Heath v. State - Appeal of Post-Conviction Relief Denial

Supre me Cou rt of Flori da _______ _____ No. SC 202 6- 0112 _______ ______ RONALD PALMER HEATH, Appellant, vs. STATE OF F LORIDA, Appellee. _______ _____ No. SC 202 6- 0113 _______ _____ RONALD PALMER HEATH, Petiti oner, vs. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. Febru ary 3, 2026 PER CURIAM. Ronald Palm er Heath, a prisoner under sent ence of death f or whom a death warr ant has been si gned and an ex ecution set f or February 10, 202 6, appeals the circuit court ’ s order s summarily

denying his s eco nd successiv e motion f or postconvict ion reli ef filed under Flo rida Rule of Crimi nal Proced ure 3.851 and his seve ral post - war rant publi c re cord s requests m ade under Fl orida R ule of Cr iminal Pro cedur e 3.85 2. He ath al so petitio ns this C ourt for a wr it of habe as c orpus and moves f or a stay of executi on. We have juri sdict ion. See ar t. V, § 3 (b)(1), (9), Fl a. Co nst. For the reasons explained belo w, we a ffirm the den ial of postcon victi on relief and public records request s and d eny the habeas petition and moti on for a stay of exec ution. I. BACK GROUND Heath was sen tenced to death for the f irst - degree murder of Michael Sh eridan in Gain esville in 198 9. On direct appeal, this Court s ummar ized the fac ts as follows: Heath and his you nger brother, Kenneth, drove to Gainesville t o visit some of Heath ’ s frien ds. On May 24, 1989, the broth ers wen t to the P urpl e Porpo ise Lounge in Gainesville w here tw o of Heath ’ s friends w orked as waitresses. Somet ime during the e vening the br others struck up a conv ersation wit h Sheridan, a traveling salesman wh o had come to th e lounge f or drinks and dinner. Sherida n bought the brothers a drink and inquired if they ever got h ig h or had any m arijuana. Heath suggested to Kenne th that they take Sheridan somewhe re and rob him; Ken neth agre ed. The trio l eft the bar i n Kenneth ’ s vehicl e, which Heath d rove to an isolat ed a rea of Alach ua C ounty. Af ter pa rking on a dirt

road, all thre e got out of th e car and smoked m arijuana. Heath made t he h and m otion of a pi stol an d as ked Kenneth, “ Did you get it? ” Kenneth retrieved a sma ll - caliber han dgun from un der the car seat, pointed it at Sheridan, and told him that he was b eing robbed. Sheridan balked at giving the brothers anything. Heath told Kenne th to shoot Sheridan. When Sher idan lunged at Kenneth, Kenneth sho t him in the ches t. Sheridan sat down, sayi ng “ it hur t. ” As Sherid an began to rem ove his possessi ons, Heath kick ed him and stabbed him in th e neck with a hu nting knife. Hea th attemp ted to slit Sheridan ’ s throat, but was una ble to complet e the task with the dull k nife and cou ld only saw at Sheridan ’ s neck. Heath then ins tructed Kenneth to kil l Sheridan with the gun, and Kenne th shot him twice in the he ad. The bro thers m oved the bo dy fur ther into the woods. After returni ng to the P urple Porpoise, the bro thers to ok Sheridan ’ s rental car to a rem ote area, removed som e items, and b urned the car. The next day the brothers used Sher idan ’ s credit cards to purch ase clothes, shoes, and other items a t a Gainesville mall. Although Kenneth signed all of the credit card sli ps, clerks f rom the vari ous stores test ified about the p urchases ma de by the brothe rs and ident ified Heath in a ph oto lineu p.. ... .. . Several wee ks after th e murder, He ath was arreste d at his trailer fo r using the st olen credit card s. [Heath ’ s girlfriend] g ranted t he officers pe rmission t o search the trailer and he r car. The office rs discovere d some of th e clothes purch ased in Gaine sville and Sh eridan ’ s watch.. .. . Heath ’ s t rial c omme nced on Nov embe r 5, 19 90. Th e primary evi dence linking Heath to th e crime was the testim ony o f Kenneth, He ath ’ s possession of a wat ch which could be traced to Sh eridan th rough its serial num ber, an d Hea th ’ s posse ssion of certain merch andise acquired in G ainesville w ith Sheri dan ’ s stolen cr edit cards. The jury f ound Heath guilty of the first - degr ee

murder and a rmed robbery of S heridan, as well as consp iracy to commit u ttering a for gery, consp iracy to commit f orgery, seven c ounts of for gery, and seven counts of utte ring a fo rgery. In the pena lty phas e, the jury recomm ended the deat h penal ty by a vote of ten to two. In i ts sen tencing order, the tria l court fo und two aggravatin g circumst ances: Heath was previ ously convicted of seco nd - degree mu rder; and th e murder was committ ed during t he course of an arm ed robbery. The trial court fo und thr ee miti gati ng circumstan ces: tha t Heath was und er the inf luence of extre me mental or emoti onal dist urban ce, ba sed u pon h is cons umpt ion of alcohol an d marijuana; t hat Heath demonst rated good characte r in prison; an d that codefendant Kenneth Heath received a lif e sente nce. The c ourt fou nd that the aggravatin g circumst ances outwei ghed the mi tigating factors and s entenced Heath to de ath for the fi rst - degree murder convicti on. H e ath v. S t ate, 648 So. 2 d 660, 6 6 2- 63 (Fla. 1994) (foo tnotes omitte d). On app eal, this C our t affirm ed Heath ’ s first - degree murder conviction an d death sen tence, id. at 666, which b ecame final when the Unit ed States Suprem e Court denied c ertiorari review in 199 5, Heat h v. Flori da, 515 U.S. 1162 (1995); se e Fla. R. C rim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(B) (“ For the p urposes o f this rule, a judgm ent is final... on the d isposi tion of the petiti on for w rit of c erti orari by th e United States Supreme Court, if file d. ”).

In the decade s since, Heat h has unsuc cessfully ch allenged his convictions an d sent ences in state and federal co urt s. See Heat h v. S ta te, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1021, 10 35 (Fla. 2009) (affirming d enia l of initial motion for postconviction relief); Heath v. S tat e, 237 So. 3d 931, 9 32 (Fl a. 20 18) (affirming denial of first succes sive motion f or postconvict ion relief); He at h v. Tuck er, N o. 1:09 - cv - 00148 - MCR, a t *62 (N. D. F la. Au g. 20, 2012) (denying f ederal habe as pe tition); Heath v. Sec ’ y, Fla. Dep ’t of Corr., 717 F.3d 1 202, 1205 (11th C ir. 2013) (affirming denial of federal habeas relief). Governor Ron DeSantis s igned Hea th ’ s d eath warrant on January 9, 202 6. Heath then filed a second success ive motion f or post convi ction relie f under rul e 3.851 raising four claims: (1) Florida ’ s allege d reckless m aladmin istration of i ts lethal inj ection protoc ol vio lates the F lorida Constituti on and the Eighth Amendmen t, and the cir cuit cou rt’s decisi on t o bloc k any furth er investigat ion violat es the Fourte enth Amend ment; (2) Flor ida ’ s secrecy rules regarding exe cutive cl emency im permi ss ibly bl ock Heath from in vestigati ng whether a federally recogn ized due pr ocess claim is available; (3) Heath ’ s death sent ence violates the Eight h Amendmen t because his t raumatic juvenile incarc eration s tunted

his brain devel opment; and (4) Heath ’ s execution wo uld violate the Eighth Amendment becaus e the jury ’ s vote for the deat h penalty was not una nimous. The ci rcuit court sum marily deni ed all four claims as well as Heath ’ s post - warrant public re cord s requ ests. This appeal follow ed. II. ANALYSIS A. S econ d Successive Motion for Postc onvicti on Relief 1. Cl ai m s T h a t Fl or id a ’s A dm in i s tr a ti on o f It s Le t h al I njection P rotocol and t he Circuit Cour t ’s D ecision to B lock F urthe r I nves tigation A re U nconstitutional Hea th first ar gues that the circ uit cou rt erre d in summ arily denying his c laim that (a) Florida ’ s alleged reckl ess or negligent maladminist ration of its lethal in jection prot ocol violates t he Florida Constitution a nd the Eighth Amendme nt and (b) the circu it cour t ’s decision to block any furth er invest igation violat es the Fourte enth Amendmen t. a. Method of E xecuti on Heath contend ed that the m ethod of exe cution us ed by th e Flori da De part ment of Corre cti ons (FDC) i s uncon sti tuti onal because the lethal injection protocol was allegedly maladministe red in pri or exe cuti ons, whi ch r aise s co ncerns about its administ ration

generally and places Heath i n imminen t danger of needl ess pain and suffering. H eath alleg ed that inventor y logs tracking lethal inject ion drugs — which came to light in a federal lawsuit filed by Frank Walls, wh o was execute d in Decem ber 2 025 — in dicate that FDC has deviated fr om its proto col in recent execution s and is una ble to competentl y carry it ou t. Heath made seve ral allega tions concerning the adm inistration of the protoco l in 2025, including that: (1) on thre e occasions, the logs sugge st that FDC did n ot docume nt the r emoval fr om inve ntory o f drugs us ed in the execut ion s until one o r two days aft er the executio ns; (2) in one execution, there is no corresponding log entry indicat ing that etomidate w as removed fr om inven tory, despite postmortem testing showing the presence of the drug in the decedent ’s blood; (3) on two occasions, drugs were removed from inv entory o ne or two days after execut ion s in am ount s all egedly l ess than re qui red by t he protoco l, suggesting incorrec t dosing; (4) on tw o occasions, lid ocaine — a drug not ca lled fo r in the protoc ol — was admini stered; (5) the logs indic ated tha t an ex pired dr ug was use d durin g four exe cuti ons; and (6) one ex ecution to ok twenty minute s, with mov emen t

occurring aft er the paraly tic wo uld have purpo rtedly been administ ered. These allegat ions of maladministration in 2025 stem from docume nts attache d to Heath’s motion, which include d page s listing f ields such as “d rug name,” “pa ckage size, ” and “date, ” among othe r s. Also attache d to Heath’ s motio n was a declar ation from Joe l Ziv ot, M.D., a physician practicing anesthesiol ogy and critical car e, suppor t ing this claim and describ ing the risks pos ed by FDC’s allege d reckle ssness in a dministering the protocol. T he circuit co u rt de nied th e claim and c onclu ded He ath ’s pr opose d alternativ e method of executio n was insuf ficiently pl eaded. To succes sfully c hallenge a meth od of exec ution, a defen dant must “ (1) esta blish th at the meth od of execution pre sents a substantial and imminent risk tha t is sure or very li kely to cause serious illn ess and needless suffering and (2) identify a k nown and available alte rnati ve method of exec ution that en tails a sign ificantly less seve re risk of pain. ” Asa y v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 701 (Fla. 2017) (citing Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 8 77 (20 15)). But speculat ive and concl usory allegat ions tha t l ethal injection protoc ols pre sent a substantial risk of seriou s harm are insuff icient

to warrant an e videntiary hearing. Col e v. State, 392 S o. 3d 1 054, 1065 n.18 (Fla.) (citing Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 46 2, 475 (Fla. 2018)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 109 (202 4). The questi on is not wheth er protocol deviat ions occu rred but whether the d efendant ’s alleg at ions would dem onstrat e a substantial and imminent risk tha t is sure or very li kely to cause serious illn ess and nee dless suffe ring. Heat h’s allegations wo uld not demonst rate such a risk. The alleged failure to documen t th e remov al of drug s fro m inventory until one or two days after an execut ion would not, witho ut mor e, show a substant ial and imminent ris k that is sure o r very likely to caus e serious illne ss and needless s uffering during an execution. Nor wou ld the alleged failu re to lo g the rem oval o f etomida te fro m inventory establish such a risk where t he autopsy in dicates the drug was, in f act, administ ered. Th e all egation that l idocaine was ad minist ered on two occasi ons certainly would not establi sh a risk of needless suffe ring. H eath ’s suggestio n that inventory removal s on dates that “see mingl y cor respon d[]” t o exe cuti ons an d reflect amo unts less than required by the protoc ol sho w that inco rrec t d oses were us ed is speculat ive and Heath does not allege th at such inco rrect dos es

would create a demonstrat e d risk of sever e pain. The same is true of the alleged us e of expi red d rug s and t he e xecution that took twenty minutes and allegedly in volved m ovement. None of H eath’s alleg at io ns would esta blish that the me thod o f executio n presents a substantial and imminent risk tha t is sure or very li kely — in other words, a virtual c ertainty — to c ause seri ous illness a nd needles s suffe ring. The circuit court also concl uded, and we ag ree, that Heath failed to ide ntify a su fficie nt alter native m ethod o f exec ution. A propose d alternative met hod must be “fea sible, rea dily implement ed, and in fact significant ly reduce[] a su bstantial risk of severe pain.” T anzi v. S tate, 407 So. 3d 385, 3 93 (Fl a.) (alt eration in original) (quoting Glossip, 57 6 U.S. at 8 77), cer t. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1914 (2025). Heath first p roposed pa using executi ons, conducti ng an indepen dent review of FDC’s lethal injection pra ctices, doc umenting and explaining any alleged erro rs that have occ urred in recent applicati ons of the leth al injection protocol, an d providing additional t rainin g and reform as n ecessary bef ore resuming executions u sing lethal injection. But t o show that an alternativ e

method is feasi ble and r eadily implem ented, “th e inmate ’ s prop osal must be suffici ently det ailed to per mit a finding t hat the Stat e could carry it out ‘relat ively easily and re asonably quic kly.’ ” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. 119, 120 (2019) (qu otin g McGe hee v. Hut c hinso n, 854 F. 3d 48 8, 493 (8th Ci r. 20 17); Art hur v. Comm ’r, A l a. D ep ’ t o f Corr., 840 F. 3d 126 8, 130 0 (11t h Cir. 2016)). Heat h’s proposal lack ed such detai l. Nor woul d pau sing execut ions to con duct an investigat ion, identify p roble ms, refor m prac tices, and conduc t training pe rmit Heath’s e xecution t o be carried out “ reasonably quickly.” The Supr eme Cour t has fur ther said that the inmate proposi ng an alternativ e meth od of execution “mu st make th e case that the State reall y can put him to death, thou gh in a different way than it plans.” N an c e v. W ar d, 597 U.S. 159, 16 9 (2022). But th ere is no sugge stion that FDC do es not “pla n” to f ollow prot ocol d urin g Heath’s ex ecution. Thus, to the extent that thi s proposal is an alternativ e method of exec ution, it w as insufficient ly plea ded. As a second alte rnati ve, Hea th propose d exe cuti on by firing squad. But he failed to make e ven a bare alleg ation that this method would be feasible o r readily implem ented, and he o ffered

only a single un elaborat ed assertio n that a f iring squad “woul d entail less ri sk of error an d severe pain.” This failure to plead suff icient facts showing that a fir ing squad is feasi ble, readily i mplemen ted, and wo uld signi ficantly reduce a sub stanti al risk of severe pain renders h is claim insufficiently pleaded. See Rogers v. S tat e, 409 So. 3d 125 7, 126 8 (Fla.) (reje cting firing squad as an alternat ive metho d of execution because def endan t failed to show how it could be re adily implement ed or sign ificantly red uce the substan tial risk of sev ere pain), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 26 95 (20 25); T an z i, 407 So. 3 d at 3 93 (same); Boyd v. Wa rden, Hol ma n Corr. F acility, 856 F.3d 85 3, 859 (11th Cir. 2 017) (rejec ting method - of - e xecut ion cl aim where Boyd did “not come cl ose to pleadin g suff icient fact s to render it pla usible that [hi s proposed altern ative meth ods of executi on were] feasi ble, readily im plement ed methods” t hat would “signi ficant ly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain”); Val l e v. S tate, 70 So. 3d 53 0, 549 - 50 (Fl a. 201 1) (af firming deni al of relief wh ere claim was sp eculative and insufficiently pleaded). For the se reasons, we find no er ror in the summ ary denial of this claim.

b. Denial of Public R ecords Requ ests Rela ting to Lethal Injec tion P rotoco l Heath next claims that the circuit court e rred in deny ing his post - war rant publi c records requ ests un der rule 3. 852(i) to FDC, the Flo rida Department o f La w Enforce ment (FDLE), an d the Offic e of the Medical E xaminer for District Eight. 1 Heath sought records rela ting to mo re than te n e xe cutions that oc curre d in 20 25, w ith which he alleged ther e were errors in the dr ug logs, proble ms with the pr epara tion of the dr ugs, or prob lems with the dr ug s themselv es. Heat h asserted t hat he sough t the reco rds because of his “ interest i n fully investi gating, befo re his sche duled execution, the mal adminis tration of the p rotoco l. .. in 2025. ” He further claimed that the records we re relevant because “ they have somethin g to do with t he subject matt er of lethal i njection. ” The circuit court sust ained the agen cies ’ objections — that the requests were u ntimely, overly b roa d, und uly bu rden some, and di d not relate 1. Co ntrary to the titl e Heath gave this issue, it contains no specific arg ument t hat the circuit court ’ s deci sion to block any furth er inve stigation into the al leged maladmin istrati on of the protoc ol violates t he Fourteent h Amendm ent or du e proc ess. Thus, we treat thi s sub - issue as a clai m that t he relevant reco rds requests were e rron eousl y den ied un der r ule 3. 852(i).

to a colorabl e claim for postc onviction reli ef — and denied the re ques ts. We review t he denial of reque sts for pub lic record s for abuse of discr etion, Muh ammad v. S tate, 132 So. 3d 176, 200 (Fla. 2 013), and find no ne here. Heath has not shown that the cir cuit cou rt abused its dis cretion in deny ing his req uests. His argu ment tha t the records related to a colo rable claim f or postconvi ction relief — i.e., that the reckless or neg ligent a dministration of the let hal injection p rotocol by FD C places Heat h in imminen t danger of needle s s pain and suffering in violatio n of the Eighth Amendment— lacks merit. As explaine d abo ve, to prevail on a met hod - of - execution claim, Heath mu st not only establish that the method presents a s ubstant ial and imminen t risk that is su re or very likely to cause seri ous illness an d needless suff ering, but he m ust als o iden tify a known and av ailable alte rnative met hod of exec ution that entails a significa ntly less seve re risk of pain. This he has not done. Furthe r, it cannot credibly be dispu ted that th e request s made to FDC and the Off ice of the Me dical Examin er were over ly br o ad or undu ly burde nsom e. Under thes e circumstance s, we cannot conclude that the cir cuit court erred in d enying the requests for

public records from FDC, F DLE, or the Office of the Medi cal Examiner at issue here. 2. Cl ai m T h a t F l orid a ’ s Extreme Cl emency Secrecy Rules I mper missibly Block Heat h f rom I nvestigating Whe ther a Feder ally Recognized Due Process Cl a im I s Av ailable Heath next ar gu es that the cir cuit c ourt er red i n summarily denying his c laim that his inability to o btain records fro m his own clemency proceeding impermissibly impede s him from in vestig ating whether the denial of executiv e clemency in h is case violat ed federal due proces s. After his death warrant was signed on January 9, 202 6, Heath filed, unde r rule 3.852(i), requests for the produc tion of public records relating to Fl orida ’s clem en cy proce ss and his own clemency p roceedin g from var iou s entiti es, includ ing th e Executive Office of the G overnor, the Florida Commission on Offen der Review, and the A ttorney G enera l of Flori da. The circuit court d enied each re ques t, concluding that the requests were bas ed on not hing more than speculat ion and conject ure. As an initial mat ter, recor ds relatin g to the clemency process are exe mpt f rom discl osu re. S ee Muhammad, 132 So. 3d at 203 (“ [C]lemency files an d records are n ot subject to cha pter 119 disclosu re and are exempt f rom producti on in a records request

filed in a post conviction pr oceeding. ”); § 14.28, F la. Stat. (202 5) (“A ll records devel oped or recei ved by any state entit y pursuant to a Board of Exec utive Clem ency inves tigati on shall be confident ial and exempt fr om the pr ovis ions of s. 1 19.07(1) an d s. 2 4(a), Art. I of t he State C onsti tution. ”). Additionally, Heath failed t o establish, as requi red by r ule 3.8 52 (i) (1) (C), that the records “ are either relevant to the subject matter of t he postconvict ion proceedi ng or are reasonably c alcul ated to lead to the disc overy of ad missible evidence.” “ [R] ec ords re que sts unde r Rule 3.8 52(i) m ust ‘ show how the requeste d records relate to a color able claim for postconvict ion relief. . . . ’ ” Jones v. State, 419 S o. 3d 61 9, 628 (Fla.) (quoting Dailey v. State, 283 So. 3d 78 2, 79 2 (Fla. 2019)), cert. den ied, 146 S. Ct. 79 (20 25). And “[w] here a de fendant cann ot demon strate that he or she is enti tled to relief on a cl aim or that records are relev ant or may reas onably lead t o the discove ry of admissib le evidence, t he trial court may properly deny a records request. ” Id. (quoting A s ay, 224 So. 3d at 700). Heath ’ s re quests g enerically at tested th at the record s he sought “ are relevan t to the subject matter of a proce eding unde r Florida Rule of Cr imina l Proc edure 3.8 51 ” or they “ app ear

reasonably c alcul ated to lead to the disc overy of ad missible evidence th at Florida’ s clemency p rocess an d the manner in w hich the Govern or determine d that [Heat h] should recei ve a death warrant on Jan uary 9, 20 26, was arbit rary and cap ricious.” He furth er alleged, withou t elaborat ion, that there are “ indica tions ” that his “ clemency deni al may not have c ompo rte d with due process, incl uding t he speed at which clemency was denied, simultan eously wit h the issuance of a warrant, as w ell as infl uence from politici ans and fami ly members of vict ims othe r than the victim in t his case. ” But chall enges to the Gov ern or ’ s a bsolut e discreti on t o issue death warrants and allegations that the Go vernor ’ s decision to sign a warrant was in fluence d by publi c i nput do not present colorabl e claims for postconvic tion relief. See, e.g., Bolin v. S tat e, 184 So. 3d 492, 5 03 (Fl a. 20 15) (re ject ing c laim that Govern or ’ s disc retion t o select an inmat e for execut ion is unconst ituti onal); M uh am m ad, 132 So. 3d at 203 - 04 (concluding that the requested clemen cy “ records wo uld not relate to a c olorable clai m becau se we have hel d many times t hat claims ch allengin g clemency pr oceedings a re meritless ”); Carroll v. Sta te, 114 S o. 3d 8 83, 88 7 - 88 (Fla. 2013)

(rej ecting ar gument that the Go vernor ’ s select i on of a death ro w pris oner f or e xecut ion is a rbit ra ry and unconstitu tional); M a nn v. S ta te, 112 So. 3d 11 58, 11 63 (Fl a. 20 13) (h oldin g th at rec ords sought i n the ho pe of sup porting an allegatio n that the Govern or ’ s selection of Mann for a death warrant w as tainted by public input were not rele vant to any col orable claim, and that su ch claim is not cognizable); V al l e, 70 So. 3d at 551 - 52 (reject ing argument t hat the Gover nor ’ s discretion in signing a death warrant re sults in an arbitr ary and caprici ous select ion process). Accordingly, Heath has no t met his burden to show how the requested re cords relate to a colorable clai m for postconvi ction reli ef. Ins tead, he was “ seeking to disc over if possi ble claims exist, rather than r ecords to suppor t a color able clai m for po stconvicti on relief, ” an obj ect ive un supp orte d by l aw. Da m as v. State, 423 So. 3d 811, 823 (F la. 2025). And t he den ial of such re que sts do es not violate a defen dant ’s righ ts to due proc ess or acce ss to t he courts. Id.; see Randol ph v. State, 422 So. 3d 16 6, 1 72 (Fla. 20 25) (observing t hat const itutional chall enges to rule 3.852 are not new but that all h ave been reje cted by this Co urt under st ate and federal law, including claims t hat the denial of public reco rds violate d due

process an d access to cou rts), cert. denied, No. 25 - 6133, 20 25 WL 3236 523 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2 025); B ate s v. S tate, 416 So. 3d 312, 3 20 - 21 (Fla.) (rejecti ng claim that defendants hav e a right to review and rebut eviden ce pertain ing to their c lemency proc eedin g), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 66 (2025); Hutchinson v. State, 416 S o. 3d 27 3, 279 (Fla.) (rej ecting cl aim that operation of rule 3.852 vi olates due process), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 198 0 (20 25). He ath offers no basis to dep art fro m this precedent. The su mmar y denial of the cl aim was proper. 3. Cl ai m T h a t H e ath ’ s De at h Sen t ence Violates the Eigh th Amendment Because His Traumatic Prior I nca rcerat ion St unt ed His Brain Developmen t In his third iss ue on appeal, Heath claims that the ci rcuit court erred in summarily denying his claim tha t the Eighth Amendmen t categ orically excl udes him f rom executi on bec aus e, although he was twenty - seven yea rs old at the t ime of Sheridan ’ s murde r, hi s alleged stunt ed brain developm ent rend ered his “ psychologic al age ” no more than twen ty - five. Heath asserted that “ [f] or the same reason s that drove the Supreme C ourt to find juvenile off enders less culpable in Roper [v. Simmon s, 543 U. S. 55 1, 578 (2005)], Heat h was less c ulpable at t he time of the offen se

because of his st ill - developing brain, which was stunted beginning at the age of 16.. . .” He ath br ought “ this claim as a mat ter of newly discover ed evidence based on Dr. Akinsulu re - Smith ’ s find ings and recent r esearch. ” Dr. Aki nsul ure - Smith evaluated Heath in Nov ember 20 25 and concl ude d th at t he several in stance s of sexual violen ce to which he was subject ed while in pri son for hi s pr ior murder convict ion — fro m age s sixteen to twenty - seven —“ resulted in severe, lifelong developm ental and heal th conseq uences, ” an d that Heath ’ s psychol ogical age at the time of S heridan ’ s murder was n o more than twenty - five. On Janua ry 13, 2026, Dr. A kins ulure - Smith wro te a letter intend ed as an adde ndum to her eval uation re port in which she id entified six publi cation s she descr ibe d as “ k ey resources ” suppor ting her conclusions. Bec ause this claim w as untime ly, proc edurally b arred, m eritles s, and le gally insu fficie nt, summary deni al was prope r. Heath ’ s arg ument, li ke many other recent post - warr ant claim s, was essent ially that because his psych ologic al age was allegedly no more than twen ty - five when he committ ed the murde r in this case, the protections recognized in R oper — which held that

“ [t]he Ei ghth and Four teenth Am endments forbid impositi on of th e death penalty o n offenders who were under the a ge of 18 when their crimes we re committ ed ”— shoul d be e xtend ed to hi m. He fur ther contend ed that t he claim is timely b ecause Dr. Akin sul ure - Smith ’ s November 2025 evaluatio n repor t and the publ ication s on which she relied constitute newly disco vered evidenc e. Rule 3.851 req uires that “ [a]ny motion t o vacate judg ment of conviction an d sent ence of death must be f iled by the defen dant within 1 year af ter the judg ment and sent ence beco me final. ” Fla. R. Cr im. P. 3.851(d)(1). Although there is an excepti on to this rule for claims inv olving n ewly discover ed evidence, Fla. R. Cr im. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A), “a ny claim of n ewly disc overed evide nce in a death penalty case m ust be bro ught withi n one year of the date su ch evidence wa s discove red or could h ave been disc overed th rough the exercise of d ue diligen ce,” Glock v. Moore, 776 S o. 2 d 243, 2 51 (Fl a. 2001). To obtain relief based on a claim of newly di scover ed evidence, a d efendant has the burden t o establish: (1) that t he newly discove red eviden ce was unknow n by the tri al cou rt, by the p arty, or by co unsel a t the time of trial and it coul d not have been di scover ed through due diligence, and (2) that the evidence is of such a nature

that it would probably prod uce an acquittal o r yield a less seve re sentence on ret rial. Dailey v. State, 329 So. 3d 12 80, 1 285 (Fl a. 20 21). Cont rary t o Heat h ’ s asserti on, neith er Dr. Akinsu lure - Sm ith ’s report nor t he publicati ons on which she reli ed const itute newly discovered e viden ce so as to rende r this claim t imely. Pur porte d Ro per claims bas ed on a def endant ’s psychologi cal, menta l, o r emotional “ a ge ” have been b rought in this Court since R oper was decided in 2005. Although H ea t h contend ed that he co u ld n ot have raised the clai m earlie r because t he psych ologi cal c ommun ity did not then under stand that his im matu r i ty, impulsi veness, and la ck of insight were in dicator s of stunted br ain developm ent attributa ble to his pr ior incarceration, he does not identify when this informati on became dis coverable. To be timely, the claim ha d to be broug ht within one year of the date the und erlying informati on became discov er able through due diligence. S ee Gl ock, 776 So. 2d at 25 1. Dr. Akins ulure - Smi th ’ s Janua ry 20 26 lette r identi fied as “ key resources ” six pu blicat ion s from 2023 - 2025 on which she r elied in her evaluat ion of Heath. But even assuming that no relevant

publication o r e xpert knowl edg e coul d hav e supported the claim befor e 2023, Heath d id not explain why th e claim could n ot have b een raised i n 20 23, 20 24, o r early 2025. Indeed, Dr. Akinsul ure - Smith’s eval uatio n report cited m ore than fif ty publications dating back to the 198 0s, many of w hich address ed subject s similar to those disc ussed in t he articles ide ntified in her Jan uary 202 6 letter concerning t he effects of i ncarcerati on and sexual a ssault on adolescent s. It is the def endant ’ s bur den t o establis h the ti meliness of a successive postconvi ction claim, Mungin v. Sta te, 320 S o. 3d 624, 6 26 (Fl a. 20 20), and without credi bly identifying when the factual basi s for the claim became discoverabl e, Heath c annot establish t imeliness. D amr e n v. S ta te, 397 So. 3d 607, 613 (Fla. 2023). Even if th is claim were timely an d even if Dr. Akin sulur e - Smith ’ s report and adden dum — and the publications on which s he relied — constit uted newly dis covere d evidence, Heath would st ill not be entitled to relief. This Court ha s repeatedly r ejected th e argum ent that Roper ’ s catego ri c al ba r on exec uti ng individuals who were under eight een at t he time of their ca pital offens e sho uld be extende d to defendants wh ose chron ological age wa s over eight een

at the tim e of the offe nse. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 9 73, 979 (Fla.) (rej ecting cl aim that th e protections of Roper sho uld be exte nded to Ford, who w as thir ty - six at the t ime of his capital crimes, be cause he ha d a mental an d development al age bel ow eighteen), cer t. den ied, 14 5 S. Ct. 1161 (2 025); Ba r wick v. State, 88 So. 3d 85, 10 6 (Fl a. 20 11) (rej ect ing cl aim t hat Roper sho uld ext en d to Barwick, who wa s nineteen when he co mmitted the capita l crime, because his men tal age w as less than ei ghteen); St ephen s v. S ta te, 975 So. 2d 40 5, 4 27 (Fla. 200 7) (rejectin g claim that Roper and the Eighth Amendment barred e xecution of de fendant who had a mental and e motional age of less than eigh teen year s because his chronologic al age at the time of hi s crimes was twent y - thre e); H il l v. S ta te, 921 So. 2d 57 9, 584 (Fla. 2006) (reje ctin g an ext ensi on - of - Roper claim and holding “ Roper only pr ohibit s th e exec ution of those defen dants whose chron ol og ical age is below eigh teen ”). H ere, Hea th d oes not even a llege that h is psychologic al age was below eigh teen at t he time of Sheridan ’ s murder. He inst ead argues that t he same “ underlying Eighth Amendment princ iples ” th at supporte d the categoric al exemptio n for juvenil e offender s in Roper shoul d app ly t o him beca use h is psych ological age w as

younger than his chronological age a nd therefor e he was “ categori cally less culpable than the average c rimina l. ” Bu t neithe r Roper nor its u nderlying Eighth Amendm ent rationale extend s t o offenders wh ose chronol ogical age w as ove r eig hteen at the time of their capit al offense. Nor are we per suaded by Heath ’ s attempt to refram e th is claim as invoking Roper ’ s “ underlying Eighth Amendme nt principles ” rather than seeking an ex tension of Roper its elf. Thus, t his claim also lacks me rit beca use, as we have repe atedly ex plained, this Court l acks the author ity to e xtend R oper: The confo rmity claus e of article I, sect ion 17 of the Flori da Consti tution pr ovides that “ [t]he prohibition against cruel or unusual p unishme nt, and th e prohibiti on against cru el and unus ual punishmen t, shall be co nstrued i n conform ity with d ecisio ns of the U nited States Supreme Court whic h interp ret the p rohib ition against cruel an d unusual pu nishment provided in the Eighth A mendment to the Unite d S tates C onstitu tion. ” This means t hat the Supre me Court ’ s interpr etation o f the Eighth Amendm ent is both the f loor and the ceiling for pro tectio n from cru el and unusual punishme nt in Flori da, and this Cour t canno t interpr et Flor ida ’ s prohibiti on against cru el and unus ual punishmen t to provide prot ection that the S upreme Court has dec ided is not afforded b y the Eighth Amendment. Gud inas v. S tate, 412 So. 3d 70 1, 7 13 (Fl a.) (alteratio n in original) (quoting Ford, 402 So. 3d at 979), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2833

(2025); Bar wick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 79 4 (Fla. 2023). For these reas ons, summa ry denial of this claim was proper. 4. Cl ai m T h a t H e ath ’ s Execut io n Wou ld Vio lat e t he Eight h Amendment Because the Jury ’ s Death Penalty Recomm endat ion Was Not Unanimous The circuit court denie d this claim a s p rocedurally b arred and meritless. The court fou nd the claim proced urally bar red because Heath raised it in b oth prior p ostconv ictio n proceedi ngs. In his initial postconvi ction procee ding, Heath argued “ that Flo rida ’ s sentencing structur e is unconstitu tional in violat ion of Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 58 4 (200 2)] bec ause it does n ot require a unanimo us jury to recommen d a senten ce of death. ” H e a th, 3 So. 3d at 1035. This Court reje cted the arg ument an d affirmed the denial of relief. Id. In his fir st successive m otion for po stconvict ion relief, Heath argued th at he was entit led to relief from his death sen tence unde r Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2 016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3 d 40 (Fl a. 201 6), receded from in part by State v. Poole, 297 S o. 3d 487, 5 07 (Fl a. 20 20). 2 Heath specifi cally a sser ted that h is death 2. In Hurst, the United States Supreme Cou rt held that Florida ’ s capital sen tencing sche me was unc onstituti onal becaus e it

sentence based on a nonu nanimous jury recommendation w as uncon stit ution al bec ause the Ei ghth Amen dment requires that a “ jury m ust unan imously r ecomme nd the death pen alty befo re a dea t h senten ce may be im pose d. ” This clai m was also s ummarily denied an d affirmed on ap peal. Se e H e ath, 237 So. 3d at 931 - 32 (holding that “ Hurst does not apply retroactively to Heath ’ s senten ce of de ath,” and citing Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 21 7 (Fla. 2017), for th e prop osition that H ur s t v. S t ate also d oes not apply retro activel y to Heath ’s death sen tence). Heath cont ends that t he circuit cour t erred in finding this claim proce durall y barred becaus e, he says, it is distinct from his “ req uired the j udge alone to f ind the exist ence of an aggravating circumst ance. ” 577 U.S. at 103. On rema nd from H urs t, this Co urt held in Hurst v. St at e that “ before a sentence of deat h may be cons idered b y the tria l cour t in Florid a, the j ury mu st find the existence of t he aggrav ating fact ors proven bey ond a reason able doubt, tha t the a ggra vating fac tors ar e suffici ent to im pose death, and tha t the agg ravatin g factor s outweigh the mitig ating circumst ances. ” 202 S o. 3d a t 53. This C ourt then deter min ed that Hurst does n ot appl y retroacti vely to cases in which the deat h sentence became fin al before the is suance of Ring, A s ay, 210 So. 3d at 22, nor doe s Hurs t v. State, H i tc h c oc k v. S ta te, 226 So. 3d 216, 217 (Fl a. 20 17). Fo ur years after deci ding Hurst v. Stat e, this Cour t “r eced e [d ] from Hurs t v. State except to the extent it requires a jury unanimo usly to find the exist ence of a st atutory agg r avatin g circumst ance.” Poole, 297 S o. 3d at 507.

prior claims in that it allege d that a nonun anim ous deat h recommen dation violates t he Eight h Amendment un der “ evolving standar ds of decency. ” But rebranding the argumen t as one base d on ev olving stan dard s of decen cy does not change the su bstance: Heath again argu es t hat his death sent ence violate s the Eighth Amendmen t because it was impose d based on a nonun animous jury rec omme nda tion. See Zack v. State, 371 So. 3 d 335, 350 (F la. 2023) (explaining that an “ evolving standard s of decency ” challeng e to a no nunanimous jury recommendation is “ precisely the same ” as arguing “ that the Eighth Ame ndment requires a unanimous jury recommen dation of death ” (quoting Poole, 297 S o. 3d at 504)). The circuit court there fore pr oper ly denie d th is claim as procedurally bar red. The cir cu it court also prope rly deni ed th is claim on the me rits. “ [T] he Supr eme Co urt ’ s precedent e stablishes t hat the Eig hth Amendmen t does not req uire a unanimo us jury recomm endation of death. ” Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 9 4, 104 (F la. 2 023). And this Court ha s previously r ejected clai m s t hat nonunanimous death recommen dations offend evolvin g standa rds of decency and thereby violate the Eighth Amendment. See J ames v. Stat e, 404 So. 3 d 317,

327 (Fla.), cer t. den ied, 14 5 S. Ct. 1351 (2025); Z ac k, 371 So. 3d a t 350. Heath i s not entitl ed to relief on this claim. B. Habea s Petiti on In his habeas p etition, Heat h argues th at h is death senten ce is disprop ortio nate relative to his brother Kenneth ’ s life senten ce in light of new inform ation regarding their r elative culpabil ity, and executing Heath witho ut reconsidering propo rtiona lity would vi o late the Eighth and Fo urteenth Amendme nts. The claim is without mer it. Heath urge s this C ourt to r ecede f rom its decision in Cru z v. S ta te, 372 So. 3d 12 37, 12 45 (Fl a. 20 23), cert. d enied, 1 44 S. C t. 1016 (2024), in whi ch we he ld that “ [a]s an int egrated part of comparativ e proporti onality review, relative c u lpabili ty review was rende red obsol ete by the L a wr en c e [v. S ta te, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020)] decision. ” 37 2 So. 3 d at 1 245. Heath offe rs no s upport fo r this request beyond his asserti on that L a wr en c e and Cruz were “ misguided,” and w e decline to ad opt his view. Moreo ver, a s Cru z expla ined, “ relative culpa bility review is neither constitutionally required no r consist ent with ensuring that a constitutional ca pital sentence wa s rendered. ” Id. A ccordi ngly, we deny the petition.

III. CONC LUSION For the reason s stat ed above, we affir m the cir cuit c ourt ’ s orde r s that summarily deni ed Heath ’ s second succ essive mot ion for postconvict ion rel ief and his post - w arrant p ublic rec ords requests raised herein. We d eny Heath ’s petition for a wri t of habe as corpus and deny his moti on for a st ay of exec ution. No mo tion for reheari ng will be enter tained b y this Co urt. Th e mandate shal l issue immedi ately. It is so ordered. MUÑIZ, C.J., and CO URIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, SASSO, and TANE NBAU M, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., conc urs in re sult. An Appea l from the Circu it Cour t in and fo r Alac hua County, James M. Col aw, Judge – C ase No. 01 1989 CF00 3026AX XXX X And an Or iginal Proceeding – Habe as Cor pus Sonya Rudenst ine, Gaines ville, Florida, for App ella nt/Petitione r James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Jason W. Rodrig uez, Senior Ass istant Atto rney Gener al, Be njamin L. Ho ffman, Se nior A ssistant Attorney Gen eral, and Nic ole Rochell e Smith, Sen ior Assistant Attorney Gen eral, Tallaha ssee, Florida, for Appellee/Re spondent