People v. Eastus - Criminal Robbery Appeal
Summary
The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed a conviction for second-degree robbery and upheld a 15-year prison sentence for Dustin Ira Eastus. The court found no abuse of discretion in the sentencing or the refusal to strike a prior serious felony enhancement.
What changed
The California Court of Appeal has affirmed the conviction and sentence of Dustin Ira Eastus for second-degree robbery. The appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Eastus to the upper term of five years, doubled due to a prior strike conviction, and imposing a consecutive five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 15 years. The court also determined that Eastus forfeited his challenge to the serious felony enhancement by not raising it at the trial level.
This decision has limited direct operational impact for most regulated entities, as it pertains to a criminal appeal. However, it reinforces the application of California's sentencing laws, including the use of prior strike and serious felony enhancements, and the forfeiture rule for challenges not raised in the trial court. Legal professionals involved in criminal defense or prosecution in California should note the court's reasoning regarding sentencing discretion and enhancement challenges.
Penalties
15 years in prison
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Feb. 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
People v. Eastus CA3
California Court of Appeal
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: C102974
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Combined Opinion
Filed 2/25/26 P. v. Eastus CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(El Dorado)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, C102974
v. (Super. Ct. No. 24CR0731)
DUSTIN IRA EASTUS,
Defendant and Appellant.
In September 2023, defendant Dustin Ira Eastus robbed a 14-year-old at gunpoint,
taking the teenager’s bicycle worth approximately $1,000. A jury convicted defendant
of second degree robbery (Pen Code, § 211) and found true an aggravating circumstance
that he used a weapon (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2)).1 Following defendant’s
agreement to a court trial on certain bifurcated matters, the trial court found true
allegations that defendant had a prior strike conviction (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and a prior
serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and it also found true four additional
aggravating circumstances: that defendant’s prior convictions were numerous and
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code, and undesignated rule
references are to the California Rules of Court.
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increasing in seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)), defendant served two prior prison terms
(rule 4.421(b)(3)), the offense was committed when defendant was on probation or parole
(rule 4.421(b)(4)), and defendant’s performance on probation or parole was poor
(rule 4.421(b)(5)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate 15 years in prison, consisting
of 10 years for the robbery (the upper term of five years doubled for the prior strike) and
a consecutive five years for the prior serious felony enhancement. Defendant did not ask
the trial court to consider striking the prior serious felony enhancement.
Defendant now contends the trial court abused its discretion in (1) sentencing him
to the upper term, and (2) failing to strike the prior serious felony enhancement. Finding
no abuse of discretion, and finding that defendant’s challenge to the enhancement is
forfeited, we will affirm the judgment.
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND
The probation report indicated that defendant had been diagnosed with Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, depression, Tourette’s syndrome, and anxiety; that he
began smoking marijuana with his mother during his youth; and that he used marijuana
and methamphetamine daily. Records indicated defendant had experienced childhood
abuse and neglect. According to the probation report, defendant committed numerous
juvenile offenses and was adjudged a ward of the court in 2007. His wardship ended two
days after his 18th birthday, and defendant entered the adult criminal justice system
approximately six months later. A static risk assessment placed him at a high risk to
reoffend. Defendant was concerned about what would happen to his brother if his mother
passed away while defendant was incarcerated.
The probation report listed the circumstances in aggravation found true by the jury
and the trial court. As circumstances in mitigation, the probation report identified the
following: that defendant said he had believed the bicycle was his (rule 4.423(a)(7)); that
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multiple enhancements had been alleged in the case (rule 4.423(b)(11)); and that
defendant’s prior conviction for robbery was more than five years old (rule 4.423(b)(13)).
At the sentencing hearing on December 20, 2024, defendant requested the low
term. The trial court said the probation report was incorrect in stating that there were
multiple enhancement allegations in the case, and it found not credible defendant’s
statement that he believed the bicycle was his. The trial court found only one mitigating
circumstance, that the conviction underlying the enhancement was more than five years
old.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review discretionary sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) In so doing, we presume the trial court was aware
of, and followed, applicable law (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114), that it
“considered all of the relevant factors” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305,
310), and that it acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377 (Carmony)). “ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking
the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.
[Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court[’s] . . . discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary
that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.)
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the
upper term.
Section 1170, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part that the trial “court may
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
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the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by
the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by
the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
Here, the jury found true one aggravating circumstance allegation, and following
defendant’s agreement to a court trial on the additional aggravating circumstance
allegations, the trial court found true those additional allegations. A single aggravating
circumstance may justify imposition of an upper term sentence. (People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730, 764.) Defendant has not demonstrated that there was anything irrational
or arbitrary about the trial court’s weighing of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, or about the trial court’s conclusion that an upper term sentence was
appropriate. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.) Defendant’s disagreement
with the trial court’s assessment and conclusion is not enough to justify reversal. (Id. at
p. 377.) There was no abuse of discretion.
II
Defendant further contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike
the prior serious felony enhancement. Specifically, defendant argues the record
established two mitigating circumstances under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)
warranting dismissal of the enhancement. The People counter that defendant failed
to preserve the contention by not requesting such relief in the trial court. We agree
with the People.
It is well-established that complaints about the manner in which the trial court
exercises its sentencing discretion, and the way in which it articulates its supporting
reasons, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th
331, 356; accord People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1075.) Defendant did not ask the
trial court to consider striking the prior serious felony enhancement. Although defendant
asserts in his reply brief that the request was discussed by the parties below, we have
found no support for that assertion in the record. It is true that the probation report and
4
the trial court both concluded it was a mitigating circumstance that defendant’s prior
serious felony conviction was more than five years old. But defendant never asked
the trial court to use that circumstance, or any other circumstance in mitigation under
section 1385, to strike defendant’s prior serious felony enhancement. Accordingly,
he forfeited this contention. (Scott, at p. 356; Wall, at p. 1075.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, J.
We concur:
/S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/S/
WISEMAN, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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