Delaware Court Order: Judgment Motion Denied, Pre-Judgment Interest Granted

IN THE SUPERIO R COUR T OF THE ST A TE OF DELA W ARE JANET SCH OEPKE, as Special) Administrator of the Estate o f EUGE NE) SCHOEPKE on behalf of the E state of) EUGENE SCH OEPKE, et al.,)) Plaintif fs,)) v.) Case No. N23C- 09 -059 ASB) E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND) COMP A NY, et al.,)) Defendants.) Submitted: Novem ber 14, 2025 Decided: Februar y 27, 2026 Upon Defenda nts’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter o f Law Und er Rule 50(b), or, in the A lternative, for a New T rial, DENIED. Upon Plaintiffs’ Motion to A lter or Am end Ju dgment to Inc lude Pr e -Judgment Inter est, GRANTED. ORDER Defendants have f iled a “Moti on for Judgm ent as a Matter of La w Under R ule 50(b), or, in the Alter native, for a New T rial;” Plaintif fs oppose t he motion. Plaintif fs, for their part, have filed a “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment to Include Pre-Judgment Interes t,” which Defendants oppose. After briefing closed, the Court heard oral argume nt from the parties. For t he reasons set forth below, Defendants ’ “Motion fo r Judgment as a Matter o f Law Under Rule 50(b), or, in the Alte rnative, for a New T rial” is D ENIED, and Plaintiff s “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgme nt to Include Pre-Judgm ent Interest” is GRA NTED.

2 BACKGROUN D On September 3, 2023, Plaintif fs filed t heir co mplai nt in this Court allegin g Defendants, E.I. Du Pont Nemours & Company (“DuPont”) and Sporting Goods Properties, Inc., individually and as successor- in -intere st to Remington Arms Company (“Reming ton”) (together, “Defendants”), alleging that the Defendants’ negligence cause d Eugene Schoe pke’ s death. 1 Prior to trial, th e parties each m oved to exclude ex pert testimony pr off ered by thei r adversary. 2 In addition to subs tantia l written b riefing, o ver two days in November 2024, the parties presented evidence and ar gume nt in s upport of their p ositions. 3 T he Court denied the parties’ m otions, 4 and the case m oved to tria l. T ri al commenced on July 8, 2025, and concluded on July 23, 2025. 5 The evidence established t hat Eugene Schoepke died on March 27, 2022, at the age o f 84 6 fo llowing his Feb ruary 22, 2022, mesothelioma diagnosis. 7 The parties did not dispute Mr. Schoepke’ s mesothelioma diagnosis or that expos ure to asbestos can 1 D.I. 1; D.I. 251. 2 D.I. 43, 47, 94, 95, 168, 183, 192. 3 D.I. 194, 195. 4 D.I. 246. 5 D.I. 341. 6 T ri al T r., 07/22/25 at 12: 18- 10, 13:8. 7 T ri al T r., 07/16/25 at 260:13- 15.

3 cause that disease. 8 Rather, th e evidence and ar gument at trial focused on whether one, the other, or both Defendants were a “legal cause” and “cause in fact” o f Mr. Schoepke’ s illness. 9 T he parties d isputed whether Mr. Schoepke’ s use of asbestos- containing Remi ngton shotgun shells exposed him to respirable asbestos and, ultimately, ca used his death. 10 Further, the parties disputed whether the Defendant s knew, o r should h ave known, of the d angers that the asbestos- containing shotgun shells created for consumers. 11 This dispute pers ists and forms the basis of Defendants’ motion. On July 19, 2025, prior to s ubmission of the case to the jury, Def endants file d a “Motion for Judgme nt as a Matter of Law on the Issue of Ca usation.” 12 Defendan ts arg ued t hat Plaintiffs presented insufficien t evidence fo r a jury t o reasonably find that Defe ndants’ conduct was a cause of E ugene Schoe pke’ s in jury. 13 Plaintiff s responded, 14 and on July 21, 2025, the Court denied the motion. 15 On Ju ly 22, 2025, 8 T ri al T r., 07/09/25 at 68: 17-21. 9 See id. at 8:9-1 0, 68:22-69:4. 10 Id. at 68:22-69:4. 11 See e.g., T rial T r., 0 7/ 22/25, at 1 10:2 - 13. 12 D.I. 335. 13 Id. at 1. 14 D.I. 337. 15 T ri al T r., 07/21/25 at 263:3 - 71:13.

4 after closin g ar gume nts and instruc tions, the ju ry received the case and began its deliberations. While the jury deliberate d, Defenda nts pre sented an o ral motion for ju dgment as a matter of law “o n six separa te issues.” 16 Defendants asserted: (1) “Pla intif f ha s not established that either of the defendants’ conduct was the legal cause o f Mr. Schoepke’ s injuries;” 17 (2) “Dr. Compton’ s fiber release study results do not show more tha n de minim is potentia l exposure [which] is requi red to prove causat ion under Illinois law;” 18 (3) “Plaintif f has no evide nce of expo sure to as bestos from gun cleaning;” 19 (4) “Plaintiff has no evidence that Mr. Schoepke was more suscepti ble to developing me sothelioma t han the average p erson, including no evidence of genetic testing;” 20 (5) “Plaintiff has no evidence to support a finding of punitive damages as to either defendant;” 21 and (6) “Plaintif f has of fered no evidence t o prov e liability as to DuPont.” 22 Plaintif fs o ppose d the motion “on all grounds.” 23 The Court did not immediate ly rule on the motion; rather, citin g to Superior Court Civil 16 T ri al T r., 07/22/25 (afternoon) a t 4:12- 14. 17 Id. at 4:15-17. 18 Id. at 6:13-18. 19 Id. at 7:23-8:3. 20 Id. at 8:5 - 10. 21 Id. at 8:1 1- 14. 22 Id. at 9:8-1 1. 23 Id. at 1 1:12-13.

5 Rule 50(b) the Court directed the parties to submit their position in writing in the event a judgme nt was returne d in Plaintif fs’ favor. 24 On July 23, 20 25, the jury re turned its verd ict, finding: - Eugene Schoep ke’ s mesothe lioma was ca used by expos ure to asbes tos, 25 - Eugene Sc hoepke was exposed t o asbest os from his use of a Defendant’ s shotgun shell s, 26 - Eugene Schoep ke’ s exposure to as bestos from hi s use of a Defenda nt’ s shotgun shell s was a proxima te cause of hi s mesothelioma, 27 - Remington was negligent and 40% responsible for proximately cau sing Eugene Schoep ke’ s injury, 28 - DuPont was negligent and 60% responsible for proximately causing Eugene Schoepke’ s injury, 29 - Damages in fa vor of plaintif f s totaling $9, 000,000. 30 The jury did not find clear and convincing evidence that the conduct of Remington or DuPont constituted willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of Eugene Schoepke. 31 24 Id. at 12:1 -1 9. 25 D.I. 340; T rial T r., 07/23/25 at 10:16- 19. 26 D.I. 340; T rial T r., 07/23/25 at 10:20-23. 27 D.I. 340; T rial T r., 07/23/25 at 11:1 -5. 28 D.I. 340; T rial T r., 07/23/25 at 1 1:6-9, 1 1:14-20. 29 D.I. 340; T rial T r., 07/23/25 at 1 1:10-13, 1 1:14-22. 30 D.I. 340; T rial T r., 07/23/25 at 1 1:23-12:7. 31 D.I. 340; T rial T r., 07/23/25 at 12:8-13.

6 After e ntry of the judgmen t, Plaintif fs f iled a “Motion t o Alter o r Amend Judgment to Include Pre-Judgment Interest,” 32 and a “Motion for Costs.” 33 Defendants filed a “Motion fo r Judgment as a Matter of L aw un der R ule 50(b) or, in the Alternative, for a New T ri al,” 34 and a “Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment Pending Disposition of Post -T rial Motion.” 35 The Court heard oral ar g ument and took the motions under advisement. 36 The parties informed the Court that the “Motion to Stay” was with drawn and the “Motion for Costs” was resolved. 37 T his Order addresses the remaining motions. The par ties agree that Delaware pr ocedura l law and Illinois substantive l aw guide the Court’ s assessment of the matters before it. 32 D.I. 348 (“ Motio n for Pre-judgment I nterest”). 33 D.I. 350. 34 D.I. 352 (“Def. Mo t.”). 35 D.I. 353. 36 D.I. 385. 37 D.I. 385, 388.

7 DISCUSSION I. DEFENDA NTS’ JUDGMENT AS A MA TTER OF LA W OR, AL TERNA TIVEL Y, FOR A NEW TRIAL A. LEGAL ST ANDARDS Defendants have m oved fo r j udgment as a matter of law an d, al ternatively, for a new trial. Su perior Court Civi l Rule 50(b) provides: Whenever a moti on f or a judgme nt a s a matter of law made a t the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the Court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raise d by the motion. Such a motion may be renewed by service and filing not later than 10 days after entry of j udgment. A mo tion for a ne w trial under Rule 5 9 may be joined with a renewa l of the m otion f or judgment as a mat ter of l aw, o r a new trial may be requested in t he alternative. If a v erdic t was returned, t he Court m ay, in disposing of t he renewed motion, a llow the judgment to stand or may reope n the judgment and either order a new trial or direc t the entr y of jud gment as a matter of l aw. If no verdict w as returned, t he Co urt may, in disposing of the renewed motion, direct the entry of judgmen t as a matter of law or may or der a new tria l. 38 And, Superior Court Civil Rule 59 p rovide s, “[a] new trial may b e granted as to all or any of the parties and o n all or part of the issues in an action i n which there h as been a trial for any of the reasons for whic h new trials have here tofore been gra nted in the Superior Court.” 39 This Court’ s rules permit these motions to be p resent ed together; howe ver, two separate stan dards a pply. 38 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50(b). 39 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59 (a).

8 In deciding a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Delaware Supreme Court instruct s: Judgment as a matter of law is a ppropriate if there is no l egally suf ficient evidentiary basis for a reasona ble jury to find for the non - moving party. Whe n considering a motion for judgme nt as a matter of law, the Court must v iew the evidence an d draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorab le to the non -moving part y. The moving p arty b ears the burden of demonstrating b oth the absence of a material fact an d entitleme nt to judgme nt as a ma tter of law. 40 “When consider ing a motion for a new trial, the Superior Court must give enormous deference to the jury’ s verdict, and should not set aside the jury’ s verdict unless a reasona ble jury could not have reached the result.” 41 The moving party “must s how the need to co rrect c lear error of law or to preve nt manifest injustice.” 42 “Historically, this Sta te’ s cour ts have exercised their power to gr ant a new trial w ith caution and extreme deference to the findings of a jury. A court will n ot set aside a jury’ s verdict unless the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonab le jury coul d not have reach ed the result.” 43 40 LCT Capital, LLC v. NGL Ener gy Partners LP, 24 9 A.3d 77, 89 -90 (Del. 2021) (cleaned up) (internal cita tions omitted). 41 Id. at 90 (cleane d up) (internal ci tations o mitted). 42 Conduent State Healthcar e, LLC v. AIG Sp ecialty Insurance Co., 2023 WL 2256052, at *1 (Del. Supe r. Ct. Feb. 14, 2023) (clean ed up) (quoting Monzo v. Nationwide Pr o p. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2020 WL 2467074, at * 2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 13, 2020)). 43 Amalfitano v. Baker, 794 A.2 d 575, 577 (Del. 2001) (cleaned up) (quotin g Stor ey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 4 65 (Del. 1979).

9 B. ANAL YSIS Defendants contend that the Court should grant judgment as a matter of law because Plaintif f “failed to meet her burden o f proving that either Defendant ’ s conduct was the legal cause of Mr. Schoepke’ s injury,” 44 “failed to prove t ha t Defendants’ conduct was the ‘cause in fac t’ of Mr. Sc hoepke’ s injury,” 45 and “fa iled to meet her burden of p roof as to a basis for DuPont’ s liability for Remmington shells.” 46 Defendants a lternatively as sert that a new trial sh ould be gra nted becau se Plaintif f improperly invited the j ury to speculate, 47 in appr opriately elicite d additional exposure testimony, 48 and invited the jury t o “impose liability for failure to recall though Defendants h ad no duty.” 49 Plaintiff s respond that they present ed suf ficient evidence as to both “legal cau se” and “cause in fact,” 50 and “presented evidence suf ficient to hold DuP ont liable.” 51 Plaintiff s further contend Defendant’ s motion for a new trial lac ks merit. 52 44 Def. Mot. at 5. 45 Id. at 1 1. 46 Id. at 22. 47 Id. at 25. 48 Id. at 28. 49 Id. at 29. 50 D.I. 374 (“Pl. Re sp.”) at 3-18. 51 Id. at 18. 52 Id. at 27.

10 1. J UDGMENT AS A M A T TER OF L AW In an asbestos products liab ility case such as this, a necessary element of proof “is that the defe ndant’ s asbestos was a ‘cause’ of the decedent’ s injuries.” 53 “[C]ausation req uires proof of both ‘cause in fact’ and ‘lega l cause.’” 54 Defendant s challenge the jury’ s findi ngs on both aspects of ca usation. a. Legal Cause Under Illinois law, in a failure to warn case, a plaintif f must prove that “knowledge existed in the industry of the dangerous propensity of the manufactur er ’ s pr o duct. ” 55 T he Illinois Supreme Court, in W oodill v. Parke Davi s & Co., 56 explained t hat for liability to at tach, a plaintiff must prove that “the defendant manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger that caused the injury.” 57 T he question fo r the Court, t hen, is whether Defendants knew or shoul d have known of t he danger p osed by their asbe stos-containin g shotgun sh ells. Defendants argue that “Illinois law required that Plaintif f come forward with specific evidence that knowled ge t hat Remington’ s shotgun shells —containing an 53 Thacker v. UNR Industries, I nc., 603 N.E.2d 449, 455 (Ill. 1992). 54 Id. 55 McKinney v. Hobart Br others Co., 127 N.E.3d 176, 187 (Ill. App. 2018) (quoting W oodill v. P arke Davis & C o., 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 1 980)). 56 402 N.E.2d 194 (Ill. 198 0). 57 Id. at 198 (emp hasis added).

11 encapsulated component—cou ld release asbestos fibers sufficie nt to p ose a risk of mesothelioma t o hunters like Mr. Sc hoepke wa s available in the scie ntific community during the timeframe in which Remington manufactured and sold the shells.” 58 T hey c ontend that “t here is a ‘crucial disti nction’ be tween knowledge t hat raw asbestos fiber s could cause mesothelioma and knowing that en capsula ted asbestos fibers in the defendan t’ s produc t posed a risk of d isease.” 59 Plaintif fs respond that they presented “ample evidence that both Defendants knew about the hazards of asbestos dust and k new that the shotgun shells created dust when used as i ntended.” 60 T hus, they contend that there was sufficie nt evidenc e establishing Defen dants’ duty to war n. 61 As is often the case, th e parties’ argum ents drive the positions to the poles, when the answer lies somew here in between. A manufacturer ha s a duty to warn of known dangers and d angers of which it should be aware. 62 And, of course, encapsulatio n of an asbestos containing product is not “irrelevant.” 63 V iewing the record, a nd a ll rea sonable inference s tha t may be draw n from the record, in the ligh t 58 Def. Mot. at 7. 59 D.I. 352 a t 7 (citing M cKinney, 127 N.E.3 d at 190). 60 Pl. Resp. at 9. 61 Id. 62 McLaugh lin v. D over Downs, Inc., 2008 W L 2 493392, a t *14 (D el. Sup er. Ct. July 17, 2008) (c itations omitte d). 63 Pl. Resp. at 8.

12 most favorable to the plaintif fs, the Court concludes that p laintif fs presented suf ficient e vidence t o find, as a matter of law, that Defe ndants knew, or s hould ha ve known, that its inclusion of a sbestos within the basewa d of a shotgun she ll p resen ted a risk to consumer s. In McKinney v. Hobart Br others Compa ny, 64 th e Illinois Appellate Cour t found that a manufacturer ’ s liability hinged on “w hether [at the time the product was manufactured] ‘knowledge existed i n the indus try o f the d anger ous propensity of t he manufactur er ’ s pr oduct – which, in this case, was not raw asbestos but defendant’ s welding rods, in which asbestos was encap sulated.” 65 In the early 1960s, when the welding rods were man ufactured, th e dangers of raw asbes tos were known in the industry. 66 But the trial record offered “no e vidence of contemporaneous knowledge in the industry t hat welding rods with asbe stos e ncapsulated in the flux were hazardous.” 67 T he McKinney court co ncluded: [I]n 1962 and 1963, defendant could not have owed plaintiff a d uty to warn plaintif f of a hazard tha t, at that time, was unknown to the industry to which defendant b elonged, namely, the ability of its welding rods to release encapsulate d asbestos fibers if t he welding rods were simply rubbed toge ther or stepped on. 68 64 127 N.E.3d 176 (Ill. App. 20 18). 65 Id. at 188. (citin g W oodill, 402 N.E.2d at 198). 66 Id. at 190. 67 Id. (ci ting Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1 129, 1 14 5 (5th Cir. 1985)). 68 Id. at 190.

13 Defendants p osit that M cKinney controls and, thus, the jury ’ s verdict here must n ot s tand. 69 At tr ial, D efendant’ s elicited state- of - the-art e xpert testim ony as i t pertained to asbestos-containing shotgun shells in the 1960s to 1980s. 70 The evidence, Defen dants claim, reveal ed: (1) that there was no scientific article or study suggesting an asbestos - related health risk to hunter s in the relevant time period; and, more broadly, (2) that scientific literature published in the re levan t time period c onsidere d p roducts c ontaining asbestos fi bers “bound with some sort of binder” to pose an insignificant risk of asbestos exposure. 71 Much like the encapsulated asbestos welding rods consider ed i n McKinney, plaintif fs o f fered no state- of -the-art evidence revealing the hazards of embedding asbestos within a s hotgun shell. Plaintif fs contend that “Illinois Courts have increasingly distanced from the standards in McKinney by both clarifying and distinguishi ng McKinney over t he years.” 72 Plaintif fs cite to Danie ls v. ArvinM eritor 73 and Johnson v. Edwar d Orto n Jr. Ceramic Fund, 74 as examples of this distancing. 75 Defendants assert that these 69 Def. Mot. at 6. 70 T ri al T r., 07/15/25, at 7:5-8, 2 0:13-21. 71 D.I. 376 (“Def. Rep ly”) at 1. 72 Id. at 4. 73 146 N.E. 3d 65 5 (Ill. App. 20 19) 74 71 F.4th 601 (2023). 75 Pl. Resp. at 5- 7.

14 cases merely reflect the applica tion of the princi ples set fo rth in McKinne y. 76 While this may b e so, the Illinois Courts’ application of the principles announced in McKinney assis t this Court in resolving t he motion. In Daniels, the Illinois Appellate Court “consi dered McKinney and W oodill ” and conc luded t hat “stat e of t he art evide nce is not w holly necessary wher e there is evidence that the defendant knew or should have known that the injury may occur if no warnin g is provided.” 77 In Daniels, plaintif fs established t hat defenda nt “wa s aware tha t e nd user s use d pa int scrapers, wire brushes, and cutters to fit the g askets and remove packagin g.” 78 T estimony established that defe ndant “w as aware of t he dangers of asbestos dust and that pipefitters manipulated John Crane’ s encapsulated asbestos i n a man ner that produced dust.” 79 Here, too, the evidenc e esta blished t hat Defendants were aware of the dangers of asbestos when it included the substance in its shotgun shells and were aware that the firing of the asbestos-containing product produc ed dust. In Johnson, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals comme nted that in McKinney “the animating policy conc ern i s t o e nsure t hat where the product 76 Def. Reply at n. 1. 77 Daniels, 146 N.E. 3d at 676. 78 Id. at 677 79 Id. (cleaned up).

15 possesses dangerous p ropensiti es and t here is unequal knowledge with respect to the risk of harm, the manufac turer, possessed of such knowled ge, must war n of the danger.” 80 Further, “what a manufact urer knew of should have kn own is d etermine d by the present state of human knowledge at the time.” 81 T he defendant packaged and delivered its product in vermiculite contaminated with asbestos. 82 T he Court found “Orton s hould b e held t o an exper t standard of knowledge with respect to the packaging tha t it used to ship its pyrometr ic cones and to which it exposed consumers such as Mr. Johnson.” 83 Liability was imposed because “it wa s possible, based on the present state of human knowledge, for Orton to know that the W.R. Grace vermicul ite was contaminated with asbestos.” 84 “Orton should have know n of the contami nation.” 85 The Court has dedic ated considerable time to evaluatin g the distinctions between the cases cited by the parties. Of cou rse, it is n ot diff icult to assess what is known within an industry at a particular time. There is no dispute here that, as early as 1960, it was known that “raw” as bestos posed a danger to consumers. The 80 Johnson, 71 F.4th at 614 (cleaned up) (quoting Sollam i v. Eaton, 772 N.E.2d 215, 219 (Ill. 200 2)). 81 Id. (internal c itations omitted). 82 Id. at 606. 83 Id. at 615. 84 Id. 85 Id.

16 challenge, of course, is d etermi ning what a manufacturer should have known. The Court concludes th at, under Illinois law, this is an intensely fact-specific question. An application o f t he principles set forth in the cited cases applying Illinois law supports the conclusion that Defenda nts should have known of the danger of their asbestos-containin g product. First, it is importa nt to understand the composition and dynamics of the Remington shotgun shell. T o form ulate a basewad, a qua ntity of a sbestos was mixed w ith o ther materials and bound toge ther by subjecting the mixture to i ntense pressure. 86 This bonding encapsulated the asbestos, creating a product that is “distinctly diff erent from. .. friable products in that you can’t crush it by hand.” 87 That encapsula ted product is then subjected to a controlled explosion when fired from a shotgun. 88 When the shotgun’ s trigger is pulled, t he firing pin “hits the bottom of t he shotgun sh ell [and] ignites the gunpow der below” ca using t he gunpowder to explo de. 89 The basewad prevents the shell from exploding; “it forces the explosion up and out of the sh ell. And when that happens, you’re shooting particulates and gases out of t he nozzle of that g un and out of the chamber on the 86 T ri al T r., 07/15/25 at 31:8 - 13. 87 Id. at 31:15-17. 88 Id. at 34:2- 7. 89 Id. at 34:9- 17.

17 side of the gun o ver a thousand feet per minute.” 90 T he asbestos b asewa d was manufactured to sit in the midst of this explosion to ensure projectiles were fo rced down the barrel of the firearm at near supersonic sp eed. 91 While a manufacturer might no t reco gnize t hat asbe stos c ould be relea sed fr om dr opping or step ping on a an asbestos-encapsul ated welding rod, it is n ot surprising that this designed explosion relea sed asbestos to be breathed by a shooter. At the time t he asbestos-contai ning shotgun shells wer e manufactured, the danger o f airborne asbestos fibers was well understood. While Defendant’ s might not h ave known that their sh ells could release asbestos, they should have known. 92 The trial record estab lished that Defen dants were the onl y ammunition manufacturer to include asbe stos within its basewads. 93 It is, theref ore, unsurpr ising that ther e was no da ta demon strating t he sa fety – or da nger – o f this manufact uring decision. But the Court does not read the Illinois cases on lega l causation to allow a Defendant to d isregard rea dily foreseeab le risks. Because D efendants have faile d to meet t heir burden by “show[ing] that there i s no co mpete nt evidence upon which 90 Id. at 34:23-35:5. 91 Id. at 34:18-35:6. 92 W oodill, 402 N.E.2d at 19 8. 93 T ri al T r., 07/18/25, 61: 4- 8.

18 the verdict could reasonably be ba sed,” 94 the ir mo tion for a new trial on the ba sis o f “legal causa tion” is DENIED. b. Cause in Fact Defendants next argue that Plaintif f failed to produce evidence es tablishin g the fre quency, regularity, and p roximi ty o f Mr. Schoepke’ s e xposure to asbestos released from t heir shotg un shells. 95 T hey assert: Plaintif f only presented evidence that the shotgun shells were ca pable of releasing as bestos fibers, without the requisite evi dence that the shells in fact released respirable fibers under circumstances such that they would be “ac tually inhaled” by Mr. Schoepke outdoors, or t hat any fibers pot entia lly i nhaled by Mr. Schoepke were an y more than de minimis. 96 In response, Plaintif fs contend that the evidence adduced a t trial s atisfies the “‘frequency, regularity, and proximity’ test which wa s adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in Thacker v. UNR Industri es, Inc. ” 97 T hey ar gue, the jury heard evidence that the normal and foreseeable use of Defendants’ a sbestos-containi ng shotgun shells causes respirable asbestos fibers t o be release d, whi ch fibers are released directly into the breathing zones of shooters, in concentrations that are orders o f magnitude greater than what the shooters would have otherwise been exposed to. 98 94 Br oughton v. W o ng, 201 8 W L 1867185, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2018). 95 Def. Mot. at 13. 96 Id. at 12-13. 97 Pl. Resp. at 9. 98 Id. at 17.

19 The parties’ written ar guments 99 mirror those made during trial, which the Court denied. 100 Nothing in the most recent b riefi ng or ar gument co mpels the Court to reach a d iffe rent res ult; thus, the Court now reduces t o writi ng the decision it issued on the record at trial. Plaintif fs c hose to pro ve “cause in fact” u nder the “su bstantial factor ” test. In Thacker v. UNR In dustries, Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court “rejected the ar gume nt … that so long as there is any evidence that the injured [party] was ex posed to a defendant’ s as bestos-containing pr oduct, there is s uff icient evide nce of cause in fac t to all ow the issue of legal causation to go to the jury.” 101 Instead, the Illino is Supreme Court adopted the “‘frequency, regularity and proxim ity’ test as a means by which an asbestos p laintif f can prove more than minimum contact to establish that a specific defendant’ s p roduct was a substantial factor in being a cause in fact of a plaintif f ’ s injury.” 102 Under the Thacker test, Plaintif fs must show that Mr. Schoepke was exposed to Defen dants’ asbestos through proof that (1) he wa s regu larly in an area where t he Defendants’ asbestos was presented an d (2) he wa s, in fac t, su ffic iently clo se to th is 99 D.I. 335, 337. 100 T ri al T r., 07/21/25 at 263:3 - 71:13. 101 Nolan v. W eil-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549, 559 (Ill. 2009). 102 Id. at 558 (citing Thacke r, 603 N.E.2d 44 9).

20 area so as to come into contact with the Defendants’ product. 103 Under the freque ncy, regularity, and proximity test, Illinois law does not require a p laintif f to prove “the exact quantity of asbestos fi bers a deceden t was expose d to.” 104 Defendants cite to Krumw iede v. T r emco, Inc., 105 a case decided by the Appellate Court of Illinois, and a case in which Dr. Frank also testified, in support of t heir position. In Krumw iede, “D r. Fra nk offered almost n o te stimony or op inions regarding decedent’ s exposure to asbestos fibers from [t he Defendant’ s] products.” 106 Instead, re lying on his o wn expe rience, Dr. Fran k testified that “ simila r products ‘c an’ release fibers under some unknown set of circ umstances and in some unknown quantity or concentration.” 107 And, as the Appe llate Court of Illinois put it, “noticeably absent from his testimony was any opinion that exposure to asbestos from [D efendant’ s] p roducts wa s a ‘substantial’ factor in decede nt’ s developme nt of his disease.” 108 103 Thacker, 603 N.3. 2d at 457. 104 Zickuhr v. Ericsson, Inc., 962 N.E.2d 97 4, 987 (Ill. A pp. Ct. 201 1). 105 148 N.E.3d 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 20 20). 106 Krumwiede v. T r emc o, Inc., 148 N.E.3d 764, 785 (I ll. App. Ct. 2020). 107 Id. 108 Id.

21 Such is not the case here. First, Dr. Frank relied on Dr. Co mpton’ s work to establish th at Mr. Schoepke was exposed t o asbestos. 109 He testified, based on his review of Dr. Compton’ s study, that “the levels from the shotgun s hells are many, several orders of magnitude greater than b ackgrou nd. They were s hort -term, intermittent high-level exposures.” 110 Unlike Krumwiede, here Dr. Frank’ s opini on was not based on his experience that certain products “can” release asbestos fibers but grounded on the release of fibers revea led throug h Dr. Compton’ s experi ment. Second, Dr. Frank opined that Mr. Schoep ke’ s exposure to asbestos from Defendants’ s hotgun shel ls was “the substantial factor in givi ng [Mr. Schoepke] th[e] disease, which caused his death.” 111 He did not, as Illinois law cautions against, solely opine t hat every exposure to asbestos was t he substantial causative factor in Mr. Schoepke’ s development of mesothelioma. And so, neither of the Krumwied e Court’ s concerns—co ncerns that necessitated judgment as a matter of law in favor of th os e defe ndants—are p resent here. Dr. Frank further based his “substantial factor” opinion on his understanding of the frequency and regularity of Mr. Schoepke’ s shooting. T o do so, he reviewed the depositions o f Mr. Schoepke’ s family member s and conclude d that M r. Schoepke 109 T ri al T r., 07/14/25 (afternoo n) at 7:18-8:18. 110 Id. at 54:13-16. 111 Id. at 15:12-14.

22 was “an avid hunter.” 112 Dr. Frank underst ood that “at least 8 times a year [Mr. Schoepke] would go out and hunt,” he “regularly used shotguns,” and that “depending o n what [Mr. Schoepke] was hunting … he might go through 8 or 10 shells, or he might go through a box or t wo, which wou ld be 25 in a box.” 113 T estimony also established tha t M r. Scho epke would, for lack of a be tter term, tar get shoot using f ield load shotg un shells. 114 V iewing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, in t he light most favorable t o the Plaintiffs, the Cou rt finds there e xists a lega lly suf ficie nt e videntiary basis for a r easonable jury to f ind for the Plain tiffs. 115 Defendant’ s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of “cause in fact” is DENIED. c. DuPont Liability Establishe d Defendants n ext contend that “Plaintif f fa iled to i ntroduce any evidence to impose liability on DuPont for a product designed, manufactured, and sold by Remington.” 116 Plaintiff s respond that Defendants waived any challenge to 112 Id. at 13:5-12. 113 Id. at 13:12-14:2. 114 Id. at 14:3- 8. 115 See LCT Capital, LLC, 24 9 A.3 d at 88- 90. 116 Def. Mot. at 22.

23 DuPont’ s indi vidual liability, 117 and in any event, sufficient evidence was o f fere d supporting the jury’ s find ing of liability f or both DuPo nt and Reming ton. 118 Defendants, citing Jones v. McCook Drum & Barr el l Co., 119 assert th at a “cause of action in products liability can only be directed against the manufactur er of the [produc t] or some p arty in the distributive chain[.]” 120 More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court explained, “a ll manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers in the chain of distribution play an i ntegral role in the overa ll producing a nd marketing of the defective product, uniquely justifyi ng the imposition of strict liabilit y even if they do not have a hand in its development or manufact ure.” 121 Here, the asbestos-contain ing shotgun shells used by Mr. Schoepke were marketed and sold with Remington and DuPont markings. 122 In fact, the two companies were closely aligned in management and production. 123 DuPont’ s Oval T rad emark Product Seal of Approval was placed on, and remaine d on, the p ackaging 117 Pl. Resp. at 18. 118 Id. at 20. 119 595 N.E. 2d 67 0 (Ill. App. 19 92). 120 Def. Mot. at 22 (q uoting McCook D rum, 595 N.E. 2d at 674). 121 Cassidy v. China V itamins, LLC, 120 N.E.3d 959, 968 (Ill. 2018) (cleaned up) (internal cita tions omitte d). 122 T ri al T r., 07/18/25, at 153: 3- 6. 123 T ri al T r., 07/21/25 at 38:6 - 20.

24 of Remington asbestos-containing shotgun shells. 124 That logo, with DuPont ’ s permission, was loca ted above the door at the Rem ington Bridgeport ma nufacturing plant. 125 DuPont engineer resource forces were stationed at the Bridgepor t manufacturing plant. 126 T he plastics and gunpowder used to make the Remingt on shells came from DuPont. 127 And a 1960 DuPont magazine advertised Remington shotgun shells. 128 T he trial evidence revealed the operations of DuPont and Remington to be inextricably intertwined, and a reasonabl e basis existed for a jury to find DuPo nt was a manufact urer of the a sbestos-containing s hells. Barbara Dawson testified as the corporate witness for DuPont, Remington, and SPGI. 129 She explained that DuPont acquired “a majorit y interest of [Remington] in 1933. But the Remington identification was much more prominent that the DuPont o ne o n e very pa ckage.” 130 DuPont was founded in 1902 “as a manufacturer of b lack powd er, gun pow der ex plosives.” 131 Remington was founde d 124 T ri al T r., 07/18/25, at 153:3-6. 125 Id. at 77: 4-15, 1 49:16-19. 126 T ri al T r., 07/18/25, at 77:16-1 8. 127 T ri al T r., 07/21/25, at 60:16-2 1, 60:22-23. 128 T ri al T r., 7/18/25, at 73: 3-23. 129 T ri al T r., 07/21/25 at 14:7 - 8. 130 Id. at 32:10-13. 131 Id. at 34:6 -7.

25 fourteen years later, 132 and in 1933 DuPo nt acquired a contr olling interest in Remington. 133 DuPont maintained a position of “management and control” of Remington t hrough the 19 80s. 134 V iewing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, in t he light most favorable t o the Plaintiffs, the Co urt finds there e xists a lega lly suf ficie nt e videntiary basis for a r easonable jury to f ind, based o n D uPont’ s “co -branding” the shotgun shells with its distinctive logo, its ongoing management and control of Remington, its advertising of the Rem ington shells in its annual magazine, and its display of the DuPont logo on t he exterior of the manuf acturing plant, DuPont l iable, independent of Remington, for Mr. Schoepke’ s injury. Defendant’ s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of DuPon t’ s liability is DENIED. 2. N EW T RIAL As an al ternative to judg ment as a ma tter of law, Defendants as sert that a new trial should be granted because the Plaintif fs “invited the jur y to speculate as to whether shotgun shell use caused Mr. Schoepke’ s mesothelioma,” 135 and “invited 132 Id. at 34:20-22. 133 Id. at 35:1 -3. 134 Id. at 38:6 - 20. 135 Def. Mot. at 25.

26 the jury to impose liability for failure t o recall though defendants had no d uty.” 136 Plaintif fs conten d these ar gume nts lack me rit. 137 “Every analysis of a motion for a new trial must begin with the presumption that the jury v erdict i s corre ct.” 138 The jury verdict i s entitled to “enormou s deference,” and sho uld only be set aside if: the verdic t “contra dicts the great w eight of the evidence,” “the jury disregarded the applicable rules of l aw,” or “the jury’ s verdict is tainted b y legal error commi tted by the trial court before or during the trial.” 139 Defendants’ contentions do no t support gra nting a new trial. a. Measuremen t of Asbestos Released by Sh otgun Shel ls Defendants challeng e the methodology employed by Plaintif f to detec t asbestos fibers in the air following shotgun dischar ge. 140 Def en dants contend “the AHERA/ISO-size d structures Plai ntiff repeate dly referenced du ring trial are not probative of the critical medical causation issue in this case.” 141 But Dr. Compton 136 Id. at 29. 137 Pl. Resp. at 27, 29. 138 Envolve Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. v. Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., 2023 WL 5604201, at *10 (Del. S uper. Ct. Aug. 30, 2023) (inte rnal citatio ns omitted). 139 Id. at *9 (inter nal citatio ns omitted). 140 Def. Mot. at 25- 28. 141 Def. Mot. at 28.

27 explained that the OSHA method proposed by the Defendants detects “only the tip of the iceber g.” 142 Further, he explained: [T]he AHERA met hod is d esigne d to u se TEM to evalua te t he pr esence of asbestos in air. ... It provides a useful tool to look at an air sample and somewhat rapidly determine wither or not t here are any asbestos fibers there bu t at a level t hat’ s higher m agnification than PCM. [W]ith PCM, you are counting only those fibers that are longer than five microm eters, but with TEM and the AHERA method, you are counting anythin g that’ s longer tha n 0.5 micrometers in le ngth. So it’ s a more total co unt in that re spect. . .. 143 And the fibers detected through Plaintif f ’ s methodology are “probative of the critical medical causation issue in this case;” 144 Dr. Frank testified that s hort fibers, not visible under a light micr oscope, “are ca pable of pr oducing dis ease.” 145 T o be s ure, the parties disagreed on t he methodolo gy used by each to measure airborne asbestos fibers generated by the firing of Defendants’ asbestos -containing shotgun s hells. Plaintiffs posited that Defendant s employed a methodology which underreporte d extant fibers and structures, while Defendants asserted Plaintif f ’ s methodology generated results “untethered to an y medical causation opinion.” 146 But each party was afforde d the opportunity to advance their respec tive theory 142 T ri al T r., 07/10/25 (morning) at 8 8:18- 19. 143 Id. at 85:17-86:5. 144 Def. Mot. at 2 8. 145 T ri al T r., 07/14/25 (morning) at 8 2:3 -4. 146 Def. Mot. at 25.

28 within the bounds of the law and each prof fered relevant exper t testim ony to explain the science beh ind the test ing they perf ormed. b. Shotgun Cle aning Defendants also contend that, by elicit ing evidence of Mr. Schoepke’ s gun cleaning, Plaintiff “invited t he jury to speculate that Mr. Schoepke was expose d to asbestos from gun cleanin g.” 147 T he Court all owed this evi dence “to t he extent tha t there are p ersonal o bservations they can testify to.” 148 But the Court also clarified with counsel that the ev idence was of limited relevance an d co nfirmed that there would not be “any arg ument that somehow gun cleaning has any impact on this particular in dividual’ s deve lopment of mes othelioma.” 149 The Court does not find Plaintif f ’ s evidence of Mr. Schoepke’ s gun cl eaning warrants a new trial. T o the extent th e Court erred in admitting this evidence, Rule 61 squarely a pplies: No error in either the admission or exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order in a nything done or omitted by the Court or by any o f the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or fo r vacating, m od ifying or oth erwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take action appears to the Cou rt inconsistent w ith substan tial justice. 150 147 Id. at 28. 148 T ri al T r., 07/16/25 at 274:17- 18. 149 Id. at 274:23-275:3. 150 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 61.

29 The Court f inds Defenda nts suf fered no prejudice from the admissi on of gu n cleaning evi dence. T he evidence, i f improper ly admitted, was harmle ss. 151 c. “Recall” Defendants contend Plaintif f ’ s argume nt that Defenda nt’ s failed to “recall” the shotgun s hells “impr operly inv ited the jur y to impose liability o n D efendants fo r failing to recall the s hotgun shells when there was no lega l duty t o do s o (an essential prerequisite for negligence liability).” 152 Plaintif f responds that “recall” eviden ce was pro perly of fere d to the jury a nd, to the extent i t pre sented c onfusion, the C ourt’ s limiting ins truction p roperly guided the jury’ s use of t he evidence. 153 Defendants’ objected th rough out trial t o P laintif f ’ s use of the word “r ecall” a s that word invokes a “regulatory process initiated by the CPSC” an d “[t]here is no such thing as a volu ntary recall.” 154 Recognizin g the wor d “recall” has an industr y- specific mea ning, and a more general mea ning, the Court invited counsel to pre pare an instructio n to properl y guide the jury if the term was m entioned dur ing trial. 155 151 See Cohen-Thomas v. Lewullis, 2016 WL 721009, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2016). 152 Def. Mot. at 29. 153 Pl. Resp. at 32. 154 T ri al T r., 07/16/25 at 270:9 - 10. 155 Def. Mot., Ex. M; see T rial T r., 07/16/25 a t 271.

30 Each party pro vided the Co urt with a draft limit ing instruct ion. 156 From the se submissions, an d b ased on exta nt law, the Court craf ted an instr uction informi ng the jury that: “Under the law applicable to this case, there is no duty to recall a product unless a statute or r egulation requires the product to be reca lled. In t he abs ence of a statutory o r re gulatory requirement, the t erm ‘recall’ mu st be a ssigned i ts commo nly understood mea ning, ‘to call b ack.’” 157 “A party is not e ntitled to a particular jury instruction but does have the unqualified right to have the jury instructed on a correct statement of the substance of the law.” 158 T o the extent Plaintiff may have sought to inject a duty upo n Defendants beyond that required by law, the Court’ s instruction informed t he j ury that, in the a bsence of a s tatute or regula tion, Defendan ts owed no suc h duty. A new trial is not w arranted. II. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST Following the jury verdict, the Court entered j udgment in favor of Plaintif f s for $9,000,000. 159 Plaintiff s then filed a “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment to 156 Def. Mot., Ex. M. 157 T ri al T r., 07/22/25 (morning) at 1 35:7 - 12. 158 Expr ess Scripts, Inc. v. Bracket Holdings Corp., 248 A.3 d 824, 838 (Del. 2021) (cleaned up). 159 D.I. 347

31 Include Pre-Judgment Interest.” 160 Defendants oppose, ar guing that Plaintif fs did not request interest in their first filed complaint and that interest is not allowed under Illinois law fo r survival ac tions. 161 A. LEGAL ST ANDARD “The recovery of prejudgment interest in Delaware is a matter of substantive law.” 162 And, the parti es have agree d that I llinois substan tive law applies. Illinois law, 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c), provides that “[i]n all actions brought to recover damage s fo r personal injury or wr ongful dea th... the plaintif f shall reco ver prejudgment interest o n all damages, except punitive damages, sanctions, statutory attorney’ s f ees, and statut ory costs, s et for th in the judgment.” 163 Under Il linois law, “[p]rejudgmen t interest. .. beg in[s] to accrue on the date the action is filed. If the plaintif f volun tarily dismisse s the action and refiles, the accrual of prejudgment interest shall b e tolled from the date the action is voluntarily dismissed to the date the action is refiled.” 164 “[I]nterest is calculated at the rate of 6% per annum on the amount o f the judgment, minus punitive damages, sanctions, statutory attorney’ s 160 Motion for Pre judgment Intere st. 161 D.I. 377 (“Def. Res p.”) at 1-2 162 Cooper v. Ross & Rober ts, Inc., 505 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Del. S uper. Ct. 1986). 163 735 ILCS 5/2-13 03(c). 164 Id.

32 fees, and statutory costs.” 165 W here t he language of a statute is clear, as i s the case with the Illinois’ statute providing for prejudgment interest, Courts have an obligation to app ly the statute. 166 B. ANAL YSIS Defendants ar gue t hat, beca use P laintif fs d id not r equest p rejudg ment interest in their original complaint, they are barred from seeking i nterest from the date of that filing under 735 IL CS 5/2-604.2. 167 Subsection (a) of t hat s tatute provides, “[e]xcept in personal injury actions, every cou nt i n every complaint and counterclaim must re quest specific rem edies the party believes it should receive from the court.” 168 But subsection (c) states “[e]xcept in the case of default, the remedies requested from the court do not limit the remedies available.” 169 “Putti ng these sections togeth er suggests that the re medies requeste d in the complaint do not limit the remedie s available when a case is adjudic ated on the m erits.” 170 It fo llows, under 5/2-604.2, tha t Plaintif fs failure to reque st prejudgme nt interest in t heir 165 Id. 166 Cotton v. Coccar o, 236 N.E.3d 517, 537 (I ll. App. C t. 2023). 167 Def. Resp. at 2. 168 735 ILCS 5/2-60 4.2(a). 169 735 ILCS 5/2-60 4.2(c). 170 See Schwartz v. Illinois Human Rights Commissio n, 256 N.E.3d 431, 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024).

33 original complai nt is not fatal, and “[p]rejudgmen t interest shall begin to accrue on the date the a ction is fil ed.” 171 Defendants next argu e that Plaintif fs are not entitled to prejudgment interest for sur vival act ions. 172 “The languag e of the statute is the b est ind ication of legislative intent, and courts give that language its plain and ordinary meaning.” 173 Under the ordinary meaning of 5/2 -1303(c), the statute applies to p ersonal i njury actions. 174 Personal injury actions that survive the decedent are actions to recove r damages, except actio ns to recover for slander and l ibel. 175 Plaintif fs survival acti on falls squarel y within the c lass of actions s ubject to prejudgment interest. Plaintif fs originally filed their complaint in Cook County Illinois on August 9, 2022. 176 Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Delaware Superior Court on Septembe r 7, 2023, 177 and voluntarily dismissed the Illinois complai nt on September 18, 171 735 ILCS 5/2-13 03(c). 172 Def. Resp. at 3. 173 Kr oft v. V iper T rans, Inc., 263 N.E.3d 1245, 1268 (Ill. App. Ct. 2 025) (citin g Mosby v. Ingalls Mem orial Hospital, 234 N.E.3d 1 10, 1 18 (Il l. 2023)). 174 735 ILCS 5/2-13 03(c). 175 755 ILCS 5/27- 6. 176 Motion for Prejudgment Interest, Ex. A (The Motion for Prejudgment Interest states the Illinois complaint was filed on August 9, 2022. The attached Exhibit A shows the Complaint was filed on May 16, 2023. Plaintif fs attached a copy of the Revised E xhibit A s howing the Or iginal Complaint filed on August 9, 2022. See D.I. 387). 177 D.I. 1.

34 2023. 178 Because the Delaware compla int was filed before the d ismissal o f t he Illinois case, interest is not tolled. 179 A nd under 5/2-1303(c) interest begins to accr ue at 6% per annum on the date o f filing – August 9, 2022 – and runs through entry of judgment – A ugust 1, 2025. 180 Pl aintif fs’ “Motion t o A lter or Ame nd Judgment to Include Pre-judgme nt Interest,” is GRANTED. The par ties shall prepare a form of final order of judgment co nsistent with t his decision. 178 Id., Ex. B. 179 See 735 ILCS 5/2-1 303(c). 180 7 35 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-1303(c); Motion for Prejudgmen t Interest, Ex. A, B; D.I. 1, D.I. 347.

35 CONCLUSION The parties vigorously li tigated the n ovel i ssue of whether exposure to an asbestos-containin g shotgun shell, through its firing, may serve as t he ca use for a shooter ’ s mesothelioma. In the end, ba sed on the facts presented, a j ury of this Court found that it could and found Remingto n and DuPont liable for the shooter ’ s – Mr. Schoepke’ s – injury and death. Defendants’ request for additional review under Rule 50 is understandable. But, having reviewed the evidence and argu ments, the Court finds the re quest mus t be de nied. Similar ly, to the exten t Defenda nts wish to revisi t certain rulings in their motion for a new trial, applying the lens of Rule 59, t hat too must fail. Finally, under Illinois l aw, the Court finds that Plaintif fs are entitled t o prejudgment interest as of the date of t he original filing. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants ’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Under Rule 50(b), o r, in the Alternative, for a New T rial, is DEN IED, and Plaintif fs’ Motion to Alter or Am end Judgment to Include Pre-Judgment Interest is GRANTED. IT IS S O ORDER ED. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Sean P. L u g g, J u d g e