Woodhouse v. State Bar - Vexatious Litigant Finding Affirmed

Filed 2/27/ 26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELL ATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT BENJAMIN WOOD HOUSE, Plaintiff and A ppellant, v. THE STATE BAR O F CALIFORNIA ET A L., Defendants and Respondents. B346662 Los Angeles Cou nty Super. Ct. No. 25STCV02208 APPEAL from an or der of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert B. Broadbel t, Judge. Affirmed. Benjamin Woodhou se in pro. per. for Pl aintiff and Appellant. Office of Genera l Counsel of the St ate Bar of California, Ellin Davtyan, Kirsten Gall er and Raymond R. Rolla n for Defendant and Resp ondent the State Ba r of California.

2 Gibson Dunn & Cru tcher, Kristin A. Lin sley and Austin Schwing for Defend ants and Responden ts Meta Platforms, I nc. and Nike, Inc. Davis Wright Trem aine and Dan Laid man for Defend ant and Respondent Wa rner Bros. Discover y, Inc. Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & R osati, Matthew R. Reed and John B. Kenney for Defendant and Respondent A lphabet, Inc. __________________ __ The trial court rule d Benjamin Woodho use is a vexatious litigant. We affirm this finding. W e hold that, as a m atter of law, Woodhouse’s co mplaint in this case asserts facts th at are delusional: his suit has no possibility of success. We likewise affirm the trial cour t orders barring Wo odhouse from future self- represented suits that lack pre -filing approval a nd posted security. Undesign ated citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure. I Woodhouse holds hi mself out as the ow ner and principal of a company called H avensight Capital L LC. Woodhouse is an attorney. His Califo rnia bar number is 261361. In 2024, th e State Bar of Califor nia, which Woodhou se made a defendant in this action, plac ed h im on involuntary i nactive status, mea ning Woodhouse cannot practice law until th is status changes. I n addition to the State Bar, the respo ndents in thi s action are Meta Platforms Inc., Alph abet, Inc., Nike, Inc., and Warner Bros. Discovery Inc. A To summarize, Woo dhouse filed many l awsuits before his complaint in this ca se. All his earlier s uits were dismissed and all his past ap peals failed. Woodhouse and his company

3 Havensight have be en declared vexatio us litigants by the Central District of Calif ornia and the Sout hern District of New York, with the latter issuing a nationwide injuncti on prohibiting them from filing new cases in federal co urt without (1) pre -fil ing approval and (2) the posting of security. Many j udges have referred Woodhouse to the S tate Bar of Californi a. We recount the relevant his tory in more detail. It began in 2014 in federal cour t. Woodhouse filed his first complaint t hat year on behalf of his company Havensig ht against Nike in the Central District of California. (Havens ight Capital LLC v. Nike, Inc. (C.D.Cal., Sep. 12, 2014 2:14- CV - 07153) 2014 W L 4637513.) Woodhouse alleged the “Nike FC” bran d logo infringed a logo for a Havensight- owne d soccer brand “St. Thomas FC.” (Ibid.) The court dismissed the case. (H avensight Capital L LC v. Nike, Inc. (C. D.Cal., Nov. 19, 2014, CV 14 – 715 3 – R) 2014 WL 1 2613382.) In a later case, the cou rt recounted a serie s of frivolous reques ts and other actions by Wo odhouse that prolon ged the proceedings in the initial case, harasse d Nike, and burdene d the court — including serial requests for d efault after Nike ha d timely moved to dismiss, a writ of ex ecution falsely claiming a j udgment of almost $250 million in favo r of Havensight, an d a series of “post - dismissal motions, a pplications, and requests for default judgment.” (Havens ight Capital LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (C.D.Cal. Sept. 24, 2018, CV 17 -6727 FMO (MRWx)) 2018 WL 6340757.) The court struck or denied all of Woodh ouse’s requests. (Ibid.) The day after t hat case was dismi ssed, Woodhouse, representing Havensight, file d a different action against Nike in the Central District of California, allegi ng antitrust violatio ns and tortious interfer ence in the sale of s occer gear. (Hav ensight Capital LLC v. Nike, Inc. (C.D.Cal., Nov. 20, 2014, CV 14- 8985)

4 2014 WL 654277 6.) The court dismisse d that action. (Havensight Capital LLC v. Nike, Inc. (C.D.Cal., Feb. 18, 2015, No. CV 14 – 8985 – R) 2015 WL 99 3334.) The court declared Havensight to be a vexatious litigant and barre d it from filing any new action in the Central Distr ict of Californi a “that ari ses from or relates to Havensigh t Capital LLC a nd i ts brand ‘St Thomas F.C.’ again st Nike, Inc.” (H avensight Capital L LC v. Nike, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2015, CV 14 – 715 3 – R, CV 14 – 8 985 – R) 2015 WL 35441 11.) A different Central District of California judge d enied Havensight’s motio ns to disqualify an e arlier judge and to s eek reconsideration. (H avensight Capital L LC v. Nike, Inc. (C. D.Cal. Mar. 31, 2015) 2:1 4- CV -07153-R, Dkt. 110.) The court turned the matter over to the S tate Bar of Californi a “for whatever acti on that body deems ap propriate.” (Ibi d.) In May 2015, Haven sight filed a complaint again st Facebook (now Met a) in the Central Di strict of California, seeking hundreds of millions of dollars f or alleged overcharg es on seven “pay - per - click ” Facebook ads. (Havensight Capital, LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (C.D. Cal., June 5, 2015, CV 15 – 3758 FMO) 2015 WL 12819160.) T he court dismissed the case. (H avensight Capital, LLC v. Fac ebook, Inc. (C.D.Cal., June 29, 2015, CV 15 – 3758 FMO) 2015 W L 3948380.) The court warne d that, had it not dismissed the case, i t wou ld have issued an order to show ca use whether Havensigh t should be decl ared a vexatious li tigant. (Ibid.) Woodhouse filed a si milar complaint aga inst Google Inc., now known as Alph abet Inc., in the Cen tral District of California. (Havensight Capital LLC v. Google, Inc. (C.D.Cal., July 15, 2015, 2:15 - CV -05297-PS G, Dkt. 1).) The court dismissed the complaint.

5 (Id., Dkt. 31.) Wood house filed an ex pa rte application to reopen the case, to disquali fy the judge, and to enter a default judg ment against Googl e. (Id., Dkt. 32.) Th e district court denied that motion and admonis hed Woodhouse that future “misuse of e x parte applications w ill be sanctioned.” (Id., Dkt. 35.) Woodhouse filed a si milar complaint on Havensight’s behalf against Faceb ook in California state court. In Ma rch 2016, the court sustained Facebook’s demurrer, explaining Havensig ht had not stated a cause of action. (Havensigh t Capital LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (Cal. Super., Jan. 1, 201 6, CIV537307) 201 6 WL 4445919.) Woodho use filed an amended complaint. Faceboo k again demurre d, and a different jud ge sustained the demur rer without leave to am end. (Havensigh t Capital, LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (Cal.Super., Ju ne 16, 2016, CIV53 7307) 2016 WL 441 0551.) The Court of Ap peal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review. (Havensight Capit al LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (Apr. 27, 2017, A1 49366) [nonpub. opn. ], review den. July 1 2, 2017, S241716).) After the Supreme Court’s ruling, Havensight fil ed a third action against Face book — now back in t he Central District of California. (Havens ight Capital LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (C.D.Cal., Sept. 13, 2017, No. 2:17 - cv - 06727) 2017 WL 40 61961.) The court dismissed Havensig ht’s complaint, declared Ha vensight a vexatious litigant, a nd ordered Woodho use to pay $71,269.8 9 in attorneys’ fees and expenses. (Hav ensight Capital LL C v. Facebook, Inc., (C.D.Cal., Sept. 13, 201 8, 2:17- cv -067 27) 2018 WL 6340757; Havensigh t Capital, LLC v. Fa cebook, Inc. (C. D.Cal., Nov. 9, 2018, 2:17 - cv -06727, Dkt. 59).)

6 The Ninth Circu it affirmed. (Havensight Capit al LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2019, No. 18-56304) 776 Fed.Appx. 420.) In August 2021, Woodhouse f iled an action against “Nike, Facebook, their cou nsel Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Alphabet, Inc., the United States Gover nment, the Chief Justice of the United States, and a number of federal judges in this d istrict and the Ninth Circuit” a lleging, as the distri ct court described it, “a stream of nonsensic al and imagined all egations — including accusations of gover nment torture and a ssassination attempts.” (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (C.D.Cal., Nov. 24, 2021, No. 2:21 - cv - 06372) 2021 WL 6 333468.) The court d ismissed that case i n November 2021. (I bid.) The c ourt found that W oodhouse and Havensight were alt er egos of, and were in privity with, one another: the vexati ous litigant orders a pplied to Woodhous e. (Ibid.) The court he ld Woodhouse in con tempt for violating t hose orders and for failin g to pay sanctions. (Ibid.) The court referred Woodhouse to the S tate Bar. (Ibid.) The Ninth Circu it affirmed. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (9th Cir., May 23, 2023, No. 22 - 55045) 2023 WL 3600032.) While the Ninth Circuit appeal w as pending, Woodhouse and Havensight file d another complaint in the Central Dist rict of California — again w ithout complying wi th the orders imposing pre -filing conditions and without paying any of the previousl y- imposed sanct ions. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (C.D.Cal., Jan. 5, 2022, 2:22- CV -00079) 2022 WL 5 9509, Dkt. 1.) The complaint asserted conspiracy and judicial corrupti on claims against N ike, Meta, Alphabet, an d several federal jud ges and attorneys w ith the U.S. Attorney’ s Office who had r epresented the gov ernment defendants in the ea rlier actions. (Ibid.) The court dismisse d the

7 defendants from the case. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (C.D.Cal. 2:22 - CV -00079) Dk t. 64.) It referre d Woodhouse to the State Bar and the Centra l District’s Standin g Committee on Discipline. (Id., Dkt. 93.) It iss ued a vexatious litigant order protecting Alphabet from furth er suits. (Wood house v. U.S. Gov’t (C.D.Cal., June 10, 2022, 2:2 2 - CV -000 79) 2022 WL 2232521.) The Ninth Circu it affirmed. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (9th Cir., May 23, 2023, No. 22 - 55598) 2023 WL 3600024.) In January 2022, W oodhouse filed anot her complaint in the Central District of California. (Woodh ouse v. U.S. Gov’t. (C.D.Cal., Jan. 27, 2022, No. 2:22 - CV -00285) Dk t. 21.) He alleged obstruction, fraud, a nd conspiracy, and named as defendant s Nike, Meta, Alphab et, and others. (Ibid.) The co urt struck Woodhouse’s claims against Nike and M eta. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (C.D.Cal. Mar. 2, 2022, No. 2:22- CV -00285) Dkt. 52.) The court dismissed the remainin g claims against Alphabet. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (C.D.Cal., Ma y 2, 2022, 2:22- cv - 00285) 2022 WL 140565 9.) The Ninth Circu it affirmed. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (9th Cir., May 23, 2023, No. 22 - 55636) 2023 WL 3600025.) Woodhouse filed a n ew complaint, now in the District of Columbia, against Nike, Meta, Alphab et, and other defend ants. (Woodhouse v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (D.D.C., July 3, 2023, N o. 1:23 - CV -01924) Dk t. 1.) That court dismissed the complai nt sua sponte. (Woodhouse v. Meta Platforms, I nc. (D.D.C., Jul y 13, 2023, No. 23- cv -01 924) 2023 WL 4531 827.) It ruled th e allegations in Woodhouse’s compla int rest “on th e kind of fantastic and delusi onal claims that wa rrant dismissal sua sponte.” (Ibid.) Spe cifically, Woodh ouse alleged the defenda nts “operated a ‘genocid e hotel’ in Pismo Be ach, CA.” (Ibid.)

8 Woodhouse also alle ged the defendants sent commandos to assassinate hi m on his property. (Ibid.) The D.C. Circui t affirmed. (W oodhouse v. Meta P latforms Inc. (D.C. Cir., Oct. 30, 2023, No. 23-5 188) 2023 WL 72682 55.) “The district court c orrectly conclude d that [Woodhouse ’s] complaint, which la cked an arguable ba sis either in law or in fact, was frivolous.” (Ibid.) In August 2023, a m onth after the district court’s dismis sal in the District of Col umbia case, W oodhouse filed an act ion in the Southern District of New York agai nst Nike, Meta, Alphabet, and other defendants, ra ising claims that “a ppear[ed] to mirror, or are similar to, the o nes asserted in his previous action in the District Court fo r the District of Col umbia.” (See Woodhouse v. Meta Platforms Inc. (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 8, 2 023, No. 23 Civ. 7000) 2023 WL 593903 6.) The District Court recounted allegation s tha t included Woodh ouse’s claims abo ut a genocide hotel. (Ibid.) The district court sua sp onte dismissed that complaint with prej udice. (Ibid..) It issued a n ationwide injunctio n prohibiting Wood house and any comp any he owns and cont rols from filin g any new federal court action relating to the same allegations absent leave of court and complia nce with pre-fili ng conditions. (Woo dhouse v. Meta Platforms Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 70 4 F.Supp.3d 502, 521.) The court noted tha t, were Woodhouse t o start filing simi lar suits in California state c ourt, that developm ent “would fact ually support the impositi on of [a] filing injun ction running to all courts in the nation —state as well as federal.” (Id. at p. 520, fn. 15.) “Should Woodh ouse direct his vexa tious litigation to st ate courts,” the court cautioned, “an appropriate court” might fi nd cause “for entry … o f an injunction reac hing state courts.” (Ibid.)

9 The Second Circuit affirmed. (Woo dhouse v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (2d Cir., Sept. 26, 2024, 23-797 3-cv) 2024 WL 4297471.) It noted Woodhouse’s co mplaint set “forth no fac ts that suggested such acts were remotely plaus ible.” (Ibid.) “ Simply put, the district cou rt did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Woodhouse’s al legations were and are irrational, and f ell solidly in the realm of fantasy or delusio n.” (Ibid.) “Wo odhouse had a history of filin g frivolous lawsuits, at least one of which alleged the sa me ‘genocide hotel’ conspir acy and was also dismissed as frivolo us.” (Ibid.) “[F]aili ng to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before a sua sponte di smissal” is bad practice in some con texts and reversible error in others, but in this case there was no error. (Ibid.) “Although Woodho use was not given notice her e that his allegations were vu lnerable to dismissal, his patter n of prior litigation would ha ve informed him that these kinds of c laims were defective.” (Ibid.) B We describe Woodhouse’s co mplaint in this case. As a self -represente d litigant, Woodhou se filed a 53-p age complaint in the su perior court on Janu ary 27, 2025. In his complaint, Woodhou se listed his address as in Pismo Beach, California. The factual alle gations are diverse but inclu de themes that recur in Woodhouse’s papers. We limit our description to five t hemes: (1) decapitations; (2) genocide hotel; (3) attacks on Wood house; (4) actress K ate Bosworth; and (5) incineration of the Honorable Carl os Bea of the Ninth Circuit. In what follows, we excerpt portions of Woodhouse’s allegations. W e excerpt extensivel y to convey th e nature and persistence of Wood house’s themes. We note Woodhouse often uses the terms “Con flicted Parties,” “Conflicted C ounsel,” and

10 “Triply Conflicted C ounsel.” Woodh ouse also refers to “Counsel Not of Record.” He does not define these terms. 1. Decapitations. There are many decapitations in the world Woodhous e perceives. “Confl icted parties” hav e decapitated “female fellow California Ba r Members.” Woodh ouse “actually had to wa tch [his] colleagu es be decapitated. ” “9th Circuit Judge Miller. . . also witne ssed Ms. Bosworth, and Ms. Fernandez Beshore be decapitated, he d id nothing to stop it. . ..” “It is also questiona ble for National pre ss to be engaging in felonious conduct, in order to participate in genocide. The Leaders of the Natio nal Press need to re flect, why our Feder al Judges, and N ational press Memb ers, would te mporarily lapse into genocide move ments, and wh at kind of mental is sues, would cause a Member of t he National Press, t o support an elderly lady, who is helping to de capi tate and r aping minors, as a re sult of mental illness, after failing to write her name, at the State Court level. There has to be a higher lev el of discipline, and higher level of accountabili ty from U.S. Leader s. They need t o stop taking bribes, and t hi nk beyond sec ond grade rhetoric, and never again uphold t he decapitations of minor and wo men, off of six red flagged cases.” “As the 2,000 assassinat ion attempts were n ot successful, Counsel Not of Record, did n ot resolve the matte rs, and improve chance o f life for the Leade rs of his Clients, instead he commenced deca pitating defenseless females, who were f ellow members of the Cali fornia Bar, and colle agues of Woodhouse. Ms. Michelle Fernandez Bes hore, and Ms. Heather Baker Dobbs, were, both decapitat ed i n front of Wo odhouse . . . Comi ng to my house, decapitating women, putting on torture sho ws, and aggrandizing those who have plead felo nies, and conflicts, is more than any one huma n being’s patience c an endure.” “Woodhouse

11 had offered notice in writing to the U.S. Attorney s, earlier that week, to extract [Ka te Bosworth], af ter Woodhouse’s col leagues had been decapitate d by Gibson Dunn Inc.” 2. Genocide hotel. Woodhouse alle ges there is a genocide hotel “across the str eet from me” in Pismo Beac h. “The genocide hotel remains open, and the Counsel Not of Recor d, who is an enemy combatant, c ontinues to yell slur s throughout the ni ght with Judge Miller, d espite W oodhou se’s testimony in p erson, in the 2nd Circuit.” “A s there have been n o detentions, Woodh ouse is unsure if People a re still dying in the genocide hotel, he is sure that Counsel Not of Record, is still yelli ng slurs in the midd le of t he night, and maki ng assertions of felonious mi srepresentation of resolutions, regar ding the genocide m atters, at hand. Additionally, the 2nd Circuit has followed this act up, in upholding genocide, terrorism, infanticide, the d ecapitations of women and minors, and ending conflict checks and Court admissions, after W oodhouse testified i n the 2nd Circuit to watching Linsley ha nd off and part icipate in the sodom ization and decapitation of a minor, after Wood house’s comely female colleagues, and Ms. Kate Bosworth, had already been decapi tated in the same hotel, w hich Woodhouse also witnessed an d testified to.” “None of these acts, brought genoci de hotel to closure a nd default. Instead, a 9th Circuit Judge, Judge Mill er, took up illegal residence in t he genoc ide hot el, commenced slee ping with Alphabet Inc.’s Cou nsel, and upheld the most felonies, conflicts, violations, and red f lagged cases, in U.S. legal hi story, after Judge Bea was inci nerated.” “Further, such behavior, could be an explanatio n as to why C.N.N. would have pu blished photos of an imposter of Ms. Bosworth, a few day s, after Woodhouse filed into the federal reco rd, watching her being decapitated by

12 Seminole Cell, and Counsel Not of Reco rd, in the genocide h otel, across from his hous e. This event, came after Woodhouse or dered U.S. Attorneys of Re cord, in writing, to extract Bosworth immediately from t he hotel, and even o ffered to do it himse lf.” 3. Attacks aimed at Woodhouse. “[T] he Conflicted Part ies attempted to execut e Woodhouse, on his property, in over 2, 000 assassination attempts. The Confli cted Parties u sed contractors to begin with, then Meta Platforms Lea ders paid $50MM U.S. to the Yakuza for hits, and then Nike paid Seminole cell simila r amounts for hits, an d eventually, Russia n dissidents, and then Russian and Moldov an soldiers would also be hired, to kill Woodhouse.” “The Conflicted Parties h ave funded the espi onage and terrorism dis cussed below, which is racketeering via operation of law, as any act, intended to terrorize U.S. citize ns, would surmount to racketeering. T hese acts, here, inclu de, but are not limited to, mass decapitations, over 2,0 00 assassination attempts, funding of foreign national ar mies, impeaching testimony with doct ored evidence, and b ribing of the Trial Counsel, via organiz ed criminals.” “In this matter, we have multiple singular ac ts, with every one of the 2,000 assassin ation attempts, and every decapitation of a w omen or minor, bein g a singular act of terro rism, notwithstandi ng the coup de gras, of the financing of the Russian and Moldov an troops.” 4. Kate Bosworth. “After failing to assa ssinate Woodhouse, the Conflicted Parti es commenced d ecapitating women and minors. Woodhouse witnessed two fema le colleagues execut ed, Ms. Bosworth, the most fa mous actress in the world, one m inor, and one 2nd Ci rcuit Clerk decapi tated.” “Shortly, thereafter, after hearing Kate Bosworth’s voice, W oodhouse requested that the U.S. Attorneys e xtract Ms. Bosworth, with an urgency of life,

13 with either, Federal law enforcemen t, or, military perso nnel. Woodhouse even off ered to extract her h imself, with her permission, and per mission from the U. S. Attorneys to use deadly force. Three days later, Ms. B osworth was decapitate d, Woodhouse disrup ted three decapit ation ceremonies, at whic h point the Seminole c ell, abandoned the ceremony, and executed her within seconds, in the parking lot of the geno cide hotel.” 5. Judge Bea. “[W]hen Conflicted P arties decapitate fe male fellow California Bar Member s, decapitate the most famous actress in the world, incinerate 9th Circ uit Judge Carlos Be a, and execute what is esti mated to be, over 1 5,000 victims, in fron t of [Woodhouse’s] hou s e, and prevail, after pleading the above, it calls into question, whether any Consti tutional rights, and values, are still avai lable to the American People? ” “[Ninth Circuit] Judge Mille r also witnessed Ms. Boswort h, and Ms. Fernandez Beshore be decapitate d, he did nothing to stop it, and did not feel compell ed to take down his Order, wh ich verges on insanity, after Tripl e Conflicted Co unsel burned alive his colleague, Judge Be a.” “[O]nce the matt er was taken up with the 9th Circuit, Judge B ea, thought he woul d make the U.S. Government settle, such that he could t ake illegal consider ation from the Conflicted Private Parties, but such benevolent act to the Conflicted Parti es, did not sit well w ith Counsel Not of Record, and Judge Bea was incine rated in front of Woodhou se, and around 5 p.m. when it was still daylight.” Based on these and other fact ual allegations, Woodhous e’s current complaint asserted c auses of action for what he ter ms (1) “Defamation of Woodhouse and Viol ation of his constitu tional rights under 42 U.S.C. section 198 3 and California Civil Code sectio n 45, 6”; (2) fr aud; (3) “Civil RICO ”; (4) “I.I.P.E.R.”; an d (5)

14 “Economic Espionag e Via Funding of Fo reign Militaries Bas ed on California Civ. Section 3426.1, and the Federal Econo mic Espionage Act, Whi ch Extends To All C onflicted Parties, Fo reign Actors, State Agenci es, and Warner Bros. Discov ery.” C The record gives the history of Woodhou se’s status with the California Bar. The State Bar of Ca lifornia placed Woo dhouse on involuntary inactive status. Licens ed attorneys in Calif ornia are either active or inac tive. (See Bus. & Pr of. Code, § 6003.) The State Bar Court ma y enroll a licensed a ttorney as inactive due to mental in firmity or illness. Inactive lice nsees are not autho rized to practice law. (Bu s & Prof. Code, § 60 06.) Licensees who have been involunta rily enrolled as inact ive cannot be reinstated to practice law unless reinstatement is directed by a court order. (B us & Prof. Code, § 6007, subd. (e)(2).) The Office of Chief Trial Counsel may initiate a proce eding for involuntary inact ive enrollment under se ction 6007, subdivis ion (b), by filing a motion in the State Bar Co urt. (See Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5. 171(a) [Bus & Prof. Code, § 6007, subd. (b)(1)]; 5.181 [Bus & Prof. Code, § 6007, s ubd. (b)(2)]; 5.191(B)(2) [Bus & Prof. Code, § 6007, subd. (b)(3)].) The State Bar Co urt determines if clear and convincing evid ence has establishe d grounds for involu ntary active enrollment. I f so, the court transf ers the licensee to inactive status. (Se e Rules Proc. of State Bar, rules 5.1 72 – 5.173.) These proceedin gs are confidential. On November 30, 2 024, shortly after the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Woodhouse’s claims and the issuance of the nationwide injuncti on against him, the State Bar ordered Woodh ouse inactive and, consequen tly, rendered him

15 ineligible to practice law in Califor nia. Woodhouse then sent messages to the Sta te Bar that included a threat of violence against State Bar Judge Yvette R oland, who had presided over Woodhouse’s bar pr oceedings. Woodhouse’s Novem ber 2024 email to th e State Bar included the followi ng about “Triple Co nflicted Counsel.” The emphasis is ours. “[A]fter [Triple Conflicted Counsel] told me that she h ad coffee with Judge Bea earlie r in the morning, when I watch ed Gibson Dunn burn J udge Bea to death six months ago. Mr. Binder and Judge R oland can also leg ally be executed with all California Bar Mem bers, as the act of disbarment, is a furtherance of the conspiracy to engage in genocide acts... [⁋ ] I will offer five b usiness days for the California Bar to res cind all charges, and charge Triple Conflicted C ounsel, otherwise, I will serve the Californ ia Bar at the end of De cember, and we will proceed with the re mediation program. [⁋ ] If I find that Ju dge Roland is connected to any of the organized crime groups that the Conflicted Parties p aid for assassination attempts, I will drown her to death, unde r all possible options individ ually.” On December 2, 202 4, Woodhouse inclu ded the following in an email, again wit h our emphasis: “I will offer up five business days from today, an d then I intend to l et them kill every member of the Cal ifornia Bar, as I will not allow any mo re People to be decapit ated, because of People being on th e take.” Woodhouse sent oth er threatening emai ls as well. Based on Woodhous e’s threats, on December 23, 2024, the State Bar filed in th e Los Angeles Super ior Court Family Law Division a petition o n behalf of Judge Ro land for a Work place Violence Restrainin g Order. After a hearing, th e court granted

16 the State Bar’s petit ion and imposed a t hree -year order restraining Woodho use from coming wit hin 100 feet of Judg e Roland. D We summarize the t rial court proceedin gs in this matter. As part of the Work place Violence Restraining O rder proceedings, Woodh ouse filed a “Cross Complaint.” The trial court dismissed this filing. Woodho use refiled it on Januar y 27, 2025 as a complain t in the superior c ourt, thus commenc ing the proceeding tha t is t he subject of this ap peal. Woodhouse n amed as defendants Nike, Meta, Alphabet, as well as t he State Bar of California and War ner Bros, Discovery, Inc. Defendants moved f or an order under se ction 391 declaring Woodhouse a vexati ous litigant. Each defendant ask ed the trial court to find that Woodhouse was a v exatious litigant an d to require him to post security of $10,000 before his claims as to each defendant co uld proceed. They also asked the court to enter a pr e -filing order requiring Woodh ouse to seek leave of th e presiding judge or justice of any California court before he may file new li tigation. Woodhouse opposed the motions. In the se oppositions, Woodhouse asserted “the Conflicted Par ties, here, have fina nced the killing, in a bout ique beach hotel, in Pismo Beach, CA. o ver a 36 month period, of almost twice the nu mber of Americans, killed by Osa ma Bin Ladi n in the 9/11 attack, restitution, and self - reporting are the only chance at life for the Leaders of these Conflicted Clients, a nd these Firm Members, und er U.S. counter terrorist protocol s, irrespective of w hat this State Cour t decides.. . . [T]he Conflicte d Counsels offer no real explanations, a s to why they have inter fered with Wood house’s Customers, why they

17 have hacked the Cal ifornia State Appellate syst em, to make Woodhouse a drug c onvict, during his P epperdine law traini ng, and as to why they have decapita ted a 2nd Circu it Clerk, one female minor, two o f Woodhouse’s comel y female colleagues, and the most fa mous act ress on earth, in Ms. Bosworth, all, in Woodhouse’s witnes s. . . . [T]he type of black sports tape used on a dead infant left at the base of Wo odhouse’s hou sing development, now a dorns the fire hydra nt at the base, in a clever attempt, to cover up, this sadistic act.” Another portion of Woodhouse’s opposition faul ted Warner Bros. Discovery for f ailing to produce evidence th at Kate Bosworth was alive. Woodho use suggested this f ailure to produce Bosworth showed W arner was complicit in Boswor th’s alleged death. The defendants replied to Woodhou se’s oppositio ns. The trial court gran ted the defendants’ vexatious litigant motions. The court ruled Woodhouse w as a vexatious litig ant under two statutory definitions. First, Woodhou se qualified as a vexatious litigant u nder section 391, subdivisio n (b)(4), because he “ was declared to be a vexatious litig ant by the United St ates District Court fo r the Central Distr ict of California” an d by “the United States Distri ct Court for the Southern District of New York” based on clai ms involving “subst antially similar facts and t ransactions that ar e alleged in this acti on.” Second, Woodhouse was a vexatious liti gant under sect ion 391, subdivisio n (b)(1), because he “comme nced or maintained. . . five litigations in propria persona wit hin the immediately precedin g seven -year perio d,” and each of “those five litigation s were finally determined adverse ly to [Woodhouse].”

18 The trial court deter mined there was no reasonable probability that Wo odhouse would prevail in th e litigation against any of the defendants. The trial court exp lained that Woodhouse failed to allege facts sufficie nt to establish the elements of any of h is five causes of acti on. The court order ed Woodhouse to post a security of $10,000 as to each of the defendants within 4 5 days of each of the court’s or ders as a condition to proceeding with the action as to each of them. The court likewise i ssued pre-filing orders under section 391.7. These order s prohibit Wood house, “directl y or indirectly through entities tha t he owns or con trols . . . from filing any new litigation in the cou rts of this state in propria persona without first obtaining leave of the pr esiding justice or presiding jud ge of the court where the litigation is propose d to be filed.” On July 22, 2025, t he trial court dis missed Woodh ouse’s action because he h ad not posted securi ty. Woodhouse appeale d. In his notice o f appeal, Woodhou se wrote that, “as the Complaint, her e, states that the D efendants have executed over 15,000 individuals, i n a single beach hotel, over a 36 month per iod, and that Nike paid unifo rmed Moldovan forces, and Russian special fo rces with machine guns t o breach his residence. Addit ionally, Woodhouse testified to the Conflicted Parties brandishing an active atomic weapon on Woodhouse’s property, and that t he U.S. Senate has been bri efed on the atomic attack, in Pismo Be ach, CA. Woodhous e has filed for death warrants, here, against Judge Broa dbelt III, and Mr. Va n Schwing, who is not a U.S. citizen, as, b oth, the participation, and the upholding of an atomic attack, agai nst the U.S. Gov ernment, is unequivocal tr eason, and colloqu ially absolutely mentally retarded. This ato mic attack has been reported to the Nuc lear

19 Regulatory Agency, and to the California U.S. Senator s by Woodhouse.” II We affirm the order s of the trial court. A Vexatious litigants use the ju stice system as a weapo n to impose costs on real or imagined en emies. Vexatious li tigants often represent the mselves and thus av oid the cost of couns el but force defendants to retain co unsel, which is expensive. Usi ng courts as a tool thus to inflict disproport ionate costs perverts a noble ideal. It turns an institution designed to re solve conflict into a weapon that magnifies conflict. This conduct ca n cause serious financial inj ury to the unfortun ate object of the att ack. (Camerado Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 838, 84 2.) Self -represented pla intiffs who avoid ret aining licensed attorneys dodge the gatekeeping functio n that retained coun sel can perform. Retai ned attorneys gener ally act as gatekeep ers against frivolo us litigation. Attorn eys are govern ed by pres cribed rules of ethics and p rofessional conduct, and, as officers of the court, are subject to disbarment, su spension, and other disciplinary sanctio ns not applicable to self -represented liti gants. Retained attorneys also are bound by ru les of ethics and rely on their reputation in t he community to su stain their careers. They are less likely to file frivolous claims. The threat of malicious prosecution liability for bringing an unmeritorio us action or special proceeding without probable ca use may do little to deter a vexatious litigant b ut is likely to have more sig nificance for a vexatious litigant’s attorney. (Shalant v. Girardi (201 1) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1176.)

20 Legislatures h ave enacted vexatio us litigant statutes to curb misuse of the c ourt system. These persistent and obses sive litigants abuse the j ustice system, there by wasting cou rt resources and harming other parties waiting their turn befo re the courts. T he Califor nia Legislature first enacted sections 391.1 through 391.6 in 19 63 to combat the te ndency of vexatious litigants to engage i n meritless liti gation. These sectio ns empower defendant s to stay pending lit igation by moving to require a vexatious litigant to furnish s ecurity if the court determines there is no reasonable proba bility the plaintiff will prevail. Failure to post the security results in di smissal of the litigation in favor of the defendant. (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 22 0 – 221 (Bravo).) In 1990, the Legisl ature enacted sec tion 391.7 to provide the courts with an a dditional means to c ounter misuse of th e system by vexatious litigants. Section 3 91.7 operates beyond the pending case and au thorizes a court to e nter a prefiling order prohibit ing a self- represented vexa tious litigant from filing new litigation without fi rst obtaining permis sion from the pr esiding bench officer. That officer may conditio n the filing of the litigation on posted security as secti on 391.3 provides. (Bravo, supra, 99 Cal.App.4 th at p. 221.) Sections 391.1 – 39 1.6 differ from sec tion 391.7 in som e significant ways. T he former sections a llow the litigant to proceed with the cas e without showing a reasona ble probability of prevailing, but the l itigant will have to furnish sec urity to proceed if t he court finds success impro bable. The latter se ction bars the litigant fro m filing the action o r proceeding if succe ss is considered improbable. Eve n if the court finds a requisite probability of succes s, it may compel the litigant to furnish

21 security as a conditi on to maintaining t he action. Vex atious litigant statutes are constitutional and do not deprive a litigant of due process of law. (Bravo, supra, 99 C al.App.4th at pp. 2 21 – 222.) We independently review qu estions of statutory interpretation. (John v. Superior Co urt (2016) 63 Ca l.4th 91, 95.) We deferentially review fact finding. B Although Woodhous e’s notice of appeal references only the trial court’s May 20 25 order granting N ike and Meta’s vexa tious litigant motion and related relief, t he respondents ask us to construe Woodhouse’s appe al as encompassing the correspo nding orders in favor of th e State Bar, Warner, and Alphabet. The y likewise request tha t we construe the ap peal as including th e trial court’s July 20 25 order dismissing the action for Woodhouse’s failure to furnish security. We assent to these unopposed requests. We may liberally construe Woodhouse’s notice of appeal because it is reason ably clear from this notic e that Woodhouse s eeks relief from all o rders joined to the order the trial c ourt granted, and Woodho use’s omission does not pr ejudice the respond ents. (See In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4t h 261, 272.) The Rul es of Court allow us to treat a notice of app eal filed after the tri al court has announ ced its intended ruling, but before it h as rendered judgment, as filed im mediately after e ntry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2).) We exe rcise our discretion to do so because no motions remain pen ding before the trial court and we can d ecide the propriety of the orders against Woo dhouse from the undisputed f acts in the record.

22 C Substantial evidenc e supports the trial court’s orders. The trial court foun d Woodhouse had, i n the preceding seven -year period, c ommenced at least f ive lawsuits that co urts ultimately determin ed against him. (§ 3 91, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court mad e the alternative fin ding that courts previously declared Woodhouse to be a v exatious litigant on similar facts. (§ 391, subd. (b)(4).) Our recitation o f the record shows o verwhelming supp ort for both findings. We do not repeat ou r earlier presentatio n. Woodhouse makes n o cogent argument t o the contrary in his briefing to us. T his briefing is a ren ewed excursion thro ugh Woodhouse’s world of decapitations and so forth. For insta nce, on page 10 of his op ening papers, Wood house offers that “Conflicted Counsel decapitated the 2nd Circuit Clerk, hi red in quid pro quo, within ten days from him arriving at the hotel, across from Woodho use’s property.” Th ere is more of the sa me elsewhere in Woodh ouse’s briefs to us. The trial court also ruled there was no r easonable probability Woodho use would prevail on his clai m against any Respondent. (See § 391.1, subd. (a).) As a matter of law, t his ruling was corre ct. California preceden t supports the trial court’s rul ing. For instance, in Hu ang v. Hanks (201 8) 23 Cal.App.5th 179, 1 81 (Huang), a self-repr esented litigant file d requests for civil harassment restrai ning orders against defendants Tom Ha nks, Arnold Schwarzene gger, the Dalai Lama, Mark Zuckerberg, Monica Lewinsky, a nd 26 other promine nt personalities. The plaintiff alleged the se “defendants are ‘ a lot of people with Hollywood background or Scie ntology background ... or p olitical

23 background,’ who ‘c ontrol [a] mental de partment in Texas,’ by which ‘they falsely a ccuse [him] and use [ ] technology fro m mental department (mind reading) [to] attack[ him] secretl y[,] ... ask[ing] some adult s to keep on stalkin g [him] and harass[ing] and threaten[ing hi m] by nano probes.” (Ibid.) The tri al court dismissed the action s as patently frivolous. The Court of Appeal affirmed because Ca lifornia courts posse ss the inherent auth ority to dismiss cases tha t are fraudulent or v exatious. (Id. at p. 182.) That includes c omplaints that are frivolous because the y lack an arguable basis eithe r in law or in fact or that include claims describing fantastic, delusional, or fanciful scenari os. (I bid.) The Huang opi nion cited many prec edents that supported its holding. (H uang, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 181 – 182.) Other courts ha ve applied the Hua ng rule to Woo dhouse’s past lawsuits. For e xample, the District Court of the Distric t of Columbia summaril y dismissed Woodho use’s complaint presenting similar a llegations about a genocide h otel, assassination attempts, and a cons piracy with for eign governme nts and co mmandos, concludi ng that the “[c]ompl aint rests on the kind of fantastic and delusional claims that warrant dismissal sua spont e.” (Woodhouse v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (D.D.C., July 13, 2023, No. 23 - cv -01924) 2023 WL 4531827.) The Southern D istrict of New York c ited similar alleg ations in dismissing Wood house’s action as frivolous, concludi ng that his “allegations about t he defendants, inclu ding, but not exclusi ve to, their alleged conspi ratorial and corrupt behavior, attempts t o assassinate W oodhouse, sexual ab use and murde rs of others, etcetera, are fantast ic and delusional.” (See Woodhouse v. Meta Platforms Inc. (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 8, 2023, No. 23 Civ. 7000) 2 023 WL 5939036.)

24 These earlier su a sponte dismissals of Woodhouse’s case s were by federal cour ts applying fed eral law. California state law operates in a similar fashion, as th e Huang case and oth ers illustrate. (E.g., Lodi v. Lodi (1 985) 173 Cal.App.3d 628, 630 – 631 [trial cou rt was empowered to dis miss the complaint by sec tion 436 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides the court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems pro per, strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conform ity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court].) In a state of some 4 0 million people, some perce ntage entertain false and f ixed beliefs, which a re delusions. (Cf. People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 125 [“ A delusion is a fi xed, false idea”]; People v. Sir han (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 726 fn. 5 [a delusion is a belief that is fal se, illogical, and qui te fixed]; id. at p. 726 [psychiatrist testified defend ant Sirhan Sirhan “gave no evi dence of believing himself to be a person chose n by God to kill [Robert] Kennedy whom he r egarded as the devil — that s uch a belief would have been a d elusion”].) Some delusional peo ple know how to file a complaint and to get into court. Trial courts have the tool s swiftly to unburden their dockets of com plaints that all reas onable people must agree are delusional, as w ere the claims in thi s complaint. Plainly thi s power to dismiss m ust be used sparingly and on ly in the most obvious cases, for tr uth can be stranger than fiction. Courts must remain open to proo f that seemingly sta rtling claims are in fact true. No reasonable perso n, however, would cl assify the worl d that Woodhouse des cribes as within the realm of possibility. The

25 trial court was right to rule the case had no reasonable possi bility of success. We affir m its orders in all re spects. D Woodhouse has file d three motions for j udicial notice, a “motion to strike an d requests,” and a “ motion to stay for Department of Justi ce review and for pa tent perjury.” The first motion ask s that we take notice of our or der informing Responde nts of their over due brief and asks that we “default all of the C onflicted Parties” an d award Woodhouse “record punitive damages.” It asserts t his “case also includ es Woodhouse witne ssing, two of his femal e Bar colleagues bei ng decapitated, two Co urts clerks being decapitate d, Ms. Bosworth, the most famous the spian in the world b eing decapitated, an d Judge Bea, incinera ted, all, across from Woodhouse’s reside nce, and by assailants, fi nanced by the Confl icted Parties.” We need not grant the reques t to take notice of our own order. We deny the remainder of the mo tion as delusional. The second motion claims that, “[s]ince this last Appellate Order, while failing to file a Brief, t he Conflicted Partie s have managed to execute a San Luis Obispo sheriff usin g a wire around the neck, an d murder a element ary school child, usi ng some kind of martia l arts knife, all, wit hin the genocide hotel, across the street fro m Woodhouse.” We denied this motion t he day after Woodhous e filed it. The third moti on accuses us of “exec uting close t o 30,000 people, in Pismo Be ach, CA, after leaving a dea d infant on Woodhouse’s proper ty, after driving two truckloads of M oldovan and Russian un iformed troops int o Woodhouse’s house, and after entering an atomic weapon into the gen ocide hotel, and simulating ignition on Woodhouse’s pro perty.”

26 The motion to strike asks that we strike Alphabet’s “untimely” request f or oral argument, o ur order grantin g pro hac vice status to Alpha bet’s counsel, “default the Co nflicted Parties,” and “grant a protect ive order for the 9th Circuit clerk.” It fu rther states “Woodhouse has fought off a seco nd Russian, and Moldovan attack, le d by the lone Moldo van survivor of the first attack on his proper ty.” Woodhouse filed the motion to stay after receiving our tentative opinion, w hich he described as a “defective, factual ly incorrect, and terror ist Judgment.” Therein, he claims we “ha[ve] been bribed” and th at we committed “p atent perjury” with respect to B osworth. We deny these motions in th eir entirety as delusional. DISPOSITION We affirm and awar d costs to Responde nts. WILEY, Acting P.J. We concur: VIRAMONTES, J. SCHERB, J.