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Feb. 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Parental Resp Conc CLR

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA1145

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (21)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3K)

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Combined Opinion

25CA1145 Parental Resp Conc CLR 02-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1145
Weld County District Court No. 23DR894
Honorable Kimberly B. Schutt, Judge

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning C.L.R., a Child,

and Concerning Luiz Fernando Rodrigues,

Appellant,

and

Flaviane Landroni Lobo Do Prado,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 19, 2026

Luiz Fernando Rodrigues, Pro Se

Harwich Brickey, LLC, Kara M. Harwich, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 Luiz Fernando Rodrigues (father) appeals the district court’s

judgment allocating parental responsibilities for C.L.R. (the child) to

Flaviane Landroni Lobo Do Prado (mother). Father also untimely

appeals, for the second time, the permanent protection order issued

against him in 2023.

¶2 We dismiss the portion of the appeal concerning the

permanent protection order. We affirm the judgment and remand

to the district court to determine mother’s appellate attorney fees

and costs.

I. Relevant Facts

¶3 The child was born in July 2022, and the parents separated

nearly a year later. Mother later sought and was granted a

temporary civil protection order against father. The parties

stipulated to dismiss the protection order and to have no contact

with each other, outside of that about the child, and the court

granted the stipulation.

¶4 At the same time, father petitioned for an allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR), and the parties agreed to a

temporary parenting time schedule providing that mother would

1
supervise father’s visits.1 The parties also filed a temporary

parenting time stipulation, but it was never made an order of the

court.

¶5 About three weeks after filing their temporary parenting time

stipulation, mother filed an emergency motion to restrict father’s

parenting time and a complaint for a temporary protection order

against father. Mother alleged that, after the no-contact agreement

had been entered, father refused to leave her home until several

hours after his parenting time ended and, two days later, came to

her home and demanded entry. She called the police and locked

herself and the child in a bathroom. The district court granted the

motion to restrict and entered the temporary protection order.

Then, after a hearing in August 2023, the court credited mother’s

allegations, granted mother a permanent protection order (PPO),

and ordered that father’s parenting time be supervised at Lutheran

Family Services. Father exercised no parenting time during the rest

of the case.

1 On mother’s request to change venue, the underlying case was

moved from Jefferson County to Weld County, where mother
resided with the child.

2
¶6 After a full-day permanent orders hearing, the court entered a

detailed, written ruling regarding the APR. The court continued the

restriction on father’s parenting time, allocating him one hour of

supervised parenting time each week. In addition, the court drew

an adverse inference about father’s income due to his repeated

failure to comply with mandatory financial disclosures, imputed

him with an income of $6,791.67 per month, and ordered him to

pay monthly and retroactive child support. The court also ordered

that father pay $30,000 of mother’s attorney fees under § 13-17-

102, C.R.S. 2025, and § 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025.

II. Father’s Opening Brief

¶7 Mother requests that we dismiss father’s appeal for failure to

comply with C.A.R. 28. We agree that father’s opening brief does

not comply with this rule. Father fails to state the applicable

standards of review, whether issues were preserved, and, if so, “the

precise location[s] in the record where” any issues were raised and

“where the court ruled.” See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A). He also rarely cites

any authorities or the parts of the record he references. See

C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B). While father represents himself, he must

3
“comply with procedural rules to the same extent as parties

represented by attorneys.” Adams v. Sagee, 2017 COA 133, ¶ 10.

¶8 We would be within our discretion to dismiss father’s appeal,

but we opt to address his arguments to the extent that we can

discern them. See Harris v. Reg’l Transp. Dist., 155 P.3d 583, 586-

87 (Colo. App. 2006) (appellate court has discretion in determining

whether to sanction pro se party who failed to comply with appellate

rules). However, we will not comb the record for facts supporting

father’s arguments that aren’t cited in his brief. See Cikraji v.

Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10; see also Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J v.

Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 328, 335 (Colo. App. 1996)

(“[I]t is not the duty of the reviewing court to search the record for

evidence to support bald assertions.”), aff’d, 940 P.2d 348 (Colo.

1997). And we warn father that if he fails to comply with the

appellate rules in the future, he may face sanctions, including

dismissal of any appeal. See C.A.R. 38(a).

III. PPO

¶9 The PPO was entered in August 2023. Father filed a post-trial

motion requesting relief from that judgment, which was denied.

Father then filed untimely appeal of the court’s denial of his post-

4
trial motion, which was dismissed with prejudice. See In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning C.L.R., (Colo. App. No. 24CA0770, June

3, 2024) (unpublished order); C.A.R. 4(a)(1); In re Marriage of

James, 2023 COA 51, ¶ 8 (“The timely filing of a notice of appeal is

a jurisdictional prerequisite for appellate review.”); see also In re

Marriage of Wiggs, 2025 COA 10, ¶ 24 (holding a PPO issued in an

ongoing dissolution case is a final, appealable order).

¶ 10 Despite that, he now appeals the PPO, claiming that the

district court erroneously entered it for numerous reasons.

Because his appeal is untimely, we dismiss it with prejudice for

lack of jurisdiction. See James, ¶ 8.

IV. Due Process

¶ 11 Father argues that the district court denied him due process

because it didn’t permit him to call witnesses or present evidence at

the permanent orders hearing. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 12 Due process requires a party to be provided with a meaningful

opportunity to be heard. See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d

326, 329 (Colo. App. 2007). However, a party generally may not

obtain relief on a due process claim absent a showing of harm or

prejudice. See People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo.

5
App. 2007); see also In re Marriage of Dauwe, 148 P.3d 282, 286

(Colo. App. 2006) (due process right to a full and fair hearing was

not violated where party failed to show any prejudice in connection

with the district court’s quashing of a subpoena for one of his

witnesses).

¶ 13 Father doesn’t identify the witness testimony and other

evidence the court excluded, nor how his case was harmed by his

inability to present that evidence at the hearing. Because he fails to

show how the court’s alleged error prejudiced him, we reject his

argument. See id.

V. Supervised Parenting Time

¶ 14 Father asserts that the court erred by continuing the

restriction on his parenting time in its permanent orders. He says

that the court didn’t make any finding that he was “unfit, abusive,

or present[ed] any risk to the child” necessitating the restriction.

We again are unpersuaded.

¶ 15 A district court has broad discretion over parenting time

matters, and we exercise every presumption in favor of upholding

its decision. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S.,

2022 COA 105, ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when its

6
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based

on a misapplication of the law. In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA

141, ¶ 25.

¶ 16 A court must allocate parenting time in accordance with the

child’s best interests, giving paramount consideration to the child’s

safety and physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025. A court cannot restrict parenting

time unless it “finds, after a hearing, that parenting time by the

party would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly

impair the child’s emotional development.” Id. In addition to

finding endangerment, when a court continues a restriction, it must

“enumerate the specific factual findings supporting the restriction.”

Id.

¶ 17 Here, the child was nearly three years old when the court

entered permanent orders. The court allocated father — who had

not seen the child since she was a year old — supervised visits of

one hour per week to build a bond with her. And it ordered that

7
father may have two supervised visits per week after at least ten

consistent visits.2

¶ 18 In support of the ongoing restriction, the court determined

that (1) supervised parenting time continued to be in the child’s

best interests and “necessary for her safety” and (2) “[u]nsupervised

time would most certainly be endangering to” her. See id. Thus,

contrary to father’s assertion, the court made the required

endangerment findings when it determined that supervised

parenting time was necessary for the child’s safety.

¶ 19 In doing so, the court credited mother’s testimony about

father’s past conduct, including (1) calling mother names such as

“demon” or “bitch”; (2) threatening to kill mother’s dog; (3) making

threats against mother or threats of self-harm when mother didn’t

give in to requests to continue their relationship and allow him

access to the child; and (4) suggesting the child would up in an

orphanage. The court also noted, with record support, that father

had repeatedly called and messaged mother and violated the PPO.

2 Due to father’s “stated refusal to participate in supervised

parenting time,” the court did not order any further phased
parenting time for him but did outline conditions father must
demonstrate before it would consider lifting the restriction.

8
¶ 20 The court found that father’s conduct fell “squarely in the

definition of domestic abuse” and stated its concern about the

“traumatic effect on the child from exposure to [such] conduct being

directed against” mother. The court indicated it was also concerned

that father would “use the child as a means of manipulation,

control or harm to [m]other, including potentially leaving the

country with the child, without [m]other’s consent.” And it had

“very little confidence that [f]ather would follow any parenting time

conditions” put in place to ensure the child’s safety. (Emphasis

added.)

¶ 21 To the extent father asserts otherwise, the evidence at the

permanent orders hearing amply supports the court’s findings. The

child’s maternal grandmother testified that she was “always

concerned” about the child because of father’s “explosive nature.”

Mother testified that father was “very controlling,” that his “biggest

threats were about custody,” and that she was “very scared that he

was going to take [the child] away.” She also described father’s

conduct that led her to obtain PPO and about the communications

she received from him after the PPO was in place. The

determination of what constitutes endangerment is highly

9
individualized, and we will not disturb findings on this issue when,

as here, the record supports them. See In re Marriage of Wenciker,

2022 COA 74, ¶ 26.

¶ 22 Nor do we agree with father’s assertion that the restriction is a

“de facto termination” of his parental rights because, as he asserts,

he cannot afford the supervising facility’s fee. Father objected to his

parenting time being supervised in his testimony and insisted that

a supervised visit was “never going to happen.” And the court

found that he had “purposefully chosen not to see the child in one

and a half years” following the restriction due to parenting time “not

being offered on his terms.”3

¶ 23 In any event, the APR did not amount to a termination

because father was granted parenting time and retained parental

responsibilities. See L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2000)

(concluding that a guardianship order was not the functional

equivalent of a termination of parental rights).4

3 In an earlier order, the court also noted that, to the extent cost

was a barrier to exercising supervised parenting time, father could
“follow the policies of Lutheran Family Services to request a reduced
supervision fee.”
4 We do not further address father’s vague and undeveloped claims

that a “cumulative effect” of the rulings he challenges, or varying

10
¶ 24 Accordingly, we discern no error in the court’s parenting time

allocation. See Evans, ¶ 25.

VI. Child Support

¶ 25 Father also asserts that the district court abused its discretion

by ignoring his financial circumstances and ordering him to pay an

unaffordable and “excessive” amount of child support, including

retroactive support. We are not convinced.

¶ 26 We review a court’s child support orders for an abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Schaefer, 2022 COA 112, ¶ 8. In doing

so, we will not disturb the court’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous and unsupported by the record. Id.

¶ 27 In calculating child support, the court must consider the

parties’ financial resources, including each parent’s income.

See § 14-10-115(2)(b)(II), (V), C.R.S. 2025. “Income” for child

support purposes means a parent’s actual gross income from any

combinations of them, “de facto terminat[e]” or otherwise violate his
constitutional rights. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530,
531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an appellate argument
presented without supporting facts, specific argument, or specific
supporting authorities).

11
source. § 14-10-115(5)(a)(I); In re Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530,

534 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 28 Father testified at the permanent orders hearing that he was a

flooring installer and that he owned his own company. Father said,

however, that his company was bankrupt and that he was nearly

“broke,” explaining that his expenses exceeded his annual income

of roughly $70,000.

¶ 29 Contrary to his claim that the court ignored his financial

circumstances, the court heard his claims of financial hardship but

didn’t find them credible. See In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d

422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007) (“The [district] court can believe all, part,

or none of a witness’s testimony . . . .”).

¶ 30 Further, we see no abuse of the court’s discretion in its

imputation of father’s income to $81,500 annually. Based on father

“repeatedly refus[ing] to comply with the Court’s order for disclosure

of financial documents,” the court drew an adverse inference that

he was concealing income. See In re Marriage of Sgarlatti, 801 P.2d

18, 19 (Colo. App. 1990) (the district court could draw the inference

that a party’s refusal to make a willing disclosure of his financial

status meant he was concealing income).

12
¶ 31 Father’s and his business’s bank statements, subpoenaed by

mother and admitted at the hearing, showed deposits of nearly

$150,000 over forty weeks. As those statements did not account for

his take-home pay, the court took judicial notice of the average

wages of flooring installers (from the United States Bureau of Labor

Statistics), recognizing that the top ten percent of earners made

over $81,500.5 Based on this, the bank statements, and other

evidence, the court imputed father’s annual income consistent with

this figure.

¶ 32 We will not disturb the court’s finding concerning father’s

income based on the evidence available to it. See Schaefer, ¶ 8; see

also In re Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 311 (Colo. App. 2006)

(upholding an order imputing income based on the only evidence

available when the party’s financial disclosures were “atrocious”).

Nor will we reweigh the evidence. See In re Marriage of Thorburn,

2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of

the evidence, and the inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom,

are matters within the sole discretion of the district court).

5 Father doesn’t contend that the court erred by taking judicial

notice of these figures.

13
¶ 33 We are also not convinced that the support order was

excessive. Based on father’s imputed income and mother’s annual

income of roughly $40,000, and after an upward deviation of less

than two dollars from the guidelines, the court calculated a monthly

obligation of $825. And it ordered that father pay roughly $16,000

in retroactive child support over twenty-four months because of his

failure to voluntarily pay any child support during the pendency of

the case. See § 14-10-115(2)(a).

¶ 34 Father makes other conclusory allegations of error, including

that the court ignored the guidelines and “due process

requirements” and that the support order was “punitive.” But

because he fails to develop any remaining claims, we decline to

address them. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531

(Colo. App. 2004). Moreover, father — who does not direct us to

where in the record he preserved any of his arguments — seemingly

makes all these claims for the first time on appeal. See Melat,

Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61,

¶ 18 (“[I]ssues not raised in or decided by a lower court will not be

addressed for the first time on appeal.”); see also McGihon v. Cave,

14
2016 COA 78, ¶ 16 (an appellate court does not consider

constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal).

¶ 35 Thus, the court’s child support order was not an abuse of its

discretion. See Schaefer, ¶ 8.

VII. Attorney Fees in the District Court

¶ 36 Father next asserts that the court erred by ordering that he

pay $30,000 of mother’s attorney fees, an amount “grossly

disproportionate to his financial ability,” and without a “finding of

bad faith or litigation misconduct.” We are not convinced.

¶ 37 The court found that, as of three months before it issued

permanent orders, mother incurred roughly $33,400 in attorney

fees. While noting it would typically apportion a greater sum of the

fees to mother, the court allocated father $30,000 of her fees to

avoid “further proceedings and opportunities for [f]ather to

perpetuate his abusive court filings through a determination of

additional fees incurred by [m]other in the last three months.” The

court in turn ordered that mother was responsible for the balance

of her attorney fees.

¶ 38 Despite father’s assertion, the court indeed determined that (1)

his conduct was substantially groundless, substantially frivolous,

15
or substantially vexatious and (2) father, while pro se, clearly knew

or reasonably should have known that his actions were without

substantial justification. See § 13-17-102(4), (6), C.R.S. 2025; In re

Marriage of Tognoni, 313 P.3d 655, 661 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 39 Moreover, the court found, with record support, that father

expanded the scope of the proceedings by “repeatedly fil[ing]

motions and other pleadings, including a premature appeal,” and

through his “willful failure” to provide mandatory disclosures. And

the court found, also with record support, that despite its clear

orders, deadline reminders, and father’s access to information for

pro se litigants, he “repeatedly failed to follow” its directions.

¶ 40 The court also concluded that this fee allocation was

appropriate under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025. Under this

statute, the court may apportion attorney fees equitably between

parties based on their relative ability to pay. In re Marriage of

Boettcher, 2018 COA 34, ¶ 34, aff’d, 2019 CO 81. The court found

that mother’s financial circumstances had been

“severely . . . hindered by the prolonged litigation” father caused

and by his failure to pay any child support. And given their

incomes, it determined that father was in a better financial position

16
than mother. To the extent father asks to reweigh the evidence

surrounding his finances, we will not do so. See Thorburn, ¶ 49.

¶ 41 Further, we do not address father’s conclusory claim that the

attorney fees order penalized him “for exercising his right to seek

custody.” See D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 531.

¶ 42 Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s well-

supported award of attorney fees. See Tognoni, 313 P.3d at 661;

Yates, 148 P.3d at 315.

VIII. Remaining Contentions

¶ 43 Father also argues that the court (1) was biased against him;

(2) failed to make findings supported by evidence; and (3)

erroneously imputed income to him without a required finding that

he was voluntarily underemployed. However, we do not address

these arguments because father makes or develops them for the

first time in his reply brief. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA

51, ¶ 31. Nor will we address any other issues that he references in

his briefs but does not sufficiently develop for our review. See

id.; D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 531.

17
IX. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 44 Relying on C.A.R. 38 and 39, section 13-17-102, and section

14-10-119, mother seeks her appellate attorney fees and costs.

Under section 13-17-102, she argues that father’s appeal is

frivolous and “another attempt at abusive court filings.”

¶ 45 An appeal may be frivolous as filed or as argued. Calvert v.

Mayberry, 2019 CO 23, ¶ 45. An appeal is frivolous as filed when

there is “no legitimately appealable issue[].” Id. It is frivolous as

argued when the appellant “fail[s] to set forth . . . a coherent

assertion of error, supported by legal authority.” Id. (quoting

Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App. 2006)).

¶ 46 We conclude that the portion of father’s appeal concerning the

PPO is frivolous as filed. There is no legitimately appealable issue

in connection with the PPO because father is time-barred from

contesting it on appeal. See id. Further, mother moved to dismiss

father’s first appeal because it was untimely, father responded, and

a motions division of this court granted mother’s motion. Because

the first appeal concerned an order entered after the PPO, father

clearly knew or reasonably should have known that he was time-

barred from raising arguments about the PPO in this appeal and,

18
thus, that his PPO arguments are substantially frivolous. See § 13-

17-102(6) (a self-represented party should not be assessed attorney

fees unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably

should have known that the party’s action or any part of it was

substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious). Accordingly, we

award mother her reasonable attorney fees for defending this part of

the appeal. We exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1 to remand

to the district court to determine the amount of the award.

¶ 47 We do not award fees under section 13-17-102 in connection

with the remainder of the appeal. As discussed, father failed to

follow C.A.R. 28 and asserted numerous conclusory and

undeveloped allegations of error. However, even if we assumed that

the remainder of the appeal, or some portion of it, lacked

substantial justification, we are not convinced that father clearly

knew or reasonably should have known that was the case. See §

13-17-102(6); see also Boettcher, ¶ 38 (“Fees should be awarded

only in clear and unequivocal cases . . . .”).

¶ 48 Mother also requests attorney fees under section 14-10-119,

based on the parties’ disparate financial circumstances. Because

the district court is better positioned to determine the parties’

19
current relative financial circumstances, we remand her request to

the district court. See C.A.R. 39.1; In re Marriage of Alvis, 2019

COA 97, ¶ 30.

¶ 49 Lastly, we award mother her costs in connection with C.A.R.

39(a)(1) and (2).

X. Disposition

¶ 50 The portion of the appeal concerning the PPO is dismissed.

The permanent orders judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded

to district court for further proceedings regarding (1) the amount of

mother’s reasonable appellate attorney fees with respect to the PPO

portion of the appeal under section 13-17-102; (2) whether to award

mother appellate attorney fees under section 14-10-119; and (3) the

amount of mother’s appellate costs under C.A.R. 39.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

20