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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Abrams v. Khattak

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24CA2218

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (688)

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Combined Opinion

24CA2218 Abrams v Khattak 02-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2218
City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV31323
Honorable Andrew P. McCallin, Judge

Abrams & Associates, LLC,

Defendant-Appellee,

v.

Fatima Khattak,

Plaintiff-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 26, 2026

Abrams & Associates, LLC, Robert Abrams, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellee

Fatima Khattak, Pro Se
¶1 Plaintiff, Fatima Khattak, appeals the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of defendant, Abrams & Associates, LLC (A&A).

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Khattak was the plaintiff in Denver District Court Case No.

22CV30058.1 Khattak entered into a contract for Abrams,

Sullenberger & Associates, LLC (AS&A), to represent her in that

case. Pursuant to the contract, if Khattak failed to pay legal fees,

AS&A was entitled to costs incurred in collecting the amounts

owed, and Khattak agreed to pay 18% per annum in interest on the

outstanding amounts.

¶3 A&A was the sole owner and member of AS&A. In April 2022,

A&A filed a statement of dissolution with the Colorado Secretary of

State dissolving AS&A. Khattak wasn’t notified of the dissolution

but continued to receive legal services from A&A. Khattak received

invoices for fees owed under the contract she had signed with

AS&A, but the invoices asked her to direct payment to A&A.

Khattak’s case proceeded to trial, and the jury found against her.

1 This case is not at issue here.

1
Before trial, Khattak paid all legal fees owed under the agreement,

even after AS&A was dissolved. After trial, though, Khattak didn’t

pay any outstanding fees. As of March 2023, Khattak owed A&A

$27,255.88 in legal fees.

¶4 A&A filed the underlying complaint in May 2023, asserting a

claim for breach of contract against Khattak for failure to pay legal

fees under the contract. In response, Khattak filed a motion to

dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), alleging that (1) there was no valid

and enforceable contract with A&A; (2) she performed her

obligations concerning the contract with AS&A; (3) the dissolution

of AS&A extinguished its existence, thereby rendering any contracts

it had entered into unenforceable; and (4) AS&A, because it was

dissolved, lacked standing. The district court denied her motion.

Khattak then filed an answer to the complaint but didn’t assert any

counterclaims.

¶5 A&A moved for judgment on the pleadings under C.R.C.P.

12(c). It attached invoices to the motion to support the claim that

Khattak failed to pay for legal services. Khattak responded,

claiming that there was no enforceable contract between her and

2
A&A because her contract was with the predecessor legal entity,

AS&A.

¶6 In April 2024, the court found that AS&A’s dissolution didn’t

preclude A&A’s claim for breach of contract. In the same order, the

court converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings to a

motion for summary judgment because A&A attached exhibits to

the motion and introduced matters outside the pleadings. The

court then ordered both parties to present all relevant evidence and

to establish any disputes of material fact on the elements of the

breach of contract claim.

¶7 Khattak submitted a response and attached documents

relating to the filing and service of the underlying complaint but

didn’t submit an affidavit or other evidence relating to the breach of

contract claim itself.

¶8 The court granted A&A summary judgment after concluding

that A&A presented evidence that Khattak failed to pay for the legal

services performed and that Khattak failed to establish the

existence of a factual dispute by attaching an affidavit or other

evidence that A&A concealed the winding-up of AS&A. Khattak

filed a motion to reconsider and attached an affidavit and other

3
exhibits to the motion. The court denied her request, however,

concluding that the evidence presented in the motion could have

been submitted in the original response to A&A’s converted motion

for summary judgment. Khattak appeals.

II. Analysis

¶9 Khattak makes multiple arguments on appeal. As we

understand her arguments, Khattak argues that (1) A&A knowingly

concealed AS&A’s dissolution and A&A’s lack of capacity to perform

under the contract; (2) the court erred by granting summary

judgment and concluding there was no genuine dispute of material

fact; and (3) the court erred by failing to consider that her “consent

to the contract was vitiated,” and therefore, summary judgment

wasn’t appropriate. While Khattak raises multiple arguments on

appeal, each of her assertions challenges the district court’s

decision to grant A&A summary judgment. We therefore confine

our review to that issue.

A. Appellate Rules

¶ 10 As an initial matter, Khattak’s pro se opening brief doesn’t

comply with the appellate rules for briefing. See C.A.R. 28. For

instance, for each issue Khattak raises, the brief contains neither a

4
statement of the applicable standard of review nor a statement of

preservation nor citations to the record. See C.A.R. 28(a)(6)(B),

(7)(B) (The appellant must provide “reasoning . . ., with citations to

the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant

relies.”).

¶ 11 The appellate rules are not technicalities; they are designed to

enable appellate review. Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10.

A party’s pro se status does not excuse the failure to comply with

the appellate rules. See Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners

Ass’n, 202 P.3d 564, 572 (Colo. 2009) (noting that while the court

may consider a party’s pro se status, pro se parties are still bound

by the rules). But we recognize that it’s challenging for a person

who is not a lawyer to represent themselves in legal proceedings.

Taking that into account, see id., we elect to address Khattak’s

arguments as best we understand them.

B. The Court Did Not Err When It Granted Summary Judgment
in A&A’s Favor

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 12 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Rocky

Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Wagner, 2020 CO 51, ¶ 42.

5
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” C.R.C.P. 56(c). “Our task on review ‘is to

determine whether a genuine issue of material fact existed and

whether the district court correctly applied the law.’” Stanczyk v.

Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 2020 COA 27M, ¶ 53 (quoting City of Fort

Collins v. Colo. Oil, 2016 CO 28, ¶ 9), aff’d on other grounds, 2021

CO 57.

¶ 13 The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the

lack of a triable issue. Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 2015 CO 25,

¶ 20. All doubts are resolved against the moving party, while the

nonmoving party receives “the benefit of all favorable inferences

that may be reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts.” Id.

(quoting Tapley v. Golden Big O Tires, 676 P.2d 676, 678 (Colo.

1983)). Summary judgment is a “drastic remedy . . . that may not

be entered when differing material factual inferences can be drawn

from even undisputed evidence.” Camus v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 151 P.3d 678, 680 (Colo. App. 2006).

6
¶ 14 To establish a claim for breach of contract, a party must prove

the existence of a contract, the relevant terms, a breach of those

terms, and the resulting damages. Marquardt v. Perry, 200 P.3d

1126, 1129 (Colo. App. 2008). A material breach of contract by one

party excuses the other party from further performance on that

contract. Kaiser v. Mkt. Square Disc. Liquors, Inc., 992 P.2d 636,

641 (Colo. App. 1999).

1. Analysis

¶ 15 Khattak argues that the district court erred by entering

summary judgment in A&A’s favor because there was a genuine

dispute of material fact. We disagree.

¶ 16 Khattak entered into a contract with AS&A for legal services.

A&A performed those services and represented Khattak at trial.

While A&A filed a statement to dissolve AS&A with the Colorado

Secretary of State, it continued performing legal services for

Khattak pursuant to the agreement she signed with AS&A,

including trial representation.

¶ 17 Khattak argues that her “consent to the contract was vitiated

due to [A&A’s] failure to disclose AS&A’s dissolution, winding up

process and significant changes.” However, it is undisputed that

7
Khattak paid legal fees owed under the contract prior to trial,

regardless of the entity named on the invoice letterhead. It is also

undisputed that Khattak failed to pay the legal fees after trial. In

support of its claim, A&A submitted affidavits and invoices

establishing the existence of a valid contract, performance under

that contract, and Khattak’s nonpayment of the fees required by the

agreement. Khattak provided no evidence refuting these facts.

¶ 18 In Khattak’s reply to the converted motion for summary

judgment, she asserted that A&A breached the contract, but she

didn’t submit exhibits, affidavits, or other evidence supporting her

assertion or countering the evidence that A&A presented. Although

Khattak expressed dissatisfaction that A&A didn’t inform her that it

was winding up the business, she failed to provide evidence that

disclosure of AS&A’s dissolution was required under the contract,

that A&A concealed the dissolution, or that a factual dispute

existed as to the existence of the contract or the amounts she owed

but failed to pay.

¶ 19 Although Khattak submitted an affidavit and multiple exhibits

after filing her motion for reconsideration, the court concluded that

such evidence could have been presented in response to A&A’s

8
motion. We find no basis to disturb that conclusion. See Fox v.

Alfini, 2018 CO 94, ¶ 36 (“[A] district court generally does not abuse

its discretion by refusing to consider new arguments and evidence

submitted in motions to reconsider.”).

¶ 20 On appeal, Khattak argues that A&A’s failure to disclose that

it was winding up its business precludes summary judgment and

caused her actual damages. However, Khattak again failed to

support her argument with any evidence indicating that AS&A

concealed the dissolution or the winding-up, that A&A had an

obligation to disclose the dissolution to her, or that she was injured

by these actions. The only evidence in the record shows that A&A

performed all contracted legal services for Khattak, and, regardless

of the letterhead on the invoice, she paid the required fees before

her case proceeded to trial.

¶ 21 Because Khattak didn’t present evidence demonstrating that

A&A concealed the dissolution or that AS&A’s dissolution rendered

A&A unable to perform under the contract, there was no material

factual dispute, and the district court didn’t err by granting

summary judgment.

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III. Disposition

¶ 22 We affirm.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.

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