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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Medrano CA2/3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B338690

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (1)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 2/26/26 P. v. Medrano CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B338690

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA125275)
v.

ANSONY EDUARDO MEDRANO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Roger Ito, Judge. Affirmed.
Mher Cholakhyan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Lauren Sanchez, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Ansony Eduardo Medrano appeals from the trial court’s
order denying his motion to vacate his conviction under Penal
Code section 1473.7.1 In 2013, Medrano entered a plea of no
contest to one count of transportation of a controlled substance in
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379,
subdivision (a). On appeal, Medrano argues he did not
meaningfully understand the consequences of his plea. We
conclude Medrano has failed to establish that any error in his
understanding of the immigration consequences of the plea was
prejudicial. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Medrano’s
motion to vacate his conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Plea
In June 2012, Los Angeles County Sheriff deputies stopped
Medrano for a traffic violation. They found 54.7 grams of
methamphetamine and $1,146 in cash in his car. In a March
2013 information, Medrano was charged with possession of a
controlled substance, methamphetamine, for sale (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11378; count 1); transportation of a controlled substance
(id., § 11379, subd. (a); count 2); and driving without a license
(Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count 3).
In July 2013, Medrano pled no contest to transportation of
a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a).)
At the beginning of the hearing, Medrano’s attorney told the
court: “There is a change of plea. If you recall, an offer was made
last time by the People. We had to check what the immigration
consequences were. The offer was originally plea to count 1.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
Count 1 is not acceptable I guess for immigration purposes. The
second one, it’s much better so long as it’s transportation of a
controlled substance. Nothing possession for sale.”
The prosecutor then indicated that the three charges
carried a maximum sentence of four years and eight months, but
that if Medrano accepted a plea to count 2, the People would ask
the court to sentence Medrano to time served and place Medrano
on probation.
After the prosecutor questioned Medrano as to whether he
understood the charges, his possible defense, and the plea, he
stated: “It’s our position that if you plead to this case—this
charge today you are going to be deported from the country, you
are not going to be allowed to return—so there’s no right to
reentry and there’s no right to citizenship. You will not become a
citizen ever in this country. [¶] Do you understand the
immigration consequences, Mr. Medrano?”
Medrano replied: “I understand what you’re telling me, but
I don’t understand it completely.” The prosecutor responded: “So
our position is you’re going to be deported from the country.
Now, if you go and get an immigration law attorney and you go
fight it over there, look, whatever happens over there with the
feds, that’s on them. But for our position—if you come back later
and say none of us told you [that] you were going to get deported,
I’m going to you [sic] pull the record where I’ve told you and this
court confirms you’re going to be deported. Okay. But whatever
happens over there, that’s between you guys. [¶] Do you
understand that?” Medrano answered, “Yes.”
The court also questioned Medrano, stating: “I want to
make sure you’re absolutely certain. Okay? The consequence of
this plea—you’re going to get deported. Okay? You are going to

3
get deported. I can’t tell you anything else. [¶] I don’t know
what’s going to happen, like [the prosecutor] says, what the
federal government will do. You have to assume you will be
deported as a result of this case. You’ll be denied naturalization.
You’ll be denied reentry. You have to assume that. [¶] If you get
deported after this because of this case, I can’t have you coming
back here saying, well, you know, they told me that, but I kind of
had [it] in my mind I wasn’t going to get deported. They were
going to do something for me. You can’t assume that. You have
to assume if I’m going to accept this plea that you’re going to get
deported. [¶] Do you understand that?
Medrano replied: “Yes. I understand what you’re saying,
but I have no other option.”
The court explained Medrano had the option of going to
trial, but advised he would likely go to prison because it was
alleged that he had “a lot of methamphetamine.” The court then
stated it did not want Medrano to “misunderstand,” and
reiterated that “as a result of this case you’re going to get
deported. [¶] Do you understand that consequence?”
Medrano responded: “And I also know that I will probably
have the consequence of going to jail, and I don’t want that. And
I want you to understand that I’m doing this because I think it’s
better.”
The court replied: “Do you understand the consequence?
I’m confident you’ve gone through this with your attorney, okay?
I need to make sure, okay? I can’t have you come to me after the
fact, well, I didn’t really know. You need to understand this is
what is going to happen.” Medrano said: “I understand.”
Medrano then pled no contest. He also signed a felony
advisement of rights, waiver, and plea form, which included an

4
advisement that his plea “will result in . . . deportation, exclusion
from admission or reentry to the United States, and denial of
naturalization or amnesty.” The waiver also stated that he had
the opportunity to discuss the consequences of his plea with his
counsel. Medrano’s trial attorney further certified that he had
discussed the consequences of the plea with Medrano.
The court found Medrano expressly, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his rights. It suspended imposition of
sentence and placed Medrano on formal probation for a three-
year period.
Section 1473.7 Motion
In November 2020, Medrano, through private counsel, filed
a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to section 1473.7. In
May 2021, the trial court called the matter for a hearing and
indicated Medrano’s attorney had been suspended from the
practice of law. The court took the matter off calendar. At a later
hearing, Medrano requested the appointment of counsel,
explaining that he does “messengering” and “deliveries” for a
living and could not afford an attorney.
The trial court appointed counsel. In July 2021, newly
appointed defense counsel requested, and the trial court granted,
a continuance. Counsel explained that she had not yet been able
to obtain Medrano’s file from his prior section 1473.7 counsel or
from trial counsel.
In November 2022, the defense filed a second motion to
vacate Medrano’s conviction under section 1473.7. Medrano
argued his trial attorney never advised him of the immigration
consequences of his plea and that if he had known of the

5
consequences, he would not have accepted it.2 Defense counsel
submitted a declaration in support of the motion indicating:
Medrano entered the United States in 2000 at the age of 20; he
obtained “employment authorization” in the United States; “this
matter is his only felony complaint to date”; at the time of the
plea he “was not made aware of the potential immigration
consequences” and his counsel did not tell him that his plea
“could potentially jeopardize his status in the United States”; his
attorney did not tell him the conviction would make him
deportable; had he known the plea would lead to removal
proceedings he would not have accepted it; he completed
probation; he obtained a GED and “has maintained gainful
employment”; he does not have “close” relatives or friends in his
birth country and immigration attorneys advised him he could
face “potential deportation” based on his conviction.
The People countered that the record established that
Medrano’s trial attorney, the prosecutor, and the trial court
informed Medrano of the consequences of his plea and he
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered the plea.

2 Although three sentences of the motion cited to a
declaration from Medrano, no such declaration is included in the
record on appeal. The motion stated: “Mr. Medrano will attest
that he would not have [pled] guilty to the HSC § 11379(A)
charge had he known that doing so would lead to his deportation.
(Medrano Decl. ¶ 15). He will state that it was not until after the
conviction that he was made aware of the severe consequences of
his plea to the crime and how it could be a crime involving a
federally defined controlled substance. (Id. ¶ 14). Had he
understood that the plea would lead to deportation, he would not
have accepted the plea and would have explored alternative
options to avoid any immigration consequences. (Id. ¶16).”

6
At a June 2024 hearing, Medrano testified that at the time
of his plea, he had been in the United States for 13 years. He did
not have a conversation with his trial attorney regarding the
plea, and the attorney did not advise him of the immigration
consequences of his plea in advance of the plea hearing. When
asked what trial counsel explained to him, Medrano said the
attorney told him that if he did not plead guilty, the attorney
would no longer represent him. Medrano had paid the attorney
$10,000 up to that point, and the attorney required
approximately $15,000 more to continue the representation.
Defense counsel attempted to submit a letter that
Medrano’s trial counsel sent to him around the time of his plea.
The court sustained the People’s hearsay objection to the letter.
Defense counsel then questioned Medrano regarding his
understanding of the information contained in the letter.
Medrano testified that he understood that by accepting the plea
he would not get jail time. Defense counsel argued that the trial
attorney did not specifically advise Medrano of the immigration
consequences of the plea.
The trial court stated it had reviewed the plea transcript,
the abstract of judgment, “the waiver form, the Tahl waiver
form[,] and the remainder of the court file.” The court concluded
Medrano “could not have been advised more thoroughly of the
immigration consequences,” and he had his questions answered
after he was “at some point reluctant.” The court additionally
observed that both the prosecutor and court had “thoroughly re-
advised [Medrano]” of the consequences of his plea. The court
thus concluded Medrano was adequately advised and did not
misunderstand the consequences of the plea.
Medrano filed a timely notice of appeal.

7
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1473.7 and Standard of Review
Pursuant to section 1473.7, “[a] person who is no longer in
criminal custody may file a motion to vacate a conviction or
sentence” if “[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to
prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept
the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a
conviction or sentence. A finding of legal invalidity may, but
need not, include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
(Id., subd. (a)(1).) A court shall “grant the motion to vacate the
conviction or sentence if the moving party establishes, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of . . . [such] grounds
for relief . . . .” (Id., subd. (f)(1).)
“To prevail on a motion under section 1473.7, a defendant
must satisfy two elements.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 1160, 1172 (Curiel).) “The defendant must first show
that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea.” (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th
311, 319 (Espinoza).)3 “The focus of this inquiry is the
defendant’s own error.” (People v. Carrillo (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 1, 16; People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747,
769 (Alatorre).)
“Next, the defendant must show that his misunderstanding
constituted prejudicial error. ‘[P]rejudical error . . . means

3 The issue of when the totality of the circumstances
establishes a defendant meaningfully understood the
immigration consequences of a plea is currently pending before
the California Supreme Court in In re Hernandez, S282186,
Supreme Court Minutes, December 20, 2023.

8
demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant would
have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood
its actual or potential immigration consequences.’ [Citation.]”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) “When courts assess
whether a petitioner has shown that reasonable probability, they
consider the totality of the circumstances.” (People v. Vivar
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529 (Vivar).) A defendant must provide
objective evidence to corroborate his assertions that he never
would have entered his plea if he had understood the
immigration consequences. (Espinoza, at p. 316; Vivar, at
p. 529.)
We independently review the denial of a section 1473.7
motion. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527; accord, Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) In doing so, we “give particular
deference to factual findings based on the trial court’s personal
observations of witnesses.” (Vivar, at pp. 527–528.) However,
“[w]here . . . the facts derive entirely from written declarations
and other documents . . . there is no reason to conclude the trial
court has the same special purchase on the question at issue; as a
practical matter, ‘[t]he trial court and this court are in the same
position in interpreting written declarations’ when reviewing a
cold record in a section 1473.7 proceeding. [Citation.] Ultimately
it is for the appellate court to decide, based on its independent
judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice under
section 1473.7.” (Id., at p. 528, fn. omitted.)
II. Medrano Has Not Established Prejudicial Error
It is undisputed that Medrano’s conviction renders him
deportable and carries other immigration consequences. (See
8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(B)(i).) Medrano also contends he has
sufficiently established that he misunderstood the consequences

9
of his plea. However, even assuming Medrano did not have an
accurate understanding of the consequences of his plea, we
conclude he has not established prejudice through objective
evidence that he would have rejected the plea if he had correctly
understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.
“Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the
defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the
defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s
priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant
had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated
disposition was possible.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 529–
530.)
“Also relevant are the defendant’s probability of obtaining a
more favorable outcome if he had rejected the plea, as well as the
difference between the bargained-for term and the likely term if
he were convicted at trial. [Citation.] These factors are not
exhaustive, and no single type of evidence is a prerequisite to
relief.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 320–321.) “Objective
evidence” to support a showing of prejudice “includes facts
provided by declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the
defendant’s immigration concerns or interactions with counsel,
and evidence of the charges the defendant faced.” (Id. at p. 321.)
Medrano presented evidence that he entered the United
States at the age of 20 and had lived in the United States for
approximately 13 years at the time of his plea; he had obtained
employment authorization and was employed; he had earned his
GED; and his own statement that he has no “close” relatives or
friends in his birth country.
This is significantly less substantial than evidence our high
court and other appellate courts have found demonstrated

10
prejudice. For example, in Vivar, the court held that the
defendant’s significant ties to the United States were a critical
factor in establishing prejudice because he “was brought to this
country at age six as a lawful resident, and he attended schools,
formed a family, and remained here for 40 years. At the time of
his plea, he had two children, two grandchildren, and a wife, all
of whom are citizens and all of whom resided in California. By
the time he was deported, his wife was undergoing radiation
treatment for a thyroid condition.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 530.) There was also evidence in Vivar that the defendant
“spoke Spanish ‘like an American,’ and found it ‘difficult to
function in Mexican society because people treat [him] like an
outsider.’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, the defendant had objective evidence of
his ties to the United States and that he would have faced a
difficult life in his home country. This “convey[ed] how [he]
would have considered his immigration status ‘the most
important part’ of his decision to plead.” (Ibid.)
In Espinoza, our high court found the defendant
established prejudice because he had “spent most of his life in the
United States. He came to California when he was 13 years old.
At the time of the plea, Espinoza had lived in California for 23
years. His wife and five children were United States citizens.
His parents and siblings lived in the United States. He was the
financial provider for his family. As Espinoza puts it,
‘[e]verything important in his life’ at the time he entered his plea
‘was in the United States.’ ” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 322.) In Espinoza, there was further proof that the defendant’s
“community ties were important to him at the time of his plea.”
(Id. at p. 323.) After his plea and related jail time, the defendant
“returned home to care for his family and community. He became

11
the caregiver for his elderly parents who suffer from severe
medical conditions. He ran his own business to provide for his
family. He volunteered, went to church, and took part in
numerous community organizations.” (Ibid.; see also Curiel,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1178–1179 [defendant immigrated
at 14 and had been in the United States for almost 20 years at
the time of the plea; her husband was a lawful permanent
resident; she had six children who are citizens and were born
before she entered the plea, including six-month-old twins;
defendant’s mother and siblings are all lawful residents];
Alatorre, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 771 [defendant came to
United States as a preschooler; all of his family lived in United
States; married to citizen with two children who are also
citizens].)
Unlike the defendants in Vivar and Espinoza, Medrano did
not arrive in the United States as a child, and he did not present
any evidence of family or other community ties to the United
States either at the time of the plea or after. Medrano’s ties to
the United States do not support a finding of prejudice.
Next, aside from trial counsel’s rejection of the
prosecution’s original plea offer on immigration grounds, there is
no evidence that Medrano placed any importance on avoiding
deportation. Rather, after multiple advisements from the
prosecutor and the trial court that he would be deported, and
when told he could go to trial rather than take the plea, he
replied: “I also know that [if I go to trial] I will probably have the
consequence of going to jail, and I don’t want that. And I want
you to understand that I’m doing this because I think it’s better.”
(Italics added.) His statement at the plea hearing indicates his
priority in seeking the plea bargain was primarily avoiding

12
imprisonment.4 He also did not provide any evidence that he had
a particular fear of deportation due to an inability to function in
his unidentified country of origin, or a fear of persecution.
Instead, he asserted only that he lacks close family and friends in
that country. (Cf. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530; People v.
Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 963 [defendant had “no
connection to Cuba, where he experienced persecution” and
record showed he “would have highly prioritized avoiding
deportation to his home country of Cuba”].)
Further, Medrano has not established that an immigration
safe plea was reasonably obtainable. (Cf. Vivar, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 531 [record showed that defendant “could have
entered a plea avoiding mandatory deportation”].) On appeal,
Medrano suggests that “an immigration-neutral disposition often
involves pleading to a non-drug offense such as [section] 32,” or
that “pretrial diversion could be another valuable option to
consider.” Yet, he did not make this argument in the trial court
and did not provide a declaration from immigration counsel or
anyone else establishing that there were immigration safe
alternatives likely available to him. (Cf. Espinoza, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 325 [finding prejudice where defendant lacked
criminal history at time of plea and submitted an “immigration

4 Medrano’s reply brief purports to cite his declaration for
the statement: “If I had known that I was going to be deported
because of this conviction, I would not have accepted the plea. I
would have wanted to explore other options.” However, the
record citation provided in the reply is to a minute order, not a
declaration. In any event, this conclusory statement would not
show prejudice, which requires a defendant to corroborate such
assertions with objective evidence. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 316.)

13
attorney’s declaration identifying alternative immigration-safe
dispositions”].)
Moreover, there is evidence that trial counsel considered
the immigration consequences of the plea, and this plea was the
best offer. Trial counsel informed the court: “There is a change of
plea. If you recall, an offer was made last time by the People. We
had to check what the immigration consequences were. The offer
was originally plea to count 1. Count 1 is not acceptable . . . for
immigration purposes.” Medrano argues this “clearly indicates
immigration consequences were already a factor in negotiations.”
We agree. This suggests that trial counsel, by obtaining a more
favorable immigration plea, did as much as he could, and an
entirely immigration-neutral plea was not possible.
Medrano also did not provide any evidence regarding the
probability that he would have obtained a more favorable
outcome had he rejected the plea. He provides no evidence that
the prosecution’s case was weak or that he was otherwise likely
to prevail at trial. The trial court indicated Medrano was caught
with a large amount of methamphetamine and would face
incarceration if he were convicted. The charges carried a
maximum sentence of four years and eight months, but Medrano
was released on probation because of the plea. Medrano had
expressly stated that he wanted to avoid jail time. Thus, the
record does not suggest Medrano was likely to have rejected the
plea if he accurately understood the adverse immigration
consequences.
Medrano contends his testimony that he could not afford
his private trial attorney’s continued representation suggests his
acceptance of the plea “was influenced by a perceived lack of
ongoing representation if he did not accept the deal.” However,

14
even if this testimony, provided years later, was credited, it does
not tend to show that Medrano would have rejected the plea had
he understood the immigration consequences.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Medrano has
not demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have
rejected the plea had he understood the actual or potential
immigration consequences.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Medrano’s section 1473.7 motion is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

HANASONO, J.

15