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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Bogan CA2/7

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B342427

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 2/26/26 P. v. Bogan CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B342427

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. MA036409)
v.

LADRILL BOGAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed as
modified with directions.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

---

In 2007 a jury convicted Ladrill Bogan of murder and
assault on a child causing death after he inflicted lethal blunt-
force trauma on three-year-old Jeremiah McKenney. In a
bifurcated bench trial, the trial court found Bogan suffered a
prior strike conviction for first degree burglary and served two
prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code
section 667.5, former subdivision (b).1 The court sentenced Bogan
to 52 years to life.
In 2024 the superior court recalled Bogan’s sentence under
section 1172.75 and struck the prior prison term enhancements.
However, the court denied Bogan’s motion under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) to
dismiss his strike conviction, and it resentenced him to 50 years
to life. Bogan contends the court abused its discretion because it
failed to take into account Bogan’s clean prison disciplinary
record, rehabilitation efforts, and age. We find no abuse of
discretion. However, Bogan also contends, the People concede,
and we agree the $5,000 restitution fine imposed by the superior
court must be vacated pursuant to recent amendments to
section 1465.9. We vacate the restitution fine but otherwise
affirm.

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Bogan’s 2007 Conviction and Sentence
We described the factual background of Bogan’s conviction
for killing Jeremiah in Bogan’s direct appeal. (See People v.
Bogan (Feb. 11, 2009, B204652) [nonpub. opn.].)
Jeremiah died on September 20, 2006 while in the care of
Bogan, his mother’s boyfriend. At trial, evidence was presented
that on the morning of September 20, Jeremiah’s face was
unbruised and he was in fine physical condition apart from
constipation. By approximately 4:00 p.m., Jeremiah was not
breathing, had no pulse, and had fresh bruises on his chest, chin,
and knees. Emergency medical personnel were unable to revive
him.
Evidence at trial showed that Jeremiah died from blunt
force trauma to his abdomen that caused internal bleeding. He
had suffered a massive laceration of the mesentery and posterior
abdominal wall, where the mesentery was completely torn from
his aorta. Approximately 700 cubic centimeters of blood pooled in
his abdomen. Jeremiah’s small intestine was torn in half, an
injury that would be caused by a blow so deeply penetrating that
it forces the anterior abdominal wall all the way back against the
spine, severing the intestine. Such an injury could not be
inflicted by a child, instead requiring punches or kicks by
someone with adult strength. Jeremiah’s pancreas was cut in
half, and his liver was torn in multiple locations, bruised on the
undersurface, and had hemorrhaged. The large lacerations of the
liver were caused by blunt force trauma. His heart and lungs
were bruised on their undersurfaces, and one lung had collapsed,
although the lung collapse may have been caused by resuscitative

3
attempts. The back of Jeremiah’s head had a bruise of
approximately 2.5 inches in diameter that was consistent with
falling or being banged against a hard, flat surface.
While hemorrhages to Jeremiah’s abdomen and diaphragm
demonstrated that some of his injuries had occurred shortly
before his death, the autopsy revealed that Jeremiah had older
injuries as well. A large abdominal hematoma with some signs of
healing indicated that Jeremiah had suffered an earlier
abdominal injury to the mesentery within a few days prior to the
fatal injury. He also had a bruise on his jaw that had been
present for at least three days.
Bogan reported to the police that on the morning of
September 20 he brought Jeremiah with him to a chiropractic
appointment and then to the park. Jeremiah played on a slide
and fell a few times, but Bogan did not observe any injuries.
Jeremiah had some stomach issues and appeared extremely
tired, so Bogan placed him in the back seat of the car to sleep.
Bogan also told the police that Jeremiah had fallen while trying
to get into Bogan’s sport utility vehicle, striking his head on the
vehicle’s running board, and Jeremiah cried afterwards. When
Bogan and Jeremiah arrived home, Jeremiah’s mother said that
Jeremiah was not breathing and was changing colors, and they
called 911. Bogan performed CPR while waiting for emergency
personnel to arrive. Bogan said Jeremiah had not been out of his
sight that day from the time they left in the morning until the
time they returned home. He denied abusing Jeremiah but said
he could not recall if he hit Jeremiah that day. At trial, Bogan
provided a similar account of what had happened on
September 20.

4
The coroner opined Jeremiah’s abdominal injuries could not
have been caused by a fall from the height of a car seat in
Bogan’s vehicle, even if Jeremiah fell directly against the running
board with his abdomen. Blows of the sort Jeremiah sustained
would cause a child abdominal pain, and he would probably be
unable to eat or keep food down. The coroner estimated that
Jeremiah would have died from his injuries within approximately
45 minutes of their infliction. Jeremiah’s body temperature at
the time of his arrival at the emergency room indicated that he
had already been dead for a couple of hours.
The jury found Bogan guilty of murder (§ 187, subd. (a);
count 1) and assault on a child under the age of eight resulting in
death (§ 273ab; count 2). In a bifurcated bench trial, the trial
court found Bogan had been convicted on June 1, 2000 of first
degree (residential) burglary (§ 459), which was a serious or
violent felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes
law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The court further found
Bogan served two separate prior prison terms for felony
convictions—for the 2000 robbery conviction and a 1994
conviction of accessory after the fact (§ 32)—within the meaning
of section 667.5, former subdivision (b).
On December 10, 2007 the trial court sentenced Bogan to
52 years to life in state prison, comprising a term of 25 years to
life for the child assault causing death, doubled under the three
strikes law, plus one year for each of the two prison priors. The
court also imposed a term of 32 years to life (15 years to life for
second degree murder, doubled under the three strikes law, plus
two prison priors), which the court stayed under section 654.
In pronouncing Bogan’s sentence, the trial court stated,
“[T]he savage beating that this child took—and it only could have

5
been at your hands, and that’s based on the evidence presented.
He was in your sole custody and care when this happened. Just
the force and the brutal nature of this crime[] is, frankly,
appalling to me. I just cannot imagine what was going through
that child’s mind when this was happening. Frankly, it’s horrific.
And I, frankly, have nightmares about this myself as a parent.
So you deserve the sentence that you got and I hope that you
think about what you have done every second that you’re alive.”
We affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v. Bogan,
supra, B204652.)

B. Bogan’s Resentencing Under Section 1172.75
In 2022 the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified Bogan on a list of inmates who
were eligible for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483), which retroactively
invalidated one-year prison priors imposed under section 667.5,
former subdivision (b). On December 28, 2022 the superior court
appointed counsel for Bogan.
On March 18, 2024 Bogan filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.75. The petition requested the superior
court strike the now-invalid prior prison term enhancements;
conduct a full resentencing; strike Bogan’s prior strike conviction
under Romero and in the interest of justice under section 1385;
and switch the principal count by imposing a sentence of 15 years
to life on count 1 for murder and staying a sentence of 25 years to
life on count 2 for child assault causing death. Bogan filed
multiple exhibits in support of his petition, including
handwritten statements of contrition, his life circumstances, and
his reentry plans if paroled, as well as numerous CDCR records

6
reflecting his disciplinary record, classification, and participation
in classes, work, and other prison programming. Bogan was
provisionally accepted into a six-month residential reentry
program with vocational, substance abuse, and mental health
programming. Bogan also submitted a letter from his mother
supporting his release, stating she was retired and disabled and
needed assistance, and, as a certified counselor, she could help
with his rehabilitation.
Bogan argued that dismissing the strike conviction would
serve the interests of justice and comport with the Legislature’s
intent in Senate Bill 483 to reduce mass incarceration and
address systemic racial bias. Circumstances that favored
sentencing relief included the fact that (according to Bogan’s
handwritten statements) Jeremiah’s murder did not involve
“sophistication or planning” but was instead the result of a
“resentful, angry, impulsive, immature and drug-addicted
individual.” Bogan’s upbringing was characterized by trauma
and loss, including physical abuse by his mother, who suffered
from drug addiction and was incarcerated when Bogan was three
years old, and shooting injuries Bogan sustained as a child that
prompted him to join a street gang for protection at age 13. In
addition, Bogan committed his prior felony offenses when he was
young, and, according to Bogan, the offenses were remote in time
relative to Jeremiah’s killing: Bogan was 26 years old when he
was convicted of burglary and just shy of 21 when he was
convicted for being an accessory to armed robbery. Bogan was
also arrested five times between the ages of 14 and 18.
Bogan presented evidence that during the almost 17 years
he spent in state prison, he received no serious rules violations
and only one minor misconduct notation for sitting at an

7
unassigned table (in 2009). Bogan’s placement classification
score improved from 77 at the time of his commitment to 19 (the
minimum possible score for an inmate serving a life sentence) in
2017, and his security level improved from level 4 (maximum
security) to level 2 (medium security). Bogan participated
extensively in rehabilitation programs, including for substance
abuse, conflict anger management, and child abuse prevention;
he also attended Bible classes, had a ministry mentorship, and in
2018 obtained his high school equivalency certificate and was
currently pursuing a college education. Bogan had many jobs
while in prison, receiving satisfactory or superior performance
reviews, and he received a special commendation for his work in
furniture upholstery. Multiple recent risk assessments placed
Bogan at a low risk of reoffending or posing other threats to
society if released. Bogan was over 50 years old at the time of his
petition, and empirical studies attached to the petition showed a
declining risk of recidivism with age, particularly among “elderly”
incarcerated persons who were 50 to 65 years old.
At the outset of the October 23, 2024 resentencing hearing,
the superior court indicated it had reviewed the probation
officer’s report from 2006, the transcript of the initial sentencing
hearing, the appellate opinion in People v. Bogan, supra,
B204652, and “everything filed by the defense,” including Bogan’s
petition, exhibits, and supplemental submissions. The People did
not file a written opposition.
Bogan’s attorney argued that under section 1172.75, “the
intent of that law is to give significant weight to postconviction
factors, [and] where there is no demonstrable public safety
concerns, that there should be meaningful reductions” in lengthy
sentences. The attorney also pointed to Bogan’s “unparalleled”

8
record of rehabilitation. Further, the fact Bogan had only one
minor rules violation over nearly two decades in prison (half of
the time spent among a maximum-security population) was
extraordinarily rare and showed Bogan’s rehabilitation. Bogan’s
attorney observed that the burglary strike offense was committed
seven years before Jeremiah’s killing, and after serving three
years without any rule violations, Bogan had been out of prison
for at least four years before offending. Further, although
Jeremiah’s killing was egregious, at the time Bogan was a
“massively drug-addicted individual who also was contending
with untreated complex trauma” from abuse and street violence,
which explained “why now, 17, 18 years later, having gone
through a great deal of programming and treatment . . . , he’s a
very different person now.”
The prosecutor focused her argument on the egregiousness
of Bogan’s crime, including Jeremiah’s young age and personal
relationship to Bogan, the extreme injuries Bogan inflicted,
evidence of prior physical abuse (including recent injuries to
Jeremiah’s jaw and abdomen), and Bogan’s prior denial of
responsibility. The prosecutor also argued that Bogan’s strike
conviction in 2000 was not remote because Bogan had been
incarcerated for three years before his release.
Bogan stated to the court, “I accept full responsibility of my
actions and the heinous act I committed. I spend every day
rehabilitating myself, thinking about the actions that I’ve done,
and praying for my victims and their family, and it’s a shameful
act, and . . . I just apologize to the court and the family of my
victims.”
The superior court denied the Romero motion, explaining it
was “taking into consideration all of the evidence that was

9
provided about [Bogan’s] conduct while incarcerated in
considering the Romero motion” under section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(3). However, the egregiousness of Jeremiah’s
killing made sentencing relief “difficult.” Addressing the
traditional Romero factors, Jeremiah’s injuries were “atrocious”
and not the type that a frustrated parent acting out of character
might inflict. The court also considered the trial court’s
expression of shock at the severity of the crime at Bogan’s
original sentencing. In addition, Bogan provided false
statements to the police and in his trial testimony, in which he
denied responsibility. Further, Bogan’s prior criminal history
was “a revolving door up to and including [the strike offense] and
the offense here.”
With respect to postconviction considerations, the superior
court found Bogan’s clean prison record, although a worthy
achievement, was not “as rare as counsel would have [the court]
believe,” and a defendant’s housing location and classification
“oftentimes can insulate or subject people to a lot of different
circumstances.” The court rejected defense counsel’s suggestion
that “the intent behind [section] 1172.75 is to allow everybody out
of state prison once they turn 50.” The court concluded, “I
certainly appreciate Mr. Bogan’s conduct while in prison and his
now willingness to take responsibility for this crime, but when
the court is looking at whether or not it is in the interest of
justice to strike a strike here, the court does not feel that it is, in
looking at the factors of this case in particular.” The court also
declined to exercise its discretion to select the murder count as
the principal count and stay the longer sentence for child assault
causing death.

10
The superior court struck the one-year prior prison term
enhancements but made no further reductions in Bogan’s
sentence. The court resentenced Bogan to 50 years to life in state
prison on count 2 for child assault causing death (25 years to life,
doubled under the three strikes law). The court imposed and
stayed a sentence of 30 years to life on the murder count
(15 years to life, doubled). Among various fines, fees, and
assessments, the court imposed a $5,000 restitution fine, a
reduction from the $10,000 restitution fine originally imposed by
the trial court.
Bogan timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 1172.75 Resentencing Proceedings
“‘Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b)
required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement
for each true finding on an allegation the defendant had served a
separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody
for at least five years. [Citation.] Effective January 1, 2020,
Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019,
ch. 590) . . . amended section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison
term enhancement to only prior terms for sexually violent
offenses. [Citations.] Enhancements based on prior prison terms
served for other offenses became legally invalid.’” (People v.
Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 854 (Garcia); accord, People
v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 379-380.) The Legislature
later enacted Senate Bill 483, effective January 1, 2022, to make
the changes implemented by Senate Bill No. 136 retroactive by
adding former section 1171.1 (now section 1172.75). (See
Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1; Garcia, at pp. 854-855.)

11
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), provides, “Any sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.” CDCR is required to identify for
the sentencing courts all persons “currently serving a term for a
judgment that includes an enhancement described in
subdivision (a).” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Further, if a sentencing
court verifies a defendant was sentenced under an invalid
enhancement, the court “shall recall the sentence and resentence
the defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).)
“‘By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full
resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly
“invalid” enhancements.’” (Garcia, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
p. 855; accord, People v. Grajeda (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 829,
836.) Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), states the resentencing
“shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed
as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement,
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety,” and
further, resentencing “shall not result in a longer sentence than
the one originally imposed.”
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2), provides further that
the sentencing court “shall apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3), provides that “[t]he
court may consider postconviction factors, including but not

12
limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of
the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether
age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.”2

B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
Bogan’s Romero Motion
1. Governing law on Romero motions and
standard of review
A trial court has discretion under section 1385,
subdivision (a), to dismiss a strike conviction for purposes of
sentencing in furtherance of justice. (People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 158; Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) In
determining whether to dismiss a prior conviction, the court
“must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances
of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the [three
strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Williams, at p. 161;
accord, People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 257.) A court’s

2 Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), contains additional
provisions that “guide[] the trial court in selecting among the
lower, middle, and upper term on each count.” (People v. Monroe
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.) The subdivision is inapplicable
here because Bogan did not receive a determinate sentence.

13
discretion under section 1385, subdivision (a), and Romero to
dismiss a strike offense is not limited by section 1172.75,
subdivision (d). (See People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
340, 360-364 [§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2)’s “changes in law” limitation
on resentencing did not foreclose court’s discretionary authority
to grant relief under § 1385, subd. (a), and Romero].)
Nonetheless, section 1172.75, subdivision (c), “promotes an
examination of information and circumstances that did not exist
at the time of the original sentencing which, in turn, evinces an
intent that the resentencing court must sentence anew under
present circumstances.” (Rogers, at p. 361.)
“[A] court’s failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction
allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of
discretion standard.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
374 (Carmony); accord, People v. Dain, supra, 18 Cal.5th at
pp. 257-258.) We likewise review a trial court’s sentencing
determinations in a section 1172.75 resentencing proceeding for
an abuse of discretion. (People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
359, 366, review granted Aug. 13, 2025, S291628; see Garcia,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 855-856 [reviewing determination
that a sentence reduction would endanger public safety for abuse
of discretion].) A trial court does not abuse its discretion in
ruling on Romero motion unless its ruling “is so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.”
(Carmony, at p. 377; accord, People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th
395, 430.) The party challenging the sentence has the burden to
show the sentence was irrational or arbitrary. (Carmony, at
p. 376; People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140.) “‘“In
the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have
acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its

14
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will
not be set aside on review.”’ [Citations.] . . . ‘“An appellate
tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its
judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.”’” (Carmony, at
pp. 376-377.)
Because the three strikes law “creates a strong
presumption that any sentence that conforms to [the law’s]
sentencing norms is both rational and proper,” there are very
limited circumstances under which the appellate court will find
an abuse of discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
These circumstances include where the court is unaware of its
discretion to strike a prior conviction; it considers impermissible
factors; or, under the circumstances, imposition of a three strikes
sentence would be irrational or arbitrary. (Ibid.; Avila, supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1140-1141.) “In the absence of evidence to
the contrary, we presume that the trial court considered all of the
relevant factors and properly applied the law.” (People v.
Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 638; accord, Carmony, at
p. 378.) Only under “‘extraordinary’” circumstances does the
court’s failure to strike a prior conviction constitute an abuse of
discretion. (Carmony, at p. 378; accord, People v. Finney (2012)
204 Cal.App.4th 1034, 1040 [“Once a career criminal commits the
requisite number of strikes, the circumstance must be
‘extraordinary’ before he can be deemed to fall outside the spirit
of the three strikes law.”].)
2. The superior court considered postconviction factors
and did not abuse its discretion
Bogan contends the superior court abused its discretion in
denying his Romero motion because the court did not give
adequate weight to postconviction factors that favored a reduced

15
sentence, such as Bogan’s advanced age at the time of
resentencing, his clean disciplinary record in prison, and evidence
of rehabilitation. Contrary to Bogan’s contention, the record
shows the court considered these circumstances. There was no
abuse of discretion.
The superior court considered the nature and
circumstances of Bogan’s present felony and his prior offenses, as
required under People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at page 161.
As discussed, the court found this was a “difficult” case for
sentencing relief because the crime was so “atrocious.” Jeremiah
was entrusted to Bogan’s care, and Bogan inflicted blunt force
trauma on the boy so severe it compressed Jeremiah’s abdomen
against his spine, severed the small intestine and pancreas,
lacerated the liver, and filled the abdominal cavity with blood.
Jeremiah would have suffered pain and likely died within
45 minutes of the assault. There was also evidence of earlier
serious abuse. Bogan lied to the police and in court about the
events leading to Jeremiah’s death, and Jeremiah was dead for
hours before emergency services were called. The court
considered this evidence and observed that Jeremiah’s injuries
were more severe than those a frustrated parent might inflict
when acting out of character.
The superior court also found Bogan’s prior criminal
history reflected “a revolving door,” continuing until his
commission of the current offense. Substantial evidence
supported this finding: In 1988 Bogan, as a juvenile, served a
term of detention for robbery. In 1994, when Bogan was about
21 years old, he was convicted of being an accessory to armed
robbery and was sentenced to 16 months in prison. Just four
years later (in 2000), when Bogan was 26 years old, he was

16
convicted of the strike offense for first degree burglary and served
three years in prison; he killed Jeremiah approximately four
years after his release.
Bogan argues “he is not the same person who entered the
prison,” and the superior court failed to consider his commitment
to education, rehabilitation, and reentry. In reaching its
decision, however, the court considered all the evidence Bogan’s
attorney submitted to show Bogan’s good behavior and
rehabilitation. The court commended Bogan for his conduct
while in prison and his recent acceptance of responsibility, but it
concluded that “in looking at the factors of this case in
particular,” it was not in the interest of justice to dismiss the
strike. The court further found that Bogan’s clean disciplinary
record was in part due to his high-security housing while
confined in prison. On this record, Bogan has not shown the
court was unaware of its discretion to dismiss the strike offense,
that the court considered impermissible factors, or that denial of
the Romero motion was irrational or arbitrary. (Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
Moreover, contrary to Bogan’s contention that the superior
court “made light” of the fact he was now over 50, the court
considered this factor but found his age did not mean he was
necessarily entitled to relief. Bogan cites to multiple California
and federal studies and reports (most of which were not before
the trial court and are not properly before us) to present policy
arguments for why there should be greater parole opportunities
for older inmates who pose a reduced risk for reoffending and
suffer diminished health and longevity. Whatever the merit of
these arguments, they do not change our analysis. The superior
court did not find that Bogan’s age was irrelevant to his Romero

17
motion; rather, the court stated (correctly) that not every inmate
who is over 50 is entitled to parole.

C. The Restitution Fine Must Be Vacated Under
Section 1464.9, Subdivision (d)
In resentencing Bogan, the superior court imposed a $5,000
restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), reducing the $10,000
restitution fine imposed at Bogan’s original sentencing in 2007.
Bogan contends, the People concede, and we agree the restitution
fine must be vacated. Effective January 1, 2025—two months
after Bogan’s resentencing—subdivision (d) was added to
section 1465.9, and it provides, “Upon the expiration of 10 years
after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to
Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be
unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment
imposing those fines shall be vacated.” (§ 1465.9, subd. (d),
enacted in Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2024, ch. 805, § 1).)
Section 1465.9, subdivision (d), applies retroactively to
Bogan’s reopened sentence. (See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d
740, 744-745 [absent evidence to the contrary, we presume
ameliorative criminal statutes apply retroactively to all nonfinal
judgments]; see People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664,
681 [Senate Bill No. 136’s changes to section 667.5, former
subdivision (b), applied retroactively to sentences that were not
final at the time the law became effective].) Bogan’s restitution
fine was first imposed nearly 20 years ago and is now
unenforceable and uncollectible under section 1465.9,
subdivision (d).

18
DISPOSITION

The $5,000 restitution fine imposed in the superior court’s
October 23, 2024 sentencing order is vacated. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed. The court is directed to
prepare and forward to CDCR an amended abstract of judgment.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

STONE, J.

19