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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State ex rel. Patterson v. Starn

Ohio Supreme Court

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 627

• Docket Number: 2025-1014

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.4K)

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Syllabus

Mandamus—Appellant's complaint makes clear that he did not lack an adequate remedy in ordinary course of law to challenge trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct judgment of conviction without holding second resentencing hearing—State ex rel. Hess v. Kessler distinguished—Court of appeals' dismissal of complaint affirmed.

Combined Opinion

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Patterson v. Starn, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-627.]

NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-627
THE STATE EX REL . PATTERSON, APPELLANT , v. STARN, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as State ex rel. Patterson v. Starn, Slip Opinion No.
2026-Ohio-627.]
Mandamus—Appellant’s complaint makes clear that he did not lack an adequate
remedy in ordinary course of law to challenge trial court’s dismissal of his
motion to correct judgment of conviction without holding second
resentencing hearing—State ex rel. Hess v. Kessler distinguished—Court
of appeals’ dismissal of complaint affirmed.
(No. 2025-1014—Submitted November 18, 2025—Decided February 26, 2026.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hancock County, No. 5-25-05.

The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Cornelius Patterson Jr., appeals the judgment of the Third
District Court of Appeals dismissing his complaint for a writ of mandamus against
appellee, Judge Jonathan P. Starn of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas.
Patterson requested a writ compelling Judge Starn to comply with a mandate issued
by the Third District in a separate proceeding in 2020. Judge Starn moved to
dismiss Patterson’s complaint, and the Third District granted that motion,
concluding that Patterson had possessed an adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of the law and that his mandamus claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
{¶ 2} Because the Third District correctly determined that Patterson had
possessed an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, we affirm its
judgment dismissing his complaint for a writ of mandamus.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Patterson’s convictions and subsequent proceedings
{¶ 3} In 2011, Patterson was convicted of four felonies in the Hancock
County Court of Common Pleas and was sentenced to a maximum term of life in
prison. In 2019, he filed in the trial court a pro se motion seeking to correct the
judgment, which he argued was void for failing to include proper notification of
postrelease control. The court granted Patterson’s motion, held a resentencing
hearing, and journalized a judgment correcting the postrelease-control notification.
{¶ 4} Patterson nevertheless appealed, arguing that the trial court had
violated his constitutional rights in the course of resentencing when it denied his
request “to consult with counsel” regarding the postrelease-control sanction. The
Third District agreed that the trial court had infringed Patterson’s right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, reversed the
judgment, and remanded the matter to the trial court. State v. Patterson, 2020-
Ohio-1437, ¶ 19-21 (3d Dist.) (“Patterson I”). On remand, the trial court scheduled

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January Term, 2026

the matter for another resentencing hearing and permitted Patterson to be
represented by appellate counsel.
{¶ 5} While the matter was still pending on remand and before the trial court
held the second resentencing hearing, we issued our decision in State v. Harper,
2020-Ohio-2913. In Harper, we held that an error in the imposition of postrelease
control renders a judgment merely voidable, rather than void, and we explained that
a claim asserting such an error—like other sentencing claims—is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata if not raised by timely objection on direct appeal of the
sentence. Id. at ¶ 40-41.
{¶ 6} On the authority of Harper, the trial court sua sponte dismissed
Patterson’s motion to correct the judgment without holding the second resentencing
hearing. Patterson again appealed, arguing that the trial court had violated the law-
of-the-case doctrine and failed to obey the Third District’s mandate by refusing to
hold the second resentencing hearing as scheduled. The Third District rejected
Patterson’s argument, holding that the trial court had complied with the remand
order and that even if the trial court had erred in refusing to hold the second
resentencing hearing, it was in any event bound to follow Harper. State v.
Patterson, 2021-Ohio-1237, ¶ 20-22 (3d Dist.) (“Patterson II”).
B. Patterson’s request for a writ of mandamus
{¶ 7} Patterson filed this action on February 19, 2025, naming Judge Starn
as respondent and asking the Third District to grant a writ of mandamus compelling
Judge Starn to comply with the Third District’s mandate in Patterson I by holding
a second resentencing hearing and affording Patterson counsel at that hearing.
Judge Starn moved to dismiss Patterson’s complaint, arguing that the Third District
had already determined that the trial court complied with Patterson I and that
Patterson had both possessed and exercised an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law by appealing the trial court’s postremand dismissal.

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 8} The Third District dismissed Patterson’s mandamus action, reasoning
that he had possessed an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law in that
he could have asserted the postrelease-control error when directly appealing his
convictions and, further, that his request for a writ of mandamus was barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
{¶ 9} Patterson now appeals to this court as of right.
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 10} A motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is “procedural and tests
the sufficiency of the complaint.” State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of
Commrs., 1992-Ohio-73, ¶ 9. The allegations in the complaint must be taken as
true, reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, and the
motion may be granted only if it appears “‘beyond doubt from the complaint that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery.’” Id., quoting
O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975),
syllabus. We review de novo a decision granting a motion to dismiss under Civ.R.
12(B)(6). State ex rel. Sands v. Coulson, 2021-Ohio-671, ¶ 6.
{¶ 11} To be entitled to the requested writ of mandamus, Patterson must
establish (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the
part of Judge Starn to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law. State ex. rel. Husted v. Brunner, 2009-Ohio-4805, ¶ 11.
As explained below, because Patterson’s complaint makes clear that he did not lack
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, we affirm the Third District’s
dismissal of the complaint.
{¶ 12} The availability of direct appeal generally constitutes an adequate
remedy that will preclude extraordinary relief in mandamus, even if an appeal is
not taken. See State ex rel. Schneider v. N. Olmsted City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,
1992-Ohio-126, ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Cartmell v. Dorrian, 11 Ohio St.3d 177,
178 (1984) (“‘The fact that [the] appellant failed to timely pursue his right of appeal

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January Term, 2026

does not make that remedy inadequate.’”). Therefore, a party who actually
exercises the remedy of appeal may not later seek mandamus relief, even if that
appeal was unsuccessful. State ex rel. Nichols v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Mental
Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 1995-Ohio-215, ¶ 17, quoting State ex rel. Inland
Properties Co. v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals, 151 Ohio St. 174, 176 (1949)
(“‘Where a plain and adequate remedy at law has been unsuccessfully invoked, the
extraordinary writ of mandamus will not lie either to relitigate the same question or
as a substitute for appeal.”’).
{¶ 13} In this mandamus action, Patterson seeks an order compelling Judge
Starn to comply with the court of appeals’ mandate in Patterson I. In his complaint,
however, Patterson explicitly alleges that he directly appealed the trial court’s
dismissal, seeking the same relief he now attempts to secure in mandamus. Thus,
he possessed an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law; the fact that
Patterson II was decided unfavorably to Patterson does not affect the adequacy of
that remedy, Nichols at ¶ 17.
{¶ 14} Patterson’s argument to the contrary lacks merit. He points to State
ex rel. Heck v. Kessler, 1995-Ohio-304, for the proposition that appeal is not an
adequate remedy when a lower court has refused to follow a superior court’s
mandate. This argument fails, however, because “the use of a writ of mandamus to
enforce such a mandate ‘is reserved for extreme cases of direct disobedience,’”
State ex rel. Simmons v. Breaux, 2020-Ohio-3251, ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. Cowan
v. Gallagher, 2018-Ohio-1463, ¶ 12. Patterson’s complaint alleges no such direct
disobedience.
{¶ 15} Indeed, Heck is easily distinguished from this case. In Heck, the
respondent trial-court judge twice dismissed a criminal charge of ethnic
intimidation on the grounds that the statute defining that offense was
unconstitutional—the second time after this court declared the statute constitutional
and remanded the case for a new trial. Heck at ¶ 1-5. The State appealed the

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

postremand dismissal, but it also filed an extraordinary-writ action in this court,
and the court of appeals stayed the appeal pending resolution of the writ action. Id.
at ¶ 5-6. This court held in the writ case that the availability of interlocutory appeal
did not preclude relief in mandamus, because holding otherwise “might lead to the
result of a lower court perpetually refusing a superior court’s mandate, necessitating
repeated, ineffective appeals.” Id. at ¶ 14. That is, a mandamus action was “‘the
only means available to . . . put teeth into’” the superior court’s mandate. Id. at ¶
13, quoting Hewitt v. Ryan, 356 N.W.2d 230, 234 (Iowa 1984).
{¶ 16} In contrast, here, Patterson timely appealed the trial court’s
dismissal, and the Third District held that, although the trial court ultimately
dismissed the matter before holding the second resentencing hearing, the trial court
had complied with the Third District’s mandate in Patterson I by scheduling the
hearing and permitting Patterson to be represented. Patterson II, 2021-Ohio-1237,
at ¶ 19 (3d Dist.) (“we conclude that the trial court had complied with our remand
order”). Thus, Patterson’s complaint does not raise the specter of “repeated,
ineffective appeals” that led us in Heck to hold that appeal in that case would not
be a “complete . . . , beneficial and speedy” remedy, Heck at ¶ 13-14; see also
Simmons at ¶ 17 (affirming dismissal of mandamus petition when the trial court had
“not disobey[ed] any mandate”).
{¶ 17} Because the facts alleged in Patterson’s complaint show as a matter
of law that he is not entitled to a writ of mandamus, the Third District did not err in
dismissing the complaint. Patterson possessed an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law to challenge the action from which he now seeks extraordinary
relief, and he may not now use a mandamus action “‘as a substitute for an otherwise
barred second appeal or to gain successive appellate reviews of the same issue,’”
State ex rel. Peoples v. Johnson, 2017-Ohio-9140, ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. LTV
Steel Co. v. Gwin, 1992-Ohio-20, ¶ 15. Because the judgment may be affirmed on

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January Term, 2026

this basis alone, we need not consider whether the Third District’s dismissal on the
alternative basis of res judicata was proper.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 18} For these reasons, we affirm the Third District Court of Appeals’
judgment dismissing Patterson’s complaint.
Judgment affirmed.

Cornelius Patterson Jr., pro se.
Montgomery Johnson, L.L.C., and Cooper D. Bowen, for appellee.

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