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Routine Enforcement Amended Final

Lakeview Loan Servicing LLC v. Frederick - Loan Servicing Case Order

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Filed February 18th, 2026
Detected February 19th, 2026
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Summary

The Delaware Superior Court denied motions to dismiss and strike filed by defendants Carl and Elizabeth Amber Frederick in a loan servicing case. The court found the motions to strike plaintiff's response to be meritless. The underlying action concerns a mortgage foreclosure initiated by Lakeview Loan Servicing LLC.

What changed

The Delaware Superior Court, in the case of Lakeview Loan Servicing LLC v. Elizabeth Amber Frederick and Carl Frederick (C.A. No. N 25L-09-015 CLS), has issued an order denying several motions filed by the defendants. Specifically, the court denied Carl Frederick's Motion to Dismiss and his subsequent Motion to Strike the Plaintiff's Response. Additionally, Elizabeth Amber Frederick's Motion to Strike the Plaintiff's Response was also denied. The underlying dispute involves a mortgage foreclosure action initiated by Lakeview Loan Servicing LLC due to the defendants' failure to make payments on a mortgage executed in 2020.

This court order signifies a procedural step in the ongoing litigation, with the defendants' attempts to dismiss the case or strike the plaintiff's arguments being unsuccessful. The denial of these motions means the case will proceed, and the defendants must continue to engage with the legal process. While no specific compliance actions are mandated for external entities, regulated entities involved in loan servicing and foreclosure proceedings should note the court's reasoning regarding the motions to strike, which were found to be meritless. The case is proceeding, and further court decisions will determine the ultimate outcome regarding the mortgage servicing and foreclosure claim.

Source document (simplified)

IN THE SUPERIO R COUR T OF THE ST A TE OF DELA W ARE LAKEV IEW L OAN SER VICING LLC, Plaintif f, v. ELIZABE TH AMBER FRED ERICK and CARL FREDERICK, Defendants.)))))) C.A. No. N 25L-09-015 CLS))) Date Submitte d: November 25, 2025 Date Decided: F ebruary 18, 2026 Upon the Defend ant Carl Fr ederick’ s Moti on to Dismis s, DENIED. Upon Defenda nt Carl Fr ederick’ s Motion to Strike Pl aintiff ’ s Resp onse, DENIED. Upon Defenda nt Elizabeth Amber Fr ederick’ s Motio n to Strike Plaintiff ’ s Response, DENIED. ORDER Janet Z. Charlt on, Esquire of M C C ABE, W EISBER G & C ONWAY, LLC, Attorney f or Plaintiff. Carl Frederick, Pr o Se Defendant. Elizabeth Am ber Freder ick, Pro Se Defendan t. SCOTT, J.

Having considered Defenda nt Carl Fr ederick ’s Motion to Dismi ss, 1 Plaintiff’s Response, 2 Mr. Frederick’s Motion to Strike Plai ntiff’s Response, 3 and Defendant Elizabeth Amber Freder ick’s Motion to Strik e Plaint iff’s Response, 4 it appears to the Court t hat: 1. On September 14, 2020, Eliza beth Amber Frederick and Ca rl Frederick (collectively, “D efendants”) execute d a mortgage (the “Mort gage ”) in favor of Mortgage Electron ic Registration Syste ms, Inc., as nominee for Pike Cree k Mortgage Ser vices, Inc., for the property located o n Barnacle C ourt in M iddletown, Delaware. 5 On June 2 2, 2022, the Mortgage was assigned to Lakeview Loan Servicing, LL C (“Plaintif f”). 6 2. Defendants failed to pay the M ortgage’ s monthly payme nts, and Plaintif f filed this scir e facias sur mortgage actio n on September 5, 2025. 7 3. On October 1, 2025, Mr. Frederick filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, arg uing that: (1) Plaintiff lack s standing because Mr. Frederi ck did not sign the 1 Def. Carl Frederick’ s Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 7 (“MTD”). 2 Pl.’ s Resp. to Def. Carl Frederick’ s Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 10 (“Pl.’ s Resp.”). 3 Def. Carl Frederick’ s Mot. to Strike Pl.’ s Resp., D.I. 14. 4 Def. Elizabeth Amber Frederick’ s Mot. to Strike Pl.’ s Resp., D.I. 16. 5 Complaint, ¶ 5, Ex. E, D.I. 1 (“Compl.”). 6 Id. ¶ 5, Ex. F. 7 Id. ¶ 6.

promissory note, and (2) that the Mortgage instrument is null and void. 8 Plaintiff filed a respon se in opposition o n November 13, 2025. 9 4. On N ovember 2 5, 202 5, Mr. Fred erick file d a Motion to Str ike Pla intif f ’ s Response to his Motion to Dismiss. That same day, Ms. Frederick also filed a Motion to Strike Plaintif f ’ s Response. The Court first addresses Defendants’ Motions to S trike. I. Defendants’ Motion s to Strike Plaint iff ’ s Responses 5. Under Su perior Court Civil Rule 12(f), the Court may “order stricken from any pl ead ing a ny i nsuf ficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.” The “standard for a motion t o strike is similar to t hat for a motion to dismiss.” 10 “Motions to strike ‘granted sparingly, and only if clearly warranted, with d oubt being res olved in favor of the plea ding.’” 11 6. The Court concludes that Defendants’ Motions to Strike are meritless. In their Motions to S trike, D efendants maintai n t hat while P laintif f ’ s Responses w ere filed with the certifications attache d with t he Court on N ovember 13, 2025, they were not actually mailed until November 14, 2025, to Mr. Fredericks, and November 15, 8 See generally MTD. 9 See generally Pl.’ s Resp. 10 Fidelity Nat’l Info, Serv s., Inc. v. Rentner, 2025 WL 3645876, at *1 (D el. Super. Dec. 15, 2025) (quoting Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(f)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Id. (quoting Heisenber g Principals Fund IV, LLC v. Bellr ock Intel., Inc., 2018 WL 3460433, at *1 (Del. Super. July 17, 2018)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025, t o Ms. Fredericks. 12 Mr. Frederick received the mailing on November 15, 2025, and M s. Fredericks rec eived her ma iling on No vember 17, 2025. 13 7. According to Defendants, the mailing must correlate with the certification under Ru le 5(b). Bec ause the mailin g and certificati on d o not correla te, Defe ndants arg ue t hat they are prejudiced by the “materia lly shorten[ed].... response window[.]” 14 8. There is no authority th at req uires time of certification and mailing to match to be v al id. Fur ther, Court cannot f ind “that the variance between the time of certification and the time of mailing has subjected [Defenda nts] to any dif ficulty[.]” 15 Nothing on this recor d shows that Defendants wer e prejudice d b y a 24 – 48 - hour dif ference in the certifications filed with the C ourt and mailing. Thus, Defendants’ Motions to Strike are DENIED. II. Defendant Carl Fr ederick’ s Motion to Dismiss 9. Upon a motion to dismiss under Superior Court Civil R ule 12(b)(6), the Court (i) accepts all well-pled factual allegations as true, (ii) accepts even vague allegati ons as well-pled if they give the opposing party notice of the claim, (iii) draws all reasonable inferences in favor of t he non -moving party, and (iv) only dismisses a 12 Def. Carl Frederick’ s Mot. to Strike Pl.’ s Resp. ¶ 6; Def. Elizabeth Amber Frederick’ s Mot. to Strike Pl.’ s Resp. ¶ 2. 13 Def. Carl Frederick’ s Mot. to Strike Pl.’ s Resp. ¶ 9; Def. Elizabeth Amber Frederick’ s Mot. to Strike Pl.’ s Resp. ¶ 4. 14 Def. Carl Frederick’ s Mot. to Strike Pl.’ s Resp. ¶ 9. 15 Gr e en v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 2007 WL 2319146, at *2 (Del. Super. July 1 1, 2007).

case w here the plaintif f would not be entitled t o rec over under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances. 16 The Court does not, ho we ver, accep t “conclusory allegations that l ack specific supporting factual allegati ons.” 17 But “it is a ppropriate... to give t he pleader the be nefit of all rea sonable infere nces that can be drawn from the pleading.” 18 10. Under 1 0 Del. C. § 5061, a mortgagee’ s assigns may file a lawsu it in Superior Court for any injury sustained due to default payme nt on a mortgage of real estate. 19 Here, Plaintif f has alleged that Defendants executed the Mortgage, whi ch was later assigned to Plaintif f, and Defendants h ave failed to make the payments required. Therefore, Plain tif f has standing. 11. T he defenses avai lable in a sc ir e facias sur mortgage foreclosure action are limited and o nly those claims or counterclaim s arising under the mortgage ma y be raised. 20 Delaware courts recognize the defenses of payment, satisfaction or avoidance. 21 A p lea in avoidance must “relate to the m ortgage sued upon, i.e., the plea must relate to the validity or illegality of the mortgage documents.” 22 These 16 ET Aggr egator, LLC v. PFJE AssetCo Hldgs. LLC, 2023 WL 8535181, a t *6 (Del. Super. Dec. 8, 2023). 17 Id. (quoting Ramunno v. Crawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Del. 1998)). 18 T rueBlue Inc. v. Le eds E quity Partners IV, LP, 2015 WL 5968726, at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 25, 2015) (quotation omitted). 19 See also CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Bishop, 2013 WL 1143670, a t *4 (Del. Super. Mar. 4, 2013). 20 Id. at *5 (c iting CitiMortgage, Inc. v. K ine, 201 1 WL 6000755, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 1, 201 1)). 21 W ells Far go Bank, N.A. v. W illiford, 201 1 WL 5822630, at *3 (Del. Super. Nov. 17, 201 1) (citing Gor dy v. Pr eform Building C omponents, Inc., 310 A.2d 893, 893 (Del. Super. 1973)). 22 Bishop, 2013 W L 1 143670, at *5.

include acts of G od, assignment, conditional liability, dures s, exception, forfeiture, fraud, illegality, just ification, non-performance of co ndition precedents, ratif ication, unjust enrichment in waiver. 23 Permissive counterclaims, however, may not be asserted in a sc ir e f acias sur mortgage action. 24 12. Mr. Frederick claims that he was fraudul ently included as a mortgagor, he was fraudule ntly induced into s ignin g doc uments, that Plaintif f slandere d and misused Mr. Fre derick’ s ide ntity, and that “USDA regulatio ns were violated.” 25 13. Mr. Frederick’ s assertions of fraud constitute an affirmat ive defense. Given that the Court is limited to the four co rne rs o f the complaint on a Ru le 12(b)(6) motion, affirma tive defenses are generally unsuited for the pleading stage “[u]nless it is clear from the face of the complaint that an affirmative defense exists and that the plai ntiff can prove no set of facts to avoid it[.]” 26 This b urden is not met here as Plaintif f states a r easonably conce ivable scir e facias sur mortgage action. 14. Finally, Mr. Frederick may not ar gue that Plain tif f slandered or misused Mr. Frederick’ s identity, nor that USD A re gulations w ere violate d because they are permissive countercl aims that are not associated with the mortgage transaction at issue. 27 23 Bishop, 2013 W L 1 143670, at *5. 24 W illifor d, 201 1 WL 5822630, at *3. 25 Se e generally De f. Carl Frede rick’ s Memorandum of Law in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 7. 26 Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 183–84 (Del. 2009); see also US Dominion v. Newsmax Media, Inc., 2022 WL 2208580, at *28 (Del. Super. June 16, 2022). 27 W illiford, 201 1 WL 5822630, at *3 n.47.

  1. For the fo reg oing reasons, Defendant Carl Frederick’ s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED; Defendant Carl Frederick’ s Motion to Strike is DEN IED; and Defendant Elizabeth Amb er Frederick’ s Motion to Strike i s DENIED. IT IS S O ORDER ED. /s/ Calvin Sc ott Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.

Source

Analysis generated by AI. Source diff and links are from the original.

Classification

Agency
Federal and State Courts
Filed
February 18th, 2026
Instrument
Enforcement
Legal weight
Binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Minor

Who this affects

Applies to
Consumers
Geographic scope
State (Delaware)

Taxonomy

Primary area
Consumer Finance
Operational domain
Legal
Topics
Mortgage Servicing Litigation

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