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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo in Interest of IB

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA1703

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

25CA1703 Peo in Interest of IB 02-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1703
Adams County District Court No. 23JV30095
Honorable Kelley R. Southerland, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of I.B., a Child,

and Concerning J.A.G.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE*
Tow and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 26, 2026

Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Deborah Kershner, Assistant County Attorney,
Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Counsel for Youth, Salida, Colorado, for I.B.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 J.A.G. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment revoking

her deferred adjudication and adjudicating I.B. (the youth)

dependent and neglected. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Adams County Human Services Department (the

Department) received multiple referrals concerning mother’s

substance use. The Department contacted mother, who agreed to

let the youth stay with kin while mother began treatment. When

the Department learned that mother had changed her mind and

was attempting to bring the youth back home, it sought, and the

juvenile court granted, temporary custody of the youth for

placement with kin. The Department then filed a petition in

dependency and neglect.

¶3 Five months later, mother and the Department agreed to a

deferred adjudication. As part of the agreement, mother admitted

that the youth was homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled

with the youth’s parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no

fault of mother. See § 19-3-102(1)(e), C.R.S. 2025.

¶4 Mother agreed to comply with a treatment plan that required

her to (1) participate in mental health and substance abuse

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treatment; (2) submit to random urinalysis testing; (3) attend family

time; (4) maintain contact with the caseworker; and (5) notify the

caseworker of any criminal charges or changes in contact

information.

¶5 Eleven months later, the Department filed a motion to

adjudicate the youth dependent and neglected, arguing that mother

had not fully resolved the protective concerns that precipitated the

filing of the petition. Following a contested hearing, the juvenile

court adjudicated the youth dependent and neglected.

II. Treatment Plan Compliance

¶6 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by entering an

adjudication order because she had complied with her treatment

plan. We are not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 “The purpose of an adjudicatory hearing is to determine

whether the factual allegations in the dependency and neglect

petition are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and

whether the status of the subject [youth] . . . warrants intrusive

protective or corrective state intervention into the familial

relationship.” People in Interest of A.M., 786 P.2d 476, 479 (Colo.

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App. 1989). Alternatively, the juvenile court may accept a parent’s

admission at an adjudicatory hearing. People in Interest of J.W. v.

C.O., 2017 CO 105, ¶ 32. “The court’s acceptance of [a parent’s]

admission establishe[s] the status of the [youth] as dependent or

neglected . . . .” Id.

¶8 Section 19-3-505(5), C.R.S. 2025, provides for a process often

referred to as “deferred adjudication.” Specifically, it allows a

juvenile court, with the consent of all parties, to continue the

adjudicatory hearing for up to six months and to defer entry of

judgment when a parent admits that the subject child (or youth) is

dependent or neglected. § 19-3-505(5)(a)-(b). Following the initial

six-month period, the juvenile court may continue the hearing for

another six months, after which the court must dismiss or sustain

the petition. § 19-3-505(5)(b).

¶9 A division of this court has concluded that the continuation of

an adjudicatory hearing under section 19-3-505(5) “contemplates

reconsidering the [youth’s] status before entering the adjudicatory

order.” People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶ 23. So when a

motion to revoke a deferred adjudication is filed, the juvenile court

“should address both the ongoing probative value of any parental

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admission and the parent’s new evidence in findings either

adjudicating the [youth] dependent and neglected as to the parent

or ordering the petition dismissed and the [youth] returned to

parental custody.” Id. at ¶ 27.

¶ 10 Whether a youth is dependent or neglected presents a mixed

factual and legal question because it requires applying statutory

criteria to evidentiary facts. See People in Interest of E.R., 2018 COA

58, ¶ 5. We review the court’s factual findings for clear error but

review de novo its legal conclusions based on those facts. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. In determining whether the

evidence is sufficient to sustain an adjudication, we review the

record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and draw

every inference fairly deducible from the evidence in favor of the

juvenile court’s decision. People in Interest of D.M.F.D., 2021 COA

95, ¶ 13.

B. Analysis

¶ 11 The juvenile court found that “protective concerns remain[ed]

concerning [the youth’s] emotional needs in her relationship” with

mother because of the youth’s experiences in mother’s care before

mother’s sobriety. Specifically, the court found that mother was

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“disconnected” from the youth’s emotional reality and unable to

meet the youth’s emotional needs. The court concluded that the

youth would lack proper care if she were to return to mother’s

home.

¶ 12 The record supports the court’s findings. The youth, whom

the juvenile court found to be credible, expressed feeling mentally

and emotionally “unstable” about potentially returning to mother’s

care. She described mother’s lengthy struggle with substance

abuse, mother’s frequent relapses, and her own resulting feelings of

insecurity and instability throughout her childhood. Following a

family time visit where mother “cornered” the youth and pressured

her to “let the court know that she wanted to go back home,”

mother and the youth did not have contact for “quite some time.”

While they resumed contact approximately three months before the

hearing — which the youth described as going “pretty good” — the

youth expressed feeling unheard and emotionally unsupported by

mother. Ultimately, the youth explained that she was “[k]ind of”

scared of mother because the youth did not feel that she could trust

her.

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¶ 13 The caseworker testified that the youth struggled with trusting

mother and feeling emotionally safe in her care. The caseworker

believed that family therapy for mother and the youth would be

“critical” to stabilize their relationship. But family therapy had not

yet begun because the youth had only recently expressed her

willingness to attend it. The caseworker opined there was “great

risk” that the youth would struggle with her mental health and

feeling safe if she returned to mother’s care.

¶ 14 Mother asserts that considering the uncontested evidence that

she had complied with her treatment plan, including her sobriety,

stability, and ability to care for the younger siblings, the juvenile

court erred by revoking her deferred adjudication. True, the

caseworker acknowledged mother’s compliance, but partial, or even

substantial, compliance may not be sufficient to correct a parent’s

conduct or condition. People in Interest of G.R.N.M., 228 P.3d 976,

978 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 15 The juvenile court considered mother’s overall treatment plan

compliance. But it also found that based on the youth’s past

experiences with mother’s substance abuse, which impacted her

“emotional and physical readiness to return to [mother’s] care,” she

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was differently situated than her younger siblings. Considering the

youth’s current status, the court determined that she would lack

proper care in mother’s home because of mother’s inability to meet

her emotional needs. See N.G., ¶ 23 (directing that before entering

an adjudicatory order at the end of a deferral period, the court

should consider the youth’s “current status”); see also People in

Interest of S.B., 742 P.2d 935, 939 (Colo. App. 1987) (“An action in

dependency or neglect is designed to determine whether the [youth],

for whatever reason, lacks the benefit of parental guidance,

concern, protection, or support.”). It is not our role to reweigh the

evidence or substitute our judgment for the juvenile court’s. People

in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62.

¶ 16 Finally, to the extent mother argues that the juvenile court

erred by not affording her the “Troxel presumption of fitness,” we

reject that argument. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68

(2000) (“[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best

interests of their children.”). The supreme court has held that

“Troxel does not require . . . any . . . addition to the statutory

criteria for the [adjudication] statute to pass constitutional muster.”

People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 23. Mother does not assert

7
that the juvenile court failed to properly apply the statutory criteria.

Nor do we discern any such error.

¶ 17 On reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the

Department, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s order

revoking mother’s deferred adjudication and adjudicating the youth

dependent and neglected. D.M.F.D., ¶ 13.

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.

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