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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo in Interest of SMG

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA1244

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (21.6K)

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Combined Opinion

25CA1244 Peo in Interest of SMG 02-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1244
Garfield County District Court No. 24JV11
Honorable Elise Myer, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of S.M.G., a Child,

and Concerning L.A.G.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Tow and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 26, 2026

Heather Beattie, County Attorney, Bart Outzen, Assistant County Attorney,
Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josie L. Burt, Counsel for Youth, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for S.M.G.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Constit.
Art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 L.A.G. (mother) appeals the judgment adjudicating her child,

S.M.G. (the youth), dependent or neglected and the dispositional

order adopting mother’s treatment plan. We reverse the judgment

and the order, and we remand the case to the juvenile court for

further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 In June 2024, the Garfield County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect concerning the

then-eleven-year-old youth. The Department alleged that mother

had taken the youth to a hospital emergency room where mother

asked for help with the youth’s “escalating unsafe behaviors.” In

the petition, the Department reported that mother had said she

could not handle being the youth’s “nursemaid” for “seventeen

hours per day” and needed “respite care.” The Department noted

concerns about mother’s mental health and, specifically, her history

of “mental health hospitalizations and diagnoses.” (The Department

filed an amended petition (the amended petition) the next month.

The differences between the original and amended petitions are not

material to this appeal.)

1
¶3 The juvenile court granted the Department temporary legal

custody of the youth, who was placed in foster care. Mother

subsequently denied the allegations in the amended petition and

requested an adjudicatory jury trial.

¶4 After a two-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict finding that

the youth’s environment was injurious to the youth’s welfare.

Based on the jury’s verdict, the court adjudicated the youth

dependent and neglected. The court subsequently conducted a

contested dispositional hearing and issued an order adopting a

treatment plan for mother.

II. Admission of Exhibits

¶5 Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred by

admitting three exhibits (the subject exhibits): (1) a police report;

(2) the amended petition; and (3) the Department’s intake report.

She argues that the subject exhibits were inadmissible because

they “exposed the jury to highly prejudicial hearsay statements that

were not admissible under the Rules of Evidence” and it was “highly

likely” they influenced the jury into “believing that the [youth’s]

environment was injurious to the [youth’s] welfare.” Mother also

asserts that, by admitting the hearsay statements in the subject

2
exhibits, the court violated her due process right to fundamentally

fair proceedings.

¶6 The Department and GAL concede that mother preserved her

hearsay arguments. And we agree that the court abused its

discretion by admitting the subject exhibits into evidence and

conclude that reversal is required because their admission was not

harmless. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the

Department and GAL’s argument that mother failed to preserve her

prejudice and due process arguments.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 The purpose of an adjudicatory jury trial is to determine

whether the factual allegations in the dependency and neglect

petition are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and

whether the status of the subject child warrants intrusive protective

or corrective state intervention into the familial relationship. People

in Interest of G.E.S., 2016 COA 183, ¶ 13, 409 P.3d 645, 649. A

child may be adjudicated dependent or neglected if the government

proves one or more of the conditions set forth in section 19-3-102,

C.R.S. 2025, by a preponderance of the evidence. See People in

Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 29, 459 P.3d 572, 577

3
(“[S]ection 19-3-102 requires proof of only one condition for an

adjudication.”), aff’d but criticized sub nom. People v. G.S., 2018

CO 31, 416 P.3d 905.

¶8 A juvenile court may not disregard the rules of evidence at an

adjudicatory hearing. People in Interest of D.M.F.D., 2021 COA 95,

¶ 10, 497 P.3d 14, 16. Thus, a department of human services must

introduce sufficient admissible evidence to meet its burden of proof

that a child is dependent or neglected; it cannot rest its case on

inadmissible hearsay. Id. at ¶ 11, 497 P.3d at 16. Nor can a

factfinder base its determination that a child is dependent or

neglected on inadmissible hearsay evidence. Id.

¶9 Hearsay is “a statement other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). Hearsay is

inadmissible except as provided by statute or rule. CRE 802. As

relevant here, the exceptions to the hearsay rule include “records of

regularly conducted activity,” otherwise referred to as business

records, under CRE 803(6), and “public records and reports” under

CRE 803(8).

4
¶ 10 But even if a document is admissible under CRE 803(6) or

CRE 803(8), any hearsay statements contained within that

document are not necessarily admissible. CRE 805; see also

Bernache v. Brown, 2020 COA 106, ¶ 16, 471 P.3d 1234, 1239

(explaining that, although a police report may be admissible under

CRE 803(8), statements made to an officer documented in the

report are inadmissible unless they independently meet a hearsay

exception). Rather, when a statement contains multiple layers of

hearsay, a court must analyze each layer separately to determine

whether a recognized exception to the hearsay rule applies.

CRE 805; Bernache, ¶ 14, 471 P.3d at 1238.

¶ 11 We review a juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 32,

456 P.3d 1284, 1289. A court abuses its discretion if it misapplies

the law or if its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair. Id.

B. Police Report

¶ 12 Mother challenges the juvenile court’s admission of a police

report describing, among other things, an incident in which law

enforcement personnel responded to an anonymous report that

5
mother was yelling at the youth. At trial, mother argued that the

police report was inadmissible because it contained hearsay

“statements . . . from an unknown party.” The juvenile court

acknowledged that the police report “contain[ed] hearsay” but

overruled mother’s objection, finding that the authoring officer’s

testimony established a sufficient foundation for admission of the

report as a business record under CRE 803(6). On appeal, mother

reiterates her hearsay arguments regarding the police report.

¶ 13 We initially note that police reports generally “do not fall

within ‘the business records exception’ to the hearsay rule.” See

Polster v. Griff’s of Am., Inc., 525 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Colo. App. 1974).

However, police reports may be admissible as public records under

CRE 803(8). See Bernache, ¶ 16, 471 P.3d at 1239. Even so,

witness statements contained in a police report are inadmissible

unless they independently satisfy a hearsay exception. Id. at ¶ 17,

471 P.3d at 1239.

¶ 14 The police report said, referring to mother and the youth, that

“an anonymous caller stat[ed] a mother was yelling at her

daughter.” Because the caller did not testify, and the record does

not indicate that the Department offered this statement into

6
evidence for anything other than the truth of the matter asserted,

the caller’s statement was hearsay within hearsay. See CRE 801(c);

CRE 805.

¶ 15 Although the juvenile court acknowledged that the police

report contained this hearsay, it did not analyze whether the

anonymous caller’s statement independently met a hearsay

exception. On this record, we cannot conclude that the statement

was admissible under a hearsay exception. See Bernache, ¶ 21,

471 P.3d at 1239.

¶ 16 Accordingly, we conclude that the caller’s statement

documented in the police report was inadmissible hearsay, and that

the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting the police

report without redacting the statement. See id. at ¶¶ 22, 38 n.6,

471 P.3d at 1239-40, 1243 n.6.

C. Amended Petition

¶ 17 Next, mother challenges the juvenile court’s admission of the

amended petition into evidence. At trial, mother argued that the

amended petition was inadmissible because it contained hearsay

and misleading allegations. The court overruled mother’s objection,

7
finding that the amended petition was admissible as a public record

under CRE 803(8).

¶ 18 It is not clear to us whether the amended petition was

admissible as a public record under CRE 803(8). Unless the

sources of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of

trustworthiness, the public records hearsay exception allows the

admission of records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in

any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities

of the office or agency; (B) matters observed pursuant to duty

imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,

excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police

officers and other law enforcement personnel; or (C) in civil actions

and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases,

factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to

authority granted by law. CRE 803(8). It is difficult to see how a

narrative of the Department’s unsubstantiated allegations against

mother falls within one of the subcategories of CRE 803(8).

Cf. Tincombe v. Colo. Const. & Supply Corp., 681 P.2d 533, 534

(Colo. App. 1984) (holding that complaints made to the Attorney

General’s Office were not admissible as public records because they

8
were comprised of unsubstantiated allegations, not factual

findings). Moreover, “matters concerning the pleadings are

ordinarily addressed to the judge, whose duty it is to state the

issues to the jury when [the court] comes to deliver to them [the]

instructions.” Cook v. Merritt, 25 P. 176, 177 (Colo. 1890); see also

People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178, ¶¶ 49, 57, 433 P.3d

627, 635-36 (concluding that the juvenile court erred when it read

to the jury detailed allegations from the petition, some of which

relied on inadmissible evidence, and providing the jury with a

written copy of the allegations from the petition “ma[de] matters

worse”).

¶ 19 On appeal, mother argues only that the hearsay statements

contained in the amended petition were inadmissible. She points to

the inclusion in the amended petition of a “running narrative” of the

events leading up to the Department’s involvement in the family,

“told from the perspective of various persons . . . most of whom did

not . . . testify during the trial.” She also asserts that statements in

the amended petition attributed to the youth’s pediatrician were

inadmissible hearsay within hearsay. Indeed, the amended petition

includes a three-page narrative of the events leading up to the filing

9
of the original petition. Although mother does not point to any

specific hearsay statements in the amended petition, we agree that

it includes hearsay statements from the youth’s pediatrician. For

example, the Department alleged the following in the amended

petition:

Dr. Dan Galka, [the youth’s] pediatrician,
reported these behaviors have gotten worse
over the last few weeks. Dr. Galka stated
[mother] has difficulties handling [the youth]
when her impulsive behaviors are escalated,
and he does not believe she has the parenting
skills to cope with the behaviors. He reported
[mother] is very adamant about who [the
youth] can see for psychiatric services and has
declined participation in many referrals.
Dr. Galka stated [the youth] is at the
maximum dosage of all [the youth’s]
medications.

¶ 20 Notably, the pediatrician did not testify at the hearing, and the

Department did not assert that it was offering the amended petition

for any purpose other than to prove the truth of the matters

asserted therein. Thus, the pediatrician’s statements were hearsay

within hearsay. See CRE 801(c); CRE 805. Moreover, the juvenile

court did not analyze whether the pediatrician’s statements

independently met a hearsay exception. Again, on this record, we

cannot conclude that the statements were admissible under one of

10
the exceptions to the hearsay rule. See Bernache, ¶ 21, 471 P.3d at

1239.

¶ 21 Accordingly, we conclude that the pediatrician’s statements

contained in the amended petition were inadmissible hearsay and,

for that reason, the juvenile court abused its discretion by

admitting the amended petition without redacting the statements.

See id. at ¶¶ 22, 38 n.6, 471 P.3d at 1239-40, 1243 n.6.

D. Intake Report

¶ 22 Lastly, mother challenges the juvenile court’s admission of the

intake caseworker’s court report. At the adjudicatory trial, mother

argued that the intake report was inadmissible because it contained

“a lot” of hearsay. The court overruled mother’s objection, finding

that the ongoing caseworker’s testimony sufficiently established

that the intake report was admissible as a business record under

CRE 803(6). (To the extent the Department argues that the intake

report was admissible under section 19-1-107, C.R.S. 2025, we are

not convinced. Although the statute allows a juvenile court to

consider “written reports and other material relating to the child’s

mental, physical, and social history,” such consideration is limited

to instances involving the court’s determination of the “proper

11
disposition of a child.” § 19-1-107(2). But the court does not

determine a child’s disposition at an adjudicatory jury trial.

Compare § 19-1-103(4), C.R.S. 2025 (stating that, at an

adjudicatory trial, the factfinder determines whether the allegations

of a petition in delinquency are supported by the evidence), with

§ 19-1-103(58) (providing that, at a dispositional hearing, the court

determines what order of disposition should be made concerning a

child who is neglected or dependent), and § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S.

2025 (stating that the court shall hear evidence on the question of

the proper disposition best serving the interests of the child after

making an order of adjudication).)

¶ 23 On appeal, mother reiterates her hearsay argument regarding

the intake report. She notes that it contains the same narrative of

events, including the pediatrician’s statements, that appears in the

amended petition. As explained above, the pediatrician’s

statements were inadmissible without a more robust foundation.

¶ 24 Mother also argues that the intake report contains hearsay

statements relating to every referral the Department received about

the family since 2012. Indeed, the report contains nine pages of

referral summaries, most of which consist of unidentified third

12
parties’ statements to the Department, such as the following reports

from such third parties:

• Mother was “pregnant and went to the hospital for pain.

[She] had received no prenatal care and self-reported she

has a high risk pregnancy . . . .”

• The youth is “underweight and [mother] has not taken

[the youth] to follow-up appointments since birth.”

“[T]here is concern that [mother] may leave the state with

[the youth]. [Mother] reported the Department is

investigating her for terrorist activity.”

• Mother “seemed paranoid, was fixated on the Department

trying to sell [the youth], and she seemed overwhelmed

trying to manage [the youth’s] needs . . . .”

• Mother’s “significant other . . . had dunked [the youth]

under water and was charged with child abuse.”

• Mother “slammed [the youth] onto the floor, grabbed [the

youth’s] wrists and ankle, and twisted them.”

• Mother “emotionally abuses [the youth] and there is

substance abuse in the home.” The youth and mother

13
were “arguing and [the youth] reported that [mother] had

dragged [the youth] across the floor.”

• The youth is “being malnourished and there were

concerns for [mother’s] lack of capacity to care for [the

youth].”

• Mother has “a history of substance use, and there is

concern for her escalating mental health issues.”

• Mother “brought [the youth] to the emergency room

saying [the youth] needed to ‘go somewhere else’ due to

[the youth] being loud and screaming because [mother]

was afraid of losing her [public] housing.” The youth was

“kicked off the swim team,” the youth was “defecating on

the floor at home,” mother said she was “not sure if she

[could] continue to care for [the youth’s] medical and

mental health needs,” and the youth “disclosed there

[was] not enough food in the home.”

¶ 25 Like the unknown caller referenced in the police report, none

of the unidentified reporters noted in the intake report testified at

trial, and the record does not indicate that the Department offered

these statements for any purpose other than proving the truth of

14
the matter asserted. Thus, the statements were hearsay within

hearsay. See CRE 801(c); CRE 805. As noted above, the juvenile

court did not analyze whether any of the unidentified reporters’

statements independently met a hearsay exception. Without a more

robust foundation, these statements were not admissible under one

of the hearsay exceptions. See Bernache, ¶ 21, 471 P.3d at 1239.

¶ 26 Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by admitting the intake report without redacting the

statements. See id. at ¶¶ 22, 38 n.6, 471 P.3d at 1239-40,

1243 n.6.

E. Harmless Error Analysis

¶ 27 The erroneous admission of evidence does not automatically

require reversal of a judgment. See CRE 103(a); C.R.C.P. 61. But

we conclude that the juvenile court’s erroneous admission of the

subject exhibits was not harmless because it impaired the basic

fairness of the trial in a way that likely influenced the outcome of

the case. See CRE 103(a); C.R.C.P. 61; People in Interest of M.V.,

2018 COA 163, ¶ 67, 432 P.3d 628, 639, overruled on other grounds

by People in Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42, 516 P.3d 924.

15
¶ 28 We acknowledge that at least some of the inadmissible hearsay

duplicated testimony at trial. For example, several witnesses

testified to the same information that appeared in the unknown

caller’s statement documented in the police report — that they saw

or heard mother yell at the youth. Further, the ongoing caseworker

testified, without objection, about certain of the inadmissible

statements in the amended petition, including the statement that

the youth’s pediatrician did not believe mother had the parenting

skills to cope with the youth’s behaviors. In addition, the GAL

cross-examined mother, without objection, about a number of the

reports to the Department included in the intake report. We note

that the inadmissible statements — primarily those in the amended

petition and the intake report — were substantially more detailed

than the analogous testimony at the trial. Thus, the erroneous

admission of the hearsay statements was harmful because it was

not merely cumulative of trial testimony. Cf. M.V., ¶¶ 66-67, 432

P.3d at 639 (explaining that the erroneous admission of evidence is

generally considered harmless if the admitted evidence is merely

cumulative of other evidence introduced at trial).

16
¶ 29 Further, one jury instruction stated that “evidence of the

alleged instances of abuse and parental neglect relied upon to

establish the child’s dependency and neglect must be considered in

the context of the child’s history as well as the parent’s prior

behavior.” Based on that instruction, the jury could have

considered the inadmissible statements in the intake report

because they specifically related to the youth’s history and mother’s

prior behavior.

¶ 30 Moreover, the juvenile court did not give the jury any limiting

instructions about the inadmissible hearsay statements in the

subject exhibits. Rather, the court instructed the jury to consider

“only the evidence received at trial,” which included “all exhibits

which ha[d] been received in evidence.” Thus, the jury may have

considered the inadmissible statements for the truth of the matters

asserted.

¶ 31 The juvenile court’s errors were not harmless because we

cannot say with fair assurance that they did not “substantially

influence[] the outcome of the case or impair[] the basic fairness of

the trial itself.” Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. 2010)

(quoting Banek v. Thomas, 733 P.2d 1171, 1178 (Colo. 1986)).

17
¶ 32 Accordingly, we reverse the adjudicatory judgment and

remand the case to the juvenile court for a new trial.

III. Treatment Plan

¶ 33 Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred by adopting

her treatment plan because the plan required her to complete a

mental health evaluation. Thus, she asserts that we must reverse

the dispositional order.

¶ 34 Given our conclusion that the adjudicatory judgment must be

reversed, we need not address this contention. See People in

Interest of R.J., 2019 COA 109, ¶ 16 n.1, 451 P.3d 1232, 1236 n.1

(explaining that a dispositional order is predicated on the

adjudicatory judgment; thus, if we reverse the adjudicatory

judgment, the dispositional order must fall, as well). Although we

have the discretion to address an issue that may arise on remand,

See Westfield Dev. Co. v. Rifle Inv. Assocs., 786 P.2d 1112, 1118

(Colo. 1990), we cannot determine if the issue regarding the

treatment plan will arise on remand because (1) we cannot predict

the outcome of the retrial, and (2) even if the retrial results in the

youth’s adjudication, the family’s circumstances may materially

change by the time of the new trial. See People in Interest of S.L.,

18
2017 COA 160, ¶ 10, 421 P.3d 1207, 1212 (explaining that the

appropriateness of a treatment plan depends, in part, on the facts

existing at the time it is adopted). Consequently, we decline to

address mother’s contention regarding her treatment plan.

IV. Disposition

¶ 35 The adjudicatory judgment and dispositional order are

reversed. The case is remanded for the juvenile court to hold a new

adjudicatory trial.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

19