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Feb. 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo in Interest of Dudley

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA2078

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.1K)

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Combined Opinion

25CA2078 Peo in Interest of Dudley 02-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2078
Arapahoe County District Court No. 25MH259
Honorable Bonnie H. McLean, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Michelle Dudley,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Grove and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 19, 2026

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Meghan Rubincam, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant
¶1 Michelle Dudley appeals the district court’s order certifying

her for long-term treatment under section 27-65-110, C.R.S. 2025,

and authorizing the involuntary administration of aripiprazole

(Abilify). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In April 2025, Dudley’s neighbor reported concerns about her

mental health, including that she had been yelling at people in her

apartment complex and seeing and hearing people in the elevator

shaft. Dudley was involuntarily admitted to a hospital to stabilize

her mental health, where she was diagnosed with schizoaffective

disorder, bipolar type. Subsequently, she was certified for short-

term mental health treatment and treated with Abilify.

¶3 Over Dudley’s objection, the district court extended her short-

term certification in July 2025 and authorized the involuntary

administration of Abilify, finding that the People had proved all four

elements of the test set forth in People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973

(Colo. 1985). Dudley continued to receive outpatient mental health

care.

¶4 Before the order extending Dudley’s short-term certification

expired, her psychologist, Dr. Alexandra Zott, and her psychiatrist,

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Dr. Paul Dobransky, petitioned the district court for a long-term

certification order and an involuntary medication order. Dudley

objected to both requests, leading the court to hold an evidentiary

hearing where Dr. Dobransky and Dudley testified. After the

hearing, the court entered an order certifying her for long-term

treatment and authorizing involuntary administration of

medication. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that

Dudley has a mental health disorder and is gravely disabled

because of it, and reasonable grounds exist to believe she will not

remain in treatment voluntarily. The court also authorized the

involuntary administration of Abilify to Dudley, finding that the

People had proved all four Medina elements.

II. Discussion

¶5 Dudley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

the district court’s order. Specifically, she contends that the

evidence was insufficient to support the court’s findings that (1) she

is gravely disabled; (2) reasonable grounds exist to believe she will

not remain in a voluntary treatment program; and (3) the People

established the first, second, and third Medina elements. We

address each issue in turn.

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A. Standard of Review

¶6 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a mental health

proceeding, we determine whether the evidence, viewed as a whole

and in the light most favorable to the petitioning party, is sufficient

to support the district court’s order. People in Interest of R.K.L.,

2016 COA 84, ¶ 13. We defer to the court’s factual findings if there

is evidence supporting them, but we review the court’s legal

conclusions de novo. People in Interest of Strodtman, 293 P.3d 123,

131 (Colo. App. 2011). Both the resolution of testimonial conflicts

and the determination of witness credibility are solely within the

province of the fact finder. People in Interest of Ramsey, 2023 COA

95, ¶ 23. Where the evidence supports the district court’s findings

and conclusions, we may not substitute our judgment for that of

the district court. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 255

(Colo. 2010).

B. Grave Disability

¶7 Under specified circumstances, section 27-65-110 permits a

professional in charge of a patient’s short-term certification and

treatment to petition for long-term care and treatment certification.

See § 27-65-110(1). As pertinent here, to authorize long-term

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certification for mental health treatment, a court must find by clear

and convincing evidence that the patient has a mental health

disorder and, as a result, is gravely disabled. §§ 27-65-110(1)(a),

27-65-113(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶8 A person is gravely disabled when her mental health disorder

impairs her ability to take care of her essential needs, “such as

food, shelter, clothing, and medical care,” without significant

supervision or assistance from other people. People v. Taylor,

618 P.2d 1127, 1134 (Colo. 1980); see § 27-65-102(17), C.R.S.

1. Such disability must put the person “at risk of substantial

bodily harm, dangerous worsening of any concomitant serious

physical illness, significant psychiatric deterioration, or

mismanagement of the person’s essential needs that could result in

substantial bodily harm.” § 27-65-102(17).

¶9 Dudley asserts that the evidence failed to establish that she is

gravely disabled because the hearing testimony demonstrated that

she is presently “fully capable of meeting her essential needs and

making decisions regarding her own care.” She points to

Dr. Dobransky’s testimony that (1) while on her current medication

regimen of injectable Abilify, Dudley is “not gravely disabled”

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because “the med works”; and (2) she ranks in the “top

percentages” for personal-care ability, motivation, and optimism

among individuals with schizoaffective disorder and a traumatic

brain injury. And she points to her own testimony that she is

presently able to provide and care for herself; has rented,

maintained, and cleaned her apartment independently for the past

five years; manages her own shopping, cooking, medical

appointments, and budgeting; cares for her service animal; and

runs her own business as a contractor in a physical therapy office.

¶ 10 The district court acknowledged that Dudley was, at the time

of the hearing, doing exceptionally well on Abilify. Nonetheless, the

court found that it is “the Abilify [that] allows [Dudley] to care for

herself on a daily basis.” Without it, she “quickly . . . deteriorates

into [a] significant psychiatric . . . danger zone.” The court noted

Dr. Dobransky’s testimony that Dudley’s “several year track record

of mental health hospitalizations puts her in a very dangerous

position.” And, consulting the entirety of Dudley’s file, the court

noted that Dudley experiences a nearly annual “decompensat[ion]

in [her] mental health, struggling to the point of needing . . .

psychiatric hospitalization, and court-ordered medications.” The

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court further noted that this was an “ongoing cycle” spanning

twenty years, which had significantly increased in the last three

years. Thus, the court found that Dudley met the definition of

gravely disabled because, “without significant supervision [of] and

assistance” with her “medication regime,” she is at risk of

significant psychiatric deterioration.

¶ 11 The record supports this determination. Dr. Dobransky

testified that he did not believe Dudley understands the risks and

benefits of taking an oral versus injectable form of Abilify. While he

said that Dudley has a “good mindset” insofar as she thinks about

her ability to function, she does not “deeply understand” the risks

associated with missing a dose of medication, forgetting to take it,

or running out. He further opined that Dudley’s prognosis without

the medication was “very grim,” noting her history of starting and

stopping medications with corresponding decompensation and need

for hospitalization. In short, he testified that Dudley was unable to

demonstrate a nuanced understanding or appreciation of the risks

associated with ceasing her medication, and he would like to see a

longer track record of improvement before transitioning her to a

voluntary medication regimen.

6
¶ 12 This evidence supports the district court’s inference that

Dudley is gravely disabled because, “without significant supervision

[of] and assistance” with her “medication regime,” she is at risk of

significant psychiatric deterioration.

¶ 13 We note Dudley’s reliance on Conservatorship of Murphy,

184 Cal. Rptr. 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), and People v. Nunn,

438 N.E.2d 1342 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), for the proposition that the

determination of whether a person is gravely disabled must focus

on the individual’s existing condition, and not on the possibility of

future relapse. We are not bound by out-of-state authority.

Madalena v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2023 COA 32, ¶ 33.

¶ 14 Nor are we persuaded by Dudley’s reliance on People v.

Stevens, 761 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1988). In Stevens, our supreme court

evaluated — among other things — whether sufficient evidence

supported a determination that a patient’s “mental illness resulted

in a present danger to herself or others.” Id. at 775. The court

determined that sufficient evidence supported such a determination

where experts testified that, although not imminently dangerous,

the patient presented a “significant risk” of danger without

treatment. Id. Given the probabilistic language of Stevens, we are

7
hard-pressed to conclude that it supports Dudley’s position, and

Dudley offers no analysis on why it should. In any event, Stevens

did not apply its rationale to a grave disability determination.

C. Reasonable Grounds

¶ 15 The long-term certification statute requires a showing that the

patient has been advised of the availability of, but has not accepted,

voluntary treatment. § 27-65-110(1)(b). However, the patient’s

acceptance of voluntary treatment does not preclude a long-term

certification order “if reasonable grounds exist to believe that the

[patient] will not remain in a voluntary treatment program.” Id.

¶ 16 As we understand her, Dudley asserts that the People failed to

prove that such reasonable grounds exist because the hearing

testimony showed that “she desires to continue treatment

voluntarily and recognizes her need for treatment and the plethora

of benefits from treatment in her everyday life.” However, despite

Dudley’s testimony and Dr. Dobransky’s view that she is currently

cooperative with her treatment, Dr. Dobransky testified that she

has a history and “track record” of “stopp[ing]” her medications and

that, as set forth above, she does not appreciate the risk of doing

so. This testimony is sufficient to support a conclusion that

8
reasonable grounds exist to believe that Dudley will not remain in

voluntary treatment.

D. The Medina Elements

¶ 17 Notwithstanding Dudley’s assertions to the contrary, we

conclude that sufficient evidence supports the district court’s

conclusion that the People proved the first, second, and third

Medina elements.

¶ 18 The first Medina element requires proof that the patient is

incompetent to effectively participate in the relevant treatment

decision. Medina, 705 P.2d at 973. The second element requires a

showing that the requested medications are necessary to prevent a

significant and likely long-term deterioration in the patient’s mental

condition. Id. And the third element requires that a less intrusive

treatment alternative is not available. Id.

¶ 19 In concluding that these elements had been established, the

district court found:

• Even though Dudley is able to care for herself, “she cannot

fully weigh the risks and benefits of taking her medications

on a consistent basis.”

9
• Dudley experiences very serious psychotic symptoms

without medication and has had many psychiatric

hospitalizations; her long-term deterioration will be rapid

without the requested medication.

• Although Dr. Dobransky is working toward getting Dudley

to voluntarily take an oral form of Abilify in the future,

“[r]ight now, the injectable [form] is the most appropriate

and only available treatment.”

¶ 20 The record supports the court’s findings and conclusions. As

to the first Medina element, Dr. Dobransky testified that, although

Dudley wants to succeed, she lacks refined or nuanced insight into

the nature of her mental health disorder and is unable to fully

understand the risks and benefits of maintaining her medication

regimen consistently. He further testified that she lacks a “detailed

grasp and insight into a direct connection between coming off meds,

and [requiring] hospitalizations.”

¶ 21 As to the second element, Dr. Dobransky said that treating

Dudley with “a member of the neuroleptic class of medicines is

compulsory and [must] continue.” Otherwise, Dudley’s prognosis is

10
“very grim”; her psychotic symptoms would likely be “continual”

and, among other things, impair her function significantly.

¶ 22 Last, Dr. Dobransky testified that there is not a less intrusive

treatment alternative, and medication — such as Abilify — would be

compulsory to treat Dudley “for life.” He further testified that

Abilify has minimal side effects compared to other medications.

And although he initially testified that he thought Dudley would

take Abilify without a court order, he later equivocated based on her

history of stopping her medications and decompensating, testifying

he was not sure that Dudley had “reache[d] a level of safety” where

she could come off court-ordered medications.

¶ 23 Under these circumstances, and because the district court is

the arbiter of both the weight and resolution of testimonial conflicts,

we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the district court’s

Medina findings.

III. Disposition

¶ 24 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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