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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Snow CA3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: C098308A

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (1)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 2/26/26 P. v. Snow CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Butte)

THE PEOPLE, C098308

Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CM027251)
v.
OPINION ON TRANSFER
RICKY ALAN SNOW,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Ricky Alan Snow was originally sentenced in 2008. His sentence
included two terms of 25 years to life under the original “Three Strikes” law and prior
prison term enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).1 The
Legislature recently limited the circumstances in which these enhancements apply, and
defendant appeals from the trial court’s February 23, 2023 sentencing order pursuant to

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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section 1172.75. In that resentencing, the trial court struck defendant’s prior prison term
enhancements but left his sentence otherwise intact.
On appeal, defendant argues he is entitled to resentencing because the court did
not apply the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Reform Act or the Act) (Prop. 36, as
approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)) to reduce his sentence further.
On May 13, 2024, we issued an unpublished opinion affirming the judgment.
Defendant petitioned our Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court granted
review and deferred the matter pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in
People v. Superior Court (Guevara), S283305, or pending further order of the court.
On December 17, 2025, our Supreme Court transferred the matter to this court,
with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v.
Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838 (Guevara). We vacated our opinion on
December 23, 2025. Under Guevara, we reverse the judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
In 2008, the trial court found defendant guilty of first degree burglary with a
person present (§ 459 - count 1), making criminal threats (§ 422 - count 2), and
vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a) - count 3). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court also
found true allegations that defendant was previously convicted of two or more serious or
violent felonies under the former Three Strikes law and that he served two separate prison
terms under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 31 years to life. For
his first degree burglary conviction, the court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate
term of 25 years to life under the former Three Strikes law. The court added five years
under section 667, subdivision (a), one year under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and
imposed, but stayed pursuant to section 654, an additional one-year term under
section 667.5, subdivision (b).

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On defendant’s conviction for making criminal threats, the court imposed a
concurrent, upper term of three years in state prison, stayed pursuant to section 654. On
defendant’s vandalism conviction, the court imposed another indeterminate term of 25
years to life, plus two 1-year enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b); the
court stayed that term, along with the enhancements, under section 654.
In July 2022, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified
defendant as a person serving a term of imprisonment that included an enhancement
described in former section 1171.1, subdivision (a).2 The trial court appointed counsel
and set the matter for resentencing. At resentencing, the trial court struck defendant’s
prior prison term enhancements and resentenced defendant to 25 years to life, plus five
years on his burglary conviction. The court imposed but stayed the upper term of three
years on defendant’s conviction for making criminal threats, and imposed but stayed
another indeterminate life sentence on his conviction for vandalism.
DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Statutory Background
1. Three Strikes and The Reform Act
“Under the ‘Three Strikes’ law as originally enacted in 1994, an individual
convicted of any felony offense following two prior convictions for serious or violent
felonies was subject to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term
of no less than 25 years.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 651 (Conley).) The
Reform Act lessened the prescribed sentence for a third strike defendant whose current
offense is not a serious or violent felony. (Id. at p. 652.) “A defendant does not qualify
for this ameliorative change . . . if his current offense is a controlled substance charge
involving large quantities ([§ 1170.12], subd. (c)(2)(C)(i)), one of various enumerated sex

2 Former section 1171.1 was renumbered to section 1172.75 without substantive change.
(Assem. Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12).)

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offenses (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)(ii)), or one in which he used a firearm, was armed with a
firearm or deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury (id., subd.
(c)(2)(C)(iii)). The ameliorative provisions of the Reform Act also do not apply in cases
in which the defendant was previously convicted of certain enumerated offenses,
including those involving sexual violence, child sexual abuse, homicide or attempted
homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or
firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, or any serious or violent felony
punishable by life imprisonment or death. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iv)(I)-(VIII).) The
Act provides that these disqualifying factors must be pleaded and proved by the
prosecution. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C).)
“In the Reform Act, the voters also established a procedure for ‘persons presently
serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment’ under the prior version of the Three
Strikes law to seek resentencing under the Reform Act’s revised penalty structure. ([]§
1170.126, subd. (a).) Under section 1170.126, ‘within two years after the effective date
of the act . . . or at a later date upon a showing of good cause,’ such persons [could] file a
petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of
conviction. (Id., subd. (b).) If the petitioner would have qualified for a shorter sentence
under the Reform Act version of the law, taking into consideration the disqualifying
factors (§ 1170.126, subds. (e), (f)), section 1170.126 provides that he ‘shall be
resentenced pursuant to [the Reform Act] unless the court, in its discretion, determines
that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety’ (id., subd. (f)). In exercising this discretion, the court may consider the
defendant’s criminal conviction history, the defendant’s disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation while incarcerated, and ‘[a]ny other evidence the court . . . determines to be
relevant.’ (Id., subd. (g).)’ ” (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 653.)

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2. Section 1172.75
Subdivision (a) of section 1172.75 provides: “Any sentence enhancement that was
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for
any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined
in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.”
Section 1172.75 creates a mechanism for resentencing individuals whose
convictions are already final. First, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation notifies the sentencing court of a person in its custody who is serving a
prison term that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a). (§ 1172.75,
subd. (b).) The trial court then reviews the judgment and, if it determines the judgment
includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), “the court shall recall the sentence
and resentence the defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).) The statute sets forth four parameters for
resentencing. (Id., subd. (d).) First, the resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence
than the one originally imposed . . . unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing
pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally
imposed.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) Second, “[t]he court shall apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for
judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).) Third, the court may take into consideration
postconviction factors. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) Fourth, “[u]nless the court originally imposed
the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless
there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by
the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (d)(4).) Section 1172.75 also requires the

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appointment of counsel and provides that the parties may waive a resentencing hearing.
(Id., subds. (d)(5), (e).)
B. Analysis
Defendant argues the trial court erred in resentencing him to an indeterminate life
term on his vandalism conviction because he was entitled to a “full resentencing” under
section 1172.75, subdivision (d), during which the trial court was required to apply the
current penalty provisions set forth in the Reform Act. And under the Reform Act,
vandalism no longer qualifies as a serious or violent felony. Accordingly, he contends,
the trial court was not authorized to impose an indeterminate life sentence on his
vandalism conviction absent a finding “by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a
lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (See § 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
In Guevara, the trial court also recalled the defendant’s sentence under section
1172.75 but “resentenced him on his third strike offense according to current law to a
determinate term of eight years.” (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 850.) Our Supreme
Court granted review to consider whether, by permitting recall and resentencing of
indeterminate third strike sentences, section 1172.75 unconstitutionally amends section
1170.126. (Guevara, supra, at p. 850.) Our Supreme Court held that, “as a matter of
constitutional avoidance, section 1172.75 incorporates section 1170.126’s discretionary
public safety override as a condition for nonserious, nonviolent third strike offenders to
obtain resentencing under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act.” (Ibid.) Our
Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the case to
the superior court to determine whether sentencing defendant under the revised penalty
provisions of the Reform Act would “ ‘pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety.’ ” (Id. at p. 878.) If it so determined, the superior court was to reimpose the
indeterminate term. (Ibid.) “If the superior court does not determine that resentencing
[defendant] would ‘pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,’ and [defendant]
is otherwise eligible under the Reform Act, the court shall resentence [defendant]

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pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act.” (Ibid.) We remand for the
trial court to conduct a new resentencing hearing consistent with Guevara.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court to
conduct resentencing consistent with this opinion.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

• Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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