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Feb. 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

JOHN RANDALL BRYANT v. MELVIN K. DOLOFF

Court of Appeals of Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A25A1515

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (23)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (17.7K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

THIRD DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
MARKLE and PADGETT, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

February 25, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

A25A1514. BRYANT v. DOLLOFF et al.
A25A1515. BRYANT v. DOLLOFF et al.

MARKLE, Judge.

After John Randall Bryant was injured in an auto accident in 2019, he and his

wife, Belinda Bryant (collectively “the plaintiffs”), filed separate suits against the

other driver, Melvin Dolloff. The cases were consolidated for trial, and the jury

awarded the plaintiffs $311,000, which the trial court later reduced based on amounts

the plaintiffs had already received from insurance. The plaintiffs now appeal, arguing

that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motions to amend the

consolidated pre-trial order; (2) the trial court erred by granting motions in limine to

exclude additional witness testimony, and evidence of alcohol use and willful and
wanton conduct; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to give their requested jury

charges; and (4) the trial court erred by amending the judgment to allow a deduction

in the award. After a thorough review of the record, and for the reasons given below,

we affirm.

Following a jury’s verdict and a trial court’s subsequent entry of
a judgment, this Court must affirm the judgment if there is any evidence
to support the verdict, because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the
weight and credibility of the evidence. We must construe the evidence
with every inference and presumption in favor of upholding the verdict.

Dunwoody Obstetrics & Gynecology v. Franklin, 363 Ga. App. 90, 91 (870 SE2d 592)

(2022) (quotation marks omitted).

So viewed, the evidence shows that John was injured in a head-on collision for

which Dolloff was at fault. The accident shattered John’s left ankle and damaged his

knee. He required surgery and physical therapy, but later started to develop

osteoarthritis in the left knee, and he never fully returned to pre-accident status. John

was self-employed and, as a result of the accident, he lost income and had to hire

someone to assist him.

2
John then filed suit against Dolloff and served his uninsured/underinsured

motorist insurance carrier, State Farm, alleging negligence and seeking punitive

damages. Dolloff was insured with Progressive. John settled his claims against

Progressive and executed a limited release, which included his punitive damages

claim. Two years later, in a separate suit, Belinda sought loss of consortium and

punitive damages. John and Belinda moved to consolidate their cases for trial.

State Farm moved for partial summary judgment as to punitive damages, and

the parties entered into a consent order agreeing that there would be no recovery

against State Farm for punitive damages. This consent order specifically states, “[t]he

parties agree that there shall be no recovery by Plaintiffs of UM/UIM

benefits/payments from State Farm’s available coverage as to Plaintiffs’ claims against

Defendant for (1) punitive damages and (2) attorney’s fees and expenses of

litigation[.]” (Emphasis added.)

On September 7, 2023, after the parties completed discovery, the trial court

entered a consolidated pre-trial order (“PTO”), identifying the negligence claims for

trial. The PTO listed a claim for actual damages, but not punitive damages. In the

PTO, the plaintiffs requested a verdict form that specified only whether the jury found

3
in favor of the defendant or the plaintiffs. It further noted that State Farm had already

paid $345,000 in uninsured motorist coverage, and that John received $25,000 from

Progressive, and the plaintiffs requested “the amounts paid [by State Farm] be

deducted from any verdict” in their favor.

Three weeks before trial, the plaintiffs moved to amend the PTO, asserting that

they needed to clarify the admission of certain evidence and witnesses. Specifically,

the plaintiffs sought to add claims of willful and wanton conduct based on allegations

that Dolloff was driving under the influence; present evidence as to the curb weight

of the two vehicles involved in the accident; and to submit evidence of Dolloff’s

toxicology reports to show he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the

accident. They again did not list punitive damages in their request to amend the PTO,

but they did propose a verdict form that set out damages to John and Belinda

individually, and they removed any reference to the deduction for amounts previously

paid. Following a hearing, which was not transcribed, the trial court rejected the

plaintiffs’ arguments and denied the motion. Thereafter, the trial court agreed to stay

the case and re-open discovery for the sole purpose of investigating John’s lost wages

claim.

4
State Farm also filed a motion in limine to exclude any reports of Dolloff’s

alcohol use. State Farm noted that the issue of punitive damages was not for

consideration, as Dolloff had admitted fault and such damages were not listed in the

PTO.1 As such, State Farm asserted that evidence of alcohol use would be unfairly

1
The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant, not compensate
for the injury. See OCGA § 51-12-5.1(c). Thus,

[p]unitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it
is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions
showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or
that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious
indifference to consequences.

Negligence, even if gross, will not alone authorize the recovery of
punitive damages; there must be circumstances of aggravation and
outrage.

Mastec N. Am., Inc. v. Wilson, 325 Ga. App. 863, 866 (755 SE2d 257) (2014), called
into question on other grounds by Quynn v. Hulset, 310 Ga. 473 (850 SE2d 725)
(2020). See also OCGA § 51–12–5.1(b). It is well-settled that an insurance company
is not liable to its insureds for punitive damages under its uninsured motorist
coverage. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weathers, 260 Ga. 123 (392 SE2d 1) (1990).
5
prejudicial under OCGA § 24-4-403. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the

motion.2

In February 2024, the plaintiffs filed a second motion to amend the PTO. This

time, they asserted that the PTO should be amended to include testimony of the curb

weight of the vehicles and financial testimony from the employee John hired to handle

tasks he was unable to perform during his recovery; and to reflect Belinda’s claim for

punitive damages against Dolloff, including evidence that Dolloff was driving under

the influence. They further suggested that the trial court could bifurcate the trial and

address Belinda’s punitive damages claim separately.

During a hearing on the motion, the plaintiffs asserted that only John had

waived his claim for punitive damages; Belinda had not. They also explained that the

curb weight evidence was necessary to show the force of the impact. The trial court

denied the motion, noting that punitive damages had not been identified in the initial

PTO. The trial court noted that the original PTO had been negotiated by the parties,

and the plaintiffs had not shown why the revisions could not have been presented

earlier.

2
The record on appeal does not contain any transcript from the hearing.
6
At the subsequent trial,3 the court excluded any evidence of alcohol use, and it

declined to give the plaintiffs’ requested jury instructions regarding willful and wanton

conduct. The jury heard medical evidence regarding John’s injuries and the likelihood

that he would continue to suffer the effects of those injuries; and it heard from Belinda

concerning how the accident had affected her. The jury found in the plaintiffs’ favor

and awarded them a lump sum of $311,000.4

The plaintiffs moved to amend the judgment, asserting that the joint award was

void, and they moved for a new trial. State Farm moved to deduct from the judgment

the amount it had already tendered to John. The trial court denied the motions for

new trial and to amend judgment, and it granted the motion to apply the deduction.

The plaintiffs now appeal.

1. In these appeals, both John and Belinda raise the same enumerations of error.

We thus address both appeals together.

3
By that point, State Farm had elected to defend in Dolloff’s name. OCGA §
33-7-11(d).
4
The plaintiffs renewed their objection to the verdict form, but the trial court
declined to alter it because it was the form plaintiffs had agreed to in the PTO.
7
The plaintiffs first argue that the trial court abused its discretion by denying

their motions to amend the PTO because delay alone is insufficient to support a

denial; Belinda had claimed punitive damages in her complaint, meaning there was no

prejudice to the defendants to amend the PTO to include punitive damages; and

justice required allowing them to amend the PTO. They further argue that the trial

court abused its discretion when it denied their second motion to amend the PTO

because the evidence was relevant to rebut testimony of lost wages and to explain the

relevance of curb weight to the jury. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion in

the denial of either motion.

Under the Civil Practice Act, the pretrial order “controls the subsequent course

of the action unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.” Ga. Dep’t of

Human Res. v. Phillips, 268 Ga. 316, 318 (1) (486 SE2d 851) (1997). The purpose of the

PTO is to “limit the claims, contentions, defenses, and evidence” to be presented at

trial. Id.

Once a pretrial order is entered, a party may not amend without
leave of court or consent of the opposite party. In passing upon the issue
of whether to allow an amendment, the trial court considers if permitting
such amendment would prevent manifest injustice and in doing so it is
clothed with a broad discretion with which the appellate courts are loath

8
to interfere ... In the absence of a viable claim of surprise or unfairness,
a trial court’s refusal to amend a pretrial order is not an abuse of
discretion. The Georgia Supreme Court has emphasized the vital role of
the pretrial order in ensuring an efficient and expeditious trial, as well as
the duty imposed on each party to assist the trial court in preparing a
pretrial order that accurately identifies the real issues in the case ... [I]f
pretrial orders are to continue to serve their laudable purposes, courts
and litigants must take them seriously. A final pretrial order should say
what it means, and mean what it says.

Whorton v. Boatwright, 233 Ga. App. 369, 371 (504 SE2d 216) (1998) (citation

modified). See also Dep’t of Transp. v. Baxley, 194 Ga. App. 29, 29-30 (1) (389 SE2d

519) (1989); OCGA § 9-11-16(b). “If a claim or issue is omitted from the order, it is

waived.” Buckelew v. Womack, 374 Ga. App. 711, 716(2) (913 SE2d 789) (2025).

In evaluating a motion to amend a PTO, “the trial court must balance possible

unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party with the movant’s reasons for delay.” Bolden

v. Ruppenthal, 286 Ga. App. 800, 803 (2) (650 SE2d 331) (2007) (quotation marks

omitted).

We have held that a trial court abuses its discretion when it denies leave to

amend a PTO based solely on the trial calendar. See Total Car Franchising Corp. v.

9
Squire, 259 Ga. App. 114, 116 (1) (576 SE2d 90) (2003).5 But there is no abuse of

discretion where a party seeks to add issues that are irrelevant to the pending claims

or doing so would prejudice the opposing party. See Whorton, 233 Ga. App. at 371 (no

abuse of discretion where party seeking leave to amend the PTO had already been

denied the evidence in a motion in limine). With these standards in mind, we consider

each motion to amend the PTO.

(a) First motion to amend.

In the first motion to amend the PTO, the plaintiffs sought to add claims of

willful and wanton conduct related to Dolloff’s alleged driving while intoxicated; to

introduce evidence of the vehicles’ curb weigh and Dolloff’s toxicology reports; and

to amend the verdict form.

Importantly, evidence related to willful and wanton conduct, such as the

toxicology reports, was not relevant to the issues at trial because the trial court had

previously entered a consent order granting summary judgment to State Farm on the

issue of punitive damages. See Mastec N. Am., Inc. v. Wilson, 325 Ga. App. 863, 866

5
The plaintiffs rely heavily on Total Car, but we find that case distinguishable
as the record reflects that the trial court here did not base its decision solely on the
trial calendar.
10
(755 SE2d 257) (2014) (punitive damages are available where there is clear and

convincing evidence of willful and wanton conduct), called into question on other

grounds by Quynn v. Hulsey, 310 Ga. 473 (850 SE2d 725) (2020); OCGA

§ 51–12–5.1(b). In that order, the plaintiffs expressly agreed that there would be no

recovery from State Farm as to their claims for punitive damages. Allowing the

plaintiffs to change their theory of the case from negligence to wanton and willful

conduct, and to pursue a claim that they failed to assert in the initial order, would have

resulted in prejudice to Dolloff and State Farm. Whorton, 233 Ga. App. at 371.

Moreover, the plaintiffs have not shown that the failure to include these claims in the

original PTO was the result of surprise or unfairness; rather, it was an error of their

own making. Phillips, 268 Ga. at 318 (1) (noting that the PTO “is an indispensable tool

for the efficient disposition of civil litigation matters. ... The Code imposes a duty on

each party to assist the trial court in formulating the pretrial order by defining the

issues for trial, and deciding such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the

action.”) (citation modified); Buckelew, 374 Ga. App. at 716(2) (claims not raised in

the PTO are waived); Bolden, 286 Ga. App. at 803 (2) (court must balance “possible

unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party with the movant’s reasons for delay.”);

11
Whorton, 233 Ga. App. at 371. Cf. Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Ass’n., 260 Ga. App.

150, 154-55 (1)(a) (579 SE2d 37) (2003) (no abuse of discretion where trial court

modified the PTO to conform to stipulation by the parties).

Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend to

correct the verdict form because there is nothing improper in the original verdict form.

See Bristol Consulting Group v. D2 Property Group, 366 Ga. App. 843, 852-54(3) (884

SE2d 546) (2023) (no error in verdict form that awarded lump sum to plaintiffs on

their claims). As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the

motion to amend.6 Whorton, 233 Ga. App. at 371. Cf. Redfearn, 260 Ga. App. at 154 -

55(1)(a).

(b) Second motion to amend.

6
We note that there is no transcript of the hearing in which the court
considered the issue, and we assume the trial court followed the law. Holmes v.
Roberson-Holmes, 287 Ga. 358, 361 (1) (695 SE2d 586) (2010) (“There is a presumption
of regularity that attaches to all official acts, which includes judicial proceedings,” and
courts apply that presumption where there is no transcript of the hearing under
review). Moreover, at a subsequent hearing, the defendants reminded the trial court
that the plaintiffs sought to amend the complaint to raise issues that had already been
negotiated between the parties, and the new witnesses named in the proposed
amended PTO were cumulative of other named witnesses.
12
As to the second motion to amend, the plaintiffs again attempted to introduce

evidence of the curb weight of the vehicles, along with testimony from the employee

whom John had hired to assist while he recovered. They also argued that Belinda’s

claim for punitive damages against Dolloff was not subject to the agreement

concerning punitive damages sought against State Farm. But, the plaintiffs have not

shown why they were unable to raise these claims at the time of the original PTO or

even in the first motion to amend the PTO. Whorton, 233 Ga. App. at 371. Rather,

plaintiffs’ counsel admitted at the hearing that there was no reason the information

he sought to include in the second motion could not have been raised earlier. Driggers

v. Campbell, 247 Ga. App. 300, 301 (1) (543 SE2d 787) (2000) (“The burden is on the

party seeking amendment to show lack of laches or lack of inexcusable delay.”)

(quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, the jury was able to view photographs of the cars involved and could

see for itself the difference in size. Curb weight testimony was unnecessary. Whorton,

233 Ga. App. at 371. The plaintiffs were also able to present evidence of the assistant

John hired, and the testimony confirmed that he was hired to handle the tasks John

was unable to do post-accident. The employee’s testimony would have been

13
cumulative and, therefore, there was no abuse of discretion in denying a motion to

amend the PTO to include this evidence. Nease v. Buelvas, 198 Ga. App. 302 (401

SE2d 320) (1991) (no abuse of discretion given the “chronology of this case and the

redundant nature of the testimony”).

1. The plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred by granting the motions to

exclude evidence of Dolloff’s alcohol use at the time of the accident and of his habitual

driving while intoxicated because this evidence was relevant to proximate cause,

punitive damages, and impeachment. We disagree.

“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine for abuse of discretion.

A motion in limine is properly granted when there is no circumstance under which the

evidence under scrutiny is likely to be admissible at trial.” Hankla v. Jackson, 305 Ga.

App. 391 (1) (699 SE2d 610) (2010) (citation modified). See also Barefoot v. Denson,

364 Ga. App. 64, 67(4) (873 SE2d 733) (2022). Evidence is admissible if it is relevant,

OCGA § 24-4-402, but it may be excluded where “its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading

the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation

of cumulative evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403.

14
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence of alcohol

use.7 As discussed in Division 1, willful and wanton conduct and punitive damages

were not before the jury, so any evidence regarding such conduct or relating to

punitive damages was not relevant.

Pretermitting whether the plaintiffs preserved their argument that the evidence

was relevant for proximate cause, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion

by excluding evidence of Dolloff’s alcohol use. Even if the evidence were relevant to

the issue of proximate cause, because Dolloff admitted fault but did not admit liability,

its admission is still subject to the balancing test in OCGA § 24-4-403. See Schwartz

v. Brancheau, 306 Ga. App. 463, 465-66 (1), 467(2) (702 SE2d 737) (2010). In the

absence of a transcript, we presume the trial court properly applied the case law and

the balancing test to determine unfair prejudice. Holmes v. Roberson-Holmes, 287 Ga.

358, 361 (695 SE2d 586) (2010) (in the absence of a transcript, we presume the trial

court followed the law).

7
It does not appear that Dolloff’s deposition was used at trial, and he did not
testify or call any witnesses. Thus, there were no prior statements subject to
impeachment. See, e.g., McCullough v. State, 330 Ga. App. 716, 726 (3) (769 SE2d 138)
(2015) (noting, in regard to jury instructions, that impeachment only applies to
witnesses who testify at trial, and no impeachment instruction is warranted where the
defendant did not testify or call any defense witnesses).
15
The balancing test under OCGA § 24-4-403 is a

quintessentially fact-sensitive enterprise, and the trial judge is in the best
position to make such factbound assessments. ... Only rarely—and in
extraordinarily compelling circumstances—will we, from the vista of a
cold appellate record, reverse a [trial] court’s on-the-spot judgment
concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect.

Rivers v. K-Mart Corp., 329 Ga. App. 495, 497 (1) (765 SE2d 671) (2014) (citation

modified).

Given that the issue of Dolloff’s negligence was not before the jury, and the jury

could see evidence regarding the damage to the vehicles and the extent of John’s

injuries, evidence of Dolloff’s alleged alcohol use added little probative value to the

issue of proximate cause, and that value was outweighed by the prejudicial nature of

the evidence. OCGA § 24-4-403; Rivers, 329 Ga. App. at 497 (1). Accordingly, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion in limine.

16
3. The plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred by denying their requested

jury instructions on proximate cause and willful and wanton conduct.8 We discern no

error.

“In reviewing a trial court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction, we

must look to the jury charge as a whole, and if the jury charge as a whole accurately

and fully apprised the jury of the law to be applied in its deliberations, then the refusal

to give an additional instruction, even if that additional instruction were accurate, does

not amount to error.” Burdette v. McDowell, 321 Ga. App. 507, 509 (2) (739 SE2d 28)

(2013).

Here, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

Proximate cause means that cause which, in a natural and continuous
sequence, produces an event, and without which cause such event would
not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission
complained of must be such that a person using ordinary care would have
foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result
therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.
When I use the expression “proximate cause,” I mean a cause that, in
the natural or ordinary course of events, produced the plaintiff’s injury.

8
They also argue that the trial court erred by refusing to give a requested
instruction defining ordinary or simple negligence. The record reflects that the trial
court gave that instruction.
17
It need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient
if it combines with another cause resulting in the injury.

This instruction mirrors portions of the pattern jury instructions for proximate

causation and was the exact language the plaintiffs requested the trial court give in its

instructions. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) § 60.200 (2024).

Nevertheless, the plaintiffs also requested that the trial court further instruct the jury

that proximate cause

is that cause which immediately precedes and directly produces the
injury and without this cause the injury would not have happened. The
proximate cause of an event is a cause without which the event would not
have occurred. There may be more than one act which constitutes
proximate cause.

The plaintiffs’ counsel admitted that the requested charge did not add anything to the

charge the trial court intended to give. The requested instruction on proximate cause

was covered by the instructions given, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by omitting this additional language as cumulative. Burdette, 321 Ga. App. at 509 (2).

See also Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 736 (5) (883 SE2d 802) (2023) (“Because the

trial court fully and correctly instructed the jury on the relevant points of law, it was

18
not error to fail to give the additional explanatory instruction that Wilson

requested.”); Stafford v. State, 312 Ga. 811, 821 (4) (865 SE2d 116) (2021) (requested

instruction not warranted where trial court gave pattern instruction that, when

considered as a whole, encompassed instruction party requested).

The remaining requested instructions were relevant only to the issues of willful

and wanton conduct and punitive damages, which, as discussed in Division 1, were not

properly before the jury. Accordingly, we find no error in the jury instructions.

1. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by using an improper

verdict form and deducting the amount insurance paid from the judgment.9

As noted in Division 1, the verdict form was proper. Moreover, the plaintiffs

cannot complain because the form the court submitted to the jury was the same one

they requested in the PTO. Floyd v. Thurman, 242 Ga. 428 (2) (249 SE2d 230) (1978).

9
State Farm filed a motion to deduct the amount the plaintiffs had already
received, and, although the plaintiffs were served with that motion, it does not appear
that they responded to it. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument on appeal, no hearing
was required. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3 (“Unless otherwise ordered by
the court, all motions in civil actions ... shall be decided by the court without oral
hearing[.]”). Thus, there is no merit to the plaintiffs’ claim that State Farm obtained
the deduction “surreptitiously.”
19
Turning to the reduction of the award, “[a] trial court’s ruling on a motion to

reduce verdict based on a question of law, as here, is reviewed de novo.” State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 309 Ga. App. 271 (709 SE2d 867) (2011). Because it is a

legal question, we need not defer to the trial court. Suarez v. Halbert, 246 Ga. App.

822, 824 (1) (543 SE2d 733) (2000).

In the PTO, the plaintiffs expressly requested that “the amounts paid [by State

Farm] be deducted from any verdict obtained by [them].” As discussed in Division

1, there was no abuse of discretion in precluding the plaintiffs from amending the

PTO. Having received precisely what they requested, they cannot now complain of

error. Video Warehouse v. Newsome, 285 Ga. App. 786, 788 (648 SE2d 124) (2007). Cf.

Phillips, 268 Ga. at 319-20 (1) (given the parties’ concessions in the pre-trial order,

Court would not address the issue appellants raised on appeal).

For these reasons, we affirm the verdict and the denial of the motion for new

trial.

Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Padgett, J., concur.

20