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Feb. 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Rinke CA4/2

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: E085062

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (0)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 2/25/26 P. v. Rinke CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E085062

v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB1201172)

JESSE TYLER RINKE, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Smith,

Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed and remanded.

Rex Adam Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,

and Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
At a hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75,1 the court found defendant

and appellant Jesse Tyler Rinke ineligible for resentencing. On appeal, defendant

contends the court erred in declining to give him a resentencing hearing. We reverse and

remand.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 17, 2015, a jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder (Pen.

Code, § 187, count 1), vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1), count 2),

evading an officer causing death (Veh. Code, § 2800.3, subd. (b), count 3), and the

unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 4). The jury

also found true an allegation attached to count 2, that defendant failed to stop at the scene

of an injury accident. (Veh. Code § 20001, subd. (c).) Defendant thereafter admitted that

he had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)), a prior

strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and two

prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) (§ 667.5(b)). (People v. Rinke (Apr. 27,

2016, E063656) nonpub. opn..)

The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 30 years to life on

count 1, a consecutive determinate term of 20 years on count 3, five years on the prior

serious felony conviction, and one year on each of the prior prison terms. Pursuant to

section 654, the court stayed the sentences on counts 2 and 4 and the enhancement

attached to count 2. (Rinke, supra, E063656.)

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2
Defendant appealed. This court affirmed the judgment but modified the sentence

to strike one of the prior prison terms that was based on the same prior conviction as the

prior serious felony conviction enhancement. (Rinke, supra, E063656.) On September

20, 2016, the court corrected the abstract of judgment to reflect the modified sentence,

which reduced defendant’s determinate term of imprisonment by one year.

At a section 1172.75 hearing on December 1, 2023,2 the People observed, “It

looks like [defendant] received a 26-year determinate term plus 30 to life. Of those 26

years, one was from a prison prior.” The court struck the remaining prior prison term

enhancement: “It will have the effect of reducing the defendant’s determinate term from

26 years to 25 years, that is still consecutive to the 30-to-life sentence.” The court

continued the matter for potential further resentencing.

At the hearing on July 12, 2024, the People informed the court, “I looked at the

defendant’s appellate history, and in 2016 there was an appellate opinion that in part

wiped out all of his prison priors. I’m not sure if the minutes or abstract reflect that. But

2 It is unclear from the record as originally filed how the section 1172.75
proceedings had been initiated. “[S]ection 1172.75 does not authorize a defendant to
seek resentencing on his or her own motion or petition. Rather the process is triggered by
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation [CDCR] identifying a defendant as a
person serving a sentence that includes a prior prison term enhancement. [Citation.]”
(People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332; accord, People v. Newell (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 265, 268; People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 382 [Lower and
appellate courts lack jurisdiction over a request for section 1172.75 relief brought solely
by a defendant].) On our own motion, we took judicial notice of a CDCR list, which
identifies individuals potentially eligible for section 1172.75 relief; defendant’s name
appears on that list.

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in 2016, his prison priors should have been removed. I want to make sure that []is

correct. And if it is, I would ask to take it off calendar.”

The court indicated it would review the file and check. Thereafter, the court

stated, “Yeah, there’s no—are no [section] 667.5(B) priors left.” The court noted, “But

we also did strike the [section] 667.5(b) prior in December 2023. Apparently, that had

already been stricken by the Court of Appeal.”

The court summarized the People’s contention as follows: “Your position is the

prior was not stricken pursuant to [section] 1172.75, it was stricken by the Court of

Appeal on a different ground that affirmed the sentence with no [section] 667.5(b), so we

have no jurisdiction to do anything?”

The People replied, “That’s exactly my position. He might have other

mechanisms for calendaring for a resentencing but [section] 1172.75 is not the right one.

For those grounds, we would ask to take it off calendar. If he has other grounds, he’s

welcome to file whatever petition he wants to for those grounds.”

Defense counsel responded, “I have not been able to review the appellate decision,

if they were stricken then or in December. I believe if they were struck prior to 2023,

they would not be eligible. But if they were struck in December 2023, he would be. I

haven’t had a chance to look at it. I don’t know if the Court can review the file and can

determine that today.”

The court replied, “So on 12/1/2023, it was on for [section] 1172.75. We did strike

the . . . [section] 667.5(b) prior. It appears that was a nullity because it had already been

4
stricken by the Court of Appeal on a different ground.” The court continued the matter to

allow defense counsel to review the file.

At the hearing on October 11, 2024, the court indicated, “So this is on for petition

for consideration for full resentencing, but his [section] 667.5(b) was actually stricken by

the Appellate Court previously.” The People responded, “It was 2016, the appeal came

back. The only change they made was striking the prison prior as a duplicative prior or

dual-use prior. So they struck it in 2016. I don’t know if it came back on remittitur to

correct that, but it should have been stricken in 2016. He only had one.”

The court then posited, “Given the nature of cases, he’s not eligible for

resentencing.” The People responded, “Not under [section] 1172.[75.] That would have

been a prison prior that was already stricken, so his sentence doesn’t have any eligible

priors to 1172.[7]5.” Defense counsel replied, “I’m in agreement that it does appear that

his prison prior was previously stricken in 2016, thus there’s no avenue for relief under

the law under this particular cloth.” Thus, the court found defendant ineligible for

resentencing.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that the order finding him ineligible for resentencing must be

reversed and the matter remanded for a full resentencing hearing. The People concede.

We agree.

“In 2019, in an effort to reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration, the

Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 136),

5
which amended section 667.5(b) to eliminate prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior

crimes except for ‘sexually violent offense[s] as defined in subdivision (b) of Section

6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.’ (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) In 2021, Senate

Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) made this change retroactive. It enacted Penal Code

section 1171.1 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3), later renumbered without substantive

change as Penal Code section 1172.75 (section 1172.75) (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12),

which declares: ‘Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,

pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a

prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section

6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.’ [Citation.]” (People v.

Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054 (Rhodius).)

“A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-invalid

enhancement is entitled to resentencing. [Citation.] To facilitate the process, the statute

directs California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to ‘identify

those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an

enhancement described in subdivision (a).’ [Citation.] Upon receiving that information,

the sentencing court must ‘review the judgment and verify that the current judgment

includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).’ [Citation.] ‘If the court

determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision

(a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.’ [Citation.] The

statute provides separate deadlines for identification, review, and resentencing of

6
‘individuals . . . currently serving a sentence based on the enhancement’ and ‘all other

individuals.’ [Citation.]” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1055.)

“Section 1172.75, subdivision (d) sets forth detailed instructions for resentencing

once a sentence has been recalled. As relevant here, subdivision (d) specifies:

‘Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one

originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the

court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would

endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer

sentence than the one originally imposed.’ [Citation.] The trial court must ‘apply the

sentencing rules of the Judicial Council’ as well as ‘any other changes in law that reduce

sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to

promote uniformity of sentencing.’ [Citation.] In addition, the court may ‘consider

postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of

rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age,

time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk

for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the

original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.’

[Citation.]” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1055.)

“[S]ection 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the underlying judgment

includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed before January 1, 2020,

7
regardless of whether the enhancement was then executed or instead stayed. [Citation.]”

(Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1054.)

Here, defendant’s judgment included two prior prison term enhancements that

were imposed and executed before January 1, 2020. (Rinke, supra, E063656.) Neither

prior prison term enhancement was for a sexually violent offense.

The court, the People, and defense counsel below all erroneously asserted that

defendant only ever had one prior prison term enhancement, which was stricken in 2016

pursuant to this court’s modification. The court and the parties all erroneously asserted

that the court’s striking of defendant’s prior prison term enhancement in December 2023,

was a “nullity.”

However, the record reflects that defendant had two prior prison terms, only one of

which was stricken pursuant to this court’s modification in 2016. The court struck the

remaining prior prison term in 2023 pursuant to section 1172.75 but continued the matter

for further resentencing. Thus, defendant was a person serving a sentence that included a

prior prison term enhancement. The court erred in determining that defendant was

ineligible for a resentencing hearing. Therefore, pursuant to Rhodius, the matter must be

reversed and remanded with directions to the court below to hold a full resentencing

hearing.

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III. DISPOSITION

The matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to hold a full

resentencing hearing. We express no opinion on whether defendant would be entitled to

any further relief at the resentencing hearing on remand.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

We concur:

RAPHAEL
J.

LEE
J.

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