ motion, and rendered a take-nothing
judgment against Insureds.

2
A divided court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for
Insureds. 708 S.W.3d 706, 708 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024). In doing so,
the court concluded that “the ‘Windstorm and Hail Deductible’ is
ambiguous because the term ‘windstorm’ is undefined and subject to
more than one reasonable meaning.” Id. at 716. The court was
persuaded by Insureds’ argument that dictionary definitions, media
coverage, and various statutory provisions indicate that “windstorm”
could mean “a storm with damaging winds that may or may not be
accompanied by precipitation, but [which] does not include a tornado.”
Id. at 711. The court of appeals therefore rejected Insurer’s argument
that the common, ordinary meaning of “windstorm” unambiguously
includes a tornado. It likewise rejected Insurer’s arguments that
various dictionary definitions of the term, as well as a definition
approved by a 1946 court of appeals decision, necessarily encompass a
tornado. Id. at 713–14. After concluding the term “windstorm” was
ambiguous as used in the policy, the court of appeals adopted the
construction of the exclusionary provision favorable to Insureds. Id. at
715–16.
The dissenting justice would have affirmed the trial court’s
summary judgment, concluding that a tornado is unambiguously a
windstorm “subtype.” Id. at 722 (Miskel, J., dissenting). Examining
dictionary definitions of “windstorm,” the dissent noted that “[t]he
consistent thread throughout” the definitions “is that a windstorm is a
storm with violent winds, and a tornado is marked by violent winds.”
Id. Given this plain meaning, the dissent concluded that “it is not
reasonable to deny that a tornado is a kind of windstorm.” Id.

3
Insurer petitioned this Court for review, arguing that the court of
appeals (1) incorrectly held that the term “windstorm” is ambiguous and
(2) created false ambiguity by relying on inappropriate sources to
discern ordinary meaning. We begin by setting out the standard of
review and the legal principles underlying the dispute before we turn to
analyzing the policy’s terms.

II. Standard of Review & Legal Principles

We review summary judgment rulings de novo. Valence
Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). As the parties
do not dispute the facts, we review the cross-motions for summary
judgment by determining the legal question presented. Guynes v.
Galveston County, 861 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex. 1993). On cross-motions
for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of establishing that
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).
“Insurance policies are controlled by rules of interpretation and
construction which are applicable to contracts generally.” Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex.
1995). “When a contract’s meaning is disputed, our primary objective is
to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent as expressed in the
instrument.” URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex.
2018). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Nat’l
Union Fire Ins., 907 S.W.2d at 520.
“In contract law, the terms ‘ambiguous’ and ‘ambiguity’ have a
more specific meaning than merely denoting a lack of clarity in
language.” RSUI Indem. Co. v. Lynd Co., 466 S.W.3d 113, 119 (Tex.
2015). If a written policy “is so worded that it can be given a definite or

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certain legal meaning, then it is not ambiguous.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins.,
907 S.W.2d at 520. But if the language “is subject to two or more
reasonable interpretations, it is ambiguous.” Id.
Should we conclude that the language is ambiguous, “we must
resolve the uncertainty by adopting the construction that most favors
the insured.” RSUI, 466 S.W.3d at 118. As the term at issue here
appears in a limitation on coverage, “we must do so ‘even if the
construction urged by the insurer appears to be more reasonable or a
more accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.’” Id. (quoting Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555
(Tex. 1991)).

III. Analysis

With these principles in mind, we turn to the question of whether
a tornado unambiguously qualifies as a windstorm for purposes of
determining whether the applicable policy’s windstorm deductible
applies. Insurer argues that “windstorm” is not ambiguous given its
plain meaning—a storm with strong and violent wind, which
encompasses a tornado. By contrast, Insureds contend that “windstorm”
is ambiguous because there is more than one reasonable ordinary
meaning of the term, including one that excludes a tornado.
When an insurance policy does not define a term, we give the
“language its plain, ordinary meaning unless something else in the
policy shows the parties intended a different, technical meaning.” See
Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 289 S.W.3d 828, 831 (Tex.
2009). As the policy does not indicate that the parties intended a
technical meaning of the terms to control, “we must give the policy’s

5
words their plain meaning.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v.
Crocker, 246 S.W.3d 603, 606 (Tex. 2008). To do so, “we typically look
first to . . . dictionary definitions and then consider the term’s usage in
other statutes, court decisions, and similar authorities.” Tex. State Bd.
of Exam’rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 511
S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. 2017).
Dictionary definitions of the term “windstorm” are markedly
consistent. Merriam-Webster defines it as “a storm marked by high
wind with little or no precipitation.” 1 The American Heritage Dictionary
similarly defines the term as “[a] storm with high winds or violent gusts
but little or no rain.” 2 Webster’s New World College Dictionary’s
definition is “a storm with a strong wind but little or no rain, hail, etc.,” 3
while the Collins English Dictionary’s comparable definition is “a storm
with heavy wind but little or no precipitation.” 4
The parties emphasize favorable elements of these definitions to
argue that their proposed interpretation of the term controls. Insurer
maintains that the “common theme” is “a storm whose main feature is
strong, violent wind,” which therefore includes a tornado. Insureds, by

1 Windstorm, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/windstorm (last visited Feb. 12, 2026).
2 Windstorm, The AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=windstorm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2026).
3 Windstorm, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (5th ed.

2016).
4 Windstorm, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://
www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/windstorm (last visited
Feb. 12, 2026).

6
contrast, focus on the “little or no precipitation” aspect of the definitions.
Insureds argue that the precipitation language serves a limiting
function to exclude tornadoes, such as the one that damaged their home,
because tornadoes are precipitation events. 5
The common thread running through dictionary definitions of
“windstorm” is a storm with violent, strong winds but little or no
precipitation. See City of Fort Worth v. Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d 176, 184
(Tex. 2022). A tornado falls within these definitional boundaries.
Dictionaries consistently define a “tornado” as a violent and destructive
movement of wind. 6 Indeed, some dictionaries explicitly define a

5 In their briefing, Insureds maintain that because the specific tornado

that damaged their home was followed by two minutes of rain, the tornado did
not qualify as a windstorm. At oral argument, Insureds’ argument shifted.
Counsel instead argued that a tornado is a “categorically different kind of
storm” that cannot meet the “little or no precipitation” element of a windstorm
because “the storm that creates the tornado has heavy precipitation.”
6 See Tornado, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/tornado (last visited Feb. 12, 2026) (“a violent destructive whirling
wind accompanied by a funnel-shaped cloud that progresses in a narrow path
over the land”); see also Tornado, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/
search.html?q=tornado (last visited Feb. 12, 2026) (“[a] violently rotating
column of air extending from a cumulonimbus cloud to the ground, ranging in
width from a few meters to more than a kilometer, with destructive winds up
to 510 kilometers (316 miles) per hour or higher”); Tornado, WEBSTER’S NEW
WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2016) (“a violently whirling column of
air, with wind speeds of about 100 to 300 miles per hour, extending downward
from a cumulonimbus cloud”).

7
tornado as a type of windstorm. 7 These definitions confirm that the key
feature of a tornado is the violent, rotating wind.
Undoubtedly, some tornadoes occur amidst broader weather
events that may not be classified as windstorms because of significant
precipitation. 8 However, the classification of the accompanying weather
event in which a tornado forms has no bearing on whether the tornado
itself is a windstorm. Rather, a tornado is merely one of multiple
elements that may or may not be part of a particular weather event. A
tornado is a windstorm in and of itself, and this is true regardless of
whether it is a subset of a broader storm involving precipitation. Stated
another way, a weather event may not qualify as a windstorm depending
on the amount of precipitation involved, but that has no effect on the
fact that, based on the ordinary meanings of the terms, a tornado is
always a windstorm.

7 See Tornado, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://
www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/tornado (last visited Feb. 12,
2026) (“a localized, violently destructive windstorm occurring over land, esp.
in the Middle West, and characterized by a long, funnel-shaped cloud
extending toward the ground and made visible by condensation and debris”).
8 Insureds additionally assert that a windstorm references “a weather

event with straight-line winds, also known as a ‘derecho,’” which is distinct
from the rotating winds that make up a tornado. No definitions of “windstorm”
distinguish between rotating winds and straight-line winds. And notably,
Merriam-Webster defines “derecho” as “a large fast-moving complex of
thunderstorms with powerful straight-line winds that cause widespread
destruction.” Derecho, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/derecho (last visited Feb. 12, 2026). Despite a derecho’s express
association with thunderstorms, which could certainly be considered events
with precipitation, Insureds maintain that a derecho is a windstorm while
insisting that a tornado, which is not defined in reference to any form of
precipitation, is not.

8
Considering the use of the term “windstorm” in statutes does not
call that conclusion into question. See Tex. State Bd. of Exam’rs of
Marriage & Fam. Therapists, 511 S.W.3d at 35. Neither the Insurance
Code nor the Property Code defines “windstorm” or “tornado.” See
Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Pol. Subdivision
Prop./Cas. Joint Self Ins. Fund, 642 S.W.3d 466, 474–76 (Tex. 2022)
(explaining how several statutes defined the term at issue, as well as
related terms, and therefore provided guidance on ordinary meaning).
Various sections of the Insurance Code and one section of the Property
Code, however, list tornadoes and windstorms separately. Insureds
contend that this indicates an ordinary meaning of “windstorm” that
excludes a tornado. We disagree.
The provisions at issue include broad enumerated terms with
ordinary meanings that encompass accompanying narrower terms. See,
e.g., TEX. INS. CODE § 252.003 (including terms such as “rain,” “tornado,”
and “lightning” in a list that also includes “weather or climatic
conditions”); see also id. §§ 542A.001(2)(C), 1806.102(c)(12)(A); TEX.
PROP. CODE § 92.0562; TEX. INS. CODE art. 5.13(c). We have recognized
that the Legislature may repeat itself for emphasis, see In re City of
Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 336 (Tex. 2001), and nothing in the cited
provisions suggests that the lists confer an ordinary meaning that
categorically excludes the narrower terms from the broader ones, see
EBS Sols., Inc. v. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d 744, 758 (Tex. 2020) (“Normally,
when a term within a statute is susceptible to either a broad or a narrow
meaning, we will presume that the broader meaning of the term is
intended, being sensitive to the term’s context in the statute.”). There

9
is not a narrowing modifier in any of the provisions to indicate that the
Legislature understood “windstorm” to exclude a tornado. See generally
Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518
S.W.3d 318, 328 (Tex. 2017). We therefore do not find the usage of
“windstorm” in the Insurance and Property Code provisions instructive
in elucidating the ordinary meaning of the term.
Nor do court decisions indicate a different meaning. See Tex.
State Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists, 511 S.W.3d at 35.
No Texas court has determined the ordinary meaning of “windstorm” as
a matter of law. Insureds argue that in Landmark American Insurance
Co. v. SCD Memorial Place, L.L.C., 25 F.4th 283 (5th Cir. 2022), the
Fifth Circuit concluded that a windstorm was distinct from other perils.
At issue in Landmark was whether an insurance policy, which referred
to “Perils Covered: Windstorm or Hail associated with a Named Storm,”
covered flood damage suffered during Hurricane Harvey. Id. at 287.
The court’s analysis was context-specific, and it did not address the
ordinary meaning of “windstorm.” Rather, it held that the term referred
to one of the specific perils covered in the policy at issue and rejected the
argument that because Hurricane Harvey was a windstorm, the policy
covered all perils associated with it. Id. Further, the court did not
conclude that a windstorm was a distinct storm from other perils;
rather, it held that a windstorm was one of several perils that might
exist within a given storm. See id.
Insurer, on the other hand, contends that Fireman’s Insurance
Co. v. Weatherman, 193 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1946, writ
ref’d n.r.e.), confirms that the ordinary meaning of “windstorm”

10
encompasses a tornado. In Weatherman, an insurance company
appealed an adverse judgment in which the insured sought to recover
for damage to his car caused by a windstorm. The trial court submitted
the definition of “windstorm” to the jury as “something more than an
ordinary gust of wind, no matter how prolonged, and though the
whirling features which usually accompany tornadoes and cyclones need
not be present, it must assume the aspect of a storm.” Id. at 248. The
insurer objected to the definition, but the court of appeals concluded that
the definition was sufficient to “bring it within the policy sued upon.”
Id. at 249. In so holding, the court examined case law from other
jurisdictions and noted that “it seems to be immaterial to a recovery
under this character of policy whether there was much, little or no
rainfall.” Id. at 248. Like Landmark, Weatherman did not specifically
address the ordinary meaning of “windstorm”; however, by defining it in
the jury charge as “more than an ordinary gust of wind, however
prolonged . . . [that] may or may not have the whirling features of a
cyclone or tornado,” the court necessarily concluded that a tornado
qualifies as a windstorm. Id. at 248–49.
Several courts, including the Landmark court, have favorably
cited Weatherman’s definition of “windstorm.” See, e.g., Landmark, 25
F.4th at 288; Emps.’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Howsley, 432 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 1968, no writ); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pittser, 399 S.W.2d
901, 904 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.). This provides
guidance that courts and parties over the years have viewed tornadoes
as windstorms.

11
Insureds also point to other sources to support their contention
that “windstorm” has an ordinary meaning that excludes a tornado.
These include media coverage of weather events, the Encyclopedia
Britannica, a meteorologist’s expert opinion, and the American
Meteorological Society’s Glossary of Terms. 9 Assuming that these
sources could be properly considered in evaluating ordinary meaning,
none of them support an ordinary meaning of “windstorm” that excludes
a tornado.
First, Insureds cite various media excerpts to argue that a
windstorm, in common parlance, is a type of storm with straight-line
winds that is therefore distinct from a tornado. However, the examples
in these excerpts are consistent with the common thread running
through the dictionary definitions of “windstorm” as a storm with
violent, strong winds but little or no precipitation. Additionally, none of
the media excerpts maintain or suggest any definitional distinction
between windstorms and tornadoes.
The Encyclopedia Britannica entry for “windstorm,” on which
Insureds also rely, provides: “a wind that is strong enough to cause at
least light damage to trees and buildings and may or may not be
accompanied by precipitation.” 10 This portion of the entry is similarly
consistent with the common thread identified above. However, the entry

9 Insureds also cite information about “damaging winds” provided by

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. This information does
not reference the term “windstorm” and is therefore not helpful in determining
the ordinary meaning of the term.
10 Windstorm, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.
com/science/windstorm (last visited Feb. 12, 2026).

12
continues by detailing additional information about typical windstorm
attributes, such as wind speeds exceeding thirty-four miles per hour. At
this point, the entry explains that tornadoes and tropical cyclones “are
usually classified separately.” As the Encyclopedia Britannica entry
recognizes, not all windstorms are tornadoes, and the separate
classification of “tornado” allows people to refer to the more specific term
when applicable. See 708 S.W.3d at 722 (Miskel, J., dissenting). The
separate classification, however, fails to confer an ordinary meaning of
“windstorm” as a storm with damaging winds that does not include a
tornado.
Finally, Insureds’ expert meteorologist maintained that there is
a meteorologically significant distinction between a windstorm and a
tornado, such that a tornado is its own distinct event, separate from any
wind event. For support, the meteorologist cited the American
Meteorological Society’s Glossary of Terms, which defines “windstorm”
as “[a] storm in which winds (that could be damaging) are its most
impactful or distinctive aspect. Windstorms may be accompanied by
precipitation (e.g., during a downburst or derecho) or not (e.g., during a
duststorm . . . .).” 11 As Insureds are not parties who agreed to a
technical meteorological meaning controlling the undefined term, the
expert’s opinion provides little guidance, if any, in determining ordinary
meaning. See generally Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 568 S.W.3d
650, 657 (Tex. 2019). But even considering the opinion, the Glossary’s

11 Windstorm, AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY, https://glossary.

ametsoc.org/wiki/Windstorm (last visited Feb. 12, 2026).

13
supporting definition of “windstorm” is consistent with the thread
identified across common dictionaries and does not exclude a tornado.
As explained, the fact that a windstorm and a tornado can be
distinct events has no bearing on whether a tornado is included within
the broader term “windstorm.” Moreover, none of the authorities cited
by Insureds indicate that a tornado is not a windstorm in and of itself.
To the contrary, all authorities indicate the obvious: not all windstorms
contain tornadoes, but all tornadoes are windstorms, regardless of
whether the broader weather event includes precipitation.
Having considered the dictionary definitions of “windstorm,” as
well as the term’s usage in other statutes and case decisions, we hold
that the common, ordinary meaning of “windstorm” in an insurance
policy unambiguously includes a tornado. The damage to Insureds’
property was caused by a tornado, which is a type of windstorm.
Therefore, Insureds’ claim was subject to the policy’s “Windstorm or
Hail” deductible.

IV. Conclusion

We hold that the term “windstorm,” when undefined in a
homeowners insurance policy, is not ambiguous and that its ordinary
meaning encompasses a tornado. Accordingly, the trial court correctly
granted summary judgment for Insurer on the ground that Insureds’
covered claim is subject to the “Windstorm or Hail” deductible in their
homeowners policy. We therefore reverse the court of appeals’ judgment
and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.

14
Debra H. Lehrmann
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: February 13, 2026

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