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Feb. 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Ramirez CA4/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: D084653

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (1)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 2/25/26 P. v. Ramirez CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084653

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD138947)

RAUL ENRIQUE RAMIREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John M. Thompson, Judge. Reversed.
Reed Webb, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski, Seth M. Friedman and Juliet W. Part, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Early one morning in August 1998, defendant Raul Enrique Ramirez

and another man were observed walking away from a burning taxicab.1
Ramirez’s hand was wrapped in a bloody cloth. After the fire was put out,
a severely burned corpse was found inside the remains of the vehicle. The
victim—the taxi driver—had been shot seven times, and was apparently dead
before the fire began. Ramirez was arrested at a hospital later that same day
after he sought treatment for burns on various parts of his body.
Following a jury trial, Ramirez was convicted of first degree murder

(Pen. Code,2 §§ 187, subd. (a) & 189), first degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5), and
arson (§ 451, subd. (d)). But the jurors found not true a special circumstance
allegation that he committed the murder in the course of the robbery.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).)
In 2020, Ramirez filed a petition for resentencing under then-section
1170.95 (now § 1172.6), asserting that he had been found guilty of murder
based on a now-invalid theory and could no longer be convicted due to recent
statutory changes. The superior court denied the petition at the prima facie
stage without an evidentiary hearing, concluding there was “sufficient
evidence to establish Petitioner acted with premeditation and deliberation
when he committed the murder.” This court affirmed in an unpublished
opinion. (Ramirez, supra, D034781.)

1 This rudimentary statement of the facts is taken from our unpublished
opinion in the direct appeal (People v. Ramirez (July 8, 2021, D078364)
(Ramirez)) and is provided only for context.
2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Three years later, Ramirez filed a second petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, again asserting that he could not presently be convicted
of murder because of changes to sections 188 and 189. The same superior
court judge again denied the petition without a hearing. Referring back to
the first petition, the judge concluded there were “no changes in the interim
in the law [that] would affect this particular case.” The judge also believed
the verdict established that Ramirez “acted with premeditation in the killing
of the victim.” In the judge’s view, his “liability for murder . . . could only be
the result of [Ramirez] personally killing the victim since he was the only one
charged . . . .”

B. Analysis

Ramirez maintains that changes in statutory and decisional law after
the denial of his first resentencing petition dictate that it not be accorded
preclusive effect. (People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1005.) On
the merits, he argues that the jury’s verdict does not conclusively establish
he is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52.) Asserting that his conviction for first degree murder
may have been based on the felony murder rule, he contends he has made a
prima facie case for relief and is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
The Attorney General appropriately concedes error. He notes that
“because there were several applicable changes to the law since the denial of
appellant’s first petition, the second petition was not barred under principles
of collateral estoppel.” These include amendments to the statute (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3)), limiting reliance on a prior appellate opinion to “the procedural
history of the case” and providing that substantial evidence to support a
murder conviction “is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” They also include more recent

3
Supreme Court caselaw clarifying that at the prima facie stage, a trial court
“should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972.)
On the merits of the petition, the Attorney General agrees that the
record “does not conclusively foreclose the possibility that [Ramirez] was
convicted as an aider and abettor to a first degree felony murder.” He points
out that Ramirez’s jury was instructed on such a theory and admits it is
“possible that the jury based its murder finding on the now-precluded theory

of aiding and abetting a robbery felony murder.”3 Referencing the jury’s
finding that the robbery-murder special circumstance was not true, he
explains it “might have reflected only that the robbery was merely incidental
to the commission of the murder or that the jury was unsure about
[Ramirez’s] exact role.”
We agree with the Attorney General’s analysis and accept his
concession of error as well taken.

DISPOSITION

The order is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings on Ramirez’s petition.
DATO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

KELETY, J.

RUBIN, J.

3 Certainly the fact that Ramirez was the only one charged does not
establish his ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. (See People v. Estrada
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 339.)
4