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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

THOMAS C. HOHMANN, JR. v. SHAY RICHARDSON

Court of Appeals of Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A25A1828

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (15.8K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION
RICKMAN, P. J.,
HODGES and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

February 26, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A25A1730, A25A1828. RICHARDSON et al. v. HOHMANN et al.;
and vice versa.

RICKMAN, Presiding Judge.

Shay Richardson paid disputed life insurance proceeds into the firm trust

account of her attorney, C. David Joyner, and subsequently discovered that he

transferred some of the money to Joann B. Hohmann and Thomas C. Hohmann, Jr.

(collectively “the Hohmanns”). Richardson and her daughters, Elizabeth Ayers

Hunter and Sibyl Ellen Hunter (collectively “Richardson”) filed suit against the

Hohmanns for conversion, trover, money had and received, constructive trust and

disgorgement of funds, seeking injunctive relief, attorney fees, and punitive damages.1

1
Richardson also filed suit against C. David Joyner, P. C., Hillary B. Cranford,
as administrator of the estate of Charles David Joyner, Cassandra Joyner, and Stanley
The Hohmanns filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted

following a hearing. Richardson filed a notice of appeal from that order and that appeal

was ultimately docketed in this Court as Case No. A25A1730. The Hohmanns moved

to dismiss the appeal, contending that the transcript from the summary judgment

hearing had not been properly filed. The trial court denied the Hohmanns’ motion to

dismiss, and the Hohmanns filed a notice of appeal from that order; that appeal was

docketed in this Court as Case No. A25A1828. We have consolidated these appeals

for review, and, as more fully set forth below, we now reverse in Case No. A25A1730

and affirm in Case No. A25A1828.

Case No. A25A1730

We turn first to the grant of summary judgment on Richardson’s claims against

the Hohmanns. “Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA §

9–11–56 (c). We review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo and construe

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Haugabook v. Crisler, 297

Ga. App. 428, 428 (677 SE2d 355) (2009).

J. Williams. These additional defendants, however, are not parties to this appeal.
2
So construed, in January 2022, the Hohmanns loaned Joyner $1,200,000.

Joyner promised to re-pay the loan, with accrued interest, on or before April 15, 2022.

As per Joyner’s instructions, the Hohmanns deposited the loan proceeds into Joyner’s

firm’s Interest on Lawyer Trust Account (“IOLTA”).2 Also in January 2022, Shay

Richardson’s ex-husband passed away. Shortly after her ex-husband died, Shay

Richardson retained Joyner to represent her regarding a disputed trust in her ex-

husband’s name.3 The trust held many assets, including a $2,000,000 life insurance

policy for the benefit of Shay’s and the decedent’s daughters. Joyner recommended

that Richardson deposit the disputed monies into his firm’s IOLTA account until the

dispute was resolved.

On March 7, 2022, Richardson wired $2,014,226.16 into the trust account. On

April 18, 2022, Joyner repaid the loan to the Hohmanns, including interest, in the

amount of $1,235,000. Bank records from the trust account make it clear that the

2
Pursuant to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), all funds
held by an attorney for a client are to be deposited in an IOLTA; except in limited,
specified circumstances, lawyers are prohibited from depositing personal funds in this
account. See GRPC 1.15(II)(a),(b), contained in Georgia Bar Rule 4-102(d). The
Hohmanns submitted individual affidavits averring they were unaware of the nature
of the account into which they deposited the loaned money.
3
Pursuant to their fee agreement, Richardson paid Joyner a $3000 retainer.
3
payment to the Hohmanns came from the same trust account where Richardson’s

money was deposited and that the money the Hohmanns had deposited into the

account had been expended prior to the time they were paid. Joyner overpaid interest

by $22,507 and the Hohmanns wired that amount back to him.

After Joyner died in January 2023, Shay Richardson began investigating the

status of the over $2,000,000 in insurance proceeds purportedly held in the IOLTA.

After discovering that the money was no longer in the account, Richardson filed suit

against, among others, the Hohmanns for conversion, trover, money had and received,

constructive trust and disgorgement of funds, and sought injunctive relief, attorney

fees, and punitive damages. The Hohmanns filed a motion for summary judgment

arguing that Richardson had no valid claims against them. Richardson opposed the

motion and argued, among other things, that at a minimum the motion was premature

because discovery was on-going.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Hohmann’s motion for

summary judgment without elaboration. However, at the hearing, the trial court

explained that this case “it is unfortunate, and justice needs to be done. But I am not

going to do justice by doing an injustice to the Hohmanns. That is not going to

4
happen. I do not - - I am so sorry for the people who have suffered, but it was not at

the hands of the Hohmanns.”

1. Richardson contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment

on her claim for money had and money received.

When reviewing a claim for money had and received we are mindful that,

[a]n action for money had and received is founded upon the equitable
principle that no one ought unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of
another, and is maintainable in all cases where one has received money
under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought
not to retain it, and ex aequo et bono it belongs to another.

Haugabook, 297 Ga. App. at 431 (punctuation omitted). “The phrase ‘ex aequo et

bono’ means ‘in justice and fairness.’” Id. “In order to maintain an action for money

had and received it is necessary to establish that defendants have received money

belonging to the plaintiff or to which he is in equity and good conscience entitled.” Id.

at 432 (punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). “Furthermore, it is immaterial

how the money may have come into the defendant’s hands, and the fact that it was

received from a third person will not affect his liability, if, in equity and good

5
conscience, he is not entitled to hold it against the true owner.” Id. (punctuation

omitted).

The record here shows4 that Richardson retained Joyner to perform legal

services related to her role as trustee for a trust account her ex-husband had created

for the benefit of their children, and that Joyner thereafter suggested that she deposit

over $2,000,000 of life insurance proceeds into his IOLTA account. At no time did

Shay Richardson have any inkling that Joyner was in financial distress, or that she was

putting her children’s insurance proceeds at risk by placing the funds in Joyner’s

firm’s trust account because he might use it to repay his personal debts. Further, it

was not until Joyner died that she discovered he never performed the legal services he

was retained to perform.

4
The Hohmanns’ appellate brief in Case No. A25A1750 is almost completely
devoid of citations to the record on appeal, including any citation to the summary
judgment transcript from which they quote extensively, arguing that these
“statements in place” of their attorney at the hearing should stand on the same
footing as evidence. The fact that the Hohmanns seek to interject evidence into this
case based on their attorney’s ascertainment of the facts gives credence to
Richardson’s assertion that the Hohmanns’s motion for summary judgment was
premature and the proceedings should have been continued to allow for the
completion of discovery. Given that this case requires weighing of the equities, a
completely developed record seems to us to be particularly important.
6
As to the Hohmanns, according to their affidavits and their attorney’s

statement at the motion for summary judgment hearing, which they say we should

treat like evidence, they knew that Joyner was under some sort of severe financial

duress when they loaned him money.5 Their loan was “backed up” by warranty deeds

on three properties owned by Joyner’s limited liability company, which the Hohmanns

had been instructed to record in the event the loan was not repaid. In an effort to

support the grant of summary judgment in their favor, the Hohmanns now suggest

that because they were repaid from the IOLTA account and thus did not need to file

the deeds to repay the loan, Richardson can use the properties as a means to recoup

some of the insurance money from the IOLTA that was used to repay the Hohmanns.

They also point to the fact that they had another outstanding smaller loan that they

could have attempted to recover, which would have depleted the available funds even

more. Further, after a lengthy, somewhat contorted, analysis of Haugabook, they say

the significance of that case here is that “had Mr. Joyner not repaid the Loaned Funds

to the Hohmanns, the Hohmanns could have had a claim for money had and received

5
A the hearing the Hohmanns’ attorney described Joyner being in a “state of
panic” or a “depressed state” and stated that Joyner told the Hohmanns that he had
“failed everything.”
7
from any party who obtained funds from the P.C. Account when, in equity and good

conscience, such party should not be allowed to retain those funds.” While they cite

these considerations as justification for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment

in their favor, it would seem to us that these considerations, assuming they pertain to

the equities between the parties, must be weighed against their debt being paid from

funds deposited by a client in an IOLTA of a lawyer who has been retained to perform

legal services for that client, who did not know they were basically making a loan to the

lawyer to pay his personal debts and, unlike the Hohmanns, were given no deeds they

could simply record to become of owners of property so as to partially recoup their

loss.6 As far as we can tell from the trial court’s statements at the motion for summary

judgment hearing, in granting summary judgment for the Hohmanns, the trial court

seemed to go under the theory that since neither party was at fault or did anything

wrong, whoever had the money last in their hands should be able to retain it. However,

6
Beyond some facial factual similarities in that it involved a lawyer, his clients,
and someone who had loaned the lawyer money, we doubt that the analysis in
Haugabook is of much relevance here in light of the obvious factual dissimilarities – the
clients in that case were lied to by the lawyer who told them he had settled their case
and they were owed $1,000,000, when in fact suit had not yet been filed; therefore,
there had been no recovery, meaning they had suffered no prejudice on account of not
recovering money they were not actually owed. 297 Ga. App. at 434.
8
given the facts here, and particularly given that the facts had not been fully developed

at the time summary judgment was granted, we believe the equities between the

parties should be weighed by a trier of fact. See Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 265 Ga.

400, 405 (349 SE2d 368) (1986) (recognizing that in action for money had and

received, it is generally for the jury to weigh the equities between the parties).

Accordingly, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment must be reversed.

1. Richardson contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment

on her remaining claims.

(a) “To make out a prima facie case, in an action for damages for conversion of

personal property, the plaintiff must show title to the property, possession by the

defendant, demand for possession, and refusal to surrender the property, or an actual

conversion prior to the filing of the suit.” Taylor v. Powertel, 250 Ga. App. 356, 358 (2)

(551 SE2d 765) (2001). “Any distinct act of dominion and control wrongfully asserted

over another’s personal property, in denial of his right or inconsistent with his right,

is a conversion of such property.” Id. “While money constitutes personal property,

money is intangible personalty that is fungible, because it belongs to a class of property

which cannot be differentiated by specific identification unless there has been created

9
a specific fund that has been set aside from other money.” Id. at 359 (2). Accordingly,

generally, “money is not subject to a civil action for conversion.” Id.

There is an exception, however, when, like in this case, the money comes from

a specific, separate account. See United Services v. Home Ins. Co., 218 Ga. App. 85, 89

(3)(c) (460 SE2d 545) (1995) (“[M]oney can be the subject of a conversion claim as

long as the allegedly converted money is specific and identifiable”). Here, the money

sent to the Hohmanns was from a specific, identifiable account. Accordingly,

construing the facts in favor of Richardson, issues of material fact exist as to

Richardson’s claim for conversion. Accordingly, the trial court erred by granting

summary judgment on this claim. See Guise v. Leoni, 366 Ga. App. 659, 667(d) (883

SE2d 892) (2023).

(b) “In order to recover in a trover case it is essential that the plaintiff show

either title or right of possession, and in some cases it is necessary to establish both.

Although title is presumed to follow possession of the property such presumption is

rebuttable.” Hinkle v. Hinkle, 167 Ga. App. 423, 424 (306 SE2d 705) (1983)

(punctuation omitted). Here, as detailed above, there is an issue of material fact as to

whether Richardson can show right of possession of the money transferred to the

10
Hohmanns. Accordingly, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the

Hohmanns on Richardson’s claim for trover. See id.

(c) The trial court granted summary judgment to the Hohmanns on

Richardson’s remaining claims for punitive damages, attorney fees, constructive trust

and disgorgement of funds, and injunctive relief because it granted summary judgment

as to Richardson’s underlying claims. Because we have reversed the grant of summary

judgment on Richardson’s underlying claims, we also reverse the trial court’s grant

of summary judgment on Richardson’s remaining claims. See North Atlanta Golf

Operations v. Ward, 363 Ga. App. 259, 267-68(4) (870 SE2d 814) (2022).

Case No. A25A1828

1. The Hohmanns contend that the trial court erred by failing to grant their

motion to dismiss Richardson’s appeal.

Pertinent to this issue, the record shows that Richardson filed a notice of appeal

from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on December 13, 2024, and

amended the notice on December 20, 2024. On December 23, 2024, Richardson filed

a “Notice of Filing Transcript” and attached the transcript of the summary judgment

hearing held on November 7, 2024; this transcript was certified by both the court

11
reporter and the transcriptionist. The trial court clerk issued an invoice for the trial

court costs on December 23, 2024, and later confirmed that the transcript was

included in the bill of costs.

Richardson paid the bill of costs on January 15, 2025. On that same day, the trial

court clerk made an online docket entry indicating “Appeal Fee Paid” but noted that

the clerk was “WAITING FOR TRANSCRIPT.” The Hohmanns’ counsel sent an

e-mail, copied to Richardson’s counsel, to the trial court’s staff attorney, noting that

Richardson had filed a copy of the hearing transcript on December 23, 2024, and

inquiring whether there were any issues with the transcript or if another transcript

needed to be filed by the court reporter. The staff attorney responded with a

suggestion that counsel contact the trial court’s clerk, and the Hohmanns’ counsel

forwarded his question to the clerk but did not copy Richardson’s counsel on this e-

mail. The trial court clerk responded to the Hohmanns’ counsel, “The transcripts

were not filed by the court reporter. They were filed as exhibits by an attorney. Please

have the court reporter file the original transcripts with our office.”

Neither the Hohmanns’ counsel nor the trial court clerk communicated directly

with Richardson’s counsel about the transcript; instead, on February 3, 2025, the

12
Hohmanns filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Richardson failed to

timely7 file the original transcript with the trial court clerk and the delay in requesting

the original transcript from the court reporter was unreasonable and inexcusable. The

trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss and later issued a detailed order

concluding that the transcript filed by Richardson, which contained certificates of

accuracy executed by both the court reporter and the transcriptionist, was an original

transcript within the meaning of the Appellate Practice Act.

On appeal,8 the Hohmanns do not appear to directly challenge the trial court’s

ruling that the transcript filed by Richardson was an original transcript ; instead, citing

OCGA § 5-6-41 (e), they now argue that the court reporter, not Richardson, was

required to file the original transcript with the trial court clerk. Because this issue was

not raised by the Hohmanns in their motion or at the hearing on the motion, the trial

court did not rule on it. Indeed, in its conclusions of law, the trial court specifically

7
Generally, the transcript, if requested, must be filed within 30 days of the filing
of the notice of appeal. OCGA § 5-6-42.
8
We note that, once again, the Hohmanns’ brief on appeal is bereft of citations
to the record and the transcript of the hearing on their motion to dismiss. However,
in this appeal they are the appellant, and thus their citation failure is even more
problematic. We reiterate that if we have missed something pertinent to this appeal,
the responsibility lies with them.
13
noted that “[t]he sole basis for [the Hohmanns’] Motion is that the transcript filed by

[Richardson] which [the Hohmanns] concede is a true and correct transcript of the

[summary judgment] hearing is not the ‘original transcript’ required by the Appellate

Practice Act[.]”

As [an] appellate court[], we are [a] court[] for the correction of errors
of law made by the trial court. In appellate practice, an error of law is a
false or mistaken conception or application of the law. . . .An error of law
has as its basis a specific ruling made by the trial court.

In re Declaration of Judicial Emergency, 358 Ga. App. 48, 53 (1) (853 SE2d 366) (2020).

Thus,

[i]t is well settled that issues presented for the first time on appeal
furnish nothing for us to review, for this court is a court for correction of
errors of law committed by the trial court where proper exception is
taken. Nor may an appellant alter the course of its arguments mid-
stream, raising issues on appeal that were not raised before the trial
court.

Georgia High School Ass’n v. Charlton County School Dist. 349 Ga. App. 309, 319 (3)

(826 SE2d 172) (2019) (punctuation omitted). See also City of Gainesville v. Dodd, 275

Ga. 834, 837 (573 SE2d 369) (2002) (“An appellate court is, among other things, a

court for correction of error of law. An error of law has as its basis a specific ruling
14
made by the trial court.”) (punctuation omitted); Kolb v. Daruda, 350 Ga. App. 642,

645(1) (829 SE2d 881) (2019) (“[I]ssues presented for the first time on appeal furnish

nothing for us to review[.]”) (punctuation omitted). And these principles have been

specifically applied in the context of a motion to dismiss based on the failure to timely

file a transcript. See Barmore v. Himebaugh, 205 Ga. App. 381, 383 (3) (422 SE2d 255)

(1992) (“Since appellee’s failure to pay court costs was not a ground of appellants’

motion to dismiss and was not ruled on by the trial court, that issue is improperly

presented.”) Accordingly, the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss the

appeal is affirmed.

Judgment reversed in Case No. A25A1730. Judgment affirmed in Case No.

A25A1828. Hodges and Pipkin, JJ., concur.

15