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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

S.O. v. Bonita Unified School District CA2/3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B339440

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (27.3K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 2/26/26 S.O. v. Bonita Unified School District CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

S.O., B339440

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV08077

BONITA UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court,
Los Angeles County, Christian R. Gullon, Judge. Reversed.

Herman Law, Allegra P. Rineer and Osvaldo Rocha
for Plaintiff and Appellant.

McCune & Harber, Stephen M. Harber and George D.
Tourkow for Defendant and Respondent.

---

In 2019, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 218
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.). (Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1.) The bill
opened a three-year window (starting on January 1, 2020)
within which plaintiffs could bring childhood sexual assault
claims against public entities that would otherwise be barred
because of statutes of limitations or the claim presentation
requirement of the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code,
§ 810 et seq.). (See West Contra Costa Unified School Dist. v.
Superior Court (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1243, 1252 (West Contra
Costa); Gov. Code, §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4.) The legislation also
amended the Government Claims Act to exempt retroactively
all claims based on childhood sexual assault from the claim
presentation requirement. (See West Contra Costa, at p. 1254;
Gov. Code, § 905, subds. (m) & (p).) Plaintiff relied on Assembly
Bill No. 218 “to ‘revive’ ” his claims alleging sexual abuse
by an employee of defendant Bonita Unified School District
(the District) that occurred in 1977 when he was 10 years old.
We join the unanimous consensus of our colleagues in
holding Assembly Bill No. 218’s retroactive waiver of the claim
presentation requirement does not violate the gift clause of the
California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6). (See West
Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1252, 1257–1264;
O.B. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
930, 933 (O.B.); R.L. v. Merced City School Dist. (2025) 114
Cal.App.5th 89, 98 (R.L.).) Because the trial court reached
a contrary conclusion in granting the District’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings, we reverse.1

1 West Contra Costa, O.B., and R.L. all were decided after
the trial court entered judgment in this case.

2
BACKGROUND
On March 4, 2022, plaintiff filed this action against the
District. He alleges that, in 1977, when he was 10 years old
and a student at an elementary school within the District,
he was repeatedly sexually abused by a District employee on
school grounds. Although he reported the abuse to the school’s
vice principal, the District did nothing to stop it, and the
abuse continued for approximately one year. Based on these
allegations, the operative complaint asserts causes of action
for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision
against the District. Because the employee’s alleged conduct
constituted “ ‘childhood sexual assault’ as defined in California
Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1,” the pleading states it is
“exempt from the claims presentation requirement set forth in
the [Government] Claims Act,” as amended by Assembly Bill
No. 218. (See Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m).)
The District moved for judgment on the pleadings,
arguing Assembly Bill No. 218 violates the gift clause of our
state constitution to the extent the legislation “purports to
retroactively strip statutory governmental immunity from
public entities.” At the time of the alleged misconduct in 1977,
the Government Claims Act required plaintiff to present his
claim to the District no later than 100 days after the cause
of action accrued. (See R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 105,
citing former Gov. Code, § 911.2, added by Stats. 1963, ch. 1715,
§ 1, pp. 3372–3376.) Because Assembly Bill No. 218 retroactively
waived the claim presentation requirement that otherwise
barred plaintiff’s claim, the District argued the legislation
unconstitutionally created a new monetary liability against
a public entity in violation of the gift clause.

3
The trial court granted the motion. Because timely claim
presentation is a “substantive element of [a] claim” against
a public entity under the Government Claims Act, the court
reasoned Assembly Bill No. 218 effectively created “liability
on public entities for past conduct where no enforceable claim
existed” before the legislation. In creating this liability, the
court concluded Assembly Bill No. 218 violated the gift clause.
The court entered judgment against plaintiff. This appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION
1. Relevant Statutes and Legal Principles
This case presents an issue of statutory and constitutional
interpretation arising at the intersection of the Government
Claims Act, the statute governing childhood sexual assault
claims, and the gift clause of our state constitution. Our review
is de novo. (See O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 935.)
a. The claim presentation requirement under
the Government Claims Act
“Enacted in 1963, the Government Claims Act . . . is a
comprehensive statutory scheme governing the liabilities and
immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.
[Citation.] For many decades before the Act, tort liability for
public entity defendants was barred by a common law rule of
governmental immunity. Over time, however, the common law
rule became ‘riddled with exceptions,’ both legislative and judge
made, and in 1961 [the California Supreme Court] abolished the
rule altogether.” (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803 (Quigley).) In response, the Legislature
enacted the Government Claims Act, which eliminated common
law tort liability for public entities by mandating that “such

4
liability must be based on statute.” (Guzman v. County of
Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 897; see Gov. Code, § 815,
subd. (a) [“Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] A public
entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of
an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any
other person.”]; Quigley, at p. 803; R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th
at p. 104.) The Act provides several statutory grounds for public
entity tort liability, including, as relevant here, for injuries
“proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the
public entity within the scope of his employment.” (Gov. Code,
§ 815.2, subd. (a).)
Under the Government Claims Act, almost “ ‘all claims
for money or damages against local public entities’ [must] be
presented to the responsible public entity before a lawsuit is
filed.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730,
734, fn. omitted (Stockton), quoting Gov. Code, § 905; R.L., supra,
114 Cal.App.5th at p. 105.) Before 1988, “[a] claim relating
to a cause of action for death or for injury to [a] person” had
to be presented “not later than the 100th day after the accrual
of the cause of action.” (Former Gov. Code, § 911.2, added by
Stats. 1963, ch. 1715, § 1, pp. 3372–3376; cf. Gov. Code, § 911.2,
subd. (a) [claim must be presented “not later than six months
after the accrual of the cause of action”]; see R.L., at p. 105.)
“ ‘The filing of a claim is a condition precedent to the
maintenance of any cause of action against the public entity
and is therefore an element that a plaintiff is required to prove
in order to prevail.’ ” (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990 (DiCampli); Gov. Code, § 945.4;
accord, Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 734; State of California
v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240, 1244.) However,

5
“the claim[ ] presentation provisions do not impose substantive
liability; some other statute must be found that imposes liability.”
(Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32 pt. 2 West’s Ann. Gov. Code
(2012 ed.) foll. § 905.8, p. 368; see Gov. Code, § 905.8 [“Nothing
in this part imposes liability upon a public entity unless such
liability otherwise exists.”].) Instead, the claim presentation
requirement’s purpose is “ ‘ “to provide the public entity sufficient
information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and
to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.
[Citations.] . . .” . . . The claims statutes also “enable the public
entity to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and
to avoid similar liabilities in the future.” ’ ” (DiCampli, at p. 991.)
The claim presentation requirement “ ‘is based on a recognition
of the special status of public entities, according them greater
protections than nonpublic entity defendants, because unlike
nonpublic defendants, public entities whose acts or omissions are
alleged to have caused harm will incur costs that must ultimately
be borne by the taxpayers.’ ” (Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017)
3 Cal.5th 903, 908.)
b. Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 and
Assembly Bill No. 218
“Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 is, for the most part,
a statute of limitations” for claims of childhood sexual abuse
or assault. (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 758, 777.) Our high court has described “ ‘the
intent that illuminates’ ” the statute “as an aim ‘to expand the
ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to hold to account
individuals and entities responsible for their injuries.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 536.)
“Since its original enactment in 1986 [citation], the statute has

6
been amended on multiple occasions to extend the filing periods
for claims alleging childhood sexual assault and revive otherwise
time-barred claims.” (Los Angeles Unified, at p. 777.) “One such
amendment occurred through the enactment of Assembly Bill
No. 218.” (Ibid.) “This revision made several changes to Code
of Civil Procedure section 340.1. Among these adjustments,
Assembly Bill No. 218 extended the time for filing claims for
childhood sexual assault (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subds. (a), (c))
and created a revival window for lapsed claims (id., subd. (q)),
which included relief from the claim presentation deadlines
within the Government Claims Act.” (Ibid.)
As relevant to this case, Assembly Bill No. 218 revived
claims for childhood sexual assault, regardless of when the
abuse allegedly took place, for a three-year period that expired
December 31, 2022. (West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1254, citing former Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q).)2
The legislation “expressly revived claims ‘that would otherwise
be barred as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute
of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time
limit had expired.’ ” (West Contra Costa, at p. 1254, quoting
former Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q).) Prior to the enactment

2 “Effective January 1, 2024, the Legislature enacted section
340.11, which now governs claims for childhood sexual assault
that occurred before January 1, 2024. (Stats. 2023, ch. 877, § 1,
eff. Jan. 1, 2024.) The revival provision at issue in the present
case is currently located in section 340.11, subdivision (q). The
current version of section 340.1 applies to any claim in which
the childhood sexual assault occurred on or after January 1,
2024. (§ 340.1, subd. (p).)” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 1253, fn. 4.)

7
of Assembly Bill No. 218, “[former] Government Code . . . section
905, subdivision (m), exempted from the claim presentation
requirement ‘[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 . . . for
the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual
abuse’ with one significant limitation: ‘[t]his subdivision shall
apply only to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after
January 1, 2009.’ ” (West Contra Costa, at p. 1254.) Assembly
Bill No. 218 removed this limitation, and Government Code
section 905, subdivision (m) now exempts all claims based
on childhood sexual assault from the claim presentation
requirement. (See West Contra Costa, at p. 1254; Gov. Code,
§ 905, subd. (m) [“There shall be presented . . . all claims for
money or damages against local public entities except any of the
following: [¶] . . . [¶] Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered
as a result of childhood sexual assault.” (Italics added.)].)
c. The gift clause of the California Constitution
Under article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution,
“The Legislature shall have no power . . . to make any gift or
authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing
of value to any individual.” (See Chapman v. State (1894) 104
Cal. 690, 693 (Chapman), citing Cal. Const., former art. IV, § 31.)
“Although the term ‘gift’ is statutorily defined as ‘a transfer of
personal property, made voluntarily, and without consideration’
(Civ. Code, § 1146), ‘the gift the Constitution prohibits is not
limited to personal property, “but includes all appropriations of
public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim,
or which perchance may rest upon some moral or equitable
obligation.” ’ ” (R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 107; see Allied
Architects’ Ass’n v. Payne (1923) 192 Cal. 431, 438–439.) “The

8
Legislature cannot ‘ “create a liability against the state for any
past acts of negligence on the part of its officers, agents or
employees” ’ because to do so ‘ “would, in effect, be the making
of a gift.” ’ ” (O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 937, quoting
Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517 (Heron); see also Conlin
v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, 22 (Conlin) [“An
appropriation of money by the legislature for the relief of one
who has no legal claim therefor must be regarded as a gift”
under the constitution.].)
d. Public entity liability for childhood sexual abuse
under the Government Claims Act
Under the Government Claims Act, a public entity is
“liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an
employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment
if the act or omission would . . . have given rise to a cause of
action against that employee or his personal representative.”
(Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a); see id., § 820, subd. (a) [“a public
employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the
same extent as a private person”]; West Contra Costa, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 1260; O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 937.)
While the statute does not make a school district liable for
sexual abuse perpetrated by an employee, as “ ‘such conduct is
not within the scope of employment,’ ” the district “ ‘may be held
liable if its supervisory employees were negligent in hiring and
supervising the abusive teacher and that negligence resulted in
the student’s harm.’ ” (O.B., at p. 937, citing C.A. v. William S.
Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 875 (C.A.)
[allegations that “the [School] District’s administrators and
employees knew or should have known of [the head guidance
counselor]’s dangerous propensities, but nevertheless hired,

9
retained and failed to properly supervise her . . . could make the
District liable under a vicarious liability theory encompassed by
[Government Code] section 815.2”].) This was the law in 1977
when the alleged sexual abuse occurred, and it remains the law
today. (See West Contra Costa, at p. 1260.)
The District does not dispute that, under Government
Code section 815.2, it could have been subject to liability for the
conduct alleged in plaintiff’s operative pleading. It maintains,
however, that any such liability was extinguished in 1977, when
plaintiff failed to present a timely claim as then required under
the Government Claims Act. On that basis, the District contends
Assembly Bill No. 218 violates the constitutional prohibition
against gifts of public funds by retroactively reviving a claim
long since barred. We turn to this contention now.
2. Assembly Bill No. 218 Does Not Create a New Liability
or Cause of Action in Violation of the Constitution’s
Gift Clause
The parties agree our Supreme Court’s decision in
Chapman is the “appropriate lens” through which to evaluate
the District’s gift clause claim. (West Contra Costa, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 1257, citing Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. 690;
accord, O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 938–940; R.L., supra,
114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 111, 115–116.)
In August 1891, the plaintiff’s assignors in Chapman paid
the State of California to store coal on a public wharf. (Chapman,
supra, 104 Cal. at p. 692.) The wharf collapsed due to the state’s
and its agents’ alleged negligence, and the coal was lost. (Ibid.)
The plaintiff presented his claim to the state board of examiners,
which rejected it. (Ibid.) Then, in February 1893—more than a
year after the wharf collapse—the Legislature enacted a statute

10
authorizing all persons “ ‘who have, or shall hereafter have,
claims on contract or for negligence against the state, not allowed
by the state board of examiners, . . . to bring suit thereon
against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent
jurisdiction.’ ” (Id. at p. 693.) The plaintiff sued under the
new statute. The state demurred, arguing it “was not liable for
the damage” at the time of the loss and the statute “should not
be construed as intended to create any liability against the state
for such past negligence.” (Ibid.) The trial court sustained the
demurrer, and the plaintiff appealed. (Id. at pp. 691–692.)
The Chapman court reversed. (Chapman, supra, 104 Cal.
at p. 697.) While the court recognized the plaintiff could not
recover on a negligence claim because “the state [was] not liable
in damages for the negligent acts of its officers,” it concluded
the action was “not founded upon negligence constituting a tort,
pure and simple,” but instead, was “substantially” based on
“the alleged breach of a contract” and, at the time of the loss,
the law was “well expressed” that “a state is bound by the same
rules as an individual in measuring its liability on a contract.”
(Id. at pp. 693–694.) Thus, although the Legislature had “no
power” under the gift clause “to create a liability against the state
for any such past act of negligence” (id. at p. 693, citing Cal.
Const., former art. IV, § 31), the plaintiff’s claim was nonetheless
viable because “the liability of the state accrued at the time of its
[contractual] breach; that is, when the coal was lost through the
negligence of the officers in charge of the state’s wharf, although
there was then no law giving to the plaintiff’s assignors the right
to sue the state therefor.” (Chapman, at p. 696, italics added.)
This distinction made a difference with respect to the gift clause,
as our Supreme Court explained:

11
“At th[e] time [of the state’s breach] the only
remedy given the citizen to enforce the contract
liabilities of the state, was to present the claim
arising thereon to the state board of examiners
for allowance . . . ; but the right to sue the state
has since been given by the act of February 28,
1893, and in so far as that act gives the right to
sue the state upon its contracts, the [L]egislature
did not create any liability or cause of action
against the state where none existed before.
The state was always liable upon its contracts,
and the act just referred to merely gave an
additional remedy for the enforcement of such
liability, and it is not, even as applied to prior
contracts, in conflict with any provision of the
constitution. [¶] ‘The fact that the state is not
subject to an action [o]n behalf of a citizen
does not establish that he has no claim against
the state, or that no liability exists from the
state to him. It only shows that he cannot
enforce against the state his claim, and make
it answer in a court of law for its liability.
What is made out by this objection is not that
there is no liability and no claim, but that
there is no remedy.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.)
As Chapman teaches, the gift clause prohibits the
Legislature from “creat[ing] any liability or cause of action
against the state where none existed before.” (Chapman, supra,
104 Cal. at p. 696; accord, Heron, supra, 209 Cal. at p. 517;
Conlin, supra, 99 Cal. at p. 22; see R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th

12
at p. 111; West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1259;
O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 939.) Thus, “[i]n assessing
whether legislation improperly permits a plaintiff to sue a
defendant on the basis of a new liability or cause of action,
the essential question—as framed by our Supreme Court—is
whether the defendant’s alleged acts or omissions violated a duty
or obligation imposed by preexisting law.” (R.L., at p. 111, citing
Chapman, at pp. 693–696.) “Where this question is answered
in the affirmative, no new liability or cause of action has been
created by ensuing legislation,” and the gift clause is not violated.
(R.L., at p. 111; accord, West Contra Costa, at p. 1259; O.B., at
pp. 939–940.)
The District contends Assembly Bill No. 218 violates the
gift clause, as construed in Chapman, because (a) compliance
with the claim presentation requirement was “the only way a
government entity waived immunity in 1977” when the alleged
sexual abuse occurred, and (b) by “retroactively” eliminating
this requirement, the legislation effectively created a new
liability that the District had been immune from before the law’s
enactment. Along these same lines, the District emphasizes
compliance with the claim presentation requirement was
“a ‘substantive’ element of plaintiff’s claim” in 1977, and, by
retroactively abrogating it, Assembly Bill No. 218 “created a
right to sue that never previously existed.” In view of these
“well settled rules that a government claim must be submitted
to waive a public entity’s sovereign immunity from liability and
that this requirement is a substantive element of any cause of
action against a public entity,” the District argues the legislation
contravenes the gift clause by “creat[ing] new liability for
otherwise invalid claims.” We disagree.

13
The District’s contention rests on the erroneous premise
that the claim presentation requirement bears on a public
entity’s “substantive” as opposed to “procedural” immunity
under the Government Claims Act. (R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 113–114.) As explained in R.L., “ ‘[a]t common law, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity had two strands: a procedural
immunity from suit without the government’s consent and
a substantive immunity from liability for the conduct of
government.’ ” (Id. at pp. 112–113, italics added, quoting
Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 811.) “Starting in the late
19th century, the state ‘would disentangle the two strands of
sovereign immunity’ [citation] by passing statutes ‘granting
legislative consent to suit’ ”—i.e., waiving the state’s procedural
immunity. (R.L., at p. 113, italics added, quoting Quigley,
at p. 812.) One of these statutes was the legislation at issue
in Chapman, which “eliminated the state’s procedural immunity
to suit, thus opening the courts to the adjudication of the
specified claims.” (Quigley, at p. 811, italics added, citing
Denning v. State (1899) 123 Cal. 316, 319 [discussing February
1893 act at issue in Chapman]; see Chapman, supra, 104 Cal.
at p. 693; R.L., at p. 113.)
“Under the law existing at the time of the Government
Claims Act’s enactment, a claim presentation requirement was
viewed as the mechanism by which the state consents to be sued,
i.e., waives procedural immunity.” (R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th
at p. 113, italics added; see Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 811.)
Consistent with this understanding, the Act’s statutory text
provides that “no suit for money or damages may be brought
against a public entity” (Gov. Code, § 945.4, italics added) unless
a timely claim is presented “after the accrual of the cause of

14
action” (id., § 911.2, subd. (a), italics added). “The general rule
for defining the accrual of a cause of action sets the date as the
time ‘when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done,’
or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent ‘liability
arises.’ ” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397,
italics added (Norgart); R.L., at pp. 114–115.) Because a claim
cannot be presented until “after the accrual of the cause of action”
(Gov. Code, § 911.2. subd. (a)), the public entity’s liability
necessarily exists before the obligation to present the claim
arises. (See R.L., at p. 115 [“Since a claim must ‘ “fairly describe
what [the] entity is alleged to have done” ’ [citation], it cannot
be presented prematurely, i.e., before liability under the
substantive law is established.”]; accord West Contra Costa,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1259–1260.) The claim
presentation requirement thus operates as a mechanism for
waiving the public entity’s procedural immunity, allowing it
to be sued on a preexisting liability, such as that created by
Government Code section 815.2 for a public entity’s negligent
failure to protect a child from sexual assault by an employee.
(See O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 937–938, citing C.A.,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 875; see also Quigley, at p. 811.)
Critically, under Chapman, a public entity’s procedural
immunity has no bearing on whether legislation violates the
gift clause. It made no difference in Chapman that “there was
then no law” authorizing the plaintiff “to sue the state” when the
wharf collapsed, because “the liability of the state [had] accrued
at the time of its breach” of contract. (Chapman, supra, 104 Cal.
at p. 696, italics added.) Thus, when “the right to sue the state
[was] given by the act of February 28, 1893,” our Supreme Court
held this waiver of procedural immunity was “not, even as

15
applied to prior contracts, in conflict with any provision of
the constitution.” (Ibid.) As the court put it, “ ‘[t]he fact that
the state [was] not subject to an action’ ”—i.e., that it was
procedurally immune from suit—did “ ‘not establish that [the
plaintiff] ha[d] no claim against the state, or that no liability
exist[ed] from the state to him.’ ” (Ibid.) Because the legislation
did not create “any liability or cause of action against the
state where none existed before,” but only waived the state’s
procedural immunity by “giv[ing] the right to sue the state,”
our high court held the gift clause was not violated. (Ibid.)
The District emphasizes that plaintiff failed to present
a timely claim, which was “ ‘a condition precedent to the
maintenance of any cause of action against the public entity’ ”
and “ ‘an element’ ” that plaintiff was required to prove to
overcome the District’s procedural immunity. (DiCampli, supra,
55 Cal.4th at p. 990; Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 811; R.L.,
supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 113–114 & fn. 10.) As we have
explained, however, procedural immunity has no bearing on
the gift clause analysis under Chapman. When the obligation to
present the claim arose, the District’s liability under Government
Code section 815.2—like the state’s liability for breach of contract
in Chapman—had already accrued upon the District’s alleged
negligent failure to protect plaintiff from sexual abuse.3 (See

3 To the extent it argues we must focus on the “negligence,
not contract, analysis” from Chapman because Assembly Bill
No. 218 “does not involve contract rights,” the District simply
misapprehends why Chapman is controlling. As the O.B. court
explained in rejecting a nearly identical argument, “the
significance of Chapman is not whether the state’s liability
to the plaintiff’s assignors sounded in negligence or contract,”
but rather that “the liability sued upon existed before the

16
O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 937, citing C.A., supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 875; Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a) [“A claim relating
to a cause of action . . . for injury to person . . . shall be presented
. . . after the accrual of the cause of action.”]; Norgart, supra,
21 Cal.4th at p. 397 [“accrual of a cause of action” occurs “ ‘when,
under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done,’ . . . and
the consequent ‘liability arises’ ”]; see also Shirk v. Vista Unified
School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 210 [“a cause of action for
childhood sexual molestation accrues at the time of molestation”];
Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at p. 696 [“the liability of the state
accrued at the time of its breach”].)
When the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 218, the
District was already liable for its alleged negligence or negligent
hiring, supervision, or retention of the employee who allegedly
assaulted plaintiff. Like the February 1893 act in Chapman,
Assembly Bill No. 218 did not create a new liability against
the District—it simply waived the public entity’s procedural
immunity by “remov[ing] an obstacle to recovery imposed by
the state as a condition of its consent to suit.” (West Contra

Legislature’s act giving the plaintiff the right to sue to enforce
the liability.” (O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 939.) In
Chapman, the liability sued upon was the state’s liability for
breach of contract, which existed before the February 1893
legislation gave the plaintiff the right to sue. (Chapman, supra,
104 Cal. at p. 696; O.B., at p. 939.) Similarly, when the alleged
sexual abuse occurred in this case, Government Code section
815.2, subdivision (a) made the District liable for its employees’
negligence in failing to protect plaintiff from abuse. (See O.B.,
at p. 937, citing C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 875.) That liability
—like the state’s liability for breach of contract in Chapman—
already existed when the Legislature enacted the new legislation.
(See O.B., at pp. 939–940.)

17
Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1263; see Chapman, supra,
104 Cal. at p. 696.) We join the unanimous consensus of our
colleagues in holding Assembly Bill No. 218’s retroactive waiver
of the claim presentation requirement does not violate the gift
clause of our state constitution. (West Contra Costa, at pp. 1263–
1264; O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 942; R.L., supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at p. 116.)
DISPOSITION
The order granting the motion for judgment on the
pleadings is vacated and the judgment is reversed. Plaintiff S.O.
is entitled to costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

HANASONO, J.

18