Florida Supreme Court Opinion on Death Warrant Appeal

Supre me Cou rt of Flori da _______ _____ No. SC2026 - 025 1 _______ ______ BILLY LEON KEARSE, Appellant, vs. STATE OF F LORIDA Appellee. _______ _____ No. SC2026 - 025 0 _______ _____ BILLY LEON KEARSE, Petiti oner, vs. STATE OF F LORIDA Respondent. Febru ary 25, 2026 PER CURIAM. Billy Leon Ke arse, a prisoner unde r sentenc e of death f or whom a death w arrant has been si gned and an ex ecution set for March 3, 20 26, appeals th e circuit court’s final order sum mar ily

denying his s ixt h successive m otion for postc onvicti on relief f iled under Flo rida Rule of Cri minal Pr ocedure 3.8 51. Kearse also petiti ons thi s Court fo r a wr it of hab eas corp us and has filed two pendi ng m oti ons for a st ay of exec uti on. We have j urisdi ction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. C onst.; se e also State v. Four th Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697 So. 2d 7 0, 71 (F la. 199 7) (h oldi ng “t hat in addi ti on to our appellat e jurisdict ion over s entences of death, we h ave exclusiv e jurisdict ion to revi ew all types of c ollateral proceedin gs in death penalty cases ”). Fo r the reason s that foll ow, we affirm the circu it court’s ord er denyi ng relief below, and we deny Kearse’s habeas petiti on and mot i ons fo r a st ay of e xec ution. I. BACKGROUND Kearse was ch arged wit h first - degree murder and robbery with a firearm in the 1991 killing of Fort Pierce p olice officer Danny Parrish. After Parrish stopped Kearse for driving the wro ng way down a one - way s treet, K earse faile d to produce a driver ’s licen se and gave him f alse names. Parrish then ordered Ke arse to e xit the car and attemp ted to ha ndcuff him. Kearse r esisted, grabb ed Parrish’s g un, and fired fourte en shots, thirte en of wh ich str uck Parrish. Par rish later di ed from his injuries at t he hospital. K earse

was apprehen ded sh ortly thereaf ter and confessed to s hooting Parri sh. Kea rse v. S tate, 662 S o. 2 d 677, 6 80 (Fla. 1 995). The jury convict ed Kea rse of first - de gree murder and r obber y with a fir e arm. After this C ourt affi rmed those convi ctions but grant ed Kearse a new penalt y phas e, see id. at 685 - 86, a second pe nalty phase jury unanimou sly recommen ded th at Kears e be sentence d to death in 199 6. The tri al cou rt fol lowed that recommen dation, f inding two aggravating fact ors: (1) the m urde r was committ ed during a robbery; and (2) the mur der was committ ed to avoid arre st and hind er law enforc ement, and the victim was a law enforcem ent off icer engaging i n the perfo rmance of his official duties (merged into one factor). Kea rse v. S tat e, 770 So. 2d 111 9, 11 23 (F la. 2000). The trial c ourt de termined that the mitigati ng circum stances — Kearse ’s ag e at the time o f the mur der; the fact t hat he confess ed; his acce ptab le behavi or at trial; and a number of cir cumstance s relati ng to his diff icult childho od — wer e insu fficient to outwe igh the a ggrava ting facto rs. Id. On direct a ppeal after the resenten cing, this Co urt affirm ed Kearse’s de ath sen tence, id. at 1135, which b ecame final when the United Stat es Supreme Court deni ed certio rari revie w in 2001, see

Kearse v. Florida, 532 U.S. 945 (2001); Fla. R. C rim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(B) (“ For pur poses of t his rul e, a judg men t i s fin al. .. on the di sposi tion of the petitio n for writ of c ertiora ri by the Uni ted States Supreme Court, if file d.”). In the decade s since, Kearse has unsucces sfully challenged his convict ions and sent ence in st ate and feder al court. See Kearse v. S t ate, 969 So. 2d 97 6, 981 (Fla. 2007) (affirming denial of initial motio n for po stconvicti on rel ief and denying fi rst state habe as petiti on); Ke a rse v. S tat e, 11 So. 3 d 355 (Fl a. 2009) (affirming denial of successive m ot ion for postcon vict ion relief); Kea rse v. S tat e, 75 So. 3d 124 4 (Fla. 2011) (un publi sh ed tabl e de cisi on) (affirming denial of suc cessi ve motion for postconvict ion re lie f); Kearse v. Tucker, 100 S o. 3d 1 148 (Fla. 2012) (unpublished table deci sion) (denying second st ate habeas peti tion); Kearse v. State, No. 56199 1CF 0001 36A (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. Jul y 1 5, 2016) (dismissing successive m otion for postconvict ion reli ef); Kearse v. State, No. SC17 - 346, 20 17 WL 5951 617, at *1 (Fla. May 9, 20 17) (dismissing for lack of juris diction ap peal of di smissal of su cces sive motion f or postconvict ion relief); Kearse v. State, 252 So. 3d 6 93, 694 (Fla. 2018) (aff irming denial of successiv e motion fo r postconvi ction

relief); Kearse v. Sec’y, Fl a. Dep’t of Corr., 20 22 WL 3 661526, at *1 (11 th Cir. Au g. 5, 202 2) (a ffirming d enia l of feder al habeas relief). Governor Ron DeSantis s igned Kearse’s death warr ant on January 29, 2 026. K earse then filed a sixth successi ve motion f or post conv icti on rel ief under rule 3. 851, raising thr ee claims: (1) there is newly disc overed evi dence that Kearse was unconstitutio nally depri ve d of a fai r penalty ph ase procee ding beca use the jury was improperly influenced b y the prese nce of uniformed law enforc ement offi cer s in the c ourtroom; (2) Kearse’s d eath sentence is unconstit utional bec ause newly discov ered evid ence esta blishe s that he is i ntellectuall y disabled; a nd (3) the truncat ed nature of Florida’s death war rant proces s violates du e process. The circuit cour t summarily de nied these th ree clai ms. The ci rcuit cou rt also denie d Kea rse’s r elated m otion for a juror interv iew, his motion to declare un con stit ut ional the “clear and convincing eviden ce” stand ard of proo f for establishing intellectual disability set for th in secti on 921.137 (4), Flo rida Statutes, a nd his pos t - warrant publ ic records requ ests ma de on F eb ruar y 9, 20 26, un de r Flo rid a Rule of Cr iminal Pro cedur e 3.852. Kearse now contests the denial of claims one an d two of h is p ostc onv icti on m otion, and in the course

of his challeng e, he also asse rts that the circuit c ourt erred in denying his m otion to inte rvie w a juror, his mo tion to d eclare secti on 92 1.1 37(4) unc onst it ution al, and his post - warrant p ublic records requ est s filed on Feb rua ry 9, 20 26. II. ANALYSIS A. Cla im T ha t Newly Dis covere d Evi dence S hows That Ke arse W as Uncon stitu tiona lly D epriv ed of a F air P ena lty Pha se B ecause the J ury W as S ubject to Impro per I nfl uen ce s Kearse first arg ues th a t th e circuit court erred in su mmarily denying his clai m t hat he was unco nstit utionally dep rived of a fair pen alty ph ase proceedin g in 1996 because the jury w as subje ct to impr op er external influence s. In su ppor t of this cl aim, Kears e assert ed that a recent Facebook c omment posted by a penalty phase juror (Juror M) constitu tes newly discov ered eviden ce that (1) unifor med law enforcem ent offi cers were present in the 1996 cour troom; a nd (2) the ir presenc e created an atm osphe re that influenced Juro r M, such that K earse di d not receive a f air trial under the Six th and Fourteenth Amendments o f the U.S. Const it ution. Juror M’s social media c omment, posted on Feb ruary 3, 202 6, rea ds in f ull:

I was a Juror at t he second tri al, for a possi ble resentencing o f the young man that kille d Danny. At the end of that 2nd tr ial, his deat h sent ence remaine d. It was one of t he hardest th ings I’ve ever done, but the re was no doub t it was the right sentenc e. I’ll never fo rget the respec t and support shown to Danny in tha t cour troom. Ev ery day, no matter how lo ng the tr ial went, the ba ck of the cour troom was fi lled with Leo ’s 1 from every city an d county in the stat e, so much supp ort and respe ct f rom hi s f ellow Leo’ s. The y w ould st and t he re f or several h ours, never wa vering. I remembe r silently hoping that his fa mily and frie nds would know how much he was loved. For the reasons explai ned bel ow, we agree wit h the circ uit court ’s conclusion that t his claim is unti mely and procedu rally barre d. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(1) re qui res t hat defendant s file an y motion to vacat e judg ment of con viction an d sentence of death w ithin one year a fter the ir judgme nt and sent ence become fi nal. Because Kea rse’s su ccessive postcon viction clai m was filed well b eyond th e one - year time limit for filing such motions, Kearse must establish t hat “ the f acts on which t he claim is predicate d were un known [by him and his attorne y]... and c ould not have been as certain ed by the exe rcise of due dili gence.” Fla. R. 1. In this conte xt, the ter m “Leo’ s” presumably refe rs to “law enforcem ent officers.”

Crim. P. 3. 851(d)(2)(A). Moreover, “any claim of newl y discovere d evidence in a d eath penalty case must be brought within one year of the date such evidenc e was disc overed or coul d have been discovered t hroug h the exercise of due diligen ce.” G lock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 2 43, 251 (Fl a. 200 1). Kearse’s clai m is untimely because it is premised on facts that could have b een disc overed dec ades ago with due diligen ce. His second penalt y phase occ urred in 19 96, and ou r affirmance of h is death senten ce becam e final in 2001. The presence of uniforme d officers in the courtroo m during the second pen alty phase w ould have been rea dily observable. To the extent that the officer s’ presence c ould have r aised const itutional c oncern s, Kearse had ample op portu nity to investigate a ny potenti al undue influen ce on the jury. Whatever the relevan ce of Juro r M ’s Faceboo k pos t, it merely dis closes i nformati on that due diligence c ould have uncov ere d long ag o. In addition, this Court has held th at “in an act ive [death] warrant cas e, a postc onvicti on claim t hat could hav e been raised in a prio r pro cee din g is pr oced ura lly ba rred. ” Roger s v. S tate, 409 So. 3d 125 7, 12 63 (F la.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 269 5 (202 5). This rule

applies to Ke arse’s claim h ere, whi ch he could ha ve raised l ong ago on appeal o r in an earlier postc onvict ion procee ding. The circuit cour t was rig ht to de ny Kearse’s cla im as proce durally barred. B. Moti on for a Juro r Int ervi ew Kearse also ar gues t h at th e circuit court erre d in denying his Febru ary 9, 2026, mo tion to inter view Juror M. Because Kea rse failed to esta blish goo d cause for filing his motion nearly three decades late or to assert a legally v alid basis f or the juror inter view, the circui t co urt di d not err i n den yin g hi s moti on. We review t he circuit co urt’s denia l of Kearse’s m oti on for a juror interv iew for abu se of di scretio n. Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 5 19 (Fl a. 2009). Flo rida R ule of Cri min al P roce dure 3.5 75 requires that a motion to interv iew a ju ror be filed “ w it hin 10 da y s after the ren dition of the verdict, unless goo d cause is shown f or the failu re to mak e the mo tion w ithin that ti me.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3. 57 5 (emphasis a dded). As we recently explained in Ba te s v. S t ate, 398 So. 3d 406, 407 (Fla. 202 4), “t he t imin g cont em plate d by the rule suggests t hat the best time f or a rul e 3.575 motion i s on the heels of trial, and th us in connect ion wit h a direct ap peal, when memories a re fresh and facts more readily ascert ain ed.” A rule

3.575 m oti on requires th at a party have re ason to b elieve that t he verdict may be subject t o legal chal lenge, and it “must s et for th allegation s that are not me rely spe culative o r concluso ry, or concern mat ters th at inhere in t he verdict. ” Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d 40, 6 5 (Fl a. 2 013). Of course, K earse f iled the motion at issue here decades af ter the e xpirat i on of t he rul e 3.5 75 de adl ine. To e xcus e th at del ay, Kearse relies e xclusiv ely on Juror M ’s February 3, 2 026, social media post. He contend s that the post reveals impr oper exte rnal influence s on the jur y and there fore jus tifies interviewi ng Juror M now. But any fact ual issues raised by Juror M ’s po s t— whether about the p resence of of ficers in t he courtro om or her reactio n to that presence — co uld h ave been dis covered long ago with due diligence. Kearse has not dem onstrate d good cau se under rule 3.575 t o exc us e his de cad es - long delay in seeking a juror interview. See Bates, 398 So. 3d at 4 07 - 08 (f inding t hat Bates’ s failure to establish g ood cause f or the long d elay was “the e nd of the matte r”). We fi nd no ab us e of disc retion in t he circuit c ourt ’s denial of Kearse’s motion.

C. Public Records C laims Also re lat ed to c la im on e of his s uccessive m otion, Kear se appeals t he circuit court’s denial of his three post - warrant p ublic records request s made on Fe bru ar y 9, 20 26, un de r Florida Rule of Criminal Procedur e 3.852(i) to the O ffice o f the Atto rney G eneral (O AG), the Office of the Sta te Atto rney fo r the N ineteenth J udi cial Circui t (SA O19), and the St. Luc ie Cou nty Sher iff’s Offi ce (SLC SO). Kearse made th ese reque sts six days after the Februa ry 3, 202 6, deadline impose d by the circ uit court. Kearse s ought recor ds relating to a ny communica tion between th o se t hree agencie s and Juror M. Kearse asse rted that he sought these recor ds becaus e he belie ve d they woul d support his claim t hat he was de prived of a f air penalty ph ase procee ding beca use Juror M was su bject t o the improp er influ ence of u niformed law enfo rcemen t officers i n the cour troom. The cir cuit cou rt sustained the ag encies’ obje ction s and denied the re quest s. We review t he denial of req uests fo r public reco rds for ab use of discr etion, Muh ammad v. S tate, 132 So. 3d 176, 20 0 (Fla. 201 3), and find no ne here. We agre e with the circu it cour t that Kearse’s requests w ere unt imely filed six days after th e deadline i mposed by

the cir cuit cou rt’s sche duling order. Kearse gave no explanati on of why he file d the requests si x days late, espe cially giv en that h e foun d Ju ror M ’s pos t only nine hours after the de adline had expire d. N or did h e seek leave of the court to f ile a late deman d. Kearse expl ained th at he sought th ese additi onal recor ds because an A ssistan t Attorney General (AAG) in this case had allegedly re spo nd ed to arti cles and social media co mment s on Facebook r egarding th e signing of Kearse’ s death w arrant. 2 Kearse asser ted that the fac t that Juror M ’ s post was del eted wit hin twenty - four hours of the AAG’s all eged comm ent (s) “raise[d] the question of wh ether t here was s ome sort of mi sconduct in contacting the j uror.” Even accepti ng Kearse’s t imelin e and factual allegation s as tru e, his theory tha t a state or county agency engaged in miscond uct by contact ing Juror M about her post is pure ly speculat ive and does not provi de a basi s for a colora ble claim of relief. Kear se’s Feb ruary 9, 202 6, records re quests amount to a fishing exp edition rather than a p roper basis for obtai n ing post - 2. A t the hearing on his Fe bruary 9 req uests, Kea rse claime d to have in his p ossession t he social media comme nts p os ted by the AAG, but they d o not appear in the rec ord.

warra nt p ubli c rec ord s unde r rul e 3. 852. See, e.g., D a iley v. S tat e, 283 So. 3d 7 82, 792 (Fl a. 201 9) (“R ule 3. 85 2 is ‘n ot i nten ded t o be a proce dure authori zing a fis hing ex pedi tion for record s.’ ” (quoting Bowles v. S ta te, 276 So. 3d 791, 79 5 (Fla. 201 9))). U nde r these circumst ances, the circuit cour t did not abus e it s discret ion in denying Kea rse’s req uests for ad ditional publ ic record s from the O AG, S AO1 9, or S LCSO filed on Febr uar y 9, 2026. Likewise, we rejec t Kearse’s a rgument that deny ing him access to these reco rds violates h is right s to due proces s and eq ual prote ction under the Eighth and Fourtee nth Amendments of the U.S. Co nstituti on and th e corre spondi ng provi sions of the Flor ida Const it ution. Col e v. S t ate, 392 So. 3d 1054, 106 6 (Fla.) (“Vague and concl usory allegat ions on appe al are insuff icient to warrant reli ef.” (citing H eath v. S ta te, 3 So. 3d 10 17, 10 29 n.8 (Fl a. 2 009))), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 109 (20 24). D. Cla im T hat Kearse’ s Deat h Sent ence Is Unco nsti tutiona l Based on Newl y Discovere d Evidence T hat Ke arse I s Intellectu ally Di sabled Kearse als o argues t hat th e circuit court erred in summa rily denying claim two of his successive mot ion, in which he argued that he is intellectually disabled and ca tegoricall y exemp t from exec ution

unde r At kins v. Vi rgini a, 536 U. S. 3 04 (20 02) (hol din g t hat the Eighth Amendment pro hibits execution o f the intellectuall y disabled). In support of this claim, Kearse p rovide d a report b y Robert H. Ouaou, Ph.D., a clini cal and forensi c neurop sychologi st, date d Febr uary 8, 2026, i ndi cati ng t hat Kearse obt ain ed a ful l - scal e IQ score of 75 on the Wechsle r Adult In telligence S cale, Fifth Edition (WAIS -5)— t he most recent revision of the widely u sed Wechsler A dult Intel ligence Scal e — admini stered to h im after his death warr ant was signed. Kearse arg ued that the IQ score h e obtain ed on th e WAIS -5 on Februar y 2, 202 6, 3 constitutes newly discovered e viden ce that h e is intellect ually disa bled. “[T]o esta blish intellect ual disabil ity as a ba r to execut ion, a defendant must demon strate (1) sign ificantl y subaver age general 3. The WAIS is one of tw o tests that can be used to e stablish “ significant ly sub average gen eral int ellectual fun ctioning,” the first prong of sect ion 921. 13 7(1), as i ndi cated i n Florid a Admin istr ative Code Rule 65G - 4.011. Although th e WAI S - 5 is the most r ecent revision of that test, Kearse’s argument framing the WAI S - 5 as a “new” test f ails because p sychologi cal tests ar e routi nely revise d to reflect chang es in the populati on and othe r factors, and such revisions d o not automatically ren der result s on earlier t ests invalid. See Hampton v. S tat e, 219 So. 3d 76 0, 777 - 79 (Fl a. 2017) (treating b oth a defen dant’s WAIS - IV res ult s fr om 20 13 an d WA IS results fr om 1989 as gener ally vali d, admissi ble evid ence).

intellect ual functi oning; (2) con curren t deficits i n adaptive beh avior; and (3) manif estat ion of the conditi on befor e age eight een.” H a lib ur ton v. S tate, 331 So. 3d 640, 646 (Fla. 202 1). “Sig nif icant ly subaverag e gener al intellect ual funct ioning” req uires perf ormance two or more stan dard devi ations below the mean on an approved standar dized intell igence test, and “an ‘IQ t est result of 75 [i]s squarely in the rang e of potential i ntellect ual disabil ity. ’ ” Wr ig h t v. S ta te, 256 So. 3d 76 6, 7 71 (Fl a. 20 18) (alte ration in original) (quoting Bru mf ield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 3 15 (2015)). Further, “a daptiv e behavi or” refers t o the degree to wh ich an i ndividual meets stan dards of pers onal indep endence an d soci al responsi bility as expected of his age, cult ural gro up, and comm unit y. § 921.137 (1), Fl a. Stat. Earlier IQ re sults from th e original trial and res enten cing establishe d Kears e had an IQ scor e of 79, whil e in eighth grade he obtain ed an IQ sc ore of 78. These scores pla ced Kea rse outside t he intellectual disability range. A t his 1996 pen alty pha se, Kearse’ s own exp ert tes tified that althou gh Kear se ha d low - l evel int elligence, emoti onal pr oble ms, l earning disabilities, a nd brain dys functioning, he was not intellectually disabled. Kearse, 969 S o. 2 d at 99 1 - 92.

And o ver th e past twenty - five years th at Kearse has been en gage d in postconvict ion liti gation, he has never raised a claim that he is intellectually disabled under A tk i n s. At mos t, in his firs t state habeas pet ition, Kear se argued th at Atk in s should be ext end ed to him based on “h is age, l ow level of in tellectual fun ctionin g, and mental and e motional im pairment s, ” but even t hen, he did n ot assert that he was int ellectually disabled. Kearse, 969 S o. 2d at 991. Kearse argu es that his intellectual disability claim is timely now because h is n ewly obtai ned I Q sc ore of 75 on the W AIS - 5 constitute s newly discovere d evidence. And he claims t hat he could not have disc overed th is IQ score earlie r becaus e the WAIS - 5 was released in 2 024. But Kea rse’s last - minute, post - warrant IQ score does not qualif y as new ly discover ed evi dence, and th e circuit cou rt did not err in d enying this untim ely, pr ocedur ally barr ed, and legally insufficient claim. Kearse’s intellectual disability claim is untimely becaus e it was raised wel l bey on d th e one - y ear time limitation imposed by rule 3.851(d)(1), and n one of th e exce pti ons in rule 3.85 1(d)(2) a ppl y. As we have expl ained, r ule 3.851 (d)(2)(A) provide s an excep tion to the

one - ye ar time limitation when the f acts on which the clai m is predicated were unk nown to the defendant or counsel and c ould not have been as certain ed by the exe rcise of due dili gence. To be considere d timely filed as newly dis covered e vidence, a claim must be filed within one year of the date upon wh ich the c laim becam e discoverabl e through due diligen ce. Jimenez v. State, 997 S o. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 2 008). Ho wever, Kearse has faile d to establi sh that he ex ercise d due diligence in discove ring his alle ged intellect ual disability. Even accepti ng Kear se’s argum ent t hat he could not have discovered hi s IQ sco re of 75 before the WAIS - 5 was rele ased, his claim is still untimel y. Kearse’s cl aim was not fil ed within one year of when his IQ score coul d have been disc overed th rough the exercise of d ue dilig ence. Acco rding to Kears e, the WAIS - 5 was released in October 2024. Assumin g that i s true, October 202 4 woul d be the earli est date upon which Kearse’s IQ score w oul d hav e become dis covera ble through th e exercis e of due dilig ence. T hus, to satisfy rule 3.851(d)(2) (A), Kear se’ s claim would need to have been filed by Octob er 2025 at the very latest. The refor e, Kearse’ s intellectual disability claim based on his Feb ruary 2, 20 26, I Q sc ore

is untimely. 4 Kearse’s in tellect ual disa bility clai m was als o properly deni ed as procedu rally bar red. See Rogers, 409 So. 3d at 1263 (“[I]n an active [deat h] warrant cas e, a post convicti on claim t hat could hav e been raised in a prior procee ding is p rocedura lly b arred.”). K earse has engage d in numer ous postc onviction p roceedin gs over the l ast two and a half de cades. Yet n ot at trial, on ap peal, or in any of his state or fede ral postconvi ction p roceedings h as he raise d a claim that he is intellectu ally disabled under A tk i n s. Finally, sum mary denial was pr oper beca use Kearse failed to sufficient ly plead t he second prong — concurrent adapt ive deficit s — of the int ellectual disa bility st andard und er sect ion 92 1.1 37(1). A defendant must establish that he meet s all thre e prongs of t he stan dar d to be f ound i ntel le ctuall y di sabl ed. § 921. 137(1), Fla. Stat. (2 025); Dufour v. S ta te, 69 So. 3d 23 5, 252 - 53 (Fl a. 2011). Thus, e ven if Kearse ’s last - mi nute, post - war rant IQ test results 4. Kearse also arg ued that he sh owed “goo d cause” for fil ing his challenge n ow, under warrant, citing Florida Rul e of Criminal Proc edu re 3. 203(d)(4) (C) (20 04). W ith out deciding t his rule’s applicabilit y, Kea rse’s argu ment that he has “good c ause” for his delay fails fo r the same rea son it is untimel y under r ule 3.851.

were sufficie nt to raise a factual iss ue as to pron g on e of secti on 921.137(1) (t hey are n ot), Kears e is not entit led to relief because he has not allege d any current deficit s in adaptive b ehavio r. Under Flori da law, the fir st pro ng must exis t “con currently” with the second prong, “ which this Cour t has interp reted to mean th at the two must exist ‘at t he same time.’ ’’ Wrig ht, 256 So. 3d at 773 (quoting Duf our, 69 So. 3d at 248). Kearse has alleg ed only adaptive deficit s that wer e present dur ing his child hood, r elat ing to his troub le with reading and mathemat ics, as well a s being less emotionally develop ed than his p eers at sch ool. Kearse has not alleged any adapti ve deficits that are pre sent now, as w ould b e re quir ed to sati sf y pron g tw o of se cti on 921. 13 7(1). See Williams v. S ta te, 226 So. 3d 75 8, 7 71 (Fl a. 20 17) (f indi ng t hat the da ta provided reg arding Williams’s a daptive def icits was “i nsufficien t to satisfy t he second pr ong of the int ellectual disability t est becau se it [did] not address Williams’s curre nt adaptive b ehavio r” (emphasi s adde d)); Stat e v. Jackson, No. 3D22 - 1451, 20 25 WL 3703628, at * 6 (Fla. 3d DCA D ec. 22, 202 5) (observi ng that “adaptive defi cits must not on ly be prese nt during chil dh ood an d a dole scen ce, but also that impairmen t must be an ong oing is sue”). A daptive d eficits exist

when at least one domain — c oncept ual, social, and/o r practical — “is sufficient ly impai red that ongoing su pport is need ed in order fo r the person to perf orm adequat ely in one or m ore life sett ings at scho ol, at work, at hom e, or i n the co mmunity. ” Wrig h t, 256 So. 3 d at 77 3. But Kea rse did not allege that any of his domain s are impai red such that ongoing suppor t is needed, nor did he alleg e that h e is currently receivin g support. B ecau se Kearse did n ot allege c urrent adaptive def icits, he f ailed to make out a facially s ufficient claim that he is intellectually d isabled under Florida law. Accordingly, the summary denial of t his claim was p roper. E. Motion t o Declare S ecti on 921. 137 (4)’s Standard of P roof for Est ablishi ng Intell ectual D isa bility Uncons titution al Kearse als o argues the circuit cou rt erred in denying his motion to decl are uncon stitut ional th e “clear and co nvincing evidence ” standar d of pro of se t fort h in sec tion 921. 137(4), Flo rida Statute s, for esta blish ing intellectual disability. Kears e argues t hat this standard of proof is too h igh, impo ses a s ignificant r isk of an erroneous determ ination th at a defendant is n ot inte llectually disabled, an d violat es the Eighth Amendment and his right to due process. Beca use we have alr eady dete rmined that Kearse ’s

intellectual disability claim is untimely, procedurally barred, and legally insuff icien t as ple aded, we need not an d will not consider t he const itut ion alit y of s ecti on 92 1.1 37(4) ’s st an dard of pr oof for establishing intellectual d isability. The c irc uit court did n ot e rr in denying his motion. F. Habeas Peti tion In his habeas p etition, Kearse argu es that h is death sentence is unconstitutio nal under the Eighth and Fou rteenth Amendments of the U.S. Cons titutio n and a rticle I, s ection 17 of t he Florida Const it ution, beca use his age at t he time of t he murde r, co uple d with his significan tly subave rage intellectual functioning, place s him in a catego ry of defend ants exempt from exec ution un der Roper v. Simmons, 5 43 U. S. 551 (20 05) (holding that the Eighth Amen dmen t pr ohi bits e xec ution of indiv idu als w ho w ere un der eighteen yea rs of age at the time the y committe d their capital cr ime), a nd A tk i n s, 5 36 U.S. at 321. We disagree. Kearse’s clai m is proc edurally b arred. In his initial postc onvictio n motio n, Kearse arg ued that he shoul d be exemp t from e xecut i on ba sed on an in ter play of Roper and A tk i n s, and o ur Court reject ed that claim. See Kea rse, 969 S o. 2d a t 991 - 92

(rejectin g Kearse’s Atk i n s claim because he present ed evi dence at his penalty ph ase th at he was not intel lectually disabled and n o evidence to th e cont rary at his init ial postconvict ion evidenti ary hearing, a nd re jecting his Roper claim be cause he w as over the age of eig hteen a t the time o f the mu rder). Kearse cann ot relitig ate th e issue now. See Wal l s v. S tate, 423 So. 3d 865, 876 (Fla.) (“B ecaus e Walls’ habea s petit ion seeks only t o relitigat e an iss ue that was previously decide d, we deny th e petition. ”), cert. denied, No. 25 - 6357, 202 5 WL 3 674 295 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2025); Jones v. State, 419 So. 3d 619, 629 (Fla.) (denyin g habea s petition raising in tellectual disability cl aim beca use it was al ready lit igated), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 79 (20 25); Kni ght v. Stat e, 923 So. 2d 38 7, 395 (Fl a. 20 05) (“[C]laims [that] were raised in [a] postconviction motion. .. cannot be relitigat ed in a habea s petition.”). Even if th e claim were not procedur ally ba rred, it is mer itless, as we determin ed in h is initial postconvi ction a ppeal. Kearse has not establi shed that he is intel lectually disa bled s uch th at he is among the cla ss of pers ons categ orically e xempt fro m executi on unde r A tk i n s, and Roper exem pts from exec uti on on ly t hose w ho were under eight een year s of age at the time of their capital c rime.

T his Cou rt ca nnot extend the pro tections of Roper and A tk i n s to Kearse. As we expla ined in Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 2023): The confo rmity claus e of articl e I, section 17 of the Flori da Consti tution prov ides tha t “[t]he proh ibition against cruel or unus ual punish ment, and the prohibiti on against cruel and unu sual punish ment, shall be co nstrued i n conform ity with d ecisio ns of the U nited States Supreme Court whic h interp ret t he proh ibiti on against cruel an d unus ual punish ment pr ovided in t he Eighth A mendment to the Unite d S tates C onstitu tion.” This means t hat the S upreme Co urt ’ s inter preta tion of the Eighth Amend ment is both the floo r and the ceiling for pro tectio n from cru el and un usual puni sh ment in Flori da, and this Cour t canno t interpr et Flor ida ’ s prohibiti on against cruel and unu sual punish ment t o provide prot ectio n that t he Supreme Court has deci ded is not afforded b y the Eighth Amendment. Because th e Supreme Co urt has in terpreted t he Eighth A mendment to limit the exe mptio n from ex ecution to those who se chronol ogical ag e was less than eig hteen years at th e time of th eir crimes, th is Court is boun d by that inte rpre tation and is pr ecluded fr om interp reting Florida ’ s proh ibi tion again st c ruel and un us ual punishment to exempt individ uals eight een or more y ears old from execu tion on the basi s of their age a t the time of their crimes. Id. at 794 (alteration in original) (rej ecting argument t hat Roper shoul d be e xten ded t o Barwi ck b ecause he was n inet een when he committe d the mu rder); see S tephens v. Stat e, 975 So. 2d 405, 427 (Fla. 2007) (rej ect ing claim th at Roper barre d exe cut ion of defen dan t

who se chronol ogical age at the time of his crimes wa s twent y - thre e). Similarly, u nder the Eighth Amendment co nformity clause in article I, sec tion 17 of the F lorida Co nstitu tion, thi s Cour t “ also lacks the author ity to ex tend A tk i n s to individu als who, like [Kearse], are not intellectually disabled. ” B ar wi c k, 361 So. 3d at 795 (“[T]he Supreme Cour t. .. has l imited the cat egorical b an announced in A tk i n s so that i ndividuals w ith ment al deficien cies other than int ellect ual disabili ty are outsi de the sco pe of that ban.”). Kearse is not catego rically exe mpt from exec uti on un der Roper, A tk i n s, or a combi nat ion there of, and we deny his petition. III. CONCLU SION For the foregoing reas ons, we affi rm the circu it court’ s order summarily denying Kearse’s six th successive moti on for postconvict ion rel ief. We al so deny Kearse’s petiti on for a writ o f habeas cor pus and his m oti ons for a stay of execution. No mo tion for reheari ng will be enter tained b y this Co urt. Th e mandate shal l issue imm ediately. It is so ordered. MUÑIZ, C.J., and CO URIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, SASSO, and TANE NBAU M, J J., concu r. LABARGA, J., conc urs in r esult.

An Appe al from the Ci rcuit Cou rt in and for S t. Lucie C ounty, Micha el Ca rlt on Hei sey, Judg e Case No. 5619 91CF0 00136AX XXXX And an Or iginal Proceeding – Habe as C orpus Suzan ne Keffe r, Acting Capital Coll ateral Reg ional C ounsel, Paul E. Kalil, Assistan t Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Court ney M. Ha mmer, Staff Attorne y, Sou thern Regio n, Fo rt Lauderda le, Florida, for App ella nt/Petitione r James Uthmei er, At torney Gen eral, Tallaha ssee, Florida, L eslie T. Campbell, Senior Assistant Attorne y General, and Lisa - Marie Lerner, Seni or Assi stant Att orney General, West Pal m Beach, Florida, for Appellee/Re spondent