Wu v. Wang - Summary Judgment Ruling

IN THE SUPE RIOR COURT O F THE STATE O F DEL AWARE CHENMOU W U,) Plaintiff,)) v.) C.A. No. N24C- 04 - 229 -PRW) HONGWEI WA NG, QINGJIE M I,) and SHUAI W ANG,) Defendants.) Submitted: February 10, 2026 Decided: February 26, 2026 Upon Plaintiff C henmou Wu ’ s Motion for Sum mary Judgme nt, DENIED. Upon Defenda nts Hongwei W ang, Qingjie Mi, and Sh uai Wang ’ s Cross-Motion f or Summa ry Judgment, GRANTED. ORDER HAVING FULLY CONS IDERED the Parties ’ Cross-Motions for Summar y Judgment (D.I. 1 5, 16); Defendants ’ Answering Brief (D.I. 18); Plaintiff ’ s Response thereto (D.I. 19); the authorities c it ed, a nd the entire record developed thus far, it appears to the C ourt that: (1) Plaintiff Chenmou Wu and Defendant Shuai Wang began dating in early 2022, and Ms. Wang move d into Mr. W u ’ s reside n ce in B ear, D elaware. 1 The couple had a chil d together. 2 1 Amend. Compl., 5 (D.I. 6); Answ er and Countercl., 1 (D.I. 9); De fs. ’ Op. Br. MS J, 2 (D.I. 16). 2 Am. Compl., 5; Answer and Countercl., 1; Defs. ’ Op. Br. S upp. MSJ, at 2. Although Mr. Wu

(2) The relationship soured. Some t ime in March 2024, Mr. Wu m oved out of the residence. 3 (3) At or around the same time of Mr. Wu ’ s dep arture, Ms. Wang ’ s mother, Qingjie Mi, and fa ther, Hongwei Wa ng, moved in. 4 (4) Litigation ensue d between the parties in both t he Justice of the Peace and Family Cour t s. 5 (5) Mr. Wu filed a pro se complaint in this Court against the Wang family (collectively, the Defendants), 6 w hich he has subsequent ly amended. 7 In Mr. Wu ’ s operative complaint, he seeks damages based on Defendants ’ occupancy of his residence and related events, asserting claims for breach of contract, transportation expenses, lost wages, “mental damages”, and other as s erted wrongdoing that mostly amount to chara ct er c riticisms of Defendants. 8 Mr. Wu allegati ons are grounded denies paternity, that assertion is immaterial to the resolution of the issues presently before the Court. Am. Compl., 5. 3 Defendants alleg e Mr. Wu wa s removed from the residence following a no -contact ord er from Delaware ’ s Justice of the Peace Court. Defs. ’ Op Br. MSJ, 2 – 4. Mr. Wu agrees that he was removed but states that Ms. Wang “ allegedly set a trap for the plaintiff by calling 911 under false pretenses, which resulted in .. . forced removal [of] the plaintiff from the home. ” Ame nd. Compl., 3 – 4. The truth of Mr. Wu’s allega tion of trap -setting is immaterial to the dispositi on of his claims. 4 Compl. 4 – 5; Answer and Countercl. Ex. A. 5 Answer and Countercl. Ex. A – C. 6 D.I. 1. 7 Amend. Compl. 8 See generally Amend. Compl.

in se v eral factual c ontentions, including: • That Defenda nts occupied his residen ce without paying rent; • That false reports were made which resulted in his removal from the residence; a nd • That Defendan t Mr. Hongwe i Wang enga g ed in threa t ening conduc t, including alleged acts described by Plaintiff as “Chinese folk witchcraft” and other pur p ortedly veiled threats. 9 (6) Defendants respon ded first w ith a pro se answer and countercla i m against Mr. Wu, including allegations of defamation and unpaid child support. 10 Defendants then retained counsel. 11 Since retaining counsel, Defendants have not advanced, br i efed, or o therwise reference d their co u nter cla ims before the Cour t. (7) Both parties have moved for summary judgment. 12 The briefing submitted addre sses onl y the claims asserted by Mr. W u and does n ot meaningfu lly address Defendants ’ counterclaim s. 13 Th e Court ’ s review of Defendants ’ claim s, therefore, looks to whether this Court retains subject-matter jurisdiction or whether Defendants ’ cou nterclaims ha v e been aba ndoned. (8) The Court finds that Mr. Wu brings no cognizable legal claims against Defendants; theref o re, Defenda nts ’ Motion for Summary Judgm ent is GRANTED. 9 See generally Amend. Compl. 10 Answer and Countercl., 4. 11 D.I. 12. 12 See generally Pl. ’ Op. Br. MSJ; Defs. ’ Op. Br. MSJ. 13 See generally Pl. ’ Op. Br. MSJ; Defs. ’ Op. Br. MSJ.

Correspondingl y, Mr. Wu ’ s Motion for Summary Judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law on his claims as plaintiff is DENIED. Further, Defendants ’ pro se counterclaim s are DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and abandonment. (9) Under this Court ’ s Rule 56, “ [s]ummary judgment is a ppropriate ‘ i f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits ’ show ‘ there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movin g party is e ntitled to judgmen t as a matter of law. ’” 14 The Court determines whether any genuine dispute of materia l fact exists while viewing th e record in the light most favorable to the n on-moving party. 15 An d if no such dispute exists and the movan t is entitled t o judgment as a matter of law, summary j udgment will be granted. 16 But at the same time, the Court need not resolve every fact u al allegati on to reach that determination. Summary judgment is also appropriate where “there is no ba sis in law on w hich the opposing p art y may successfully rely in opposing such a motion for summary judgment.” 17 Thus, w here a claim isn ’ t legally cognizable, 14 Options Clearing Corp. v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., 2021 WL 5577251, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2021) (quoting Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)). 15 AeroGlobal Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 871 A.2d 428, 444 (Del. 2005). 16 Brooke v. Elihu-Evans, 1 996 WL 659491, at *2 (Del. Aug. 23, 1996) (citing Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 312 A.2d 322, 325 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973)); see also Jeffries v. Kent Cty. Vocational Tech. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 743 A.2d 675, 677 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999) (citing Mitchell v. Wolcott, 83 A.2d 759, 761 (Del. 1951)) (“ However, a matter should be disposed of by summary judgment whenever an issue of law is involved and a trial is unnecessary. ”). 17 Emmert v. Prade, 711 A.2d 1217, 1220 (Del. C h. 1997); Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355,

judgment as a matter of law may be entere d irrespective of any “immaterial factual disputes.” 18 (10) First, Mr. Wu cannot succeed on his bre ach - of -contract claim. To recover rent or “housing” costs, Plaintiff must establish the existence of a l andlord - tenant relationship or other enforceable agreem ent obligating Defenda nts to pay rent. 19 The record contains no evidence of a written lease, a verbal rental agreement, or conduct gi ving rise to a n implied c ontract. 20 (11) The undisputed evidence affirmatively negates the existe nce of any contractual relati onship. Mr. Wu invited Ms. Wang to reside w ith him; there is no evidence that her occupancy was conditioned on payment of rent or other consideration. 21 After Mr. Wu departed from the residence, Ms. Wang ’ s parent s moved i nto the home at her inv i tation — not pu rsuant to any lease or rental arrangement with Mr. Wu. 22 Moreover, prior proceedings in th e Justice of the Peace 1365 (Del. 1995). 18 Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1365 (Del. 1995). 19 Malcom v. Dorseman, 148 A.2d 353, 355 (Del. 1959); Interim Healthcare, Inc. v. Spherion Corp., 884 A.2d 513, 548 (Del. Super. Ct.), aff ’ d, 886 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2005) (“ Under Delaware law, the elements of a br each o f contract claim are: (1) a contractual obli gation; (2) a breach of that obligation; and (3) resulting damages. ”). 20 See generally Amend. C ompl.; see also M alcom v. Dorseman, 148 A.2d 353, 355 (Del. 1959); Cap. Mgmt. Co. v. Brow n, 813 A.2d 1094, 1098 (Del. 2002) (citing C hase Manhattan Bank v. Iridium Afr. C orp., 239 F. S upp. 2d 402, 408 (D. Del. 2002)) (declaring that intent and mutual assent is required for an implied contract). Mr. Wu has never alleged a meeting of the minds between Defendants and himself. See generally Amend. Compl. 21 Amend. Compl., 5. 22 Compl. 4 – 5; Answer and Countercl., Ex. A.

Court expressly determined that no landlord -tenan t relationship existed betwee n Mr. Wu and Ms. Qingjie Mi. 23 Absent proof of an agreement, Mr. Wu ’ s contract theory fails as a matter of l aw. No agreement is provide d, evidenced, or eve n alleged. 24 To the extent Mr. Wu now attempts to assert the existence of such a contract, the Court ’ s doctrines of preclusion would b ar relitigating the matter. 25 Accordingly, h i s contract theory fails as a matter o f law. (12) Second (and similarly to the first), Mr. Wu ’ s freestanding claim for transportation costs and lost wages likewise fail s. He has identified no contractual, statutory, or o ther legal duty requiring Defendants to rei mbur s e such expenses. 26 Nor has he demonst rated a legal ly cognizab le basis tying tho se claimed l o sses to an 23 Answer and Countercl., Ex. A. 24 See generally Amend. Compl. 25 Columbia Cas. Co. v. Playtex FP, Inc., 584 A.2d 1 214, 1216 (D el. 1991) (“ Collateral estoppel bars a party from relitigating a factual issue previously litigated, while res judicata bars a suit involving the same parties based on the same cause of action. ”). California Stat e Teachers ’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 179 A.3d 824, 842 (Del. 2018) (quoting Riverdale Dev. Co. v. Ruffin Bldg. Systems, Inc., 146 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Ark. 2004)) (“‘ Coll ateral estoppel, or issue pr eclusion, bars relitigation of issues, law, or fact act ually litigated in the first suit. ’”); Answer and Countercl., Ex. A (“ The Court found . . . [Ms. Qingjie Mi] moved into [Mr. Wu ’ s] home for the sole purpose of tending to her grandchildren a fter t he domestic incident occ urred. As such, the Court determines [she] w as not a tenant when she moved into [Mr. Wu ’ s] home. Furthermore, the Court determines that a landlord tenant relationship does not exis t between the parties as [Mr. Wu] fails to establish that a rental agreement (verbal or written) existed between the partie s . . . ”). 26 Mr. Wu seeks a “ transportation fee of $40 per week day ” for the fifty -six days he was not residing in his home. Am. Compl., 2. As with his breach-of-contract theory, this claim is not grounded in any agreement or other cognizable legal obligation requiring Defendants to pay such expenses. He also seeks $1,260 for days he attended proceedings in various Delaware courts. Id. The Court cannot find any statutory or other legal basis permitting recovery of such litigation - related transportation costs in this separate action.

actionable wrong by D efenda n ts. W ithout a viable underlying claim, these damages cannot stand i n depen d ently. (13) Third, Mr. Wu ’s claim for “mental damages” i s not independently cognizable under Delaware law. 27 Typically, mental anguish constitutes a catego ry of damages, not a sta n dalone ca use of action. 28 Given the liberal standard it a pplies when construing pro se pleading s, 29 the Court has carefully considered whethe r Mr. Wu ’ s allegations may b e v iable under any recognized theory of liability that would permit recovery for emotional distress. They cannot. The closest potentially applicable t heory is intentional i nfliction of emotional d i stress (“IIED”). The Court therefore analyzes the claim under the IIED framework, as its failure under that standard necessarily demonstrate s the insufficiency of any other pot en tial emotional - distress claim. (14) To prevail for a cl ai m of IIED under D elawar e law, a plaintiff must establish that another, through extreme and outrageous condu ct, intentionall y or 27 Amend. Compl., 3. 28 Cf. Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del. 1984). 29 See Browne v. Saunders, 2001 WL 138497, at *1 (De l. Feb. 14, 2001) (“ As a general rule, we interpret pleading requirements liberally where the plaintiff appears pro se. ”); see also Vick v. Haller, 1987 WL 36716, at *1 (Del. Mar. 2, 1987) (“A pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, may be h eld to a somew hat less stringent technical stand ard than fo rmal pleadings drafted by lawyers. . . . ”); Buck v. Cassidy Painting, Inc., 2011 WL 1226403, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2011) (“When appropriate, this Court will provide pro se litigants some degree of latitude in preparing and presenting their cases.”).

recklessly caused him s evere emotional distress. 30 The emotional distress alleg ed must be substantially severe — i n fact, of such substan t ial quali ty or enduring nature that no reasonable p erson could be expected to endure it. 31 And liability “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or other trivialities. The law cannot intervene in every case where someone ’ s feelings are hurt.” 32 (15) Under Delaware law, Mr. Wu ’ s IIED claim fails. The conduct he alleges — Defenda nts ’ continued occupancy of the residence; 33 t heir participati on in a protective-order action and related court proceeding s; 34 his vaguely describe d claims that Defendants accuse d him of abusing them and his children; 35 contacting 30 Cooper v. Bd. of Educ. of Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 2581239, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2009) (“ Delaware applies Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 in defining the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress ”). 31 Doe v. Wildey, 2012 WL 1408879, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 2012); Ham v. Brandywine Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 1985 WL 189010, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 26, 1985); R estatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j (A.L.I. 1981). 32 Adams v. Aidoo, 2012 WL 1408878, at *10 (D el. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 2012), aff ’ d, 58 A.3d 410 (Del. 2013), as revised (Jan. 3, 2013) (quoting the trial court ’ s jury instructions); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (A.L.I. 198 1). Delaware sets a high bar for IIED claims. Compare Coll ins v. Afr. Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, 2006 WL 157 9718 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2006) (denying summary judgment on an IIED claim where a pastor allegedly made repeated sexually harassing and intimidating phone calls to a parishioner for nearly a year); with Farmer v. Wilson, 1992 WL 331450 (Del. Super. C t. Sept. 29, 1992) (gr ant ing summary judgment on IIED claim where sc hool officials took a student to a doctor for a sports physical without parental consent; the Court held that, although im proper, the conduct was not extr eme or outrageous and plaintiff ’ s stress and headaches did not amount to severe emotional distress). 33 See generally Amend. Compl. 34 See generally id. 35 Amend. Compl., 2 – 3, 8. The abuse allegations are pled in wholly conclusory terms. Wilson v. Metzger, 2021 WL 2355230, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. June 9, 2021) (“ Such allegations, with no

police about a m issing laptop, w h ich resul ted in Mr. Wu being quest i oned; 36 stating that Ms. Wang never intended to have a long -term marriage with h im; 37 and his characterizatio n of certain act s as threate n ing or in v olving “C hin ese f olk witchcraft” 38 — does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required to sustain an IIED claim. At most, the record reflects a deteriorated domestic relationship and contentious litigation. Such circumstances d o not qualify as intolerable c onduct. (16) Moreover, Mr. Wu has produced no evidence demonstrating s evere emotional distress of the type required under Delaware law. 39 No doubt these alleged acts were troubling to Mr. Wu — he is here in Court airing them in prolix filings — and some may seem beyond mere annoyances, but they are not groundin g for turning this private domestic dispute into a n actionable tort. This Court is not a factual support, do not satisfy [Plaintiff ’ s] initial burden on summary jud gment. His conclusory allegations merely mirror those in the complaint. As such, they, alone, do not demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact. ”). Mr. Wu vaguely suggests that Defendants lied about various abuse allegations to police and in other Delaware courts, but h e identif ies no specific statements, when exactly they were made, to whom exactly they were made, or what consequences followed. Nor do es he point to any e videnc e supp orting those assertions. Mr. Wu likewise fails to allege any concrete harm stemming from the purported accusations. 36 Amend. Compl., 2. 37 Id., 5 – 8. 38 The alleged “ witchcraft ” consists of bu rning papers, c hanting, and placing wood -shaped weapons and chopped w ood near and within the house. Amend. C ompl., 10 – 11. According to Mr. Wu, his name means “ Wood ” in Chinese, and therefore, chopped w ood is a veiled threat against his life. Id. 39 See generally Amend. Compl.

forum for converting the unpleasant, sometimes eccentric byproducts of a strained domestic relationshi p into claims for money damages. T he record contains no objective proof of distress so substantial or enduring that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. 40 A ccordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Wu ’s claim for “mental dama ges.” (17) Finally, Mr. Wu advance s various additional grievances and allegations not tied to any particular legal claim nor remedy that is availa bl e in th e Superior Court. 41 T o the extent not expressly addressed, they are either not p roper ly before this Court or ar e not tied to any c o gnizable cause of action. (18) Next, for the sake of completeness, the Court should turn to Defendants ’ counterclaims that were penned when they were s elf-represented. Defendants bring counterclaims that attempt to address child support payments. 42 By stat u te, the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to child support, including the establishment, modification, and enforcement of support obligations. 43 Thus, this Court simply cannot hear those claims. Given that thi s Court has no jurisdiction thereover, those child s upport counterclaim s are dismissed. 40 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j (A.L.I. 1981); see Doe, 2012 WL 1408879, at *5; Ham, 1985 WL 189010, at *3. 41 See generally Amend. Compl. 42 Answer and Countercl., 4. 43 D EL. C ODE A NN. tit. 10, § 921 (2026).

(19) The Court conclud es by reviewin g all of Defendants ’ other counterclaim s and grievances — in cluding that for defamati on. 44 This Court has the authority to dismiss claims for failure by the claimant to meaningfully preserve them. 45 A party’s failure to develop, brief, or otherwise pursu e as serted claims throughout the course o f litigation warrants treating those claims as abandone d. 46 Because D efenda nts have taken no action to substa n tively advance t h eir defamation allegations or any other grievances follo w ing their inclusion in the ir Answer, and counsel has not pursued them in motion practice or briefing, the Court deems those counterclaim s abandone d and di s misses the m accordingly. (20) For these reasons, Defendants have demonstrate d that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all Mr. Wu ’ s claims. Mr. Wu ’ s Motion fo r Summary Judgment seeking judgment in his favor as a matter of law is DENIED, and Defendants ’ Cross-Motion 44 See generally Answer and Countercl. 45 See Del. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 41(e), (f); Harrison v. Delaware Supermarkets, Inc. ex rel. Shoprite of Christ iana Crossing, 2014 WL 2718830, at *3 (Del. June 12, 20 14) (c it ing Gebhart v. Ernest DiSabatino & Sons, Inc., 264 A.2d 157, 159 (Del. 1970)) (explaining that the authority “stems from that court’s inherent power to ‘manage its own affairs and to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of its business.’”). 46 Park C tr. Condo. Counc il v. Epps, 723 A.2d 119 5, 1198 (D el. Super. Ct. 1998) (“Avoiding dismissal .. . require s more significant ac tion than taking steps to delay o r pre vent trial. A litigant must actively pursue a ca se from its inception through its re solution.”) (interna l citations o mitt ed) Wilmington Trust Co. v. Barry, 397 A.2d 135, 138 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979) (quoting Rovner v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 29 F.R.D. 488, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1962)) (“The purpose of rules such as Rule 41(e) is to dispose of pending cases where possible, not merely to permit liti gants to maintain a ‘faint spark of life in their litigation.’”).

for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defenda n ts ’ counterclaims are likewi se DISMISSED as either abando n ed or for lack of subject mat ter jurisdic t ion. SO ORDERE D, / s / Paul R. Wallace ____ ___ _____________ __ Paul R. Wallace, Ju dge Original to Pr othonotary Cc: All partie s and c ounsel