Gorokhovskiy v. Barclays Bank Delaware - Appeal of Default Judgment

IN THE SUPE RIOR COURT O F THE STATE O F DEL AWARE VI KTOR S. GOROKHOVS KIY,:: Appellant,:: C.A. No. K25A-09- 00 3 JJC v.:: BARCLAYS BA NK DELAW ARE,:: Appellee.: Submitted: Jan uary 23, 2026 Decided: February 26, 202 6 ORDER On this 2 6 th day of February 2026, ha ving cons idered Appellant Vi kto r Gorokhovskiy’s a ppeal from the decision of t he Court of Common Pl eas, his opening brief, and the record, it ap pears that: 1. Mr. Gorokhovski y appeals a d efault judgment that the trial court entered in favor of Barclay s Bank Delaware (“Barcla ys”) after Mr. Gor okhovskiy failed to appear for t rial. He asks the Court t o reverse that jud gment on appeal because he alleges insufficie nt s ervice of process below. He further contends that Barclays had no standing to bring the suit and that the trial court demonstrated bias in certai n discovery ruling s, w hich he conten d s violated his due process r ights. Mr. Gorokhovskiy filed his opening brief in support of his appeal. Barclays failed to file an answering brief or otherwise participate in the appeal, however. For the reasons to follow, the trial court’s judgment must nevertheless be affirmed because the appellate re cord demonstra tes no revers ible error. 2. In an appea l of a decision of the Court of Common Pleas, the Superior Court must determine whether the trial court committed legal error, whether the record suffi ciently supported the trial court’ s factual findings, and whether the t ria l

2 court’ s conclusions were a product of an orderly and logical deductive process. 1 Superior Court Civil Ru le 72 controls the process for these appeals and sets briefing deadlines, subject to adjustment by the Court. 2 When a party fails to file a required brief, the Court sends a brief delinquency notice. 3 In the delinquency notice, the Court provides an extension to file the brief and expla i ns the consequences for failing to do so. When, as here, the offe nding party is t he appellee, t he Court has the discretion to decide the appeal adversely to that p arty or, alternatively, decide the case based o n the appellant’ s brief and the appella te record. 4 3. In this case, when Barclays failed to file its brief, the Court sent it a delinquency notice and provided it ten additional days to com ply. 5 W hen that time expired without the filing, the Court notified the parties that it would decide Mr. Gorokhovskiy’ s appeal after con sidering o nly the opening brief and the record. 6 4. The Court glean s the following backgro und from the trial c o urt ’s docket an d plea dings. They demonstrate that Barclays filed a complaint in the Cour t of Co mmon Pleas alleging that Mr. Gorok hovskiy o wed Barclays a debt. 7 Barclays attached an affi davit 8 and a credit s tatement 9 to the complaint in support o f its c lai m for a sum certai n – $12,241. 2 6, inclusive of interest. T he docket and certified record confirm service upon Mr. Gorokhovskiy at his address of record, via a person of necessarily suitable age – a “Michae l, co-tenant.” 10 T he record further co nfirms that Mr. Goro k hovskiy had actual notice of the action from the outset. Namely, he filed 1 W right v. Platinum Fin. Servs., 930 A.2d 929, 20 07 W L 1850904, at *2 (Del. 2007) (T ABLE). 2 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 72(g). 3 Id. 4 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 107(f). 5 Super. Ct. D.I. 14 [hereinafter, the C ourt will refer to the Superior Court docket as “Super. Ct. D.I. . . .” and will refer to the Court of Common Pleas docke t as “CCP D.I. .. .”]. 6 Super. Ct. D.I. 16. 7 CCP D.I. 2. 8 Id. at 2. 9 Id. at 3. 10 CCP D.I. 4.

3 a timely answer. In it, h e acknowledged that he had “received the Summons and Complaint....” 11 He also contemporaneo usly sent Barclays a d iscovery reques t seeking informa t ion abou t an af fidavit Barclays had attache d to its complaint. 12 5. The docket, the plead ings, and Mr. Gorokhovskiy ’ s own brief, demonstrate the ex ercise of considera ble patience by the trial c ourt when accommodating Mr. Gorokhovskiy, a self-represen ted litigant. A t first, Mr. Gorokhovskiy failed to appear at a pretrial con ference despite undisputed notice of the p roceeding. 13 As a result, Barclays’ co unsel m oved for a default judgment. The Court then e ntered j udgment in the amount specified in t he complaint, $12,365. 76. 14 Mr. Gorokhovskiy then moved to vacate the default judgment. 15 The t rial cour t granted the motio n, reopened the cas e, and scheduled a nother pretr ial conferenc e. 16 6. The trial court then accommodated Mr. Gorokhovskiy’ s further requests for accommodations which further delay ed the proceedings. For example, he requested a continuance of the second-scheduled pretrial conference, and the court granted t he request. 17 Then, Mr. Gorokhovskiy appeared and p articipa ted in the third-scheduled pretrial conference and the court scheduled the tr ial. 18 Next, Mr. Gorokhovskiy requested a continuan ce of th e trial, and the court granted it. 19 He then failed to appear on the day of the second-scheduled trial, and the court granted Barclays’ seco nd motion f or default jud gment. 20 Mr. G orokhovskiy did not attemp t to vacate that judgment. Instead, he filed this appeal. On appea l, h e seeks reversal 11 CCP D.I. 5 ¶2. He contended in his answer, however, that service was “unjust” and improper. 12 CCP D.I. 7. 13 CCP D.I. 9. 14 CCP D.I. 13. 15 CCP D.I.s 14, 15. 16 CCP D.I.s 20, 21. 17 CCP D.I. 23. 18 CCP D.I. 31. 19 CCP D.I.s 34, 35. 20 CCP D.I. 40.

4 and judgment entered in his favor because of allegedly (1) insuffici ent service of process below an d (2) the trial c ourt’ s bias and unfair treatment. 7. As to service of process, Court o f Common Pleas Civil Rule 4 (f)(1)(I) provides that ser vice of the sum mons and complaint may be made [u]pon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person by delivering a copy of the summons, complaint and aff idavit, if any, to that individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at tha t individual’ s d welling house or usual place of abode with s ome person of suitable age an d discretio n then resi ding therein[.] A defense of insuf ficiency of service of process is waived if n ot asserted by motion or answer. 21 8. Here, Mr. Gorokhovskiy asserted this aff i rmative defense in his answer while contradictori ly admitt ing that he had received the pleadi ngs. Importantly, the record d oes not reflect that he advanced an improper service arg ument at any point after he successf ully moved to vacate the first de fault judgme nt. Nor does it reflec t that he ever request ed dismissal as a remedy. The docket does reflect, and the process server attested, that “Michael,” at Mr. Gorokhovskiy’ s ad dress of record, accepted process as Mr. Gorokhovskiy’ s co -tenant. 22 Again, Mr. Gorokhovsk iy admitted that he received a copy of the complai nt and summons. 23 He then fully participat ed in the litigation which demons trated that his actual notice of the action precluded any unfair prejudice. 9. Mr. Gorokhovskiy further contends in his b rief that Barclays, and its process server, falsified the return. On that point, the trial court was in the best position to assess the suf ficiency of ser vice. It d id not abuse its dis cretion in rely ing on the return of s ervice or when refraining from dismissing the matter su a sponte, or alternatively, at Mr. Gorokhovskiy ’ s request as he n ow implies. 24 21 Ct. Com. Pl. Civ. R. 12(h)(1). 22 CCP D.I. 4. 23 CCP D.I. 5. 24 CCP D.I. 20.

5 10. Finally, Mr. Gorokhovski y seeks reversal and entry of judgment on appeal becau se Barclays h ad no standing, the evidence di d not support the judgmen t, the judge was biased, and Barcla ys committed various discovery violations. There is no indication in the record that he raised these issues below which alone is dispositive on the ground of waiver. Independently, he further waived any such arg uments when he failed to a ppear for tri al. 11. In summary, the trial court did n ot abuse its discretio n when i t declined to dismiss the underlying action, sua sponte o r o therwise. 25 Nor did it abuse its discretion or commi t legal er ror when entering the default jud gment. WHEREFORE, for t he reasons stated above, the judgment o f the Court of Common Pleas is AFFIRM ED. IT IS S O ORDERED. Jeffrey J Clark Resident Judge 25 Mr. Gorokhovskiy seems to contend, without expressly arguing, that the trial court committed reversible error by de clining to dism iss the suit sua sponte based on insufficient service of pro cess. The record reflects that he raised the issue o f impr oper service only when he sought to vacate the first default judgment. There, the trial court seemed to have vacated the judgment on the separa te ground of his excusable neglect for failing to appear. Neither in Mr. Gorokhovskiy’ s brief nor in the record is there a refe rence to how he raised the issue with the trial court by motion or othe r means after th at point or that he ever requested dismissal as a remedy. An absence in the record showing that he pursued the ar gument indep endently, outside of the context of his request to vacate the first default judgment, waives the ar gument on appeal. Th e Court reco gnizes that there is no verbatim transcript available from the second pretrial conference. If at some point, Mr. Gorokhovskiy renew ed the issue and ask ed for dis missal as he implies in hi s brief—perhaps at the second pre trial conference for instanc e—the trial court nevertheless had ample bas es in the record to deny any such motion as explained above.