Delaware Supreme Court Opinion on Corporate Law Amendments

IN THE SUPREME C OURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWA RE THOMA S DREW RUTLEDGE, § § No. 248, 2025 Plain tiff Below, § Appe llant, § § Court B elow: Cour t of Chan cery v. § of t he Stat e of Delawa re § CLEARWAY ENERGY GR OUP § C.A. No. 202 5- 0499 LLC, a nd CHRIST OPHER S OTOS, § § Defe ndant s Below, § Appe llee s, § § and § § CLEARWAY ENERGY, INC., § § Nomi nal De fenda nt Bel ow, § Appe llee. § Submit ted: Nove mber 5, 2025 Decide d: Febr uary 27, 2026 Before SEITZ, Chie f Justi ce; VALIHUR A, TRAYN OR, LEG ROW and GRIFFI THS, Just ices, c onst ituti ng the C ourt e n banc. Upon Cer tifica tio n of Que sti ons of L aw fro m the C ourt of Cha ncery. CER TIF I ED QUEST IONS ANSW ERED. Grego ry V. Varallo, E squire (argue d), A ndrew E. Blum berg, Esqu ire, Da niel E. Meyer, Esquire, BERNS TE IN LITOWITZ BERGER & GRO SS MAN LLP, Wilm ingto n, Dela ware; Jeroen va n Kwaw ege n, Esqu ire, Edwa rd G. Tim lin, Es quire, Chris tophe r J. Orr ico, Es quir e, Thom as G. Jame s, E squire, BERNS TEI N LITOW ITZ B ERGE R & GR OSSM AN L LP, Ne w Yor k, New York; Joel F lem ing, Esquir e, La uren Godl es Mil groo m, Esq uire, EQUI TY LI TIGA TION GRO UP LLP, Bosto n, Massa chusetts; Aar on Morr is, Esqui re, L eo Kandino v, Esq uire, for Pl ainti ff Below, Appe llant Th omas Dre w Rutle dge.

2 Elena C. Nor man, Esquir e, Sk yler A. C. S peed, Es quir e, Aly ssa T. A tkiss on McKeeve r, Esqui re, YOUNG CONAWAY STA RGATT & TAYLO R, LLP, Wilm ingto n, Dela ware; Brian M. Lutz, Esqu ire, GI BSON, DUNN & CRUTC HER LLP, Sa n Fra ncisco, Calif ornia; Coli n B. Davi s, Esq uire, GIBSO N, DUN N & CRUTC HER LL P, Ir vine, Ca lifor nia; Jo natha n C. Bon d, Esq uire (argue d), Russell B. Bal ikian, Esqui re, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Was hingto n, D. C., for Nomi nal Defe ndan t Clearw ay Ener gy, In c. Srini vas M. Raju, Esquire, Ma tthew D. Perr i, Esqu ire, A ndre w L. Mila m, Es quire, RICHA RDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmi ngton, De laware, f or Defe ndant s Below, Appe llees Cle arway E nergy Gr oup LLC and Christ ophe r Sotos. Peter J. Wals h, Jr., Esqu ire, M ichae l A. Pi ttenge r, E squ ire, T. Brad Da vey, Esqu ire, Calla n R. Jackso n, Esquir e, Joshu a S. Almond, Esquire, POTTER ANDE RSON & CORR OON L LP, Wi lmin gton, Delawa re. Willia m Savitt, Esquir e (argue d), Rya n A. Mc Leod, Esqu ire, Anitha Redd y, Es quire, Alex ander S. M ackler, Esq uire, WAC HTELL, LIP TON, R OSEN & K ATZ, New Yor k, New York, f or Inte rven or t he State of Delaw are ex rel. G overn or Matthe w S. Meye r. Ned Weinberg er, E squir e, Mark D. Richards on, Esq uire, LABATON KELLER SUCH AROW LLP, Wilm ingt on, De law are, for Amici Curia e, Corpor ate L aw Aca dem ics in suppo rt of Appellant. John P. DiTom o, Esqu ire, Sar a Car naha n, Esquir e, Ja cob M. Perr one, E squir e; MORR IS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNN ELL LL P, Wilming ton, De laware, for Amic i Curi ae, Cor porate L aw Profe ssor s in supp ort of Appe lle es and t he St ate of Delaw a re. Willia m M. Laffer ty, Esquire, Lau ren K. Ne al, E squire, Phil lip R eyta n, Esqu ire, MORR IS NICHOLS AR SHT & TUNNEL L, Wilm ingto n, De lawa re; Nic ole A. Sahar asky, E squir e, M inh Ngu yen - Dang, Esqu ire, MAYER BRO WN LL P, Washin gton, D.C. for Amic us Curiae, the Socie ty fo r Corp orate G over nance, in suppo rt of Appell ees. Anthony A. Ric key, Esqu ire, MA RGRAVE LAW LLC, Wilmi ngton, De laware; Bria n T. Fra wley, E squir e, Ma tthew A. Sch wartz, Esqui re, Mi chae l T. Lema nski, Esqui re, Will iam S.L. Weinbe rg, Esqu ire, SUL LIVAN & C ROMWELL LLP, New York, New Yor k, for Amic us Cur iae, Chamber of Commerc e of th e Unit ed Stat es of Ameri ca, in suppo rt of Appell ees and I nterveno r t he Sta te of Del aware.

3 TRAYN OR, Justic e: With t he ag reeme nt of the partie s, t he Cour t of C hance ry c ertif ied f or our cons idera tion tw o ques tion s of law re gard ing the const ituti onal ity of re cen t amen dmen ts to the D elawa re Gen eral C orpor atio n Law (“ DGCL ”). The c halle nged amen dmen ts purp orte d to retr oact ivel y alte r the sta ndar d of re view t hat ap plies t o cert ain trans actions involving a control ling sto ckholde r. We conclud e that the stat utory a men dment s do not viola t e the Del aware Con stituti on. Sena te Bill 2 1 (“SB 21 ”) was pas sed b y both ho uses of t he 153 rd Gen eral Assem bly and si gned by the Gover nor in Marc h 2025. Among other thin gs, SB 21 amen ded § 144 of the DGCL, 1 a statut e that previous ly addres sed cont racts or transa ctio ns be twee n cor poratio ns an d int ereste d dire ctor s or of ficer s, to i nclu de “safe ha rbor” proce dur es for tra nsact ions be tween corpor atio ns and t heir con trolli ng stoc kholde rs. SB 21 also added a def inition of “cont rolling st ockhold er” to § 144 and se t a sta ndard f or asse ssi ng dire ctor inde pende nce a nd dis intere sted ness. Six wee ks after th e Governo r signed SB 21 into law, T homa s Drew Ru tledge, a stoc khol der of Cle arway Ener gy, Inc., br ough t a der ivat ive ac tion a gain st Clear way’ s form er C EO, Chr ist opher Sotos, an d the m ajor ity st ockho lder o f the compa ny, Cl earwa y Ener gy Gro up LLC, alleg ing tha t they brea ched t heir fi ducia ry dutie s. He claim ed t hat Cl earwa y over pai d Clea rwa y Energ y Group for an ass et 1 8 Del. C. § 144.

4 rela ted to a wi nd proj ect in I daho. Thi s trans acti on — pric ed at $10 7 milli on — was purp orted ly appr ove d by a c ommi ttee cons istin g of dir ecto rs tha t Clea rwa y’s major ity - confli cted b oard de eme d indepe nde nt. The deal eventually closed for $1 17 milli on and was not appr oved by a majo rity - of - th e - minorit y vote of Clearway ’s public stoc khold ers. This u nfair pr ice, Rutle dge all eged, was the res ult of C learway Energ y Grou p’s and Sotos ’ (colle cti vely, the “Clea rwa y Defend ants”) breac h of their f iduci ary du ties. He additi onal ly sou ght a judg ment de cla ring portions of S B 21 unco nstit utiona l. Spec ific ally, Rutle dge’ s comp laint a llege d that (i) SB 21’ s safe harbor prov ision s viola te Ar ticle IV, § 10 of the De lawar e Con stitu tion “b y purp or ting t o dive st [the Court of C hanc ery] of e quit able j urisdic tio n below th e cons titut ional m inim um esta bli shed by Artic le IV, Sec tion 1 0,” 2 and (ii) Sec tion 3 of SB 21 viola tes A rticle I, § 9 of the Dela ware Co nstit ution “ by purpor tin g to elimi nate ca use s of actio n that ha d accru ed or veste d befor e Sena te Bill 21 was adop ted.” 3 To ad dress these c onsti tutio nal i ssues a nd upon R utle dge’ s unop pose d moti on, the Cour t of Cha ncer y certif ied the foll owing questions to us under Artic le IV, § 11(8) of the De lawa re Co nstit ution a nd De lawar e Sup reme Court R ule 4 1: 1. Does Section 1 of Se nate Bill 21, codifie d at 8 Del. C. § 144 — elimi nati ng the C ourt of Cha ncery ’s abi lity to awar d “equ itab le reli ef” or “da mages ” where the Saf e Har bor Pr ovis ions are satisf ied — vio late 2 App. to Answering Br. at B7. 3 Id.

5 the Dela war e Const itutio n of 1897 by pur port ing to div est the Cour t of Chanc ery of it s equitab le jurisd iction? 2. Doe s Sec tion 3 of Se nate B ill 21 — applying the Safe H arbor Provi sions to p lenar y breac h of fiduc iar y claims a risin g from act s or transa ctio ns tha t occ urred bef ore t he dat e that Se nate Bi ll 21 wa s en act ed — viola te the Delaw are C onsti tutio n of 1 897 by purpor ti ng to elimi nate c ause s of a ction t hat ha d alrea dy ac crued or ves ted? In its ce rtif icat ion order, the C ourt of Chancer y conc lude d tha t “t he re is an impor tant a nd urge nt rea son for a n imme diate de ter mina tion of t he pose d que stion s by the Su prem e Cour t, the C ourt of C hanc ery ha s not dec ided t he ques tion s, and no fact s mater ial to th e issue certif ied a re in d ispute. ” 4 “ The court a lso fo und tha t the cert ified questi ons p ose q uesti ons of law . .. of firs t inst ance i n this S tate and a lso rela te to the cons titut iona lity, constr ucti on or ap plica tion of a stat ute i n this S tat e whic h has no t been, but s hould be, se ttled by the Supre me Co urt. ” 5 “ Finally, t he court c onclu ded tha t certif ica tion was w arran ted in the se uniq ue circ umst ances beca use De lawar e co urts, c orpor ati ons, l itiga nts, a nd tra nsac tion plan ners a like will benef it fr om the S upr eme Co urt re solvi ng the quest ions r esol ved. ” 6 Short ly afte r the c our t entere d its o rder bu t befor e de liverin g it t o this Co urt, the Co urt of Chanc er y grante d Go vern or Mat t Meye r’s m otion to int erve ne for purp oses of part icipa ting i n the a ppeal of the c ertif ied q uestio ns. 4 D.I. 3. (cleaned up). 5 Id. (cleaned up). 6 Id. (cleaned up).

6 In our or der a ccept ing the certif ied q uest ions, we “agre e[d] w ith the C ourt o f Chanc ery a nd [fo und] t hat ther e [we re] impor tant a nd ur gent re aso ns for a n imme diate dete rmina tion of th e ques tions c ert ified. ” 7 Fo r the reas ons stat ed below, we ans wer bot h ques tion s in the ne gative. More s pecif icall y, we c onclude first that, by establish ing a frame work f or the revi ew of ce rtai n tra nsacti ons in volv ing a contr ollin g stoc khold er or a contr ol grou p, the Safe Har bor Pro visio ns set for th in Secti on 1 of SB 21 do not co nflic t w ith Arti cle I V, § 10 of the Del aware Const itution. T hat i s so eve n th ough the pr ovi sions under certa in cir cums tance s affec t the C ourt of C hancer y’s a bili ty to aw ard equ itab le relie f or award dam age s in case s chal lengin g co ntroll ing - stockholde r trans actions. We con clude f urther that, by pro vidi ng that t he Sa fe Harb or Pro visio ns app ly to “a ll ac ts or tr ansac tions whet her occ urri ng before, on or afte r the ena ctme nt date, ” Sect ion 3 of SB 21 does not viola te Ar ticle I, § 9 of the Del aware Consti tutio n. I We dec ide th e consti tution ality o f the SB 21 am endment s at i ssue as presente d in the ce rtif ied que stio ns de novo. 8 When revie wing l egisla tive e nactm ents, w e foll ow our “ strong j udic ial tra ditio n” of pr esum ing the c onst ituti onali ty of th ose enac tmen ts. 9 We hav e emp hasiz ed tha t “[l] egisla tive a cts sh ould n ot be d istur bed 7 Id. 8 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Estate of Malkin, 278 A.3d 53, 59 (De l. 2022). 9 Opinion of the Justices, 425 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. 1981).

7 exce pt in cle ar case s . . . and sho uld no t be dec lare d inva lid un less [t he legis lati ve enac tmen t’s] in validit y is beyond doubt.” 10 “One who c halleng es the const itution ality of a s tatute ha s the bu rden of ov ercoming the p resumpti on of its valid ity.” 11 II Secti ons One and Th ree of S B 21 ad dress, among other t hing s, how direct ors and st ockhol ders m ay appr ove cor porate tra nsact ions in a way that lim its t he liab ilit y of con trol ling stockh older s. To p ut into cont ext the c hange s SB 21 e ffec ted, we f irst prov ide the jurispr ud entia l backgr oun d again st whic h the Ge nera l Assem bly an d the Gover nor ap prov ed the le gislat ion. We haste n to ackn owle dge that what foll ows is not an e xhau stive e xam inati on of th e evo lution of o ur law gover nin g judic ial re vie w of contr oll ing - stockholde r trans action s. We hop e, howe ver, th at a broad ou tline of certa in key t urnin g point s in this a rea wi ll ena ble the reader — one not stee ped in t he arcana of D elaware corporate law — to gain a general und erstand ing of th e backgr ound again st whic h SB 21 was ad opte d. A Over tim e, our cor por ate law jur ispru dence ha s deve loped sta ndar ds of rev iew that our c ourts w ill a pply when de ter mining whe ther c orpor ate fi duci aries — 10 Justi ce v. Gatchel l, 325 A.2d 97, 102 (Del. 1974) (citing Klein v. Nat’l Pressure Cooker Co., 64 A.2d 529 (Del. 1949)). 11 Id. (citing State v. Brown, 195 A.2d 379 (De l. 1963)).

8 typic ally, but n ot al ways, c orpor ate d irec tors — ha ve vio lated the ir fiduc iary du ty. On the more le nie nt end of the re vie w spec trum i s the busin ess ju dgmen t rule, which enti tles dir ect ors “t o a pre sumpt ion that the y were f aithf ul to t heir fiduc iary dut ies. ” 12 On the other end of the spec trum lie s the exacti ng ent ire - fa irne ss standa rd —“ the highe st standa rd of revie w in c orpo rate law.” 13 To sa tisfy t he ent ire - fairness stan dard, the defe nda nt bear s the bur den o f persua sion a nd mus t demon stra te that the tra nsac tion or a ct is ent irely f air, as to both pri ce and pr oces s, to the corp orati on and its st ockho lders. E ntir e - fair ness re vie w can be fact - intensive, so ent ire - fairn es s case s ofte n survi ve a m otion t o dismi ss, 14 whic h in tur n expo ses t he defen dant to furthe r litiga tio n expe nses and increa ses t he l ikelih ood t hat t he c ase wil l pro ceed to trial. Our l aw ha s lon g reco gnize d tha t whe n a co ntro lling stoc kho lder o f a corpor ati on engag es in a trans acti on with the c orpor atio n, the conf lict s of inte rest that i nhere i n the t ransa cti on call f or hei ghte ned scr utiny lest the inte rest s of the corpor ati on an d its mi nori ty stoc khold ers b e insuff iciently heeded. On th e one h and, 12 Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 104 8 (De l. 2004) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)) (emphas is i n original). 13 Maffei v. Palkon, 339 A.3d 705, 729 (Del. 2025) (quoting Ka hn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014)). 14 In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc, S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1180 – 81 (Del. 2015). (“ When [t he ent ire - fairnes s] standard is invoked at the pleading stage, the plaintiffs will be able to survive a motion to dismiss by interested parties regardless of the presence of an exculpatory charter provision because their conflicts of interest support a pleading - s tage infe rence o f disloyalty.”).

9 all stoc khol ders ha ve the righ t to vote the ir share s in their own best in teres ts. On the other hand, c ontr ollin g stoc khol ders o we a fid uciar y dut y of loy alty to the corpor ati on and i ts minor ity s tockh older s when t hey ex ercis e their c ontro l ove r corporate acti ons and decision s. On top of th at, whe n a c ontrol ling st ock holde r stan ds on b oth si des of a tran sact ion “ both cor pora te dec isio n - making bodies to whic h Dela ware c ourts ar dentl y defer — the boar d of dir ect ors an d disin terest ed voting sto ckholder s — are con si dere d compr omise d by the contr oller ’s influ ence.” 15 In rec ognit ion of th ese tensi on s and to protect against explo it ati on of t he min ority, when a c ontr ollin g stoc khol der enga ges in sel f - dealin g — tha t is, wh en it em ploys its contr ol to ca use t he cor porat ion to e nter i nto a tra nsac tio n in whic h the controll er receive s some thin g “to the ex clusi on of, a nd de trim ent t o, min ority stoc kholde rs” 16 — upon ju dici al revie w, the c ontr oller mu st demo nstr ate the in trinsi c fair ness of the tr ansa ction. This pr inci ple was fo rceful ly art icula ted i n Wein berg er v. U OP, Inc., 17 which involv ed a chall enge to a merger in which a corpora tion that was a majority stoc kholde r of it s subs idiar y acqu ired t he rema inin g share s, c ashing out the subsid iary’s minority sto ckholder s. In addr essing “the absence o f any atte mpt to 15 Maffei, 339 A.3d at 730 (quoting Larkin v. Shah, 2016 WL 4485447, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016)). 16 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 17 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).

10 struc ture [the ] tra nsaction on an arm ’s length ba sis ” and the effec ts of th e confli cts the co ntro lling s tockho lder’ s desi gnee s to the sub sidia ry’ s boar d fa c ed, this Court empha size d: T here i s no “safe harbo r” for such divid ed loyalt ies in Delawa re. When direc tors of a Dela ware c orpor ation a re on bo th side s of a tra nsac tion, they ar e requ ired t o demo nstra te the ir utm ost goo d fait h and the most scrup ulous i nhere nt fa irness of the ba rgai n. The re quire ment of f air ness is unf linchi ng in it s dema nd that w here one stan ds on both si des of a transa ctio n, he has the bur den of esta blish ing its e ntire fa irne ss, suffic ient to pa ss the te st of c arefu l scru tiny b y the c ourt s. 18 Bede viled b y t his predic ame nt, co rpora te - tra nsact ion pla nner s devise d “cleansin g” mec hanism s that w ould ass uage the concern s — the absence of arm’ s leng th nego tiat ions a nd the contr oller’ s coerc ive i nflue nce — a nimat ing the en tire - fair ness sta ndar d. On e such devic e is t he appr oval of the tr ansa ction by an infor med vote of a major ity of t he mino rity st ockh older s. In Rose nblat t v. Ge tty Oil C o., 19 th is Court held that, a lth ough a m erge r effec ted by a ma jorit y shar eholde r wa s subjec t to entire - fai rness r evie w eve n when a ppro ved by an inf orm ed vote of the m ajor ity o f the m inor ity sh areho lder s, suc h a v ote “ shifts the burde n of pr ovi ng the unfa irnes s of the m erge r enti rely to the pl aint iffs. ” 20 A deca de la ter, in K ahn v. Lynch C ommunic ation Systems, Inc., 21 this Court affirm ed the princi ples ann ounc ed in Weinber ger and Rosenb latt when i t co ns ide red 18 Id. at 710 (citations o mitted). 19 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985). 20 Id. at 937 (citation o mitted). 21 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).

11 whet her the a pprova l of a cash - out merger effect ed by a cont rolling stock holder b y an inde pend ent comm ittee of disin teres ted dire ctor s woul d alter th e revie w standa rd. Justi ce H olland, writing on beh alf of t he Cour t, em phas ized t hat suc h appr oval di d not pr ompt a lower stan dard of rev iew bu t noted th at it wa s anoth er way fo r defe ndant s to s hift the bur den of pers uasi on on to the pl ainti ff. Thus, und er Khan v. Lyn ch and Rosenbla tt, the defe nda nts co uld sh ift the burden of per suasi on to t he plai ntiff b y show ing tha t the cha llen ged transac tion wa s appr oved b y a well - funct ionin g inde pende nt com mitte e or that i t wa s app rove d by a ny inf orm ed major ity - of - the mi norit y vote. The bu rden - shif ting ap proac h was sma ll consol atio n for defe nda nts whos e claim s agai nst the m were subje ct to e ntire - fairne ss rev iew. As mention ed earlie r, those claim s gener ally cou ld not be dis misse d at the plead ing stage, and costly litig ation would foll ow. That cha nged with t his Co urt’ s 2014 d ecisi on in K ahn v. M & F Worl dwide Corp., 22 now c ommo nly re ferre d to as MFW, which c larif ied t ha t the em ploym ent of both burden - shifti ng de vice s in the sam e tran sact ion would chang e the s tand ard o f re view: To sum mariz e our holdin g, in con trolle r buy outs, t he bus iness judgm ent sta ndar d of r eview will be ap plie d if an d only if: (i) the contr oller c ond ition s the pr oce ssion o f the tra nsact ion on t he ap prova l of bot h a Spec ial C ommit tee and a major ity of th e minor ity stoc kholde rs; (ii) the S pecial C ommi ttee is indepe nden t; (iii) the Speci al Committ ee is empow ered to freely s elect i ts own a dvisors and 22 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).

12 to sa y no def init ively; (iv) the S pecia l Com mittee mee ts its d uty of ca re in ne gotiat ing a f air p rice; (v) t he vote of th e minor ity is info rmed; a nd (vi) t here is no coe rci on of the minor ity. 23 As we later ob served, “ MFW and la ter ca ses cl eare d the wa y for defend ants in con trolli ng stoc kho lder tra nsac tion s to gain p lead ing - sta ge dism issal o f compl aint s.” 24 But Weinber ger, Rosenbl att, Kahn v. Lync h, and MF W were all decided in the freeze - out mer ger co ntext. Our 2024 de cisi on in Mat ch addressed wheth er MF W ’s fra mew ork shou ld be ap plied t o tran sacti ons ou tside that co ntext. W e deci ded t hat it did: whe n a contr ollin g stoc khold er stan ds on bo th side s of a transa ctio n and re ceiv es a non - ratab le ben efit, “[t]h e pre sumpt ive sta ndar d of rev iew is ent ire fa irne ss, unl ess th e defe ndant s can sa tisf y all of MFW ’s re quirem ents t o chang e the s tand ard o f revie w to bus ines s judgme nt. ” 25 Accor din gly, un der our hol ding in Mat ch, “ [t] he cont rolling stockhol der ca n shif t the b urden of pr oof t o the p lain tiff by prope rly em plo ying a spec ial co mmit tee or an un affili ated stockh older vote. But t he use of jus t one of these proce dura l devic es does no t chan ge the stan dard of re view. If the cont rolling st ockhold er wants to se cure t he be nefi ts of busi ness j udgm ent r evie w, it m ust follow all MFW ’s requir eme nts. ” 26 23 Id. at 645 (footnote omitted). 24 In re Match Group, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 315 A.3d 446, 463 (Del. 2024). 25 Id. at 470–71 (emphasis in original). 26 Id. at 451.

13 B Separ ate fr om, bu t rela ted to, the case s addr essi ng stan dard s of re view disc ussed a bove, Court of Chanc ery jurispr udenc e an d this Court’ s case la w conce rnin g what co nstit utes “c ontr ol” of a corpora tion wa s deve lopin g. Our le vel - sett ing exe rcise he re nee d not ch art the c our se of the de velo pment of the c once pt of contr ol in t he con trol ling st ockho lder c ont ext. It suff ices for p rese nt purpo ses to summarize certain princ iple s that we re ex tant a s the Genera l Asse mbly c onsi dered SB 21. A nd for th at we tur n to o ur rece nt deci sion i n In re Or acle C orpo ratio n Deriv. Lit ig. 27 [A] stoc kho lder w ho own s or contr ols over 50% of a Delawar e corpor ati on's s tock is pr esum ed to e xercis e “har d” con trol a nd assu mes fiduc iary d utie s in ce rta in circ umst ances. Thi s is bec ause a majo rity stoc kholde r con trol s the le vers of power with in the corpor atio n. . . . Conve rsel y, a sto ckh older who o wns or c ontr ols le ss tha n 50% o f a corpor ati on ’ s vot ing po wer is n ot pres umed t o be a cont roll ing stoc kholde r wit h fiduc iary du ties. Even so, a minorit y stoc khold er can be a co ntroll ing sto ckho lder b y exerci sing ac tual c ontr ol over the corpor ati on's b usines s and af fair s or by e xerci sing a ctua l contr ol ove r a specif ic tra nsact ion. The tes t for ac tual c ontro l by a min orit y stockh older “ is no t an easy one to sa tisfy. ” The mi norit y stoc kho lder m ust ha ve “a com binat ion of pote nt voti ng power and ma nagem ent co ntrol s uch tha t the sto ckho lder coul d be dee med t o have ef fect ive c ontr ol of th e board wi thout actually ownin g a ma jorit y of st ock.” T o pro ve act ual co ntro l over a spec ific transa ctio n, a p lain tiff m ust pr ove t hat the mi norit y stoc kho lder 27 339 A.3d 1 (Del. 2025).

14 “exer cise d actua l contro l over t he boar d of dir ecto rs dur ing the c ourse of a pa rtic ular tra nsac tion. ” 28 With th is bac kgro und in mi nd, we tur n to th e relev ant pr ovisi ons of S B 21 an d the ar gume nts for and a gainst their c onsti tu tional ity. C SB 21 a men d s §§ 144 an d 220 of the Dela ware Ge nera l Cor porat ion Law. The ame ndmen ts to § 220, which go verns st ockhol der ins pecti ons of cor pora te books a nd rec ords, a re not i mpl icate d by the quest ions t he Court of Chan cery cert ified to us. W e ther efore c onfi ne our discu ssio n to the a men dment s to § 1 44. The most sign ificant ame ndments to § 14 4 are th e provisi ons gove rning cont rolling - stockholde r trans actions. Under § 144(e)(3), a contro lling - sto ckholder transa ctio n is define d as: [A] n ac t or tra nsact ion be tween the co rpora tio n or 1 or m ore of its subsi diarie s, o n the 1 han d, an d a contr olling s tockh older or a con trol grou p, on the o ther hand, or an act or tr ansac tion fr om whic h a contr ollin g stoc khol der or a contro l gro up rece ives a fina ncial or other benef it no t share d wit h the c orpora tio n’s st ockh older s gener ally. 29 SB 21 also redi rect s the previo usly me ntion ed judic ial de velopm ent of th e conce pt of “con trol” by def ini ng the term “co ntro lling st ockh older. ” Now, unde r § 144(e) (2), “ contr olli ng stock holde r” mea ns any per son tha t, toge ther wi t h such perso n’s af f i lia tes an d assoc iate s: 28 Id. at 19–20 (citations omitted). 29 8 Del. C. § 144(e)(3) (defini ng “Controlling stockholder transaction”).

15 a. Owns o r cont rols a majo rity in voting power of the ou tstandi ng stoc k of the cor pora tio n entit led to v ote gene rall y in the e lecti on of direc tors or in the ele ction of direct or s who h ave a majori ty in v oting power of the vote s of all direc tors on the b oard of dire ctor s. b. Ha s the r ight, b y co ntrac t or o ther wise, to cau se the elect ion of nomi nees w ho are se lecte d at the discr etion of such perso n and wh o cons titute e ither a major ity of the me mber s of the boar d of dir ectors or direc tors e ntit led to c ast a major ity in voti ng power of the votes of al l direc tors o n the board of direc tors; or c. Has th e power func tionall y equival ent to th at of a stockho lder that o wns or c ontro ls a ma jority i n votin g powe r of o utstan ding stock of the corp orati on e ntitle d to v ote ge neral ly i n the e lecti on of dire ctor s by vir tue of o wner ship or co ntro l of at lea st 1/3 i n votin g power of outsta ndi ng stoc k or the c orpo rati on en titled t o vote genera lly in the elec tion of d irect ors o r in the e lecti on of d irect ors wh o have a major ity in votin g power of the vote s of all direc tors on the boar d of direc tors and po wer to ex erc ise ma nager ial au thor ity ove r the b usine ss an d affair s of t he corp orat ion. Sect ion 14 4(e)(1) def ines “c ontr ol grou p” as “ 2 or m ore pers on s that ar e not contr ollin g stoc kho lder s that, by vir tue of a n agr eeme nt, a rrange men t, or unde rstanding between or among such p ersons, consti tute a contro lling stoc kholde r. ” The Sa fe Har bor Pr ovisi ons ref erre d to in the firs t certif ied qu estion r esid e princ ipal ly in § 14 4(b) an d (c). Un der sub sect ion (b), “a con trolli ng st ockho lder transa ctio n (ot her th an a goin g pri vate t ransac tio n) ma y not be t he su bject of equi table relie f, or give rise to a n awar d of dama ges, agai nst a d irec tor o r offi ce r of the cor pora tion o r any co ntro lling s tockh olde r or mem ber of a con trol gr oup, by reas on of a claim base d on a breac h of fidu ciary du ty” if one o f two of the cle ansing

16 mech anism s discu ssed ear lier ar e fo llowed. Subsect ion (b) codif ies th ose mechanisms, which a re employe d when: (1) The materi al fac ts as to s uch co ntrol ling st ock holder tran sactio n (incl uding t he con trol ling st ockho lder’ s or co ntrol gr oup’ s inter est there in) are di sclo sed or ar e known t o all memb ers of a com mitte e of the boa rd of dir ect ors to wh ich th e board of direc tors ha s expre ssl y deleg ated the a uthor ity to neg otia te (or ove rsee t he ne gotiat ion o f) an d to reje ct suc h contro ll ing stoc khol der tra nsac tion, and such c ont rollin g stoc kholde r tra nsact ion is ap prove d (or re comm ende d for appr oval) i n good f aith and with o ut gr oss ne glige nce by a m ajor ity of t he disin tere sted dir ect ors the n servin g on the com mitte e; pr ovide d that th e comm ittee consis ts of 2 or more direc tors, each of whom the boar d of direc tors has d eterm ined t o be a disi ntere sted direc tor with re spec t to t he cont rolli ng stoc khol der tra nsact ion; or (2) S uch c ontro lling stoc khol der tra nsac tion is co nditi oned, by it s term s, as i n effe ct a t the t ime i t is s ubmi tted to sto ckhol ders f or t heir appro val or rati fica tion, on the ap prova l of or rat ifica tion b y disin tere sted st ockh older s, and suc h con trolli ng st ockho lder tra nsac tio n is ap prove d or r atif ied by an i nforme d, un coer ced, a ffir mati ve v ote of a major ity of the v otes c ast by t he di sinter este d stock holder s; or i f neit her of t he mec hani sms is em ploye d, the n liab ility c an be a voide d only if the transa ctio n is de eme d to be “ fair a s to the cor pora tion a nd t he cor porat ion ’s stoc kholde rs.” 30 By ena ctin g subse cti on (b) of § 1 44, the Gene ral Assem bly di splac ed our ruli ng in Match. Su bsection (c) r eta in ed the MFW framework— the re quirement that both c lean sing me cha nisms be obs erved — but o nly for goi ng - pri vate tr ansac tio ns. 31 30 8 Del. C. § 144(b)(3). 31 “Going private transac tion ” is defined in § 144(e)(6) as either a Rule 13 e - 3 transac tion under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 or “ any controlling s tockholder transaction, including a merger, r ecapital izat ion, sh are purch ase, cons oli dation, amendmen t to the cert ificate o f

17 In essence, SB 21, and spec ifica lly su bse ctions (b) a nd (c) of ne w § 1 44, co di fied the re sult t hat the def endan ts adv ocate d, and we rejec ted, in Match. 32 Othe r provisi ons o f SB 21 that m ight a lso be fair ly char acte rized a s “saf e harbor s” inc lude (i) a de finit ion of “ disin tere sted dir ect or” as “a dire ctor who is n ot a part y to the a ct or transa ctio n and d oes not ha ve a ma ter ial inte rest i n the ac t or transa ctio n or a m ater ial rela tio nship with a perso n tha t has a ma teria l int erest i n the act or tra nsac tion,” and (ii) a reb uttabl e pre sump tio n that direc tors of p ublic compa nies a re di sinter ested i f the b oard ha s dete rmi ned tha t the d irecto r is inde pende nt un der ap plica ble s tock exc han ge rule s. Rele vant to t he sec ond cer tifie d quest ion, Sect ion 3 of SB 21 provi des that amend ed § 14 4 “ appl [ies] to al l acts and tr ansa ction s, whe ther oc curri ng befor e, on, or aft er the ena ctm ent of this Ac t” exc ept f or “any ac tio n or proc eedin g comm ence d in a co urt of compe tent juri sdicti on tha t is compl eted or pend ing . .. on or befor e Febr uary 1 7, 2025. ” 33 incorporation, tender or exchange offer, conversion, transfer, domestication or continuance, pursuant to which all or substantially all of the shares of the corporation's c apital stock held by the disinterested stockholders (but not those of the controlling stockholder or control group) are cancelled, converted, purchased, or otherwise acquired or cease to be outstanding.” 32 Subsection (b)(1) also departs from Match ’s holding that, for a special committee to be d eemed independent all directors serving on the committee must be disinterested. Under subsection (b)(1), if the co mmittee path is followe d, although the board is cha rged with determining tha t all members of the committee are disintereste d, the committee’s dec ision will be respected, e ven if the court were to disagree with that determination, if a pproved by a majority of the directors the c ourt deems independent. 33 S.B. 21, 153d Gen. Assemb. § 3 (2025).

18 D Rutle dge ar gues t hat SB 21’ s s af e harbor s are un constitut ional because they imper missi bly de pri ve t he Co urt of Chan cery of it s equi ty jur isdic tion. The s af e h arbor s, Rutle dge bel ieves, violat e Artic le IV, § 10 of the Delaware Cons titut ion of 1897, whic h imbue s the C ourt of Chance ry wi th the “jur isdict ion a nd powe rs ves te d by the la ws of thi s State [.]” 34 In his vie w, the s afe h ar bor s, which expressly requir e — un der cer tain c ondit ions — that an a ction m ay not be the “s ubjec t of equi table relief, or give r ise t o an a ward of dam age s,” caus e an u nconsti tutional reduc tion of the C our t of Cha ncer y’s equ ity j urisdi ctio n. 35 The Cle arwa y Defe ndant s and the Gover nor defe nd the am endm ents. As t o the s afe h a rbo r s, th e Clearwa y Defe ndant s e mphas ize t hat SB 2 1 doe s not red uce th e Court of Chance ry’ s juris dict ion, tha t is, its power to hear and de termin e a case, b ut inste ad pr ovide s a statut ory “r evie w fr amewor k” f or an alyzin g fi ducia ry - duty claim s. They also a rgue t hat the enac tment of th e amen dment s aligns with the histor y of the Gener al Assem bly exercis ing its power s to legi slate o n matter s of equi ty. The Go vern or large ly co ncurs w ith the C learwa y Def enda nts’ p osit ion but under score s tha t SB 21 do es no t redu ce th e Court of Chanc ery ’s eq uity j urisdic tio n 34 Opening Br. at 16 (quoting Del. Const. art. IV, § 10). 35 Id. at 26 –28 (quoting 8 Del. C. § 144(b)(1) (as amended by SB 21)).

19 beca use the amen dment s do no t dist urb i ts power to adj udica te. Th e Gov ernor stres ses th at the Co urt of Chanc ery reta ins j urisdic tio n over breach of fiduciar y duty claim s, and im port antly, has the p ower t o determ ine whe ther the r equirem ents f or the s afe h arbor s to a pply h ave been sa tisfie d. E It is n ot dis puted that s tockh older c omp lain ts alle ging that a contr ollin g stoc kholde r has breac hed i ts fiduc iary duty in a cor pora te tran sact ion to the de trime nt of min orit y stock hold ers fa ll wit hin the Cour t of C hancer y’s eq uity juris dict ion. I t is equa lly beyo nd disp ute tha t Artic le II of the Const ituti on of 1897 vest s “[t] he legi slative power of thi s State. . . in [the ] Ge neral A ssemb ly . .. .” 36 This le gislat ive power inc ludes t he p ower t o crea te an d ame nd the gener al c orpor ate la w wit h the concurre nce of two - thir ds of al l the memb ers e lecte d to e ach H ouse of the G enera l Assem bly. 37 That v oting thr eshol d was me t, wi th SB 21 passin g the Se nate by a vote of 20 - 0 (one abse nt) an d the H ouse of Repr ese ntativ es by a vote of 32 in fa vor, seven agai nst (two a bsen t). T he fir st cer tifi ed que stio n pits the a uthor ity of the C ourt of Cha ncer y to e xerci se its equ ity jur isdic tion a gai nst the Genera l Ass embl y’s po wer to legi slate. 36 Del. Const. art. II, § 1. 37 Del. Const. art. IX, § 1 (“No general incorporation law, nor any special act of incorporation, shall be enacted without the concurrence of two - thirds of all members elected to e ach House of the Gener al Assem bly.”).

20 Rutle dge de rive s his a rgum ent tha t SB 21 repre sent s an i mperm issi ble exerc ise of the Ge neral As sembl y’s leg islati ve po wer fr om two u nassa ilab le prem ises. The f irst pr emi se is t hat Ar ticl e IV, § 10 c onfer s equ ity jur isdic tion on th e Court of Chance ry. Thi s is well - set tle d. The se con d prem ise i s that t his gr ant of juri sdicti on em powe rs the Cour t of C han cery to fa shion equi table reme dies f or breac hes of fi duciar y duties. Like the fir st prem ise, this one is not di spute d. It is the conclus ion th at Rutledge draws f rom these premi ses tha t m ust b e tes ted. R utle dge concl udes that, because SB 2 1 alter s the contou rs of c orpo rate dir ect ors’ a nd offic ers’ f iduci ary du ties an d the sta ndar ds b y which t he Cour t of C hancer y mus t revie w brea ch of fid uciar y dut y claim s, it encroa che s imperm iss ibly o n that c ourt’ s equi ty juris dict ion. Th at conc lusio n, in o ur view, c olla pses u nder scr uti ny as our revie w of t he ca ses o n whic h Rut ledg e rel ies a nd the hist ory of the Gener al Assem bly’ s modif icati on of our gener al co rporat e la w dem onstr ate s. We begin, howev er, with a br ief hi stor ical sketc h of the gene sis of the Co urt of Cha ncer y’s e quity juri sdict ion. As th is Co urt ob serve d in DuPon t v. D uPont, 38 “no on e deni es tha t the ge neral e quity j uri sdicti on of t he Cour t of Cha ncery .. . is define d as al l the gene ral equ ity jur isdic tion of the High Court o f Chanc ery of G reat Brita in as it e xiste d prio r to the se parat ion of the co lonies, subje ct to the prov iso . . . that the C hancel lor s hall n ot he ar and deter mine a ny ca use w here a suff icien t reme dy 38 85 A.2d 724 (Del. 1951).

21 exis ts at la w.” 39 T he Cour t of C hancer y’s j uris dicti on is deepl y ro oted i n ou r cons titut ional histor y. Delaw are’s f irst C ons tituti on of 1776 carrie d for war d the equi table jurisd icti on tha t had been es tabli shed during the co lonia l er a in a stat ute known as the Gor don Act. 40 Unt il 1792, g enera l equi ty juris dic tion re sided in t he Court of Comm on Pl eas. The C onst ituti on of 179 2 crea ted the Cour t of Chanc ery as a sep arate court of equit y and ve sted “[t] he equ ity j urisdi ctio n heret ofor e exer ci sed by t he Ju dges of the Com mo n Plea s . . . in a Chan cell or, wh o shall hold Court s of Cha ncer y in the sever al co untie s of th is state.” 41 Th e Constitut ions of 1831 and 1 897 — our cur rent c onsti tutio n — mai ntai ned the Cour t of Cha ncer y as our co urt of equ ity. F The pr inci pal prec ede nts Rutl edge re lies u pon are DuPont v. DuP ont 42 and In re Arz uaga - Gue vara. 43 Neither, we conclu de, c ontrol s our answer to the first certi fied que stion. I n DuPon t I, the C ourt of C hanc ery considered in th e first insta nce th e cons titut ional ity of a sta tute t hat p urporte d to co nfer ex clus ive juri sdicti on ove r acti ons for separate maintena nce on t he Fam ily Co urt. There, a 39 Id. at 727. 40 Donald Wo lfe & Mi chael Pi ttenger, C ORPORATE AND C OMM ERCIAL P RACTICE IN THE D ELAWARE C OUR T OF C HANC ERY § 2.02b. 41 Del. Const. of 1792, a rt. V I, § 14. 42 79 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. 1 951), aff’d, 85 A.2d 724 (Del. 1951). In this opinion, we will r efer to the Court of Chancery opinion as “ DuPont I ” and this Court’s opinion as “ Dupont II.” 43 794 A.2d 579 (Del. 2001).

22 wife sue d her husba nd in the Co urt of Cha ncery in two a ctions for sep arat e mainte nance in a proceedin g that had no connecti on with a div orce acti on. 44 T he husba nd moved to dismi ss her a ctions, contend ing that the cour t had n o juri sdicti on to awar d such relie f. He argue d that the Court of Chance ry never had juri sdicti on over se par ate - ma inte nance pr ocee dings, but, eve n if it did, th e legisl ative act crea ting the Fa mily Cour t for New C astl e Cou nty — t he Fam ily C ourt Act — dep rive d it of juri sdicti on. The Co urt of Chan cer y conc luded that the sta tute in que sti on, by granting to the Fa mily C ourt e xclu sive juris dict ion ov er sup port a nd ma intena nce a ction s, purp orted to depr ive the Co urt of Chanc er y of jur isdic tion i n case s of t he ty pe the wife ha d fil ed in its cour t. B ut the na ture of the new f orm of acti on in t he Family Court v arie d in mat eria l respec ts fr om the separa te mai ntena nce ac tion t hat was tradi tiona lly ava ilab le in t he Court of Cha ncery. Hence, under this C ourt’ s teac hing in Gland ing v. Indust rial T rus t Co. 45 that t he Court of Chance ry’ s “con stitu tiona l juris diction may be cut down only by the subst itut ion of an ade quate r emedy in some other tr ibu nal,” 46 the C ourt of Cha ncer y focuse d on whe ther the Fa mily Co urt’ s separate - ma inte nance remedy was adeq uate. The cour t dete rmine d that, for a 44 The wife sought an award of separate support and maintenance alleging that she “was abandoned by her husband, without lega l cause and that she [was] in destitute and necessitous circumstance s.” DuPont I, 79 A.2d at 680. 45 45 A.2d 553 (Del. 1945). 46 DuPont I, 79 A.2d at 682.

23 number of reasons — inc ludi ng tha t the act ion in Famil y Co urt, whic h rese mble d a crim inal pr osec utio n, wa s contr olle d by th e Sta te an d the wi fe c ould not app eal — the Fa mily C ourt r em edy wa s inade qua te. Th e Cour t of C hanc ery t herefo re deni ed the h usban d’s mo tion t o dism iss, conc ludi ng tha t it had not bee n depr ived of it s juri sdicti on. The p lot th icken ed on a ppeal when this Co urt “r aise d on its own mot ion a basic c ons titut ional q uest ion ... : Is the g rant to the Co urt of C hance ry by S ecti on 10 of Artic le IV of the Consti tutio n of 1 897 of ‘ a ll the jur isdic tion a nd powers ve sted by the la ws of t his sta te in the C ourt of Cha ncery ’ s ubjec t to unre stric ted le gisla tive curta ilme nt by re ason of the i nclus ion i n Arti cle IV of Sec tions 17 an d 18?” 47 Find ing that § 18 “appl ies on ly to the po wers of the offic e of Cha ncell or in contra dis tinct ion to the ge nera l equi ty pow ers o f the C ourt of Cha ncer y,” 48 the Court focuse d on § 17. Th at sect ion pr ovide s, in re levan t part, that “[t]he Ge nera l Assem bly, no twith stand ing any thing c onta ined i n this Ar ticle, shal l have po wer t o repea l or al ter an y Ac t of the Gener al As sembl y giv ing jur isdic tion to . . . t he Cour t of Cha ncery .. . [a nd that it ] shal l als o have power t o conf er up on . . . the Cour t of Ch anc ery j urisd icti on and p ower s in a dditi on to t hose he rei nbefor e mention ed....” 49 After a ca reful analysis of t he cons titut ional developme nt of 47 Dupont II, 85 A.2d at 726. 48 Id. at 727. 49 Id.

24 the Co urt of C hance ry’s e qui ty juri sdic tion, the DuPont II majority conclud ed tha t Artic le IV, § 17 “doe s not a uth orize the Legislatu re to alter, ame nd, or rep eal any part of the jur isdic tion of the Co urt of Ch ancer y conf erre d upo n it by Section 10 of Artic le IV of the C onsti tutio n.” 50 But tha t jur isdict ion, t he Co urt ma de clear, i s subje ct to t he pr oviso that the Co urt of Cha ncery “ shal l not h ear a nd dete rmi ne an y cause where a suff icient remed y exists at law.” 51 Put anot her wa y, tha t pro viso “i s part of the co nsti tuti onal gra nt of equity jur isdi ction t o the C ourt of Chanc ery. ” 52 In a passa ge R utled ge cite s here with gr eat e mpha sis, Justic e Wol cott wrote: We concl ude . . . tha t Section 17 is not an auth orizati on to the Legi slatur e to res trict Chance ry juri sdict ion to le ss than it was in 17 92. We thi nk the C onst ituti ons of 179 2, 18 31 and 1 897 int ende d to estab lish fo r the bene fit of the pe ople of the state a tr ibunal to adm inister the re medie s and pr inciple s of eq uity. They sec ured t hem for the rel ief of the pe ople. This conclu sion is i n com plete ha rmon y with th e under lying theor y of wri tte n consti tutio ns. Its resu lt is to e stabl ish by the Ju diciar y Artic le of the C onsti tutio n the irre ducib le mi nimum o f the judic iary. I t sec ures f or the prote ctio n of th e peop le an a dequa te j udicia l syste m and re move s it fr om the vaga ries of legis lati ve whim. 53 50 Id. at 730. 51 Id. at 729. 52 Id. at 730. 53 Id. at 729.

25 The co urt t hen tur ned to t he suff icie ncy of “the purpor ted ly exc lusiv e [spou sal - maintenan ce] remedy ” 54 in the Fami ly Cour t and, find ing it la cking, affirm ed th e deci sio n of the C ourt of Chan cery. 55 While we comm end t o all wh o are int erest ed in sta te con stitu tiona l law a nd the hi story of the Cour t of Cha ncer y a read ing of the n - Vic e Chanc ellor Seitz’ s opini on in DuPon t I and Ju stice Wolcott ’s majorit y opinion and Ju stice Tunnell ’s disse nt in DuPont II, we do not v iew the opini ons as we ighi ng agai nst th e const itution ality o f SB 21. SB 21 doe s not ope rate l ike the statute crea ting t he Fami ly Cour t’s pur porte dly exc lusi ve jur isdic tion in Du P ont I and II. SB 21 does not dive st the C ourt of Chance ry of j u risdic tion of any cause of ac tion, nor does it direc t any cl aim or ca tegor y of clai ms to an other c ourt. B reach of fi duciar y du ty claim s rema in withi n the undis pute d jurisd icti on of the Cour t of Chance ry. Indee d, Rutl edge’s cla im itself r emains wit hin the Cou rt of Chanc ery’s j urisdi ction, alb eit subje ct to a revie w fr amewor k he fi nds unf avora ble. Althou gh the relie f — equitable relief or damages — the Cour t of Cha ncery forme rly wo uld con sider is no w unava ilab le when i t deter mine s tha t a chal len ged tra nsac tion ha s bee n appr oved by one of the t wo stat utor ily des igna ted c leans ing mec hanism s, SB 21 d oes n ot stri p the 54 Id. at 734. 55 In dissent, Justice Tunnell voiced his vie w that “whether the substituted remedy is adequate or not is entirely for the judgment of the General Assembly, and this court’s views as to its adequa cy are unimportant.” Id. at 735 (Tunnell, J., dissenting).

26 court of it s juris dict ion over equi tabl e claim s. In ste ad, SB 21 repr ese nts, i n our vi ew, a legi timate exer cise of the G enera l Asse mbly’ s aut hority to enac t sub stant ive la w that, in it s legis lat iv e jud gment, serves th e intere sts of the cit izens of our State. No r doe s Arzuaga - Guevara i mpe l us to conclud e othe rwise. Arzuag a - Guevara 56 inv olved a guard ians hip pr ocee ding i n which the mo ther of a ser iousl y injur ed four - month - old child pet itione d the Cour t of C hanc ery to be a ppoi nted guard ian f or the pur poses of con sent ing to or wit hhol ding t he chi ld’s medic al trea tment. T he chi ld’s fa ther objec ted t o the Co urt of Ch ance ry’s j urisdi ctio n, argui ng tha t three su bsect ions of 10 Del. C. § 921 g ranted exclu sive jurisdic tion of such ma tter s to t he Fam ily Cou rt. The fat her co nten ded tha t § 9 21 (3), (4), and (1 6) dive sted the Court of Chancer y of sub ject ma tter ju risdic tion de spite the unamb iguo us gran t of jur isdic tion t o t he Cour t of Cha ncery t o appo int guar dia ns fo r disa bled pers ons in 12 Del. C. §3901. 57 This C ourt ma de shor t wor k of th e argum ent, n otin g that two o f the subs ection s of § 921 cit ed by the f ather — subse ction s (3) a nd (4) — “d id not gra nt the Fam ily Cour t any jurisdi ction to a ppoint guard ians f or min ors. ” 58 And rel ying i n part on the legis lati ve syn opsis of the b ill i n 56 794 A.2d 579 (Del. 2001). 57 12 Del. C. § 3901 p rovides that “[t]he Court of Chancery shall have the power to appoint guardians for the person or property, or both, of any person with a disability. . .. ‘Person with a ‘disability’ means [amo ng other things] any person who . . . [b]y reason of being under the age of 18 is legally unable to m anage their own property or make dec isions concerning the care of their own person . . . .” 12 Del. C. § 3901(a)(1)– (2). 58 794 A.2d at 583 (emphasis in original).

27 whic h subs ecti on (16) orig inate d, wh ich e xpres sly st ated that the Fam ily C our t’s juri sdicti on wa s to be conc urre nt wit h that of t he Cour t of C hancer y, the Court deter mine d that t he Fa mily C ourt’ s juris dict ion was not ex clusi ve. In s hort, t he Court’ s co ncl usion that 10 Del. C. § 92 1 did n ot di vest th e Cour t of C hanc ery of its equi ty jur isdic tion was ba sed o n its i nter preta tion of § 921 an d not on c onsti tutio nal princ iple s. 59 The oth er decisi ons Rutl edge most frequently cit es — Schoo n v. Smith 60 and CML V, LLC v. Bax 61 — get u s no close r to an answe r to t he first certif ied que stio n. Both wre stle w ith the scope of der ivat ive st anding but nei ther ad dresse s a leg islati ve effor t to di vest the Cour t of Ch ance ry of its equ ity jur isdi ction. The qu estio n here, a t bott om, is n ot whe ther the Genera l Ass embly ma y elimi nate a segme nt of the Co urt of C hanc ery’ s equi ty juris dict ion — jur isd ictio n that is time - honor ed an d firml y gro unded in our s tate c onsti tutio n — without simu ltane ousl y esta blishi ng an a dequa te le gal rem edy i n anothe r tri bunal. It may not. The quest ion is wh ether Secti on 1 of SB 21 ef fect s the res ult Ru tled ge claim s that i t does. We co nclude that i t doe s not. 59 The Court did, however, engage in a thoughtful review of the history of the Court of Chancery’s equity jurisdiction and DuPont II. But it did s o in its consideration of the fathe r’s alternative argument that t he exi sten ce of an adequ ate rem edy at l aw in the Fam ily C ourt preclu ded the Court of Chancer y ’s assertion of guardianship jurisdiction. 60 953 A.2d 196 (Del. 2008). 61 28 A.3d 1037 (Del. 2011).

28 The ca ses addre ssed ab ove, th ough no t suppor tive in o ur view of R utl e dge’s argum ent, pr ovide exam ples of what a d ives titure of jur isdict ion loo ks like. In DuPont, the husband’ s argument was that, by virtue of an act of the Ge neral Assem bly, t he Cour t of Cha ncer y could n o longe r adj udica te separa te mai nte nance actio ns br ought by dest itute spo uses. T hat wo uld d ivest the C ourt of Chan cer y of its equ ity juri sdic tion with out prov id ing a remedy in anothe r tribunal equivale nt to the re medy avai lable in the Co urt of C hanc ery. T hus, the arg ument was re jecte d. I n Arzuaga - Guevar a, the father asser ted tha t 10 Del. C. § 921 too k from the Cour t of Chanc ery i ts guar dians hip jur isdi ction a nd gave i t to the F ami ly Cour t. T he C ourt dispo sed of this a rgum ent as a m atte r of st atut ory inte rpre tati on. By c ontra st, SB 21 does n one of the thi ngs tha t prom pted c ou rts in DuPont and Arz uaga - Gue vara to susta in the C ourt of Cha ncer y’s j urisdi cti on. G When we lo ok else where, we find su pport f or our conc lusi on that the Ge nera l Assem bly ac ted wi thin it s const ituti onal le gisla tive a uthor ity whe n it ena cte d SB 21. In G lassman v. Unoca l Explora tion Corp., 62 thi s Cour t cons idere d “w hether a minor ity stoc kho lder ma y chal lenge a sh ort - f orm me rger by see kin g equi table relie f thro ugh an e ntire fa irnes s claim.” 63 The claim c lashed w ith 8 Del. C. § 253, whic h 62 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001). 63 Id. at 247.

29 auth orize s a st ream lined p roce ss for s hort - form mer ger s. The proce dure, the Cour t note d, “is i ncon siste nt wit h any re asona ble n otion of fa ir deal ing[]” 64 for va rious reas ons, inc lud ing t he abs ence o f not ice t o the m inori ty stoc khol ders, direc tor approv al or a stockhold er vote.” The Cour t res olved the co nfli ct “by givi ng effe ct to the i ntent o f the G enera l Assem bly. ” 65 Th is holdi ng in Gl assm an has remaine d undis turbe d for a quar ter cen tury. 66 Glassma n ’s defe renc e to the Genera l Ass embly ’s aut horit y to ad opt DGC L prov ision s that sha pe the contour s of eq uitable claim s and aff ect the relief availa ble in intr a - cor porate lit igati on is borne out b y the DGCL’ s hi story. E xer cisin g “[t ]he legi slative power of this S tate,” 67 the Gene ra l Assem bly ena cted the DGCL in 1899. And, n ot sur prisin gly, the Gener al Ass embl y has am ended th e DGC L, on oc casi on — as, in part, he re — in r espo nse to j udicia l dec isio ns. For ins tance, in the wake of Smith v. Va n Go rkom 68 and a perce ive d dire ctor s and of fice rs lia bili ty in suranc e cr isis, t he Gener al Ass embl y ena cted 8 Del. C. § 102(b) (7) al lowi ng corp orate c har ters t o excul pate d irec tors fr om pers onal l iabi lity in d amage s for du e care vi olatio ns. I n a simi lar way, when t his Cour t up held the fac ial va lidit y of fe e - shif ting byl aws in ATP 64 Id. 65 Id. at 248. 66 Rutl edge concedes that “ Glassman ’s holding li kely cannot survive a ruling in [his] favor.” Reply Br. at 17. 67 Del. Const. art. II § 1. 68 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that director s m ay be persona lly liable in money damages for gross negligence in the decision-making process).

30 Tour, Inc. v. Deutsc her T ennis B und, 69 the Ge nera l Assem bly am ende d 8 Del. C. § 102 by a dding a new sub paragr aph (f), to pro hibit “an y [cha rter] provis ion tha t would imp ose lia bili ty on a stoc khol der f or the att orney s’ fees or ex pense s of the corpor ati on or an y other pa rty i n conne ction with a n inter nal c orpora te cla im . .. .” In bo th the se ins tance s, the Gene ral A ssem bly ac ted in re spo nse to jud icial decisi ons by enac ting s tatute s it beli eved ser ved t he best i ntere sts of t he cit izen s of Delaware. And in bo th, the legi slat ive resp onse a ffec ted how the Cour t of Cha ncery m ight, absent the st a tut ory e nactme nt, e xerci se it s equi tabl e jur isdict ion. As yet a nd s o far as we know, no one has mo unte d a cons titut ional c halle nge to § 102(b)(7) or § 102 (f). But if we were to a ccep t Rutle dge ’s expa nsive r eadi ng of Ar ticle I V, § 10, both w oul d stand on cons tituti ona lly shak y gro und. A nd other se ctio ns of the DGCL would f eel the sha kin g. We have alrea dy men tione d the sho rt - for m mer ger pro cedur e author ize d by 8 Del. C. § 253. A s ment ioned, Rut ledge h as ac knowle dge d that C learwa y and t he Gover nor a re c orrec t tha t Glassma n ’s hol ding th at the in tent of the Gener al Assem bly a s expre sse d in § 25 3 take s preced ence over t he Cour t of Cha ncer y’s entire - fai rness j uris prude nce “l ikel y can not sur vive a rul ing in [his] f avor. ” 70 Oth er 69 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 70 Reply Br. at 17.

31 secti ons wh ose c onstit ution al foo ting would be thre ate ned inc lud e § 122(17), 71 § 141(e), 72 § 174(a), 73 § 327, 74 and § 367. 75 And ironica lly en ough, as Clea r wa y point s out, “un der [Rut ledg e’s] t heory, the pre - amend ment - vers ion of § 144 w ould itse lf be uncon stitu tiona l. 76 After a ll, th e pre - a mendm ent ve rsion of § 144 pre vente d the Co urt of Chanc ery from appl ying t he com mon law pr inciple that intere sted transa ctions we re enti rely i nvalid. To sum mariz e, we c oncl ude Ru tledge has not met his bur den of overc oming the pre sumptio n of SB 21’s c onstitut iona l valid ity. T he G enera l Assem bly’ s enac tmen t of SB 21 fal ls with in the “broad and a mple sweep” 77 of its le gislat ive power. III The sec ond que stion asks w hether Se ctio n 3 of SB 21, w hich pr ovide s that amen ded § 14 4 will appl y to “al l acts a nd tr ansac tions, whet her oc curri ng bef ore, on, or af ter the ena ctmen t of [SB 2 1],” vi olate s Artic le I, § 9 o f the Con stitu tion o f 71 8 Del. C. § 122(17) (allowing corpora tions to renounce specific corporate opportunities, protecting fiduciaries from a breach of the duty of loyalty). 72 8 Del. C. § 141 (e) (prote cting directors from liability when they rely in goo d faith upon corporate records, information, opinions, and reports). 73 8 Del. C. § 174(a) (exoner ating directors from liability if they rec ord their dissent to unlawful dividend payments or stock purchases). 74 8 Del. C. § 327 (abrogating common law derivative standing by imposing a continuous stock - ownership requirement). 75 8 D el. C. § 367 (imposing a stock - ownership requ irement for standing to bring an action ag ainst a public benefit corporation). 76 Clearway’ s Answering Br. at 31. 77 Coll ison v. State ex r el. Green, 2 A.2d 97, 101 (Del. 1938).

32 1897 b y eli mina ting c auses of ac tion that a lread y accr ued or vest ed. 78 Under Ar ticle I, § 9: A ll cour ts shall be open; an d every in divid ual for an in jury don e to the indiv idua l’s rep utat ion, person, or mo vable or imm ovable p ossessi ons, shal l have reme dy by the due c ourse of law, a nd ju stice admi nister ed accor ding to the very r ight of the caus e and the law of the land, w ithou t sale, denia l, or u nreas onable de lay or expense. We have inter preted Art icle I, § 9 to guar ante e the sam e rig hts as a re secur ed by the due pr ocess c lauses of the Fif th and Four teen th Ame ndme nts of th e fede ral const itution. 79 This gu arante e pr otect s citiz ens a gains t “unre asonable and a rbitr ar y depri vati on of r ights wh ether relat ing to lif e, liber ty, pr oper ty, or fund ament al ri ght s of ac tion re latin g to p erson or pro perty. ” 80 Rutle dge contends that he has a prope rty r ight i n his bre ach of fi duciar y duty claim that had al read y a ccru ed o r vest ed befo re the Gene ral As sembly ame nded § 144. He argue s that the legis lati on strip s him of h is pro pert y right retroactive ly witho ut the bene fit of due proce ss unde r Ar ticle I, § 9. We disa gree. 78 D. I. 3. 79 Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Const. Co., 489 A.2d 413, 416 n.5 (“The terms ‘due course of la w’ and ‘law of the land’ in Del. Const. Art. I, § 9 are analogous to the term ‘due process of law’ in the F ourteenth Amendment.”); see al so Opinion of the Justices, 246 A.2d 90, 92 (Del. 1968) (The phrase “law o f the land” has “substantially the s ame meaning as the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution.”). 80 Bailey v. Pennington, 406 A.2d 44, 46 – 47 (Del. 1979) (quoting Gallegher v. Davis, 183 A. 620, 624 (Del. Super. Ct. 1936)).

33 A Delaware law re cognize s a pres umpt ion ag ains t the ret roact ive a pplic ation of legi slatio n. 81 As we have state d, “[l]la ws ap ply retr oact ively on ly where t he Genera l Assem bly ha s made its inte nt plain and u namb iguou s.” 82 H ere, th e legi slature was clear: a mende d § 144 is t o apply t o “all acts an d transact ions, whether occ urring befor e, on or a fter” the dat e of enac tment e xcept f or “an y actio n or proce edin g comm enced in a co urt of c ompeten t juris dic tion t hat is c omple ted or pend ing . .. on or before Februar y 17, 2025.” 83 Such le gislatio n is sti ll subj ect to t he te st of du e proce ss. Acts o f the legi slatur e “ma y not arbi trarily e xting uish a right of actio n which redre sses e ssenti al righ ts of perso n or proper ty.” 84 Indeed, “a veste d right of a ction is prope rty j ust a s tang ible thin gs are, a nd is prote cted from arbitr ary le gislat ion, ap ply[ing] to those righ ts of a ction whic h sprin g from c ontrac ts or the c ommon la w.” 85 But “[a] vested righ t is some thin g more tha n a mere expe ctat ion base d upon an ant icip ate d cont inuanc e of t he ex istin g law.” 86 81 A.W. Financial Svs., S.A. v. Empire R esources, Inc., 981 A.2d 1114, 1120 (Del. 2009) (quoting State ex. rel. Brady v. Pettinaro Enter., 870 A.2d 513, 529 (Del. Ch. 2005)). 82 Id. (citations omitte d). 83 S.B. 21, 153d Gen. Assemb. § 3 (2025). 84 Cheswold, 489 A.2d at 418 (citing Gallegher, 183 A. at 624). 85 Hazzard v. Alexander, 173 A. 517, 519 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934). 86 Id. at 518.

34 In Che swold V ol. Fi re Co. v. Lambe rtso n Constr. Co., a case tha t did not invol ve the r etroacti ve ap plica tion of a sta tute, the Co urt ex plain ed the princ iple in lang uage R utle dge ci tes in s uppor t of his ca use: While the L egislatu re remai ns free to lim it or expun ge c ommon law righ ts, we ar e mindf ul tha t this p ower mu st be exercis ed in conf ormit y with the dicta tes of due pr ocess. W e are mindf ul, too, th at the Legis lature may not arb itraril y extin guish a right of action which redresses essent ial ri ghts o f per son or prope rty. Th us, w hile n o one h as a vest ed i ntere st in a rule of the common law, due pr oces s pre serve s a righ t of ac tion w hich has ac crue d or veste d bef ore the effe ctive date o f the stat ute. 87 But co ntrar y to what Rutle dge c ontend s, SB 21 d oes no t exting uish h is rig ht of ac tion. He may yet c halle nge the Clea rway tr ansact ion bas ed up on alle gation s that Clear way’s CEO and ma jority s tockh olders br eache d their fi duciar y dutie s. To be sure, the cour t must now revie w the cha llenge d transac tion u nder s tatu tory stan dards that c hange d after the tra nsact ion clo sed b ut bef ore Ru tled ge file d suit. It is hig hly ques tiona ble, howeve r, that the statutor y cha nge eff ecte d the exti nguis hmen t of Ru tledge ’s ve sted ri ght. His i ntere st, to the c ontrary, appe ars t o be mor e “an a nticipat ed con tinua nce of the existin g law” than a vested propert y right. But eve n if we wer e to accep t the pro posit ion that SB 21 ext ingu ished a ve sted righ t, it wo uld sti ll be incu mbent on R utled ge to dem onstra te that the Genera l Assem bly di d not e xerci se its le gisla tive author ity in conf ormity wit h the dicta tes of 87 Cheswold, 489 A.2d at 418 (interna l citations omitte d).

35 due pr ocess. As Ch eswol d ma kes cle ar, when a l egisla ture lim its or expun ges comm on law r ights, “the di ctates of d ue pro cess” 88 must be obser ved. We als o reco gnize d that “[w]he n revie wing ec onom ic leg islati on the d ue proce ss guaran tee of the F ourte enth Am endment [— the sta nda rd we app ly to Ar ticle I, § 9 — ] requires that t he sta tute be ar a reas onab le rela tion to a permi ssible le gis lative obje ctive. ” 89 Given that the G eneral A ssembl y has the cons titutio nal a uthority to cr eate and modif y the gener al cor porate law o f Delaware, it seems e vident t o us th at SB 2 1 is desi gned to f urther a permiss ible le gisla tive object ive. B The other cas es Rutled ge cite s in sup port of his argument a gainst the retr oacti vity of S B 21 ca nnot b ear the wei ght he ask s the m to c arry. Mona celli v. Grime s concer ned whet her a c hange in the statut ory substitut ed - serv ice proc edur es that a pla intiff mu st follo w to subje ct a non - resi dent def endant to in perso nam juri sdicti on re troactiv ely altere d subst antive rights. 90 T he cha nge in su bstit uted - servic e procedu re conferr ed up on the pla intiff “a le gal right wh ere none bef ore exis ted.” 91 Thus, we determ ined tha t the sta tutory re visi on “involve [d] the 88 Id. 89 Id.; see also Town of Cheswold v. Central Del. Bus. Park, 188 A.3d 810, 821 n.58 (Del. 2018) (“[A] st atute m ay r etroact ively r each p roperty ri ghts wh ich hav e vest ed and may c reate n ew obligations with respect thereto, provided that the statute is a valid exercise of police power.” (quoting Price v. All American Engineering Co., 320 A.2d 336, 340 (Del. 1974)). 90 Monacell i v. Gri mes, 99 A.2d 255, 258 (Del. 1953). 91 Id. at 267 (quoting Ashle y v. Brown, 151 S.E. 725, 727 (N.C. 1930)).

36 funda menta l noti on of due pr ocess of law and he nce dea l[t] with subs tantiv e righ ts.” 92 Amende d § 144 operat es qui te differ ently; it ma y affe ct the sta ndar d of rev iew, but it does n ot aff ect a s ubsta ntive right wit hout due pro cess. Cons istent wi th Monacelli, in Re n nick v. G lasgow Re alty, I nc., 93 a pre mises liab ility ca se, the fed eral di strict co urt dec lined t o retr oact ively apply a n amende d versi on of Delawa re’ s Gue st Prem ises Sta tute 94 becau se it wou ld “impos e a new duty up on defe ndant s whic h did not exi st at the ti me of the ac cide nt.” 95 In addition to that, the cour t “per ceive [d] no thing which in dica tes a legis lat ive inte nt that [the amen ded sta tute] be ap plie d retroa ctive ly.” 96 These disting uishing factor s d rain Re n nick of any per suasive forc e it may oth erwise br ing to bear. Final ly, i n A.W. Finan cial Ser vices, 97 this C ourt c onsid ere d whet her a 20 08 amen dmen t to the Delaw are Es cheat St atute woul d app ly retr oacti vely i n civil actio ns inv olvin g stoc ks that wer e esch eate d prior to th e ame ndmen t. We a nswere d “no, ” becau se “the re [wa s] no expre ssed st atutory in tent, l et alone one that i s plai n and un ambi guous that th e 200 8 amen dmen t have re troacti ve effe ct.” 98 T he effect of the am endm ent, mor eover, wa s to pe rmit the Stat e to di vest a stockh olde r of a 92 Id. 93 510 F. Supp. 638 (D. Del. 1981). 94 25 Del. C. § 1501. 95 Re n nick, 510 F. Supp. at 641. 96 Id. 97 981 A.2d 1114. 98 Id. at 1120.

37 Delawa re corpo ration o f a pr operty right — owner ship i nteres t in the stock. Seen in this lig ht, A.W. Finan cial Se rvices is a poor fit f or an a naly sis of am ended § 144, whic h invo lves a cle ar statem ent of le gisl ative i nten t, is sup porte d by a leg itima te legi slative purp ose, and does n ot wre st a ve sted proper ty rig ht from Ru tled ge’s hand s. As wit h his c halle nge to § 1 of SB 21, Rut ledge has not m et his bur den of overco ming th e presump tion tha t § 3 of SB 21 is cons titut iona lly val id. IV We end w here we bega n, answ erin g both q uesti ons cer tified to us by the Cour t of Cha ncery in the ne gative. The pr ovis ions of S B 21 that Rutle dge h as cha llenged neit her dive st the Co urt of Cha ncer y of its con stitu tion ally der ived eq uity juri sdicti on nor do the y imper miss ibly e xting uish an y disc erni ble ve sted r ight asser ted by R utledge.