Raymond Bright v. State of Florida - Murder Conviction and Death Sentence Appeal

Supreme Co urt of Flori da _______ _____ No. SC2023 - 1735 _______ _____ RAYMOND BRIGHT, Appellant, vs. STATE OF F LORIDA, Appellee. _______ _____ No. SC2024 - 0876 _______ _____ RAYMOND BRIGHT, Petiti oner, vs. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. Febr uary 26, 20 26 GROSS HANS, J. Raymond Bright bru tally beat two men to death with a hamme r. Based on this c onduct, B right was found g uilty o f first - degree murd er and ultimat ely sent enced to deat h. In separat e

appeals, we affirmed his c onvicti ons and senten ces. Bright l ater file d a moti on un der Flor ida R ule of Cr imi nal Pr oced ure 3.851, asking the cir cuit court t o vacate his deat h senten ces. The co urt denied that mo tion, which Bright now a ppeals. In add ition to his nume rous argume nts dire cted at th e circu it cou rt’s ruling s, Brigh t urges us to iss ue a wri t of habeas corp us to remedy al leged e rrors in his guilt and penalty phases. Fo r the following reaso ns, we affirm t he challeng ed order and de ny habeas r elief. 1 I In Februa ry 2008, Mich ael Majors visited Bright ’s Jack sonville home. Twenty - year - old De rri ck K ing and sixt een - year - old Randall Brown were als o present at the res idence. The next day, after attemp ting to c ontact B rown, M ajors re turned to Br ight’s ho use. No one respon de d w hen M ajor s kn ocke d, pr ompt ing him t o ent er th e home through an ope n window. Once inside, M ajors pr oceeded to t he living room. There, he discovered t he dead b odies of Brow n and King. Brown was on a recliner, wi th his head propped ag ainst the wall and pa rtially 1. We have jurisdi ction. See art. V, § 3 (b)(1), (9), F la. Co nst.

covered by a blanket. King was lying fac e down on the floor, and his head was be si de the co uch. There wa s a signif icant amount of blood unde r the reclin er and on th e couch, as well as on the adjacent w all and ceilin g. Bright was no t present. After disc overing t he scene, Maj ors called 911, and l aw enforcem ent officers responded t o Bright’ s home. As part of the investigat ion that followed, crime scen e technici ans obtain ed physical evi dence from the area, including a h amme r and guns they foun d h idden i n the front y ard. Later test ing reveal ed King’s DNA on the hammer. Meanwhile, with the inv estigation underway, Bright to ld his friend Benjamin Lu ndy about the incid ent at his home, noting that he “sc rewe d up” a nd ki lle d two p eo ple. Bri ght als o spo ke wit h hi s former wife, who th en contacte d law enf orcement an d set up a meeting f or Bright t o discuss the homici des. Pri or to the meeti ng, officers arrest ed Bright at his f ormer wif e’s house. Dur ing his incarcer ation at the county jail, Br ight spoke with another inm ate name d Mick e y Graham. Br ight tol d Graham that a confro ntatio n occu rred, which ended with Bright striking bo th victims wit h a hammer. Acc ording to Bright, he co uld hea r the men

breathing and gurgling, but then the room became silent. Ultimate ly, the St ate c harged Bright with two co unts o f first - degree mu rder and sought the deat h penalty f or both crime s. At the guilt - p hase trial, the Stat e called numerou s witnesse s, including Ma jors, the respon ding off icers, and the m edical ex aminer s who conducted the a utopsie s. The medic al examine rs opined that Bro wn and King each died from b lunt forc e trau ma to the head. King had over fifty - fiv e separate inj uries, inclu ding thirty - eight to his head an d neck. The injuries to his body were consistent with defensi ve wo unds. Brown ha d at least eight skull f ractures and four teen other independent injur ies to his body, som e of which were consi stent wit h defensive w ounds. After being pre sented with this and other ev idence, the jury found Bright guil ty as charged. Fo llowing the penal ty - phase trial in which both p arties present ed additi onal evi dence, the jury recommen ded the death penalty for both mur ders by a vote of eig ht to four. Co nsistent with those recommenda tions, the tria l court imposed tw o death sentences. Bright appealed, c hallenging both his co nvictions and death sentence s. Br ig h t v. S ta te, 90 So. 3 d 249, 25 2 (Fla. 201 2). We

affirm ed after determining that sufficient evidence sup ported th e convictions an d that none of Brigh t’s claims j ustifi ed reversal. Id. a t 258 - 6 2, 265. Following o ur affirman ce, Brig ht sought postconvi ction reli ef in cir cuit cou rt, asser ting bo th gui lt - and penal ty - phase clai ms. The circuit court reje cted all guil t - phase cl aims. Bu t as to the penalty - phase claims, the court found couns el inef fective in investigating and presenting mitigating evide nce. Both the State and Bright app ealed. State v. Bright (Br ig h t II), 200 So. 3d 710, 715 (Fla. 2016). We affirmed in all r espect s and reman ded for a new penalty ph ase. Id. at 742. At t he second penal ty phase (g overne d by the post - Hu rst, 2 pre - Poole 3 sentencing r egi me), the State so ught to pro ve two a ggrava tors: (1) that Bright had pri or violent felony convictions (PVF) and (2) that the murder s were es pecially hei nous, atroc ious, or cruel (HAC). See § 921.1 41(6)(b), (h), Fla. St at. (2017). 2. Hurst v. Sta te, 20 2 So. 3 d 40 (F la. 2016) (int erpr et ing Hurst v. Florida, 5 77 U.S. 9 2 (2016), as re quiri ng that a j ury unani mousl y recommen d the deat h penalty). 3. Stat e v. Poole, 297 S o. 3d 487 (F la. 2020) (rec edin g f rom Hurs t ’s inte rpretatio n requ iring a unanimous jury recommen dation of de ath).

F or the P VF aggravator, the State introd uced Bri ght’s conte mp oran eou s mur der c onvi cti on s and 1 990 rob bery c onvi cti on. To establish the HAC agg ravato r, the Stat e called th e chief medi cal examine r, who had revi ewed the au topsy rec ords for both vict ims. Her testimony l argely paralleled t he evid ence outline d above. Of note, she foun d eviden ce of a prolon ged brutal at tack wi th an obj ect consisten t with a hamme r. For mitigat ion, Bri ght called fami ly mem bers and f riends who spoke of his dif ficult upbringing and milit ary service. One such witness was B right ’s sister, Janic e Jones. Bright al so presente d mental - health mitiga tion thr ough the exper t testimony of Dr. Ha rry Krop, Dr. Steve n Go ld, and Dr. Robert O uaou. After delibera tions, the jury un ani mo usly r ecom me nde d deat h for eac h murd er, fi nding PVF pr ov en a s to bot h mur de rs an d HAC proven as to the King murder. In light of th at rec ommenda tion, the court held a se parate Spencer 4 hearing. At this hear ing, Bright’s daughte r tes ti fied about her relatio nship with her father an d the situa tion i n hi s h ome le ading up t o th e murde rs. 4. Spencer v. State, 615 S o. 2d 688 (Fla. 199 3).

The c ourt f oun d the St ate proved th e PVF aggravat or beyon d a reason abl e d oubt. In addit ion, the c ourt f oun d the Stat e had prove d the HAC aggravator as to King’s murder. The court gav e great weight to these agg ravatin g factors. As for mitigat ion, the cour t rejec ted the extr eme - disturban ce and substan tial - im pairment statu tory miti gators. See § 921.141(7)(b), (f), Fla. Stat. However, the c ourt f oun d six cat egories of nonstatu tory mitig ating facto rs, assigning little o r no weight to eac h. 5 The court concl uded that t he aggravato rs “heavi ly outweigh [ed ] ” the m itigatin g circumstan ces. It therefore im posed a sentence of d eath f or each murder. Bright appeal ed hi s death senten ces. Brigh t v. S tate (B r i g h t III), 299 So. 3d 98 5, 989 (Fla. 20 20). W e rejected all his claims a nd affirm ed. Id. at 997 - 98, 1012. Bright then unsu ccessfully sought review by the U. S. Su prem e Court. Br ight v. Flor ida, 141 S. C t. 1697 (2021). This brings us to Bright’ s current postconvict ion mot ion, 5. (1) Bright w as the victim of child abuse an d neglec t (no weight); (2) Bright’s military career (little weight); (3) Bright’s history of drug and alcohol abuse (little weight); (4) Bright’s positive relationships with others (little weight); (5) Bright’s good a nd mannerly behavior during cou rt proceedings (no we ight); and (6) Bright’s b ehavior wh ile incarcer ated (no wei ght).

which is at i ssue in th is appeal. In th e motion, Brigh t raised seventeen numbere d claims for relief, asking that t he circuit cou rt vacate his death sentence s. He primar ily argued that his penalty - phase couns el provi ded ineff ective assi stance i n variou s respects under the sta ndard set fo rth in Strickland v. Washing ton, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Br ight later sough t to am end his motion to add four more claims. However, t he circuit co urt denie d his request to amend. It also denied hi s req uest to intervi ew vario us penalty - phase jurors. As for the seventeen claims, the circuit court sum marily denie d fo ur but hel d a n evidentiary hearing o n the thirte en remaining claims. At this hearing, Bright call ed numer ous witnesses an d introd uced certain d ocumenta ry evide nce. The witnesses incl ude d Bright’s pen alty - pha se counsel and sever al veterans wh o served with him or w ere his contemporaries. Bright also calle d severa l experts. The circuit cou rt entered an order de nying the remaining claims, which Brigh t now appeals. He al so pet iti ons for a writ of habeas cor pus. We begin w ith Brigh t’s appeal.

II Before ad dressing Bright’s substan tive clai ms, we co nsider his challenge s to certain t hreshold rulings made by t he circuit co urt. A Bright fi rst argu es that the circu it c ourt erred in denyi ng his requ est to a mend h is post con vic tio n mot ion t o add f our addit i onal claims. A pply ing a deferent ial abuse - of - discreti on standard of review, w e disagree. See Marek v. State, 8 So. 3 d 11 23, 11 31 (Fl a. 2009) (reviewing denial of a motio n to amend a pos tconvict ion motion for an a buse of dis cret ion). A post conv icti on m otion “ma y not be am end ed un le ss go od cause is shown.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.85 1(f)(4). In Bright’ s proposed am endment, he sought to add cl aims based on inf ormati on that was r eadily availabl e when he filed his post conv icti on m otion. Neverth eless, Bright con tends tha t good cause exist ed for the late amen dment because of t he COVID - 19 pandemic, volumi nous recor ds in his case, an d turnov er at the law firm that represented him. We have caref ully consi dered th ese reasons b ut conclude t hat none, in isol a tion o r in the aggregate, constitute g ood caus e for failing to include claims readily a ccessible

to counsel at t he postconviction motion’s initial filing. See Lugo v. State, 2 So. 3 d 1, 19 (F la. 200 8). Accordingly, the circuit court did not ab use its discr etion in denying Bright’s motion to amend. B As another thresho ld claim, Bright argues that the circuit court e rred in d enying his motio n to interv iew ju rors from hi s second penalty phase. W e conclude th at the court did not abuse it s discretion in d enying this motion. See F oster v. Sta te, 132 S o. 3d 40, 65 (Fla. 20 13) (“ A trial cou rt ’ s decisi on on a mot ion to intervi ew jurors is review ed purs uant to an a buse of discr etion st andard. ” (quoting Anderson v. State, 1 8 So. 3d 50 1, 5 19 (Fl a. 20 09))). A moti on t o interview juror s must “be filed within 10 days afte r the rend ition of the v erdic t, unless good cause is sh own for the failu re to mak e the mo tion w ithin that ti me.” Fl a. R. C rim. P. 3.575. Th us, a defendant whose motion is untimely bears the burde n of sh ow in g goo d cause for t he del ay. Bates v. State, 398 So. 3d 406, 407 (Fla. 202 4). Bright d oes no t dispute that his m otion wa s untim ely. Rather, he asserts that his penalt y - phase c ounsel wo uld not have

interview ed the jur ors due to an all eged personal co nflict, forc ing him to wait to seek juro r intervi ews. Even assuming this is true, Bright fa ils to explain why his mot ion to intervie w jurors was filed over a year aft er hi s current c ounsel took ove r representati on. There fore, Bright has not show n good cause, and we affirm the circuit court ’ s r uli ng. 6 C We now foc us on Bright ’ s substanti ve claims, beginning with numerous ass erti ons that his penal ty - p hase counsel was ineffect ive. “ [C] la ims of ineff ective assi stance of couns el are revi ewed under the two - prong test establi shed by S trick land.” Sal azar v. State, 188 So. 3d 799, 8 14 (Fl a. 2016). To succe ed on a Stric kland claim, a defendan t must pr ove that (1) counsel’s p erformanc e was deficient — i. e., that it fell below an objective stan dar d of reasonabl eness — and (2) such def iciency w as preju dicial. 46 6 U.S. 6. Brigh t also conte nds tha t the circ uit cou rt erred in sus taining th e State’ s objec tion to his proffe r of trial counsel’s f iles, resulting i n an incomplet e appellat e record. This arg ument is frivol ous. As noted by the State, the record c ontains t he documen ts that Bri ght proffe red.

at 68 7. The pr ejudice pr ong requi res a showing “t hat there is a reasonabl e probabilit y that, but for counsel ’s unprof essi onal errors, the res ult of th e pro ceedin g would ha ve bee n different.” Id. at 694. If the d efend ant fail s to es tablish one pro ng, a cou rt need not address the oth er. Id. at 697. When reviewing in effective assi sta nce claim s followin g an evide ntiary he aring, “thi s Co urt defers to the fa ctua l findi ngs of the trial co urt to the ex tent that the y are s upported by co mpetent, substantial eviden ce, but review s de novo the a pplication of the law to tho se fac ts.” Smi th v. Stat e, 330 So. 3d 867, 87 5 (Fla. 2 021) (quoting Johnson v. State, 135 So. 3d 100 2, 101 3 (Fl a. 2014)). 1 Bright ar gues that he received inef fect ive assistan ce stemmin g from penalty - phase co unsel’s failure to use a victim - blaming strateg y. In various iterat ions, he asser ts that co unsel was ineffect ive for faili ng to intr oduce eviden ce that t he victims wer e drug dealers, rebut t he State’s des cription of th e victim s as innocent, argue tha t Bright fear ed the victims, and blame t he victims in o pening an d closing stat ements. However, base d on the testimony at the eviden tiary hearing, we agree wit h the lower court

that couns el made a r easonabl e strategi c decis ion not to vi ctim bl ame. We have repeat edly stressed th at ther e is “a stro ng presumpt ion that coun sel’s con duct f alls with in the wide range of reasonabl e profes sional assist ance, ” and the d efendant the refore “must overc ome the pr esumpti on that, under the circum stance s, the challeng ed act ion might be con sidered s ound trial st rategy. ” Hayward v. Sta te, 183 S o. 3d 28 6, 29 7 (Fla. 20 15) (internal quotation mar ks omitted) (quoting Strick land, 466 U.S. at 68 9). A nd consisten t with these principle s, we have held that “ [s] trateg ic decisions d o not constitut e ineffect ive assi stance of counsel if alternat ive course s have been c onsidere d and reject ed and co unsel’s decision wa s reasona ble under t he norms of pr ofessional c onduct.” Smith, 3 30 So. 3d at 878 (q uot ing Occhicone v. State, 768 S o. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2 000)). Here, couns el test ified that she considere d, and ultimately rejected, t he victi m - blaming appro ach. Based on her years of experienc e, she concl uded that this strategy would be un wi se becaus e it migh t hurt her ra ppo rt with the j ury and have negative consequenc es for Bright. Instead, she de cide d to e mpha si ze mercy -

relate d mitig ation. In ou r view, as found by the c ircuit co urt, this testi mony supports t he legal conclusi on that counsel had a str ategic reas on for no t impugning the rep utatio n of the vic tims. And we think her strategy was emin ently reasona ble under t he facts a nd circumst ances of th is case —a hol di ng t hat accor ds wi th our pri or cases. See Spencer v. State, 842 S o. 2d 52, 61 - 62 (Fla. 2 003) (holding that c ounsel d id not p erform de ficien tly by de clining to present evi dence of the antag onistic r elationshi p between the defendant and the vict im to avoid “ being percei ved as blaming the victim”). T hus, Bright cannot show deficient perf ormance in counsel’s d ecisio n to refr ain from victim bla ming, both in argument and witness examination. Bright also fails to establish prej udice. The proposed evidence — t hat th e victims were dr ug dealer s who th reatened Bright — would no t have under mined th e aggravatin g eviden ce 7 or 7. We specifically note and reje ct Bri ght’s content ion t hat victim blaming would have re butted the HAC aggr avator. The HA C aggravator f ocuse s on the “mean s and mann er” in which the defendant inflicted t he death — not the defendan t’s “int ent and motiv ation.” Barnhill v. State, 8 34 S o. 2d 8 36, 85 0 (Fla. 2002); see also Cruz v. State, 320 So. 3d 69 5, 728 (Fla. 20 21). Br igh t’s

furnished s ignificant mitigating evide nce. And victim blaming would have i nvited t he State t o point out the m any altern atives available to Bright i n resolving any conflict betw een him an d the victims other th an bludgeoning them to death. S ee Douglas v. State, 141 So. 3d 107, 1 23 - 2 4, 1 26 (Fl a. 20 12) (f indi ng t he defendant failed t o establish prej udice wher e the pr oposed evi dence woul d hav e open ed t he do or to ot he r dam agin g test i mony). In su m, w e reject each of Brig ht’s victim - denig ration claims, finding t he record amply s upport s the cir cuit court’s conclusi on s. 2 Bright ne xt argu es that counsel was inef fective for failing to investigat e and pr esent mitigation wit nesses to testify regarding his mental healt h, milit ary service, and backgr ound. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the circ uit c ourt’s denial o f these claim s. a As to his mental - health mitiga tion, B right co ntend s that propose d evidence does n ot rebut the HAC aggra vator, as it does not bear on the m eans an d manner by w hich he kille d the victim s. As a result, there is no rea sonable probabili ty that Bright would have recei ved a lesser sentenc e had couns el blamed the victims in this manner.

counsel was ineffect ive for failing to prepare Dr. Krop as a witne ss and to provi de him wit h necessary backgro und mater ial s for a PTSD assessmen t. 8 Brig ht argu es that D r. Krop contrad icted o ther expe rt s when he stated he had not tested B right fo r PTSD a nd he lacked sufficient i nformati on to suggest that Bri ght wa s unde r extreme men tal or emotional dist urbance. However, comp etent, substantial eviden ce supports t he circuit co urt’s findin g that Dr. Krop did not co ntradi ct thos e experts. At the penalty - phase trial, Dr. Krop testifi ed about his 2 008 and 2009 testi ng of Brigh t and no ted he had not teste d Brig ht for PTSD d es pite observing symptoms of the di sor der. Bright fa ils to explain how th is contr adict ed the testimo ny of two othe r exp erts, Dr. Gol d an d Dr. Oua ou, who opined that Bright had PTSD. Dr. Krop never testi fied tha t Bright d id not ha ve PT SD. Mo reover, c ounsel introduced D r. Krop’s testimo ny primarily to establish th at Bright d id no t have an tisocia l persona lity di sorder. T estin g for PTSD was outsi de th e scope of Dr. Krop’s review. Accordingly, 8. Bright also asse rts in a single senten ce that counse l was ineffect ive for faili ng to call Dr. Miller. Because t his claim is im prope rly bri efed, we d o not co nside r it. See Trappman v. State, 384 So. 3d 7 42, 751 n. 4 (Fl a. 20 24).

Bright fails to show ho w counsel w as deficient in her prepa ration o f Dr. Krop. b Second, Br ight alleg es that co unsel was ineffec tive for fai ling to pres ent testi mony from mu ltipl e individuals who served with him in the mili tary. At t he postcon viction evidentiary h earin g, Bright int roduc ed testimony from the se veterans. Collective ly, t hey indicated that Bri ght “ was an extremel y valua ble asset, ” and they comm ente d on h is a ssum pti on of a high degre e of responsi bility as he worked o n the flight deck — “the most dang erous plac e in the whole world to work.” A ccord ing to Brig ht, penalty - phase c ounsel could have u sed this test imony to show that Bright was a responsi ble and hardwor king Mari ne Sergeant. Bu t this claim fails as well. As an initial matter, we find tha t c o unsel’ s perform ance was not d eficie nt. At the penalty - phase tria l, counsel cal led military expert James Hern andez to presen t eviden ce of Brigh t’s milit ary service. Among other th ings, H erna ndez unde rscored B right’s milita ry contri bution s, which w ere refle cted in the awards and merito rious d istinctio ns he earn ed. We acknowle dge that the

postconvict ion wi tnesses in clu ded additional details not encompass ed in Her nandez’ s testimony, b ut this does not rend er counsel’s p erform ance deficient. S ee Valentine v. Stat e, 9 8 So. 3 d 44, 53 (Fla. 20 12) (“ [T] he p resentation of more favorabl e testimo ny in postconvi ction proceeding s does not r ender couns el’s inves tigatio n into miti gation defic ient.”). Moreo ver, counsel’s decision t o use Hern andez’s testi mony alone was a reaso nable strateg i c o ne. Counse l chose not to call other witnesses, such as those wh o testif ied at the evident iary hearing, to avoi d th e poss ibili ty that the jury might hear about negative inci dent s during Brigh t’s mili tary servi ce. See Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 57 (Fla. 20 05) (“[C] ounse l is not deficien t where he mak es a reason able str ategic deci sion to not pr esent [certain] mitigati on testi mony during the penalty ph ase beca use it could open the d oor to other d amaging tes timony.” (quoting Griffin v. State, 866 S o. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 200 3))). Nor c an Bright show pr ej udice. T he cour t gave Brig ht’s military service litt le weight as a nonstatutory mitiga tor. We do not think that presenti ng addit ion al, largely cumulative evid ence woul d have altere d th e balan ce of aggrav ating and mit igating

circumst ances. See Hilton v. State, 32 6 So. 3 d 640, 64 9 (Fla. 20 21) (“Where t he additional mit igation i s minor or cu mulative an d the aggravatin g circumst ances su bstant ial,. . . co nfidence in the outc ome of the pen alty phase i s n ot under min ed. ”). c F inal ly, Bright arg ues that couns el f ailed to make re asonabl e efforts t o investigat e and present mitigation regarding his backg roun d. At the evident iary hearing, Bri ght pres ented family members an d other lay wit nesses to testi fy abou t his childhood, their pos i tive relationships with him, his work eth ic, and his othe r positive q ualities. However, Bright has f ailed to est ablish d ef icient per formance because c ounsel made every r eason able effort t o contact t hes e witnesses. T hey could not b e loc ated, or the y simply were unwilling, and theref ore unavaila ble, to tes tify at his pe nalty p hase. See White v. State, 964 S o. 2d 127 8, 1286 (F la. 2 007) (“A defen dant cannot esta blish in effective assi sta nce of couns el based on counsel’s f ailure t o call a witness w ho is unavai lable.” (citing Melton v. State, 949 S o. 2d 994, 100 4 (Fla. 200 6))); see also Evans v. State, 995 So. 2d 9 33, 943 (Fl a. 200 8) (fi ndin g th at coun sel wa s not

ineffect ive for faili ng to call an una vailable wi tness at trial w here reasonabl e effort s were made to fin d the wit ness). T he reco rd in this case reflects significa nt effort by counsel to locate the pr oposed wit nesses. Counsel testified at the evident iary hearing that she and her investiga tor tr ied on numerous occasions to co ntact B right’s fam ily. Althoug h Bri ght present ed evidenc e at the hearing that was in tension wit h counsel’s test imony, t he circuit court found co unsel m ore cr edi ble. B ased on coun sel’s cre dited testim ony, we a ffirm the co urt’ s finding that counsel was not defic ient fo r failing to pre sent these witn esses. F or th e reasons outlined above, we deny this claim in it s entirety. 3 Bright a lso claim s th at counsel wa s deficient for fa i ling to impeach Maj ors and object to the in troduc tion o f Majors ’ s 911 c all on relevan cy grounds. T his clai m lacks meri t. As to impeach ing Majors, counsel explai ned she wan ted to use hi s testimo ny to sugge st that t he victims wer e awak e on the night of the mu rder s. O n cross - examination, she elicited wh at she needed from M ajo rs and did n ot w ant t o discr edit the favo rable porti ons o f

his testimony b y impeaching him with his criminal histo ry. This was a reasona ble st rategic deci sion and th us d oes not c onsti tute deficient p erform ance. See Occhicone, 768 S o. 2 d at 1048. With rega rd to th e 911 call, we agr ee wit h the cir cuit court that it was indeed rel evant. See Bearden v. State, 161 S o. 3d 1 257, 1266 (Fla. 2 015) (“Cor roborative e videnc e is admissi ble ‘t o strengt hen a witness ’ test imony by evidence of matter s showing it s consisten cy and reas onablene ss and ten ding to indi cate t hat the facts proba bly wer e as stated by th e witn ess.’ ” (quot ing Cha acho u v. Chaachou, 73 So. 2d 83 0, 8 37 (Fl a. 19 54))). Therefore, c ounsel ’s failu re to ob ject on relevancy gr ounds was n ot defic ient. See Rigteri nk v. S tate, 19 3 So. 3 d 846, 873 (Fla. 2016) (holding that couns el was no t defic ient fo r failing to ob ject to the introd uction of relevant evi dence). Alt hough c ouns el co uld ha ve of fe red a nonfriv olous obje ction th at the probative v alue was outweigh ed by the danger of unf air prejudice, s uc h an obj ect ion i s not one that al l reasonabl e attorney s would mak e, especially given t he limited scope of the 911 call an d everything else the jury heard and saw regarding the horri fic crime scen e. Accordingly, w e deny relief on th is claim.

4 Bright contends that coun sel was i neffecti ve for failin g to objec t to three remarks in the State’s closing argument regarding Bright’s ab usive ch ildhood and his militar y service. The cir cuit court p roperly denied this cl aim. Bright f irst takes issu e with h is counsel’s f ailure to object to the Stat e’s asserti on that symp athy for hi s childhoo d relat ed only to mitigation and co uld n ot pr ovi de a basi s for the j ury’s recommen dation of life or death. However, on dir ec t appe al, we held this commen t was not improper. Bright III, 299 S o. 3d at 999 (“[T] he pros ec utor did n ot in str uct t he jur ors t o dis re gard e vide nce of Bright’s ab use in reach ing thei r decisions, but r ather, explained that th e evidence of ab use is prope rly consid ered as miti gation, and that th eir decision s may not be based upon sym pathy. ” (citing Zac k v. State, 753 S o. 2d 9, 24 (Fla. 200 0))); see also Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 4 90 (1990) (ex plain ing m it igat ion i s th e eviden ce t he jur y considers in m aking its senten cing recom mendation whereas sympathy is a lens through which the ju ry ex amines the evidence). 9 9. To the e xtent Bright is arguing tha t we were wrong in ou r assessmen t of that remark on dire ct appeal, h is argument i s

In short, w e see no basis to hol d counsel deficient f or failing to object t o a comment we found pro per. Indeed, w e have repeat edly held that co unsel cannot be deficie nt for f ailing to make a meri tless objec tion. See Cannon v. State, 310 So. 3d 1 259, 12 65 (Fl a. 20 20); Matthews v. State, 288 S o. 3d 10 50, 106 5 (Fla. 20 19). Bright a lso fa ults cou nsel fo r not ob jectin g to two other prosecutor ial stat ements, n amely, that he (1) did n ot g et PTS D fr om the military and (2) arrived at wor k intoxica ted. C o ntrary to Bright’s ar gumen t, counsel m ade reas onable strat egic deci sions not to ob ject to th e state ments. Inste ad of ob jecting, counsel r esp onde d to t he comment s in a way that she believe d would eng ender sym pathy from the ju ry. This strategy was reasona ble, as it com por t ed wit h counsel’ s overarching theory of mitigatio n. Moreover, accordi ng to counsel ’s credited t estimony, she determi ned that this approach avoi ded t he implication that Bright had some thing to hide. Thus, counsel w as not d eficie nt for declining to object t o the Stat e’s comments. See Brown v. State, 846 S o. 2d 1114, 112 2 (Fla. 20 03) (“ Coun se l’s proc edur ally barred a nd not sub ject to reco nside ration. S ee Deparvine v. State, 146 So. 3d 10 71, 11 06 (Fla. 2014).

strategi c decision s will not be seco nd - guesse d on collat eral att ack.” (quoting Johnson v. State, 769 So. 2d 990, 1 001 (Fla. 200 0))). Bright ha s not s hown e rror in the circu it court’ s de nial of this claim, and w e affirm. 5 Bright also asserts th at counsel wa s ineff ective for failin g to request a cont inuance of t he penalt y - phase trial due to H urric ane Irma. We disagree. At trial, defense coun sel, the pro secutor, a nd the court dis cuss ed h ow bes t to proceed in light of the impending hu rricane. At the postconvi ct ion evident iary hear ing, counsel te stified to he r concerns about resc heduling the trial, including the risk of having to select a new ju ry after securing a jury about which she felt opti mistic. She therefore ma de a strat egic decision t o move forward. We see nothing unreas onable a bout that decisi on. Moreo ver, Bright has not demon strated prej udice. Bright alleges only that the tr ial’s chaotic conditions w ere pr ejudicial. This vague and concl usory allegati on is insuffici ent to sh ow a reasona bl e probab ility tha t he woul d hav e r eceived a life sen tenc e had the t rial been resche duled. See Jones v. S tate, 998 S o. 2d 5 73, 5 84 (Fla.

20 08) (holding that a conclusory allegat ion of pre judice is insu fficient). Finding neit her def icient perfor mance n or prej udi ce, we affirm the circuit court’ s rejecti on of this claim. 6 Bright also claim s t hat counsel w as ineff ec ti ve during v oir di re for fail ing to a sk adequate life - qual ifying quest ions. 10 Th e circui t court s ummarily denied this cl aim, findi ng the rec ord s uffici ent to refute it. We agre e with tha t ruli ng. “To be entitle d to an evident iary hear ing on a claim of ineffect ive assista nce, t he defendan t must alleg e specif ic facts t hat are not concl usivel y rebutte d by the record .. . . ” Anderson v. State, 220 So. 3d 1 133, 1142 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Rhodes v. State, 986 So. 2d 501, 513 - 14 (Fla. 2 008)). Here, t he record c onclusivel y refutes B right’s claim. In reaching t hat concl usion, we h ave caref ully review ed the r elevant porti ons of the trial transcri pt, which show that co unsel gave leg ally 10. Life - qualifying questions e xamin e whether a prospectiv e juror will auto mati cally recom mend the deat h penal ty aft er a defendant ’s convict ion regardle ss of t he evidence pre sented. See Morgan v. Illino is, 50 4 U. S. 719, 73 4 - 35 (199 2).

accurate st atemen ts on the law (including t he signif icance of aggravation an d mit igation) an d asked appr opriate life - qualifying questions. The j udge als o explained cer tain deat h - penalty c oncepts to the j ury. Ac cordin gly, we affirm the c ircui t cou rt’s summary denial of this claim. 7 For his fin al ineffect iveness cl aim, Bright argues that co un sel should have ob jec t ed to the v erdict form because it failed to expl ai n that a penalty - phase juror “may not r efuse to consid er or be precluded fr om consi dering any r eleva n t mitigati ng evidence.” M ills v. Mar yland, 48 6 U. S. 367, 374 - 75 (1 988) (emphasis omitted) (interna l quo tation mark s omitte d) (quoting Skipper v. Sou th Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (19 86)). Th is argumen t lacks merit. As in terpreted by the U.S. Supreme C ourt, the Constitut ion forbi ds impos ition of the d eath p enalty if th e jury i s p reclud ed from considering any relevant mitigat ing eviden ce. Smith v. Spisa k, 558 U.S. 139, 1 44 (2010). Applying that principle, the Cou rt held th at jury instru ctions and verdic t form s togeth er may not indicate that a mitigati ng circum stance must be found unani mously by the jury. Id. (citing Mills, 486 U.S. a t 380 - 8 1).

The verdict f orm here di d not indi cat e a unanimity requirem ent. Instead, Bright merel y takes issue wit h the form on the gro und tha t it did not e xpre ssly in for m juror s th at t hey could cons ider a mi tigator ev en if o ther juro rs did no t find that th e mitigator was establish ed. H owever, t he jury was pr operly instru cted th at mitigatio n need not be determin ed o n a unanim ous basis. And the si x compl eted mitig ation verdi ct forms sh ow that t he juro rs follow ed the ins tructio ns in th at five o f the ve rdicts contain ed nonun ani mous v ote s. As such, th e record concl usively r efutes the claim that co unsel’s perf ormance w as defici ent. See Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 384 (Fla. 2007) (explaining that counsel cannot be in effective f or failing to raise a meritles s objecti on). We thus affirm t h e summary deni al of this claim. D We now turn to Bright’s actual - conf lict - of - inter est clai m, in which he ar gues that counsel ’s impending move influenc ed her deci sion t o not request a continua nce in light of H urrica ne Irma. This conflict, B right co ntend s, excuses hi m from demonstrating preju dic e un der S trickla nd. Even a ssuming t his is the t ype of

actual conflict tha t cou ld entitle Bright to re lief, 11 the fac ts develope d at the eviden tiary hear ing do not esta blish t hat a conflict existed. Generally, a d efen dant alleging an inef fective assist ance clai m must dem onstrate prej udice. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 16 6- 67 (20 02). But t he U.S. S upreme Court has r ecogniz ed that cou rts may presum e prejudi ce when the d efendant’ s attorn ey labors un der a conflict of in terest. Id. at 16 6-68, 171 - 72. We have sum marize d that a defendant must est ablish th e following two elements bef ore prejudice i s presumed: (1) counsel ha d an ac tual conflict o f intere st, and (2) the conf lict advers ely affected counsel’ s repr esentation of the de fendant. See S tate v. Larzelere, 979 S o. 2d 1 95, 2 08 (F la. 2008); Sliney v. State, 944 So. 2d 270, 279 (Fla. 20 06). 11. We have applie d actual - conflict principles when a defendant alleges a conflict bas ed on the defen se att orney’s perso nal inte rests. See Sta te v. Larzelere, 979 S o. 2d 19 5, 20 8 - 10 (Fla. 2008); State v. Coney, 845 S o. 2d 1 20, 133 - 34 (Fla. 2 003). However, the U.S. Supreme Court h as only ever applied th ese principles i n the conte xt of multipl e representat ion. See Cuyler v. Sulliv an, 446 U.S. 33 5, 348 - 50 (1980); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 1 66 - 67 (2002). In deed, th e Court h as warne d against “expansive a pplic ation” of these principle s to o ther kind s of conflict — the kind our preceden t s ha ve entertained. See Mickens, 535 U. S. a t 174 - 75.

An actual confl ict of i nterest exist s when counsel “act ively repre sents co nflicting inte rests.” Larzelere, 9 79 S o. 2d at 2 08 (quoting Sl iney, 944 So. 2d at 2 79). “To de mon str ate an act ual conflict, the defen dant must i dentify specif ic eviden ce in t he record that su ggests that [counsel’s] in terest s were com promi sed. A possible, sp eculat ive or merely hypothet ical conf lict is insuff icient t o impugn a criminal co nviction.” Id. (internal quo tation marks omitted) (quoting Slin ey, 944 So. 2d at 279). At the postconv ict ion evidentiar y hearin g, counsel repeat edly denied that her impen ding move i mpacted her decisi on not to request a cont inuance. Rather, she and Bright felt that a f avorable jury had been sel ected, an d they did not want to r isk selectin g anothe r. The l ower co urt cred ited this te stimo ny. No other evidence support s Brigh t’s claim that counsel’s per sonal inter est in movi ng compromise d her e fforts to repre sent him. As such, we deny relief on t his claim. E Last ly, Bright co ntend s that the c ircuit court erre d in failing to find he was deprived of a fair t rial due to cumul ative er ror. We disagree. We have assesse d all of Bri ght’s inef fectiv e assistan ce

claims and f i nd no deficien t perfor mance. Accordin gly, this claim cannot succ eed. State v. Woodel, 145 S o. 3d 782, 8 03 (Fla. 201 4) (“[B]eca use we do not f ind multiple er rors in t his case, th ere is no cumulativ e error ef fect that establishes prej udice.”). III Bright has also fil ed a habeas peti tion in which he rais es ten individual claims. We deny t hem all. A Bright presen ts mult iple claim s regardin g appellat e counsel ’s representat ion in his 2 020 app eal. “I n general, claims of ineffect ive assistan ce of appellat e counsel ar e proper ly present ed in a petiti on for writ o f habe as corpu s. . . . ” Br own v. State, 304 So. 3d 243, 278 (Fla. 202 0) (citing Baker v. State, 214 So. 3d 53 0, 536 (Fl a. 2017)). “The st andard for a cl aim of ineffect ive assist ance of appellate c ounsel mi rrors th e Strick land standard for ineffec tive assistan ce of trial coun sel: the peti tioner must dem onstr ate deficient p erform ance and r esulting prejudice.” H ilton, 32 6 So. 3 d at 6 52 (citing Frances v. State, 143 So. 3d 340, 3 58 (Fla. 2014)). Regarding the d eficiency prong, Bright must s how that appellate c ounsel’ s failure t o raise cer tain issues “constitute [s] a

serious err or or subst antial defici en cy falling measur ably outside the rang e of profession ally acc eptable per formanc e. ” Pope v. Wainw rig ht, 4 96 S o. 2d 79 8, 8 00 (F la. 19 86). As for prejudice, he must prove th at any deficiency “ compromise d the a ppellate pr ocess to such a degree as to undermi ne confi dence in th e correctnes s of the res ult.” Id. In other wo rds, “ the deficiency mu st concern an issue which is error affect ing the o utcome, n ot simp ly harmless error.” Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 106 9 (Fl a. 20 00) (quoting Knight v. Stat e, 394 So. 2 d 99 7, 100 1 (Fla. 198 1)). 1 Bright firs t argues that appellat e counsel w as ineffe ctive for fail ing to raise a claim related to prosecut orial misc onduct. He contends the State imp roperly sugg ested t hat the j ury sh ould not c onsider a life se ntence be cause B right did not give that same choice to th e victims. In cl osing, the S tate argued: I sn’t i t ironic that in term s of – you have a choi ce. By his action s, he now is in the criminal justi ce syst em, and as a result, you have a ch oice as to wh ether he should get deat h o r whet her he shoul d get life. W ell, Raymond Brig ht never g ave each of these victi ms a choice, did he? We assume that the challenged co mment was pre served by a

sufficient ly specif ic ob jecti on from penalt y - phase c ounsel. Even so, appellate c ounsel’ s failure to raise the same - mercy argument on direc t ap peal doe s not s uppor t a findi ng of prej udice. Our prece dent char acterizes “s ame mercy” argument s as “impermissi ble.” See Wolf v. State, 416 So. 3 d 1117, 1132 (Fl a. 2025), cert. de nied, 2026 W L 13 5610 (U.S. Jan. 20, 20 26). But “a mercy argum ent standing alone d oes not const itute reversible error.” Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1 054, 1 062 (Fla. 2 007). This is so especially when “t he mercy com ments [are] not dwelled upon or emphasize d in the conte x t of the en tire closing.” Id. Here, consid ering t he entir e closing, the Sta te did n ot dwe ll upon or empha size t he mercy com ments. Namely, t he State did n ot implo re the ju ry to rec ommend de ath as a re sult o f Bright’ s fail ure to show me rcy. Considering t h ese facts along with the s trength o f the eviden ce against Bright an d the gravit y of the aggr avators, we find that any error would have bee n harmless. As such, Bri ght cannot show that a p pellate c ou nse l’s failure to rais e th is claim preju diced him. 2 Bright’ s asse rtion of ineffectiveness in appellat e counsel’s

failu re to argue t he lack of lif e - qualif ying question s is also meritless. As discuss ed above, the record demo nstrate s that B right’s counsel adequately life - qual ified the jury based on th e facts and circumst ances of th is case. Appell ate counsel c annot be deemed defic ient fo r declining to raise nonmerito rious issues. S ee Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 119 0, 121 1 (Fla. 200 5). 3 Bright ’s argumen t that ap pellate coun sel shoul d have raise d a Sixth Amen dmen t challenge based on penalty - phase counsel’s asserte d actual conflict o f intere st fails too. Fo r the r easons given above, we se e no basi s for finding a n actual conf lict. Again, appellate c ounsel can not be fault ed for fai ling to brief a meritless argument un support ed by the rec ord and case law. See id. 4 Bright also conte nds that appellate co unsel’s c umulat ive error in his 2020 a ppe al entitle s him to a new penalty ph ase. We reject this argument, as his claims are m eritless. See Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981, 98 6 (Fla. 200 3) (conclu ding that h abeas corpu s petitioner’ s cumulative error cl aim was pro perly deni ed where individual claims were mer it less and proced urall y barred).

B Next, Br ight a sse rts a due proce ss vio lati on b ecau se porti ons of the appellat e record wer e r edact ed in his direct appeal. This claim fails fo r two reas ons. Firs t, it is p rocedura lly b arred. See Coving t on v. State, 348 So. 3d 456, 481 (Fla. 2022) (claim s that could have been previously raised are ba rred in a h abeas petiti o n). Bright cou ld have raise d his objection t o an incom plete rec ord on direct appeal but faile d to do so. Second, Bright has not suggested that any po rtion of the redacted rec o rd woul d have sup ported a via b le appel late argument or was necessa r y to bol ster a claim that was raised in hi s b riefing. For these reas o ns, Brigh t’s due pro cess claim f ails. C Bright all eges mul tiple error s relating to his appellat e counsel’s r eprese ntation in the direct appeal that fol lowe d his 2 009 guilt phase. He advances three claims of ineffect ive assistan ce of appellate c ounsel 12 and one claim of cumulati ve error. A t the 12. He argues that ap p ellate co u nsel was i neffecti ve for f ailing to rais e claims based on (1) a disc overy violation, (2) t he trial judge’s

outse t we note “ [h] ab eas c orpus shoul d not be use d as a vehicle f or presenting i ssues which shoul d have been raised at t rial and on appeal or in postconvicti o n procee dings. ” Smith v. State, 126 S o. 3d 1038, 1053 (Fla. 2 013) (quoti ng Wright v. State, 8 57 So. 2d 86 1, 874 (Fla. 2003)). We previously review ed Bright’s i nitial p ostco nviction motion. See Bright II, 200 So. 3d at 7 29 - 42 (affirming the po stconvi ction court’s ord er and r emanding for a new penalty phase). Bright could have and shoul d have raised th ese arguments at that tim e. Because he di d not, t he se claims are procedur ally barr ed. Accordingly, we de ny relief. 13 D As his final hab eas claim, Br ight as serts th at Florida’s postconvict io n proce ss is inheren tly biased becau se it allows the same judge w ho presi ded over a d efendant’ s trial t o adjudicate t he defendant ’s postc onvicti on claims. According to Bri ght, the judge sidebar comm ent, and (3) the impr oper dismi ssal of two jurors unde r Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986). 13. Even i f we considere d these guilt - pha se claims on the merits, we w ould c oncl ude that they do not suppo rt relief.

will be pre dispose d in postc onvicti on toward s presum ing the correctnes s o f his or her previous a ctions an d rulings. Bright contends t hat becaus e of this bias, he suffered a mani fest injust ice during his postconvict ion proce eding s, which amounted to a violat ion of due pr ocess. A defendant m u st f ile a motion to di squalify w hen he “belie ves he cannot obt ain a fai r and imparti al trial before the assign ed trial judg e.” Liv ingsto n v. State, 44 1 So. 2d 1083, 108 6 (Fla. 19 83). Bright did not file a motion for judicial disqualification or othe rwise present thi s argumen t below, so hi s cu rrent claim of in herent bias is pro cedura lly barred. See Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 837 n.14 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting a habeas cl aim as proced u rally barr ed when tri al coun se l did not obj ect in the l ower cour t). Even if not bar red, the ar gument is meri tless. Th e Supre me Court’s due process i nquiry in t his context asks if “as an object ive matter, ‘the average judg e in his position is “ likely ” to be neutral, o r whether th ere is an u nconstitu tional “ potentia l for b ias. ” ’ ” Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (qu oti ng Capert on v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009)). There is no objectively r eason able basis t o think a judge pre siding over a

postconvict io n moti on cannot con sider claims regar ding a prior t rial over which he or she presided. Neutr al judges are e ntrusted with reviewing t heir prior decision s at multiple points in both civil and crimin al litiga tion, and Bright p resents n o reaso n to dou bt this practice. We therefore deny r elief on this claim. IV For the foreg oing reason s, we affirm the circuit cour t’s denial of Bri ght’s po stconvic tion moti on, and we deny his petition for writ of habeas c orpus. It is so ordered. MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL, FRANCIS, SASSO, and TANE NBAUM, J J., concur. NOT FI NAL UNTI L TIME EX PIRES TO F ILE R EHE ARING M OTIO N AND, I F FILE D, DETE RMINE D. An Appe al from the Ci rcuit Cou rt in and for Duval County, Russell L. Healey, J udge – Case No. 162008 CF002 887AX XXMA And an Or iginal Proceeding – Habe as Corpus Dawn Mac ready, Capit al Collate ral Regional Counse l, Elizabeth Spiaggi, Assistant Capital Coll atera l Regional Co u nsel, and Nida Imtia z, Assistan t Capital Collate ral Regional C ounsel, Northern Region, Tall ahass ee, Florid a, for App ella nt/Petitione r

James Uthmei er, At torney Gen eral, and Jas on W. Rodrig uez, Senior Assistant Attorne y General, Tall ahassee, Florid a, for Appellee/Re spondent