California Supreme Court Modifies Opinion on Free Speech Rights

1 Filed 1/21/26 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANG ELES POLIC E PROT ECTIVE L EAGUE, Plaintiff and Respo ndent, v. CITY OF L OS ANGEL ES et a l., Defendants and Ap pellants. S275272 Second Ap pellate D istrict, Divis ion Sev en B306321 Los Angel es Count y Superior Court BC6768283 ORDER MO DIFYING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION FOR REH EARING THE COURT: The majority opinion in this matter, filed on November 10, 2025, and a ppearing at 1 8 Cal.5th 970, is mod ified as fo llows: 1. The secon d to last sent ence of the first full paragraph on pag e 985, whic h begi ns, “In the wake of those decisi ons.. .,” is deleted i n its ent irety and r eplaced wit h the f ollowing: Prior to the issuance of those decisi ons, the City of Los Angeles (the City) had entered into a consent decree with the

2 federal governm ent that effectively barred it from requirin g complaina nts to sign the type o f advisory described in section 148.6(a)(2). 2. The first sentence of the second full paragraph on page 991, which begins, “Following those federal decisions.. .,” is deleted in its entirety an d replaced w ith the following: Before those cases were decid ed, the City h ad enter ed int o a cons ent d ecree with the federa l government th at prevented the City from enforcing the advisory require ment set f orth in section 148.6(a)(2). This modi fication d oes not af fect the j udgment. The petiti on for reh earing is d enied.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANG ELES POLIC E PROT ECTIVE L EAGUE, Plaintiff and Respo ndent, v. CITY OF L OS ANGEL ES et a l., Defendants and Ap pellants. S275272 Second Ap pellate D istrict, Divis ion Sev en B306321 Los Angel es Count y Superior C ourt BC676283 November 10, 2025 Justice Gro ban author ed the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Gue rrero and Jus tices Corri gan, Kruger, Evans, a nd Jenkins * concurr ed. Justice Liu filed a diss enting op inion. * Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, assigned by the Chief Justi ce pursuant to art icle VI, section 6 o f the California C onstitu tion.

1 LOS ANG ELES POLIC E PROT ECTIVE L EAGUE v. CITY OF LOS A NGELES S275272 Opinion of the Cou rt by Grob an, J. California requires law enforcement agencies to investigat e complaints against peace officers. (See Pen. Code, § 832.5, subd. (a)(1).) Pena l Code sect ion 148.6, subdivisi on (a) (section 148. 6(a)) 1 makes it a cr ime to fi le a knowi ngly false allegation of m isconduct against a peace officer. (See § 148.6, subd. (a)(1) [sectio n 148.6(a)(1) or subdivisi on (a)(1)].) The statute also mandates that before accepting a complain t, law enforcem ent agenci es must require the compla inant to re ad and sign an advis ory inf orming the c omplainant that filing a knowingly false compla int of polic e misconduct is a crime. (§ 148.6, subd. (a)(2) [section 148.6(a)(2) or subdi vision (a)(2)].) The issue presented in this case is whether section 148. 6 (a) ’s provisions violat e constitutiona l free speech rights. We conclude that they d o. This is not the first time we have cons idered this issue. I n People v. Stanistre et (2002) 29 Cal.4th 497 (Stanistre et), the defendants argued that section 148.6(a) violated the rule set forth in R. A. V. v. St. Paul (199 2) 505 U.S. 377 (R. A. V.), whic h generally requ ires that courts apply heightened scrutiny to regulations that discriminat e on the basis of content within a 1 Except where noted, all further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 2 proscribab le category o f speech. (See Stanistreet, at p. 507.) More specific ally, the defendants argued that heighte ned scrutiny was warrante d under R. A. V. because section 148.6(a) “appl[i ed] one defamation rule t o citizen complaints against peace officers, and a different rule to tho se made against other public o fficials. ” (Stanistree t, at p. 507.) We agr eed that section 148.6(a) constitut ed a content-b ased regulati on within a proscribab le categ ory of speech, whi ch we described as “ knowingl y false statements of fact.” (Stanistreet, at p. 508.) We conclude d, however, that the statute fell within various categories of content di scri mination within a proscribab le class that R. A. V. had recogniz ed as gener ally permiss ible. After Stanistreet was decided, m ultiple federal decisions rejected its analysis and held that section 148.6(a) violated the First Amendment. (See C haker v. Crogan (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 1215 (Chaker); Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino (C.D.Cal. 2004) 325 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1091 (Hami lton II); 2 accord Eakins v. Nevada (D.Nev. 2002) 219 F.Supp.2d 1113 (Eakins) [adopting Hamil ton I ’s reasoning in striking dow n Nevada statute making it a m isdemea nor to file knowingly false allegations of misc onduct against a peace offic er].) In the wake of those decisions, the C ity o f Los Angeles (the City) ent ered into a consent decree barr ing it from requiring complaina nts to sign 2 The district court issued two published opinions in the Hamilton matter, both of which are cited in this opinion. The first opinion denied the City of San Bernardino ’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to section 148.6(a) (see Hamil ton v. City of San Bernardin o (C.D.Cal. 200 0) 107 F.Su pp.2d 1239 (Hamilton I), while the second granted the plaintiff ’s motion for summary judgment on that claim (see Hamilton II, sup ra, 325 F.Supp.2d 1 087).

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 3 the advisory descri bed in section 148.6(a)(2). Th e consent decre e expired in 2013, but the City still does not requir e a signed advisory from comp lainants. In 2017, the Los Angeles Police Protective League (LAPPL) filed th e current action se eking an injuncti on that would require the City to comp ly with section 148.6(a)(2) ’s advisory requirement. Relying on the reasoning of the federal authorities cited above, the City argued that section 148.6(a) was an unconstitutiona l regulation of speech. T he trial court concluded it was bound by Stanistree t and enjoined the City from accept ing any complaint allegin g misconduct by a peace officer unless the compla inant h ad sign ed the advis ory required by section 148.6(a)(2). The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding (as the trial court had) that it was bound by Stanistreet. (See Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (2022) 78 Cal.Ap p.5th 1081, 1088.) As a result of the ruling, the City was ordered to advise complain ants that it was a crime to file a knowingly false cl aim o f misconduct against a peac e of ficer despite the fact that multiple federal decisions had found that criminal provision to be unconstit utional. The City petitioned for review, arguing that Chaker and other intervening federal decisions cast doubt on St anistreet ’s reasoning. We granted review. In the intervening years sinc e Stanistreet was decided, the United States Supreme Court has i ssued additional guidance on First Amendment issues that relate both to R. A. V. and, more generally, prohibitions on knowing fal seho ods. This new guidance compels us to reconsi der o ur decision in Stan istreet. In Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass ’n (200 7) 551 U.S. 177 (Davenport), the court discussed when speech restrictio ns that

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 4 fall outside “ ‘ the general prohibition ’ ” (id. at p. 188) on content- based regulati ons may nonetheless warrant hei ghtened constituti onal scrutiny. The c ourt’s analysis indicates that when content-based regulation occurs within a proscr ibable class, the key inquir y is whether the statute risks “impermiss ibly distort [ing ] the m arketplace of ideas” (id. at p. 189) by “ ‘ “ driv[ing] certain ideas or viewpoints ” ’ ” from the public sphere (i d. at p. 188; accord R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 387 – 388). And i n United States. v. Alvarez (2012) 567 U. S. 709 (Alvarez), the court announced for the first time that even well-intent ioned pr ohibitions o n know ing falseh oods can t rigger heightened constitution al scrutiny if they go too far in chilling protected speech. (See id. at p p. 709, 723, plur. opn. o f Kennedy, J. [crim inal statut e that targets “falsity and nothin g mor e” would risk “cast[ing] a chill [on speech that] the First Amendment cann ot permit” ]; id. at p. 736, conc. opn. of Breyer, J. [statute criminalizin g any knowingl y false claim o f receiving military award raised sufficient “ risk of chilling ” to warrant heightened scrutiny].) Most recently, in Free Speech Co alition, Inc. v. Paxton (2025) 60 6 U.S. 461 (Free Speech Coalition), the court held that content-based res trictions that re gulate unprotect ed speech are subject to heightened constitutiona l scrutiny if they have an “incidenta l burden” on protected speech. (Id. at p. 4 95; see id. at pp. 48 2 – 483.) 3 3 The United States Supreme Court decid ed Free Speech Coalition short ly after we held oral argument i n this matter. We vacated submissi on and di rected the parties to s ubmit supplement al briefing addressi ng the effect, if any, of Free Speech Coa lition on the issues her e.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 5 The fundam ental principl e we derive from these subsequent cas es, read in conjunct ion with R. A. V., is that when assessing a statute like section 148.6(a) — whi ch discriminates on the basis of content within a proscribable class of falsity (defamat ion) — courts must evaluate whether the risk of “ ‘ driv[in g] certa in ideas or viewpoints’ ” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387) from the public sphe re is so “inconsequ ential” (Davenport, supra, 5 51 U.S. at p. 188) that no furth er constituti onal scrutiny is warranted. Stated differently, courts should ask whether the content-based regulation of pr oscribab le speech is structured in such a m anne r that it either disfavors certain subjects or viewpoints (as in R. A. V.) or burdens protected forms of speech (as in A lvarez an d Free Speec h Coalition). 4 4 As discuss ed in more det ail bel ow, R. A. V. conc luded that the st atute at issue in that case ri sked driving out certa in viewpoints by criminaliz ing hate speech made in connection with certain topics (race, religion and gender), whi le leavin g unregulate d hate s peech perta ining to any other to pics (s uch as political affiliat ion or sexual orientation). Although the st atute did n ot burd en any form of protected speech (as all forms of hate speech are unprotect ed), the court reasoned that heightened scrutiny was warrante d because it imposed “special prohibitions on those speakers who express views o n disfavore d subjects.” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 391.) In this case, however, we focus not on whether section 148.6(a) im permiss ibly targets defamatory s peech on dis favored top ics, but rather wh ether the statute risks driving out certain viewpoints or ideas by regulating a subset of defamation in a manner that sufficient ly burdens protect ed speech s o as to warrant heighte ned scrutin y. (See Free Speech Coalit ion, supra, 606 U.S. at pp. 48 2 – 483; Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 709, 723, pl ur. o pn. of Kennedy, J.; id. at p. 736, c onc. opn. of Breyer, J.)

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 6 Applying those principles here, we conclude that sect ion 148.6(a)’s crimin al provision (§ 148.6(a)(1)) and its accompanying admonition requirement (§ 148.6(a)(2)) exhibit numerous char acteristics that, consid ered together, suffici ently burden a protect ed f orm of speech — namely, truthfu l (or at least well-intent ioned) complaints of police m isconduct — so as to warrant heightened constitut ional scrutiny. Those features include: (1) singling out for cr iminal treatmen t knowing ly false allegations of misconduct that are filed against a cat egory of governm ent offici al whose job duties are of particu lar conc ern t o the public; (2) asy mmetrica lly cri minalizing knowingly false allegations that are f iled against law enforcement, while leaving unregulate d false statements that w itnesses might make in support of law enforcement during the course of the ensuing investigat ion that i s required under section 832.5; (3) barring law enforce ment from accepting a formal complaint of police misconduct unless complainants agree to read and sign an admonition warning th at they c an be cri minally prosecuted if their claims are disbeliev ed; (4) providing complain ants ill- defined and inconsistent descr iptions of what specific types of false statements might trigger criminal liability; and (5) failing to r equire that the statements actually be m aterial to an actionable type of misconduct or th at they cause any harm to the falsely accused. (See post, at pp. 38 – 48.) While we express no view whether any of these elemen ts might unduly burde n speech when considered in isolatio n, we think it clear that, consider ed togeth er, they “threaten censorship of ideas” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 393) by deterring citizens f rom filing truthful (or at least not knowingly false) complai nts of police misc onduct.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 7 There is still a question under United States Supreme Court jurisprudence as to whether strict or intermed iate scrutiny shoul d apply to a content-bas ed regulation like sect ion 148.6(a), which discri minates within a proscribable cl ass of knowing falsehoods (defamati on) in a manner that incidentall y burdens prot ected speech. (Compar e R. A. V., supra, 505 U. S. at p. 395 [applying strict scrutiny to a viewpoi nt -based regulation that discriminated within a proscribable class of speech] with Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at pp. 482 – 483 [content- based restrictions that regulate unprotected speech but incidental ly burden protected speech are subject to intermedia te scrutiny]; c ompare Alvarez, supr a, 567 U.S. at p. 72 4, plur. opn. of Kenned y, J. [certain f orms of regulati ons on false stat ements of fact should be subject to strict scrutiny] with id. at p p. 73 0 – 731, conc. opn. of Breyer, J. [restrictio ns on false statements of fact should generally be reviewed under intermedia te scrutiny].) For th e purp oses of this c ase, h owever, we nee d not resolv e tha t question be caus e we conc lude that section 148.6 (a) cannot survive even the less exacting standard of i nterm ediate scrutiny, which requir es that “ a law must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern mental interest. ’ ” (Packin gham v. North Caro lina (2017) 582 U.S. 98, 105 – 106 (Pack ingham).) Applying that tes t here, we c onclude that whil e the Legislatur e had a legitimat e and significant interest in remedying the harmful effects of abusive false claims of police misconduct, section 148.6(a) is not narrowl y tailor ed to meet those object ives. Instead, the statut e establish es an ill-def ined, asymmetric al criminal provision (see § 148.6(a)(1)) that is accompani ed by an un usual admonition r equirement. Considered together, those elements “creat e [] a po tent

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 8 disincent ive for citizens to file ” even well -inte ntioned comp laints of police m iscondu ct. (Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Sup p. 2d at p. 1094.) T hus, while we reaffirm Stanistreet ’s conclusio n that the Legislat ure is authorize d to take steps to pr otect the integrity of the peace officer complaint pro cess (see Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 510), we part ways wi th Stanist reet by now concludin g that, as presently drafted, section 148.6(a) “ ‘ burdens substan tially more sp eech than is necess ary to further the governm ent’s legitimate interests.’ ” (Packin gham, supra, 582 U.S. at p. 105 [descr ibing int ermediat e scrutin y standard].) I. B ACKGROUN D A. Regulation of Co mplaints Against Peac e Officers Section 832.5 requires “[e]ach department. . . that employs peace officers ” to “ establish a procedure to investigat e complaints by members of the public against the pers onnel o f these departments . . . , and. . . [to] make a written description of the procedure availab le to the public.” (§ 832.5, subd. (a)(1).) The statute furth er requires th at “[c]omplaints and any reports or find ings re lating to th ese c omplaints ... shall b e r etained f or a period of no less than 5 years.” (Id., subd. (b).) Complaints “that are determined.. . to be frivolous,. . . or unfounded or exonerat ed” are not to b e retained in the officer’s genera l personne l file (id., subd. (c)) and “shall not [be] use[d].. . for punitive or promoti onal purp oses” (id., subd. (c)(2)). The Penal Code provision at issue in this case, section 148.6(a), makes it a misdemeanor for any person to “file[] any allegation of misconduct against any peace officer.. . knowing the allegat ion to be false.” (§ 148.6(a)(1).) The statute

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 9 separately prov ides that a ny law enforcem ent agency accepting an allegation of misconduct against a peace officer “shall require the complaina nt to read and sign” an advisory explaining that California pr ovides citizens “th e right to m ake a complain t against a police officer for any improper police conduct” and requires law enf orcement agenc ies to investigat e such complaints. (§ 148.6(a)(2), all caps and boldface omitted.) The admonition goes on to warn the complainant that “ it is against the law to m ake a complaint that you know to be false. If you make a complaint against an officer kn owing th at it is false, you can be prosecuted. ...” (Ibid., all caps and boldface omitted.) The statut e further mandates tha t the ad visory sha ll be w ritten in all capita l letters and boldface. (Ibid.) 5 5 Section 148.6(a)(2) req uires that the admonition include the followin g langu age: “ YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINS T A PO LICE OFFICER FOR ANY IMPROPER POLICE CONDUCT. CALIFORNIA LAW REQUIR ES THIS AGEN CY TO HAVE A PROCEDUR E T O INVESTIGA TE CIVI LIAN ’ COMP LAINTS. Y OU HAV E A RIGHT TO A WRITTEN DESCRIPTION OF THIS PROCEDUR E. THIS AG ENCY MAY FIN D AFTER INVESTIGA TION THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENC E TO WA RRANT AC TION ON YOUR COMPLAI NT; EVEN IF T HAT IS THE CASE, YOU HAVE THE RIGH T TO MAKE THE COMPLAINT AND HAVE IT INVESTIGA TED IF YOU BELIE VE AN OF FICER BEHAVED IMPROP ERLY. CI VILIAN COM PLAINTS AND ANY REPORTS OR FINDINGS RELATE D T O COMPLAI NTS MUST BE RETAIN ED BY THIS AGENCY FOR AT LEAST FIVE YEARS. [¶] IT IS AGAINST THE

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 10 Prior to section 148.6(a) ’s enactment, a different statute “made (and still makes) it a misdemeanor to report a felony or misdemean or knowing the report to be false. (§ 14 8.5.) However,. .. courts had interprete d section 148.5 as not applying to complai nts of police misconduct from members of the public. [Citations.] The Legisl ature enacted section 148.6 to f ill this gap.” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 502.) Section 148.6(a), howev er, “ does not merely extend section 148.5’s protection to pea ce officers. Section 148.5 applies only to knowingly false r eports ‘ that a felony or misdemean or has been committed, ’ i.e., to reports o f a cr iminal offense. By contrast, section 148.6 applies to all ‘citizens’ complaints of police misconduct duri ng the perfor mance of an offic er’s duties that may or may n ot rise to th e lev el of a cri minal offense.’ ” (Stanistreet, at p. 503.) The legislative materials accompanying the assembly bill that added section 148.6(a) explained that “[s]ince the Rodney King incident in March 1991, law enforce ment agencies throughou t the state have revised their citizen complaint procedures to promot e greater accountability on the part of their line officers. [¶].. . [One] glaringly negative side-effect which has result ed has been the willingness on the part of many of our less ethical citizens to m aliciousl y file false alle gations of misconduct a gainst officers in an effort to punish them f or simply doing their j obs. [¶] Unfortun ately for th e officers, these complaina nts usually become a permanent part of their LAW TO MAKE A COMPLAI NT THAT YO U KNOW T O BE FALSE. IF YOU MAKE A COMP LAINT AGAINST AN OFFICER KNOW ING T HA T IT IS FALSE, YOU CAN BE PROSECUT ED ON A MISDEME ANOR CH ARGE.”

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 11 personne l jackets. . .. [M]ost of the officers find they have very little recourse against the co mplaints. ” 6 (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Ass em. B ill No. 1732 (1995 – 1996 Re g. Sess.) April 18, 1995, at p. 1 (Asse m. Com. on Public Safet y Analysis); see Stanistree t, supra, 29 Cal.4 th at pp. 502 – 503.) The arguments in favor of th e bil l si milarly explained that section 148.6(a) would “finally address[] the issue of knowingly making false allega tions of misconduct aga inst any peace officer. These false accusations can adversely affect the officer’s position within the Depart ment, and this legislation will discourage such false reports. [¶]. . . [¶] Yearly hundreds of unfound ed and false complaints are filed against Peace Officers. In the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Depart ment alone, over 500 compla ints were received of which approximate ly 6 0 t o 70% w ere unf ounded. [¶] This bill wi ll help prev ent frivol ous compla ints which can affec t the ind ividua l offic er’s future. For example, a Deputy Sheriff on a list for promot ion to Sergeant receives a false rep ort of misconduct, after which his promoti on is d eferred until th e matter is resolved. Aft er which, the complaint being found un found ed, the Deputy has no recourse for any financial loss due 6 The leg islative history of section 148.6(a) does not e xplain how law e nforcem ent agencies had “ revis ed their citizen complaint procedures to promote grea ter accountabilit y on the part of their line officers.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety Analysis, supra, at p. 1.) Whatever the nature of the revisions, it appears that such changes wer e not compelled by section 832.5. That statute was originally passed in 19 74 and remain ed in its orig inal for m when section 1 48.6(a) was enacted.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 12 to th e d elay.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety Analysis, supra, at p. 2.) Although not mentioned in the reports before the Legislatur e, sever al enroll ed bill reports stated that section 148.6(a) wou ld also save “dep art ment resourc es and time by no t having to investi gate unfoun ded complaints. ” (Dep. of Forestry and Fire Protection, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1732 (1995 – 1996 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 8, 1995, p. 1; see Dep. Parks and Recreation, Enrolled B ill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1732 (1995 – 1996 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 8, 1995, p. 1; Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, En rolled Bill R ep. on Assem. Bill No. 1732 (1995 – 1996 Reg. S ess.) Sept. 8, 1995, p. 2.) B. Procedural H istory As discussed in more detail below, in Stanistree t, supra, 29 Cal.4th 497, w e rul ed that section 148.6(a) d id not vi olate the First Amendment because it fell within each of the categor ies that R. A. V. had identified as permissible forms of content - based regulatio n within a proscribable categor y of speech. Two years after we decided Stanistree t, a federal district court expressly r ejected our analysis and h eld that secti on 148.6(a) “does not come within the... R. A. V. categories of permiss ible content- bas ed subclass regula tion” and was thus “unconst itutional in v iolation of t he F irst Amendment.” (Hamilton II, supr a, 325 F.Sup p.2d at p. 1091; acco rd Eakin s, supra, 219 F.Sup p.2d 1113.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circu it short ly follo wed suit, reasoning that secti on 1 48.6(a)(1) unlaw fully disc riminated on th e b asis of viewpoint by crimina lizing knowingly fals e speech that is critical of police o fficers while leavin g unregulated knowingl y false speech that is supportive o f police officers. (See Chaker,

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 13 supra, 4 28 F.3d at p. 1227 [“ The imbalanc e gen erated by s ection 148.6 — i.e., only individuals critical of peace officers are subject to liabilit y and n ot those who are supp ortive —. .. turns the First Amen dment on its head”].) Following those federal decisi ons, the City entered into a consent decree with the federal government that prevented the City from enforcing the advisory require ment set f orth in section 148.6(a)(2). After the decree expired i n 2013, the City — presumab ly concer ned about Chaker ’s holding that section 148.6 (a)(1)’s cri minal provision was unconstitut ional — continued not to comply with the admonition requiremen t. In 2017, the LAPPL filed the current action against the City, which seeks an injuncti on requirin g i t to comply with section 148.6(a)(2) ’s advisory requirem ent. Co ncludin g that it was bound by Stanistreet, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the LAPPL and enjoined the City f rom accepting any complaint alleging misconduc t by a pe ace officer unles s the complaina nt has signed the adviso ry described in section 148.6(a)(2). The Co urt of App eal affirmed. We grant ed review. II. D ISCUSSION The City argues that Chaker, supra, 428 F.3d 1215, and other interven ing federal author iti es cast doubt on the continuin g validity of St anistreet. 7 As discussed below, while we apply different reasoning than the Chaker court, we ag ree that 7 In challengin g the constituti onality of section 148.6(a), the City appears to rely solely on the free speech clause set fo rth in the First Amendment of the federal Constitution; it has not raised any argu ment t hat t he Califor nia Co nstitution provides a separate basis of relief.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 14 subsequent developments in the law warrant a reconsi deration of our h olding in St anistreet. A. Relevant C ase Law In order to u nderstand the complex First Amendment issues present ed in this case, it is necessary to review th e s eries of cases th at preceded th e challeng e before us. 1. R. A. V. v. C ity of S t. Paul In R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. 37 7, the Supr eme Cour t consider ed a constitutiona l challenge to a City of St. Paul ordinanc e that made it a crime to display a symbol “ ‘ which one knows or has reas onable gr ounds to know ar ouses an ger, alar m or res entment in ot hers on the bas is of race, color, creed, religion or gender. ’ ” (Id. at p. 380, italics a dded.) The Minneso ta Supreme Court had previously construe d the ordinance as reaching only “fighting words,” a well-establis hed category of unprotect ed speech. In its analysis, the Supreme Court accepted the state court’s concl usion that the statute only reached speech that amounted to fight ing words. The cour t explained, however, that even those “limited” categories of speech that m ay be subjected to r egulation (fighting words, defamati on, obscenity, fraud, etc.) are not “ entirely invisib le to th e Const itution.” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 38 3.) R. A. V. established a general rule that “while certain categories of speech. .. may be regulated, such regulation may not discriminate within that category on th e basis of content.” (Stanistreet, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 507.) Thus, for example, “the government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further cont ent disc rimination of pr oscribing only libel cri tical of the govern ment.” (R. A. V., at p. 384.)

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 15 Critically, however, the court went on to explain that the First Amendment’s general prohi bition against content discriminat ion “ app lies differ ently in the context of proscriba ble speech than in the area of fully protected speech.” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387.) According to the court, while the “ rationale of the general prohibition. .. is that content discriminat ion ‘ raises the specter that the Governm ent may effectivel y drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplac e, ’ [cita tions]. .. content di scrimin ation among various instances of a class of proscr ibable speech often does not pose this threat. ” (Id. at pp. 387 – 38 8.) The court next describ ed some categories o f content discriminat ion within a proscribabl e class of speech that generally do not threaten to drive viewpoints fro m the public sphere. The first of thos e categories is “ [w]hen the b asis for th e content discriminati on consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable. ” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 388.) Providing illustrations of regulations that might f all within this category, the c ourt explained that “[a] State might choose to prohibit only that o bscenit y which is the most patently offensive in its prurience — i.e., that which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not prohib it, for example, o nly that o bscenit y which includes offensive politic al messa ges. [Citation.] And the Federal Govern ment can cr iminaliz e only thos e threats of violence that are direct ed against the Presid ent [citatio n] — since the reasons why threats of violenc e are outside the First Amendment (protecting individua ls from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibilit y

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 16 that the thr eatened violence w ill occur) have special f orce when applied to th e pers on of the P resident. ” (I bi d.) Second, citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (1986) 475 U.S. 41, 48 (Renton), the court expla ined th at cont ent-bas ed regulations within a proscribable category of speech are generally “valid ” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 390) when the regulation is “a imed only at th e ‘secondary e ffects’ of th e speech” (id. at p. 394). The court noted, for example, that a state could “permit all obscene live pe rform ances except those involving minors.” (Id. at p. 389.) Finally, the court recognized a “more general exception for content d iscrimina tion that does not threat en censors hip of ideas.” (R. A. V., supra, 5 05 U.S. at p. 393.) A s explained by t he court, “ Where totally pro scribab le speech is at issu e,” there need not be any speci fic “ ‘neutral’ basis [to justify the regulation] so long as the nature of the conten t discrimin ation is such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppress ion of ideas is afoot. (We cannot think of any First Amendment interest that would st and in th e way of a Stat e’s proh ibiting onl y those obscene motion pictures w ith blue-eyed actress es).” (Id. at p. 390.) Having laid out the general principl es applic able to content-bas ed regulations within a proscribab le category of speech, the court concluded that the statute under review was impermiss ible becaus e i t created a special proh ibition on hate speech that insults or provokes violence “ ‘ on the basis of race, color, [or ] creed, ’ ” while permitting symb ols that are intended to express host ility for other reasons, such as “political affiliation, u nion memb ership, or h omosexual ity. ” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 391.) The court further conclud ed th at the

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 17 prohibiti on went “even beyond m ere content discriminati on, to actual viewpo int discriminat ion. Displays con taining som e words — odious racial epithets, for example — would be prohibited to proponents of all views. But ‘fighting words’ that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender. . . wou ld . . . be usabl e ad libitu m.” (Ibid.) The court next addressed why the statute did not fall within any of th e three cate gories of generally permiss ible content-bas ed regulati ons it had describ ed earlier in the opinion. Turning to the first category — “content discrimination based on the very reasons why the particular class of speech at issue . . . is proscribable ” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 393) — the court explained that fighting word s are excluded from First Amendment prote ction because their “co ntent embodies a particular ly intolerable.. . mode of expr essing what ever idea the speaker w ishes to conv ey” (ibid., italics o mitted). The court reasoned, h owever, that the ord inance at issue had “n ot singled out an especially offensive mode of expr ession. . .. Rather, it has proscribed fighting words of whatever manner that communica te messages of racial, ge nder, or religious intoleranc e.” (Id. at pp. 393 – 394.) The court als o concluded the ord inance did n ot fall withi n the exception for cont ent discrimina tion “a imed only at the ‘secondary effects’ of the speech. ” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 394.) St. Paul had arg ued th is exception w as applicable because the i ntent o f the ordinance was not to limit the speech rights of the acc used, but rather to pr otect “ ‘particularly vulnerabl e’ ” groups that had ‘ ‘ historically. . . been discriminat ed against.’ ” (Ibi d.) The court disagreed, explainin g that “ ‘[t]he emotive impact of sp eech on its audience is not a

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 18 “ secondary effect. ” ’ ” (Ibi d.) The court likewise concluded that the “ general exception ” (id. at p. 393) for restr ictions that are “beyond the suspicion o f official suppression of ideas” (id. at p. 395) was clearly inapplicable be caus e St. Paul had expressly argued that th e intent of the statute was to suppres s ide as expresse d against spec ific class es of pers ons. Having found that the ordinance was an impermissi ble content-bas ed regu lation on h ate spe ech becaus e its app lication turned on the viewp oint of the speaker, the court went on to apply strict sc rutiny and found the st atute unc onstituti onal. 2. People v. Stan istreet In Stanistre et, supra, 29 Cal.4t h 497, the defendants challenged their convictions under section 1 48.6(a)(1), contending that the statute violated R. A. V. ’s rule agains t content-bas ed regulati ons within proscribable categories of speech. The defendan ts argued that while California was permitted to ban all defamatory statements made against public officials (or at least those that m eet the hei ghtened mens rea requirem ent of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 (New York Times)), the state was not permitted to “apply one defam ation rul e to citizen complaints against p eace o fficers, and a diff erent rule to those m ade against o ther public officials.” (Stanistreet, at p. 507.) We agreed with the d efendants that secti on 148.6(a) ’s distinct tre atment o f compla ints against peace officers versus complaints against other public o fficials qualified as a content- based regulation within a proscribab le category of speech, which we describ ed as “knowingly false statements of f act. ” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 50 8.) We further held,

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 19 however, that th e s tatute f ell w ithin each of the thr ee cat egories of conten t-based r egulations of pr oscribable speech that R. A. V. identifi ed as generally n ot posin g an y threat to th e marketplac e of ideas. Applying the first category — “ ‘[w]hen the basis for the content discriminati on consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue i s proscribable ’ ” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 508) — we reiterated that the relevant “ [proscribabl e] class of speech at issue ” was “ know ingly false statements of fact.” (Ibid.) Relying on R. A. V. ’s example that “ ‘ the reasons why t hreats of viol ence are [prosc ribable].. . have special forc e when applied to the President ’ ” (ibid.), w e concluded that the reason false statemen ts are generally proscribab le likewise “has ‘sp ecial force’ [cit ation] when a pplied to false accusat ions aga inst pe ace of ficers. When a person makes a com plaint against a peace officer of the type that section 148.6 governs, the agency receiving the complaint i s legally o bligated to investigate it and to reta in the compla int and resulting rep orts or findings for at least five years. (§ 832.5.) Thus, the potential harm of a know ingly false statement is greater h ere than i n other situat ions. ” (I bi d., italics omitted.) We also found section 148.6(a) valid under R. A. V. ’s second ca tegory of generally permissibl e forms of regula tions, reasonin g that false accus ations against peace officers ha ve “substantial s econdary e ffect s — they tri gger mandat ory investigat ion and record retention require ments ” that compel law enforc ement agencies to expend “[p] ublic resources . .. that could otherwis e be used for o ther matters. ” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 509.) We further noted that once triggered, those mandatory requirements could “ adversely affect the

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 20 accused peace officer’s career, at least until the investigati on is complete.” (Ibid.) Finally, we held that the statute was valid under R. A. V. ’s general “ catchall exception, ” concluding there was “no realistic possibility” (Stanistre et, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 509) that section 148.6(a) ’s criminal ization of k nowingl y fals e c omplaints against police was meant to suppress any particular idea or viewpo int. Rejectin g the Court of A ppeal’s concl usion that the law might operate “ ‘ to suppress.. . citizen complaints of police misconduct, ’ ” we explained that “[t]he Leg islature i s not suppressin g all com plaints of police misconduct, only kn owingly false ones.” (Stanistreet, at p. 509.) We further noted that rather than disfavoring police complaints, the Legislature had in many respects “ favo red ” such speech by requirin g their investigat ion. (Id. at p. 510.) We explained that “ [t]he Legislatur e may elevat e the status of a category of complaints ” by mandating that they be i nvesti gated and that the records of the investigation be ret ained, “ and at the same time pe nalize those ” who choos e to file a kn owingly false comp laint after having rece ived an admonition explain ing that their al legations would trigger an investigation under California law. (Ibid.) “ N o one has a constitutional right to make a complaint of misconduct knowing b oth that the c omplaint must be in vestigated an d that it is false. ” (I bi d.) In a concurring opinion, Justice Werdega r (joined by Justice Moreno) agreed that section 148.6(a) was constit utional under R. A. V. ’s second ary effects category of regu lation bu t disagreed that either of the other two categories applied. As to the first R. AV. category, the c oncurrence defined the relevant “class of speech at issue” as “ defamati on,” which i s generally

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 21 subject to regulation because defamatory statements “ may injure personal reputat ions withou t making any positiv e contribution to the dem ocratic proce ss.” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 513, conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.) The concu rrence reasoned that “section 1 48.6 do es not target s peech that i s especially worthles s o r especial ly injurious to reputat ion. . . . [N]othing about false speech affecting peace officers. .. distinguis hes it from false speech affectin g other governmenta l officials with res pect to the grounds on whi ch defa mation i s proscribab le in the first place.” (Ibid.) The concurr ence also rejected the m ajority’s application of the “ catchall ” exception, e xplainin g that the Legislature had created a special crime that applies only to allegations against peace officers while simultane ously creating a “unique. .. mandate” that “prospect ive co mplainants” be warned of the “possibilit y of criminal sanctions.” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 513, conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.) Justice Werdegar explained that, “[r]ealistica lly,” these features of the law would cause “ some complainants. . . to choose not to go forward — e ven when th ey have legiti mate complaints.” (Id. at p. 514.) 3. Cases dec ided aft er Stanistre et Since Stanistreet was decided, sever al federal decision s have weighed in either specifically on the constitutional ity of section 148.6(a) o r more genera lly o n issues that relate to the analysis in R. A. V. and S tanistreet.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 22 a. Federal cases finding se ction 148.6(a) unconstit ut ional In Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d 1087, a plaintiff brought a federal civil rights action against the City of San Bernardino arising out of his interactions with law enforcement. (See Hamilton I, supra, 107 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1240 – 1241.) The plaintiff, a Black man, alleg ed that he had been unlawfu lly stopped on his bicy cle a nd was th en h andcuffed and beat en. He was taken into c ustody and lat er released with a ci tation for not having a bi cycle license. The plaintiff later returned to the police to lo dge a citizen ’ s complaint. Accord ing to th e complaint, the watch commander questioned his story and orally advised the plaintiff that he could be prosecuted for knowingly filing a false complaint and provided a copy of the written admonition required under section 148.6(a)(2). After receiving thos e warnings, the pl ainti ff chose not to f ile a compla int. The plaintiff subsequen tly filed a civil rights complaint against the police depart ment that included a claim alleging section 148.6(a) w as unconstitut ional. The district court granted the plaintif f summary judgment on his challen ge to section 148.6(a), concluding that Stanistree t had err ed in finding that the statute fe ll with in the categories of generally permissibl e content-based regulations of proscribable speech described in R. A. V. Regar ding the first category, the court rejected Stanistree t ’s rational e that “the reasons for proscribin g defamation have specia l force when applied to law enforcem ent offic ers” because false complai nts trigg er investigat ion requirements that might result in “great er harm to law enforcement officers than to other groups of persons.” (Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1091.) Echoing Justice

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 23 Werdega r’s concurrenc e in Stanistree t, the court found that the state had fai led t o s how there was anyt hing “ ‘about the p osition of a peace officer [that] is inherently ti ed to the polic ies underlying the law o f defamation, as comp ared to the position of other gover nment officers. ’ ” (Hamilt on I, supra, 107 F.Supp.2 d at p. 1246.) The court explained that, i n fact, “ [p]ublic officials are generally entitled to less protection from defama tory statements since they hold positions of prom inence.” (Hamilto n II, at p. 109 2, italic s added.) Regarding the “secondary effects” exception, the court concluded that “ even if [Califo rnia] w as partly mot ivated by the desire to curb the harmful effects of wast ed inves tigativ e resources and damage to officers’ reputation,. .. these motives focus on the direct impact of the speech, not its ‘secondar y’ effects. ” (Hamilt on II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1093.) Because section 148.6(a) “ is justifi ed o nly by reference to the content of the speech. . ., the ‘secondary effects’ doctrine” does not apply. (Id. at p. 1093.) Finally, the court rejected Stanistreet’s conclusio n that “ ‘ the natur e of the content di scrimi nation is such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot. ’ ” (Hami lton II, supra, 325 F.Supp. 2d at p. 109 0.) According to the court, section 148.6(a) ’s criminal provision, combined with its “mandat[e] that an individual wishin g to register a complaint. .. first receive the sobering forewarnin g that she or he can be crimina lly pro secuted for making a knowingly false complaint against an officer ” (id. at p. 1094), were “high[ly] li ke [ly ] [to ]. .. cause individuals to refrain from filing a co mplaint aga inst law enforc ement of fi cers” (ibid.).

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 24 Shortly after Hamilton II was decided, the Ninth Circuit held that section 148.6(a)(1) ’s crimin al provisi on violated the First Amend ment. (See Chaker, supra, 428 F.3d 1215.) Unlike Stanistree t, the court did not focus o n the fact that s ection 148.6(a) treats misconduct claims made agai nst peace officers different ly than compla ints made against other types of public officials. Instead, Chaker concluded that the statute “discriminat es o n t he bas is of a spea ker’s viewpoint” (Chaker, at p. 1217) by “ holding. . . citizen complainants accountable for their knowing falseh oods, while leaving unregulat ed the knowingly false speech of a peace officer or witness.” (Id. at p. 1226.) T he court observ ed that the s tate’s “asserted interest” (ibid.) in passing section 148.6(a) — to save valuable public resources and maintain integrity in the compla int process — was undermined by “its choice to prohibit o nly the knowingl y false sp eech of those citizens who compla in of pea ce officer conduct.” (Chaker, at p. 1226.) b. First Amend ment d ecisions i mplicatin g issues related t o R. A. V. and Stan istreet In Davenpor t, supra, 551 U.S. 177, a union filed a free speech challeng e to a state l aw that placed certain restrictions on pub lic empl oyee unions’ ability to sp end fees that they collect from employees who are not union members but who are represent ed by the union in collect ive bargaining. The law a t issue required the unions to obtain af firmativ e consent from nonunion member s before using their funds for election-rel ated expenditur es but permitt ed the union to expend nonme mber fees for other purposes without obtaining such cons ent. The union argued that by placing restr ictions on expend itures related to elections but not fo r other purposes, the statute

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 25 effectivel y imposed a content-based regulation that must be evaluated u nder st rict scrutin y. The court agreed that the statut e c onstituted a c ontent- based regulat ion and that such regulations are gener ally treated as “ presumptiv ely invalid. ” (Daven port, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 188.) Quoting R. A. V., the court explained that “ ‘ [t]he rationale of the general prohibiti on ’ ” on conten t-based discriminat ion is that such regulations “ ‘ “ raise [] the specter that the G overnment may effec tively driv e certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace. ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 188.) The court further explained, however, that its prior cases had “ identified numerous situation s in which that r isk i s inc onsequent ial ... so that. . . strict scrutiny is unwarran ted. ” (Ibid.) As an exampl e, the court again cited R. A. V., explaining that “content discriminat ion among various instances of a class of proscribab le s peech does not pos e a threat to th e marketplace of ideas when the selected subclass is chosen for the very reason that the entire class can be proscribe d.” (Ibid.) The court then applied thos e general principles to the statute before it, concludin g that placing a “reasonab le” and “vi ewpoint -neu tral limitation” on the manner in which nonunion members ’ fees could be expe nded did not “ impermissibl y distor t [] the marketplac e of id eas. ” (Id. at p. 189.) Notably, in disc ussing R. A. V. and other First Amendment decisions addressing situations where content-based regulations are generally permissibl e, the court focus ed o n the minimal risk th at thos e forms of regulations posed to suppressi ng certain ideas or viewpoints, not on whether the government was in fact attemptin g to suppress su ch speech.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 26 I n Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. 709, th e Supreme Court consider ed a First Amendment challenge to “The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 ” (the Stolen Val or Act or th e Act), a federal law that made it a crime to falsely represe nt having been awarded the Congress ional Medal of Honor. Although six justices found the law to violate the First Amendmen t, no opinion secured a majority. The four-vote plurality opinion began i ts analysis by rejecting the government’s contention that false stateme nts of fact consti tute a gener al categor y of spe ech that lack First Amendment pr otection. (See Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 722, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J. [“The Governme nt has no t demonstrat ed that false stat ements g enerally sh ould constitut e a new category of unprotecte d speech”].) While acknowledg ing that prior opini ons contained langua ge that could be rea d to support that conclu sion, the plurality cla rified that those cases involved false state ments that were associated with a “legally cognizab le harm” such as defamation or fraud. (Id. at p. 719.) In contrast, the plurality reasoned, the A ct extended cri minal liability to false claims regarding military medals, no matter the context in which they were made and regardless o f wheth er they had caused harm. (Id. at pp. 722 – 723.) Although the plurality concluded that the Act further ed a legitima te state interest — “protecting the i ntegr ity of the military honors system” (id. at p. 725) — it explained that approving a criminal statute that target ed “falsit y and no thing more” (id. at p. 719) would risk “cast[ing] a chill. . . [on speech that] the First Amendment cannot pe rmit ” (id. at p. 723). According to the pl urality, because the Act “conflict [ed] with free speech principles ” it was subject to strict scrutiny and c ould not satis fy that “exacting ”

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 27 level o f review because th ere were less speech-det erring ways to address th e state’s int erests. (Id. at p. 724.) In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer (joined by Justice Kagan) likewise rejected the govern ment’s theory that “f alse factual statem ents” are entitled to “ ‘no [constitu tional] protection at all. ’ ” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 732, conc. opn. of Breyer, J., at p p. 732, 733.) Unlike the pluralit y, however, the concurrence conclu ded that when evaluating a regulation of “false statements about easily verifiable facts” (id. at p. 732), courts shoul d apply interm ediate scrut iny, asking whether “the statute works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justificati ons” (id. at p. 730). In applying that test, the concurrence note d that the Act lacked any of the “limiting features ” (id. at p. 736) that were evident in numerous other prohibiti ons on falsity the court had previously endorsed. Thos e limitations i nclude d, for example, “requiring proof of specific harm to identif iable victims ” or limiti ng th e re ach of the statut e to statements made in “ contexts in which a tangible harm to others is especially likely to occur. ” (Id. at p. 734.) In contrast, the Act’s broad prohibition on any knowing false claims about being a meda l recip ient “cr eate [d] a signif icant risk o f First Amendment har m” by (among other things) broadly applying t o contexts in which the falsity would be unlikely to cause harm, inviting selective prosecutions on the part of the government and “ chilling. . . [speakers who] might still be worried about being prosecut ed for a careless false statement.” (Id. at p. 736, italics omitted.) The concurrence ultimat ely concluded that while the Act had laudable objectives, it could not pass intermed iate scrutiny becaus e t he governmen t had failed to

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 28 show “why a more fine ly tailored statute woul d not” satisfy those goals. (Id. a t p. 739.) Finally, in Free Speech Coalit ion, supra, 606 U.S. 409, the court addressed the constitut ionality of a state law requiring “ commerci al websites that publish sexually explicit content to verify the ages of their visitors.” (Id. at p. 46 2.) The state argued that the law was only subjec t to “ rational-b asis review ” (id. at p. 477) because it regulated an unprotect ed form of speech, namely “ speech that is obsce ne to m inors ” (id. at p. 482). While the court agreed that the statute did not “directly regulate. .. protected speech” (ib id.), it concluded that heightened scrutiny was nonetheless warranted because the age verification statute had a n “ incident al burden ” on p rotecte d speech, namely “a dult[s ’ ]. .. right to access speech that is obscene on ly to min ors ” (id. at p. 495, i talics added). The court went on to hold that intermediat e scrutiny was the appropriat e standard of review for laws that “ directly regulate[] unprotected activity. . . while only incidentally burdenin g protected activity.” (Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S at p. 492.) The more “unforgiving” strict scrutin y standard, the court explained, is reserved for re stricti ons that “direct [ly ] target []. .. fully protec ted speech.” (Id. at p. 484.) According to the court, while not as exacting as strict scrutiny, intermed iate scrutiny no nethe less “plays an important role in ensuring ” that statutes with an “o stensibl y legitimate purpose [] ” are not structured in a manner that threatens to “suppress fundamental rights.” (Id. at p. 495.) The court explained for example, that while merely requiring an adult to verify their age throu gh a routine credit-card transacti on was

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 29 permissibl e, the state could not “req uire as proof of age an ‘affidavit’ from the ind ividual’s ‘bio logical pare nt.’ ” (Ibid.) B. Is There an Adequate Basis to Re consider Stanistreet? Before addressing the merits of the parties ’ arguments regarding section 148.6(a), we first address whether there are appropriate grounds to rec onsider our holding in Stanistree t, supra, 29 Cal.4th 497, given the doctrine of stare decisis. 8 (See Moradi-Sha lal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 296 [stare decisis requir es that “ prior applicable precedent usually must be followe d even though the case, if considere d anew, might be decided differentl y by the current justices ”].) For the reasons explained below, w e conclude th at a re-exa mination is w arranted. W hile we do not “lightly” depart from past precedents, stare decisis nonethel ess remains a “ ‘ a flexible [policy]. ’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 89 6, 924.) “[R]eexamin ation of precedent m ay be com e necessary when subsequent developments indicate an e arlier de cision was unsound, or has become ripe fo r recon sideration.” (In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal. 4th 12 8, 13 3.) “ ‘This is espec ially s o wh en [the issues und er consideration]... relate[] to “matter[s] of continuin g conce rn” to th e co mmunit y at large.’ ” (Mor adi- Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 296.) 8 Although the LAPP L has not raised any arguments directly predicate d on the stare decisis effect of Stanistreet, we nonethel ess think it appropriate to address this “ fundament al jurisprudenti al policy.” (Moradi-Shala l v. Fireman ’ s Fund Ins. Co mpanies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296 (Moradi-Sha lal).)

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 30 Those factors are clearly implicated he re. We are presente d wi th a constitutional question regarding the validity of a statute that implicates a subject — “ ‘[c]riticism of pub lic officials[— that] lies at the v ery core of sp eech protecte d by the First Amendment.’ ” (Green v. City of St. Louis (8th Cir. 2022) 52 F.4th 734, 739 (Green); accord Hernandez v. City o f Phoenix (9th Cir. 2022) 43 F.4th 966, 981.) What restric tions, and in particular what criminal restricti ons, our government may place on speech relat ed to the misconduct of police officers is clearly a matter of cont inuing conce rn to th e public at large. Moreover, in the years since Stanis treet was decided, multiple federal decisions have rejected its reasoning, creating a split of authority that has resulted in a mandatory injuncti on issued by a state superior court (and af firmed by the Court of Appeal) directing that the City e nforce section 148.6(a)(2)’ s admonish ment require ment despite the fact tha t the Ninth Circuit has held that the criminal provision that section 148.6(a)(2) refer ences is unconstituti onal. (See Swift & Co. v. Wickham (1965) 382 U.S. 111, 116 [reevaluat ion of preceden t may be necess ary where prior holding has creat ed practical complicat ions or resulted in “mischi evous consequ ences to litigants and c ourts”].) 9 9 The potential problems that split has caused are not just theoretica l. In Cuadra v. City of South San Francisco (N.D.Cal., Jan. 4, 2010, N o. C 08-3439 T EH) 2010 WL 55875 (Cuadr a), the plaintiff brought a federal civil rights action against the City of South San Francis co after being arre sted for violating section 148.6(a)(1). The off icers who prepar ed the po lice report that led to the plaintiff’s arrest moved for sum mary judgment on the

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 31 Most critically, as discussed in more detail below, since Stanistree t was decided, the United States Suprem e Court has issued multi ple rulings that prov ide f urther gu idance r egardin g how we should evaluate the constitutional ity of a statute like section 148.6(a), w hich discrimin ates based on content with in a proscribab le class of knowing falsehoods (defamation). (See Davenport, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 188 [describing when restrictions on speech that fall outside “ ‘ the general prohibiti on ’ ” on content-based regulations warrant heightene d scrutiny ]; Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 709 [false stateme nts do not qualify as a category of unprotected speech ]; Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at p. 495 [content-based restricti ons that regulat e unprotected speech are subject to heightened review if th ey incident ally burd en protect ed speech].) For all those reasons, we believe this is an appropriate case in wh ich to revis it our prior pr ecedent in Stanistreet. C. Is Section 14 8.6(a)(1) a V alid Restr aint on Speech? 1. Section 1 48.6(a) quali fies as a c ontent-based regulati on within a proscr ibable cate gory of speech The question we must address in this cas e is wh ether section 148.6(a) constitutes an impermissib le content-based restriction on speech. T he parties do no t dispute that the statute, which makes it a crime to file a knowingly false “allegation ” of police misconduct and compels compla inants to basis of qualified immunity. The federal court denied the motion, explaining that there “ was no probable cause to arrest [plaintiff] for br eaking a law that had already been held unconstitut ional [by the Ninth Circuit], which means a constituti onal right was violat ed. ” (Id. at pp. *28 – 29.)

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 32 read and sign an admonition acknowledging it is a crime to file a knowingly false “complaint against an officer,” qualifies as a content-bas ed regulation of speech. (§ 148. 6(a), capitalizatio n and boldface omitted; see generally Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015) 576 U.S. 155, 163 (Reed) [a law is content based if it “applies to particular speech becaus e o f the topic discussed or the idea o r message expressed ” ]; McCullen v. Coakley (2014) 573 U.S. 464, 479 [law i s content based if it “require[s] ‘enforcem ent authorities’ to ‘exa mine t he c ontent of th e message that is conveyed to de termine whether’ a violation [of the law] has occurre d” ].) Content-base d laws are presu mptively uncons titutional and generally subject to strict scrutiny. (Reed, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 163.) Notwithstandin g that general rule, our high court has identifi ed limited situations in which strict sc rutiny does not automatica lly apply. It is well-established, f or example, that content-bas ed restr ictions are permiss ible o n speech that f alls within certa in “ ‘ “ historic and tr aditional categor ies [of expressi on] long familiar to the bar, ” ’ ” including (among other categories) defama tion, fraud, fighting words and obscen ity. (Alvarez, su pra, 567 U.S. at p. 717, plur. opn of Kenned y, J.; see R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 388.) R. A. V., in turn, e stablish ed an alternate framework of analysis for “content discrimi nation among various instanc es of a class of proscribable speech.” (R. A. V., at p. 38 8; see Chaker, su pra, 428 F.3d at p. 1 224 [“Th e leading case establishing the First Amendment’s application to proscribab le classe s of speech is R. A. V. ”].) Accordingl y, the first i ssue w e must address is whether section 14 8.6(a) qu alifies as a con tent-based restriction within a proscribab le category of speech, thus triggering review under

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 33 the principles of R. A. V., or whether i t implicates “fully protected speech” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 38 7), thus automatica lly triggeri ng strict scrutiny review. As explaine d above, Stanistreet concluded that review under R. A. V. was appropriate beca use “[s]ection 148.6 proscr ibes only constituti onally unprotect ed speech — knowingl y false statements of fact.” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 50 1, italics add ed; see id. at p. 508 [“the entire class of speech at issue — knowin gly false stat ements of fact — is pr oscribable” ].) Alvarez, s upra, 567 U.S. 709, however, has since sugg ested tha t we were incorrect in concluding that knowingly false statements of fact qu alify as a categ ory of proscr ibable spe ech. (See ante, at pp. 26 – 28.) While true th at wit hout th e benef it of Alvarez, S tanistreet broadly charact erized the relevant category of proscr ibabl e speech as “ knowingly f alse statemen ts of f act ” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 508), o ur analysis in that case nonethel ess makes clear t hat w e also view ed sect ion 1 48.6(a) a s regulating a subcl ass of false stat ements that u nquesti onably falls outside the protections of the First Am endment, name ly defamatory falseho ods. Our decision, for example, characteriz ed the defendants’ core constitut ional argu ment to be that section 148.6(a) imper missibly establ ishes differ ent “d efamatio n rule [s]” for complaints against peace officers. (Stanistreet, at p. 507.) Further, when summarizi ng the applicabl e First Amendment principles at i ssue, we focused almost exclusively on Supreme Court precedent addressing the limitations on defamation actions against public officials. (See id. at pp. 50 5 – 506 [discuss ing New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. 254 and Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) 379 U.S. 64].) And when

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 34 addressing why we need not consider “ the California Constitution as a separat e bas is t o inv alidate sec tion 148.6, ” w e explained that “California law regarding defamation is cotermino us with that of the United States Const itution.” (Stanistreet, at p. 504, fn. 3; see id. at p. 507, fn. 4 [noting that R. A. V. “cited defamat ion as an example of the kind of proscribab le speech it was talkin g about”].) We now confirm what we implied in Stanistreet: section 148.6(a) crimin alizes allegations of police misconduct th at are defamatory in nature. Indeed, the legislat ive history makes clear that one of the primary motivations in enacting sect ion 148.6(a) was to protect l aw enforcement from the professiona l and reputational harms that result from knowingly false allegations of misconduct. (See ante, at pp. 10 – 12; Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 503 [§ 148.6(a) was intended to address “frivolous complaints which can affec t the individ ual officer’s future ” and have an “ ‘adverse impact’ ” on peace officers’ careers], italics added; see also Rest.2d Torts, § 569, com. e [statements that “attribute.. . conduct or characteristic s incompati ble with the proper conduct.. . or with the proper discharge o f . .. duties as a pub lic officer” ar e generally d eemed to be defamator y].) Accordingly, we conclude that section 148.6(a) constitutes a content-bas ed regulation within a proscribab le category of speech and i s therefore subject to review und er the fr amework set forth in R. A. V. 2. Applicati on of R. A. V. a. General pr inciples guidin g the evalu ation of content-based regulati ons of defa mation R. A. V. makes clear that some form s of content-based regulation within a proscribable class of speech warrant

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 35 heightened scrutiny while others do not. (See R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 384.) The high court’s de cision, howev er, leaves some uncertainty as to how, exactly, courts should evaluate whether a particular form of content-bas ed regulati on within a proscribab le class of speech warrants additional scrutiny. Broadly speak ing, the court explained that whi le content-bas ed regulations are generally prohibited be caus e they “ ‘r aise [] the specter that the Gover nment may eff ectively drive c ertain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace ’ ” (id. at p. 388), many forms of “ content discri mination among various instances of a class of proscribab le speech. .. do [] not pose this threat ” (id. at p. 388). The court then described three categories of content discriminat ion within a proscribabl e category of speech that generally “do n ot threaten to drive i deas or view points fr om the marketplac e and he nce are permissible.” (Stanistree t, 29 Cal.4th at p. 508, citing R. A. V., at pp. 388 – 390.) While the se three categories play an i mportant role in assessing whether a conte nt-bas ed regulation within a proscribab le categ ory of sp eech warrants further scrut iny, we believe they are best understoo d as proxies for the ultimate question that courts must decide when evaluating such a regulation: Does the form of regulation that th e Legislature adopted create a consequential risk of “ ‘driv[ing] certain ideas or viewpoints ’ ” from the public sp here? (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387; s ee Davenport, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 188 [characteriz ing the first R. A. V. “category” of permissible regulation — “when the selected subclass is chosen for the very reason that the entire class can be proscribed” — as one situation where “the risk” that the regulati on “ will

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 36 impermiss ibly interfere with the marketplace of ideas ” is so “inconseq uential” that fu rther scrut iny “is unwarr anted” ].) Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S 709, applied similar principles in the context of regulations that prohibit knowing falsehoo ds. A majority of the court t he re conclu ded that some forms of prohibiti ons on knowingly false statements, e ven well - intention ed o nes, can trigger constitutional scrutiny i f the prohibiti on i s written in such a manner that it unduly burdens protected speech. (See id. at p. 723, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J. [permitting the governm ent to criminaliz e any knowing ly f alse statement regardin g the receipt of a military medal, regardless of co ntext, would “c ast[] a chill ... the First A mendment cann ot permit ” ]; id. at p. 736, conc. opn. of Bre yer, J. [while limiting the Act to “knowin g and intentiona l acts of decepti on. . . reduc[es] the risk that valuable speech is chill ed,” the “ breadth ” of the statute nonethel ess “creates a signif icant risk of First Amendment harm”; “a speaker migh t still be worried about being prosecuted for a careless false statement, even if he does not have the intent required to render him liable” ], italics omitted.) Thus, much like content-based regulati ons within a proscribab le category of speech, a core conc ern with sta tutes targeting knowing falsehoods is whether they risk driving out certain forms of id eas from the marketplace, which includ es “true” (or at l east well-inten tioned) sp eech. (Id. at p p. 7 33, 736, conc. opn. of Breyer, J. [prohibiti ons on fals ity “ can inhibit the speaker from making true statements, thereby ‘ chilling ’ a kind of speech that lies at the First Amend ment’s heart”; “ a speaker might . .. be worried about being pr osecuted for a careless false

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 37 statement, even if he does not have the intent requir ed to render him liabl e ”], italics omitted.) 10 M ost rece ntly, the Su preme Court’s decision in Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, confirm ed what was implied in R. A. V. and Davenport: Statutes that regulate only unprotect ed cat egories of speech can be su bject to heighten ed scrutiny if they have “ ‘an incident al effect on protect ed speech. ’ ” (Free Speech Coalition, at p. 478, quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) 530 U.S. 640, 659.) Thus, the m ere fact that we have construed section 148.(6)(a) as applying to an unprotect ed category of speech — knowingly false, defamator y claims of police misconduct — does not foreclose the possibi lity that the statute’s impacts on protec ted speec h (truthful or well- intention ed claims of police misc onduct) might warrant heightened r eview. While there remains some uncertainty regarding the specific contours of the high court holdings discussed above, th e fundament al principle we derive from tho se cases is that when assessing a content -based regulation within a proscribable class of speech, courts must evaluate whether the “risk” (Davenport, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 188) that the prohibition will “ ‘driv e certain ideas o r viewpoints’ ” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387) 10 In A lvarez, 567 U.S 709, the cou rt ex pressed concerns about multiple effects of the Stolen Valor Act, which broadly criminaliz ed knowingly false claims of having received certain types of military medals. Those concerns i nclude d prohibitin g lies in contexts wh ere they were unli kely to cause harm (e.g., private convers ations in the bedroom) and chilling nonmalic ious forms of speech, including true sp eech. (See id., plur. opn. of Kennedy J., at pp. 722 – 7 23; conc. opn. of Breyer, J., at pp. 733 – 734, 736.)

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 38 from the public sphere is so “inconseque ntial” (Davenp ort, at p. 188) that further constitutional scrutin y is unwarrant ed. (See R. A. V., supra, 50 5 U.S. at p. 387.) Stated differ ently, courts sh ould ask whether the regulat ion disfav ors certain viewpoints (as in R. A. V.) or is structured in a manner that burdens protected f orms of speech, whether dir ectly (as in Alvarez) or incidental ly (as i n Free Speech Coalition). Alvare z suggests that when a statute targets a form of knowing falsehood (as sec tion 148.6(a) does), the court ’ s evaluation should take into account whether the prohibition is drafted in such a manner that it creates a conseque ntial risk of chilling citizens from engaging in protected forms of speech, including truthful speech. Co nsideration should als o be given to th e various categories of content discri mination described in R. A. V. that generally “ do[] not threa ten censorsh ip of ideas. ” (R. A. V. at p. 3 93; see id. at p. 388.) Finally — and criti cally — while R. A. V. includes language sugg esting as much, cases li ke Davenport, Alvarez, and Free Speech Coalition make clear that in conducting this inquiry, the ulti mate questi on i s not whether there is reason to believe that the governmen t actuall y intended to drive ou t certain viewp oints or forms of pr otected speech, bu t rather whether the means that government has selected — even if well- intention ed — create a substantial risk of doing so. (See R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 387, 388 [some forms o f content- based regulations within proscribable classes of s peech do not “pose [the]... threat” of “ ‘ effecti vely driv[ing] certain ideas or viewpoints from the market place ’ ” ], italics add ed; Davenport, supra, 551 U.S. at pp. 188, 189 [describing relevant inquiry as

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 39 whether regulati on “pose[s] a threat to the marketplace of ideas” or “imperm issibly disto rt [s] the mark etplace of ideas” ].) b. Section 1 48.6(a) rai ses substantia l risks to the marketplace of idea s Applying the R. A. V. fram ework, as supplemen ted by the high court’s analysis in Davenport, Alvarez, and Free Speech Coalition, we concl ude t hat s ection 148.6(a) ’s cr iminal provision (subdivisio n (a)(1)) and its acco mpanying admonit ion requirem ent (subdivision (a)(2)) exhibit nu merous characterist ics that, consider ed together, “inciden tal [ly ] burden” (Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at p. 483) or otherwis e present a reasonable risk of driving certain forms of protected speech — namely, truthful (or at least not knowingly false) com plaints of police misconduct — fr om the pub lic spher e so as to warr ant addit ional scrut iny. First, section 148.6(a) does not merely regu late speech, but imposes crimin al liability on speech. As our high court has repeatedly explain ed, “ [T]he severit y o f crimina l sanctions may well caus e speaker s to remain silent rather than communica te even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and imag es. [Cit ation.] As a practical matter, this increased deterr ent effect.. . po ses greater First Amendmen t concerns than those implicate d by... civil regulation. ” (Ren o v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) 521 U.S. 844, 872 (Reno); see City of Houst on v. Hil l (1987) 482 U.S. 451, 459 [“Criminal statutes [involving speech] must be scrut inized with particular care”]; U.S. v. Caronia (2d Cir. 2012) 703 F.3d 149, 163 [“Criminal regulatory schem es [on speech]. .. warrant even more careful scrutiny”]; A shcroft v. American C ivil Liberties Union (2004) 542 U.S. 656, 660 [“Content -based prohib itions, enforc ed by severe criminal

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 40 penalties, hav e th e const ant potent ial to be a repress ive f orce in the lives and thoug hts of a fr ee people” ].) Second, section 148.6(a) singles o ut for criminal treatment speech that is critical of a particular class of government official — la w enforcement — whose “duties. .. tend naturally to hav e a relativel y larg e or dramatic imp act on members of the public. ” (Kahn v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1611 (Kahn).) Courts have l ong emphasized that “ the freedo m to criticize public officials and expose their wrongd oing is a fundament al First Amendment value.” (Arnett v. Myers (6th Cir. 2002) 281 F.3d 55 2, 5 60; s ee Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966) 383 U.S. 75, 85 [“ Criticis m o f government is at the very center of the constitutio nally protected area of free discussion. Criticis m of those responsible for government o perati ons must be fr ee, lest critic ism of govern ment i tself be pena lized ” ].) Thus, section 14 8.6(a) is rare not o nly in that it imposes a form of penalty that has been recogniz ed to have a parti cular ly deterrent effect on speech — criminal liability — but also implicat es a topic — criticism of law e nforce ment — that “ ‘li es at the very core of... the First Amendmen t.’ ” (Green, supra, 52 F.4th a t p. 739.) Adding to those concerns, section 148.6(a) (1)’s criminal provision is asymmetrica l in its application, criminalizing knowingly false complaints filed against law e nforc ement personne l — and expressly requiring complainants be told of that possibility — while leaving unregulated (and requiring no admonition against) knowingly false claims that a witness might make against the complainant during any ensuing

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 41 investigat ion. 11 LAPPL argues that this asymmetry i s understanda ble given that a knowingly false alle gation of misconduct trigger s a mandatory investigati on but a knowin gly false statemen t supportiv e of law enforcemen t has no such effect. That does not change the fact, however, that complain an ts fac e a situa tion in w hich the y can be pr osecuted if authorities believe they ar e ly ing about th eir all egations of misconduct — and are forcef ully reminded of that possibility through the admonition requirem ent (discussed more below) — but witnesses speaking in favor of the accus ed officers would face no such consequenc e under th is law we re they to lie about the events in qu estion. T he conc ern with th e st atute the n is not its “ ‘ underincl usiven ess ’ ” per se (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387) — i.e., extending speech-related protect ions to one 11 Multi ple federal courts have held that section 148.6(a)’s disparate treatmen t of false claims made against police versus false claims made in support o f police in the c ontext of an official investigat ion qualifies as a form of “viewpoint” discrim ination, a subset of content- based restrictions that can “rarely, if ever,. . . withstand [constitutional ]. .. scrutiny.” (Sons of Confedera te Veter ans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. C ommission er of Virginia Dept. of Motor Vehicles (4th Cir. 2002) 288 F.3d 610, 616, fn. 4; see Chaker, supra, 428 F.3d at p. 1227 [§ 148.6(a) “regulates an unprotected categ ory of speech, but singles out certain speech. .. based on th e sp eaker’s viewpo int”]; Ha milton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1094 [§ 148.6(a) “discri minates based on v iewpoint ”].) Because we conclude that section 148.6(a) i s an invalid content-bas ed regul ation, we need no t address whether it might also qualify as an i nvalid viewpoint-based r egulatio n. (See generally Iancu v. Brunetti (2019) 588 U.S. 388, 418, conc. & dis. opn. of Sotomayor, J. [“the line between viewp oint -based and viewpoint- n eutral content discri mination ca n be ‘slipp ery’ ” ].)

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 42 category of public off icial that other persons do not enjoy — but rather that it does not treat d efamator y expr essions made in the context of the same official police misconduct procee ding the same way. 12 More troubling still, section 148.6(a) (1)’s criminal provision i s accompanied by an admonition requiremen t that contains vario us speech deterring el ements. Se ction 148.6 (a)(2) prohibits l aw enforcement from acce pting an officia l claim of misconduct unless the complainant reads and signs an admonition, which m ust be written in bold printed capital letters, warning that “ IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO MAKE A COMPLAINT THAT YOU KNOW TO BE FALSE. IF YOU MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST AN OFFIC ER KNOWING THAT IT IS FALSE, YOU CAN BE 12 The dissent argue s that the se asymmetry concerns are unfound ed because a witness testifyi ng in support of a peace officer would still be subject to crimi nal liability under section 132. (See dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 9 – 10.) That provis ion directs that, in any trial or o fficial proceeding, it is a cri me to submit a knowingl y forged or fraudulent ly altered “ instrum ent in wr iting.” (§ 132.) The asym metry remains, h owever, because section 132 w ould n ot app ear to reach oral sta tements a w itness for the peac e officer might ma ke during an offic ial investigation. The dissent also relies on section 118, which is California’s prohibiti on on perjury. But section 118 pertains only to people who have taken an oath and the dissent has provided no basis to conclude that witness state ments made in the context of section 832.5 police investigations are generally required to be made under oath. Nothing in section 132 o r section 118 alters the basic fact that s ection 148.6(a) cri minalizes knowingl y false allegations of misconduct that are filed against a peace officer while leaving unregulat ed knowingly false allegations that are made in sup port of an accus ed peace officer.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 43 PROSECUT ED.” (Ibid.) Potential complainants are thus effectivel y told: To lodge a complaint against a police officer, you must f irst sign an acknowle dgment that we can charge you with a crime if we think you are being knowingly untruthfu l about the allegations of misconduct levied against the empl oyees of our agency. Those conc erns are compounded by the fa ct that, at least in some situations, it appears that the admonition will be provided by another law enforce ment agent in the settin g of a police station. And these concerns are further exacerbated by the fact that the ver y entity the citizen is making the c omplaint to will often be the same e ntity that decid es whether the complaina nt has com mitted a crim e purs uant to this statu te for purposes of effectu ating their arrest. (See Cuadra, supra, 2010 WL 55875 [supervis ing captain of precinct found the defendant’s allegations of m isconduct untruthful and prepared report referring th e d efendant for pros ecutio n und er sect ion 148.6(a)].) As Justice Werd egar a st utely observed i n Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th 497, subdivision (a)(2) “is uniqu e in its mandate that the possi bility of cri minal sanctions for kno wingly false complaints be prominentl y held up before prospective complaina nts at a critical juncture. In many police misconduct situations, it inevitably will c ome down to the word of the citizen against the word of the police officer or officers, in which case law enforcement authoriti es will con duct an invest igation to determin e wh o is telling the truth. If auth orities for any r eason disbelieve the citizen, t he citizen (w hether guilty or innoc ent) may then. . . face both crimin al pros ecution and the burden and expense of retaining a defense attorney. Prospective complaina nts cannot help but be aware of these realiti es when deciding whether to go f orward with their complaints by signing

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 44 the stat ute’s required admonition. Realistically, some complaina nts are likely to choose not to go forward — even when they have legitimate complaints.” (Id. at p p. 513 – 514, conc. opn. of Werdegar, J., italics omitted; accord Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Su pp.2d at p. 1094 [“There is a high likelihood that Section 148.6’s warnin g will caus e individua ls to refra in from filing a c omplaint against law enforce ment off icers”].) S imilarly problematic, the admoniti on requirement may well de ter reporting by p ersons who mer ely suspect, but cannot be certai n, that they were a victim of more subtle forms of police misconduct such as racial profil ing or an unlawful stop. (See Alvarez, supra, at p. 736, conc. o pn. of Bre yer, J. [mens rea element does not eliminate the risk that “a speaker might.. . be worried about being prosecuted for a careless false statement, even if he does not have the intent required to render him liable”], italics omitted.) In sum, subd ivision (a)(2) requir es that: (1) complain ants walk into a police station and locate the appropr iate person to complain to, who will likely be a uniformed police officer; (2) complaina nts mak e known that they want to levy a serious complaint of misconduct against one of the colleagues of the person they are complaining to; (3) co mplainants will then be told that before the police will even accept a complaint, they must sign an advisory acknowledging that they can be criminall y charged if law enforce ment believes that any thing they say is knowingly f alse; and (4) the entity that will make a determina tion of falsity for purposes of effectu ating an arrest is, in the first instance, likely to be the very entity that the person is complai ning about. It is reas onable to assume that when presente d with s uch a s ituation, some citizens — whether

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 45 fearful of retaliation for truthful reports of misconduct or merely uncertain whether the alleged misconduct can b e proven — might wel l throw up the ir hands an d ask, “ W hy bother?” Raising further co ncerns, the langu age of subd ivision s (a)(1) and (a)(2) introduces uncertainty and confusion as to the specific scope of statements that might fall within the criminal provision. Su bdivisio n (a)(1) criminalizes any knowingly f alse “allegation of misconduct” but includes no definiti on of what might constitute “misconduct. ” (See, e.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvan ia (1966) 382 U.S. 399, 404 [statute allowing jury to assess costs ba sed on a findin g that party engaged i n “misconduc t” deemed impermiss ibly vague]; Perrine v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 656, 663 [statute deemed vague for failing to “define what const itutes ‘acts of sexua l misconduct ’ ”]; Sog lin v. Kauffman (7th Cir. 196 9) 418 F.2d 163, 168 [the “use of ‘misconduct’ ” as a standard in imposing st udent discipline “ conta ins no clues which could assist. . . in determin ing whether conduct no t transgressing statutes is susceptibl e to punishm ent ”].) Nor does subdivision (a)(1) expressly require that th e false state ment be material to the allegations at issue or that the statem ent actually caused any harm to the accused. (See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds (8th Cir. 20 21) 8 F.4th 7 81, 787 (Anim al Le gal Defense Fund) [applying Alvarez in invalidati ng a statute prohibiting falsehoods on an employment application and noting that “the absence of a mat eriality r equirem ent” dist inguished the statute from “per missible prohibitions on fraud, perjury, and l ying to governm ent officia ls”].) Subdivision (a)(2)’s admonition provision uses entir ely different — and arguabl y erroneous — language t o e xplain the

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 46 scope of subdivision (a)(1) ’s criminal provision. I t states, in relevant par t: “Yo u have th e right to make a c ompla int against a police officer for any improper polic e conduct. . .. [¶] It is against the law to make a complaint that you know to be false. If you make a complaint against an officer knowing that it is false, you can be prosecuted on a misdemeanor charge.” (§ 148.6 (a)(2), italics added and boldface and all caps omitted.) The term “imprope r polic e conduct ” could be reas onably construed as encompassing a br oader categ ory of behavior than “misconduc t.” (Compare Black ’ s La w Dict. (9t h ed. 2009) p. 826, col. 1 [defining “i mproper” as “incorr ect; unsuitab le or irregular”] with id. at p. 108 9, col. 1 [defin ing “misconduct” as “a dereliction of duty”].) And whereas subdivision (a)(1) makes clear that it is a knowin gly false “allegation of misc onduct” that triggers the cri minal sancti on, the admonition in subdivision (a)(2) simply states it is a m isdeme anor to file any “complaint ” that one knows to be false. Given that complainant s must also be asked to sign the admonition attesting they “have read and understood the above stat ement” (even though they might not have), a legitimate complaina nt might reasonab ly but erroneous ly conclude they are being aske d to guarantee th e accuracy of all facts contained in the compla int under threat of possible prosecution, and not sim ply tho se m aterial to the allegations of miscond uct. (See Racial Ident ity & Prof iling Advisor y Board (RIPA) Annual Report 2025, at p p. 170 – 171 [as of Nov. 10, 2 025] 13 (RIPA Annual Report 2025) 13 All I nternet c itations in th is opinion are arc hived by year, docket number an d cas e name at

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 47 [advisory’s wordin g may cause citizens to believe that “the inclusion of a single, inaccurate allegation that is not material to the claim of misconduct is enough for prosecution” ].) Given the breadt h and “diff erent lin guistic fo rm[s]” (Reno, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 871) of the language that subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) employ in defining the scope of potential criminal liability, the statute ra ises concerns that persons of common int elligenc e will be left to “guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. ” (Connall y v. General Construc tion Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391; Reno, at p. 871 [statute ’s use of “dif ferent linguistic form[s] ” to describe scope of potential criminal liability “ will pro voke unce rtainty amon g speakers about how the two standards relate to each other and just what they mean ”], fn. omitted.) We ackn owledge that section 148. 6(a) does have certai n narrowing requirements. First, as no ted, section 148. 6(a)(1) applies only to knowingly false allegations of misconduct. But as ou r high court mad e clear in Alvare z, the presence of a mens rea requir ement does not invariably shield content-base d statutes regulating f alsity from constitution al scrutiny. In this case, we are unpersuaded that the statute’s limitation to knowing falsehoods eliminates the s ubstantial chillin g risk s presente d by the combined eff ects of the various charact eristics discussed a bove. Second, unlike the Stol en Valor Act at issu e in Alvarez, section 148.6(a) does not crimina lize knowingly false claims of police misconduct “made to any person, at any time, in any context.” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 720, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) Instead, section 148.6(a) applies only to persons who “f il e [] ” a knowing ly false allegation of police misconduct.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 48 We hav e previous ly constru ed this language to limit the statute ’s application to official complaints of misconduct that trigger the invest igation requir ements set forth i n secti on 832.5. (See Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 511 [“section 148.6 app lies on ly to formally filed accusations that the agency must investigate” ].) Presumab ly then, the statut e would not apply to knowing fals ehoods deliver ed through other channe ls, such as picketing, s ocial media or the press. The fact remains, however, tha t the “ context ” (Alvarez, supra, 5 67 U.S. at p. 720, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) section 148.6(a) does target (officia l citizens ’ comp laints) is a particu larly important a nd utilitarian form o f government criti cis m in California: complaints that the governm ent is required to investig ate and respond to. The fact that section 148.6(a) leaves other avenues of criticis m unregulate d does little to negate our concerns regarding the statute ’s potenti al speech-deterring effects on th e most accessible and effective mode of reporting police misconduct that is av ailable to the c itizens of Californ ia. In sum, we do not question whether section 148.6(a) was intended to address a legitimate problem facing law enforcem ent (the filing of knowing ly false police complaint s), or that a differe nt law crafted more narrowly and specifica lly might pass constitution al muster. Nonetheless, we conclud e that the combined e ffect of the statutory scheme creates more than an “inconsequen tial” risk of driving out certai n ideas or viewpoints that are at the very cor e of the Firs t Amendment, namely speech that reveals, and seeks redress for, official abuses of power. Much like the situation in Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, be caus e section 148.6(a) targets an unprotected category of speech (knowingly false defamatory

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 49 allegations of miscond uct) in a manner that incid entally burdens protected speech (well-inte ntioned reports of police misconduct) further constitutiona l scrutin y is warra nted. 14 c. Stanistreet’s applic ation of R. A. V. LAPPL’s defens e of sect ion 148.6(a) focuses on the reasonin g of Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th 497, which was issued without the benefit of decisions such as Davenport, 14 Alth ough Free Speech Coaliti on makes clear that regulations on un protected speech are subject to heightened scrutiny if they incidental ly burden protected speech, the opinion does not examine what qualifies as an “ incidental burden ” or how courts should evaluate whether a regulati on on unprotect ed speech burdens protected speech. In ou r view, however, the bur den section 148.6(a) places on truthf ul (or at least not knowingly false) rep orts of police misconduct is at le ast as great (and arguably greater) than the “modest burden ” (Free Speech Coalitio n, supra, 606 U.S. at p. 496) that the statute at issue in Free Speech Co alition places on adults’ ab ility to access sexually explicit materia l. Th at statute requ ired adu lt websit es to verify users’ age through various means such as a simple “ credit-card transaction [] ” (ibid.) or obtaining proof of age through “a thi rd - party verification service” (id. at p. 497). According to the court, similar verificat ion methods were already in use by “ te ns of thousands ” of adult websites and numerous other age-restr icted on line servic es. (I bi d.) As enumera ted above, the statut e here includes a broadly worded criminal provisi on that is acco mpanied by an unusual admonition requir ement. T he se statutory elements, as described by the Hamilton II court, create a “ potent disincent ive ” for citizens to file even well- intentione d complaints of police misconduct. (Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1094; see ante, at pp. 39 – 49.) We do not believe that section 148.6(a) ’s potential chilling impacts can be reasonably characteriz ed as l ess obtrusiv e than submitt ing proo f of age to a third-party v erificati on service.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 50 Alvarez and Free Speech Coalition (and before m ultiple federal courts found s ection 148.6(a) v iolative o f free speech pr inciples). As noted, Stan istreet did not dir ectly address wheth er the features of section 148.6(a) risk driving certain ideas or viewpoints from the pub lic sphere by burd ening protected speech. Instead, Stanistree t ’s analysis focuse d on whether section 148.6(a) fell within any of the three categories of content- based regulat ions that R. A. V. had — in the words of Stanistree t — “identifi ed [as]. . . not threaten[ing] to drive ideas or viewpoints from the mark etplace.” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 508.) Stanistree t ul timately c oncluded that section 148.6(a) fell within each o f thre e R. A. V. -deli neated categories and was therefore constitutionally “permissible. ” (Stanistreet, at p. 5 08.) Our a nalysis gave little consideration as to whether or how the principles of R. A. V. might appl y to content-bas ed regulations within proscrib able classes of speech that have an incidental burden on protect ed forms of speech, including true (or well-intentioned) spee ch. 15 In stead, we 15 To the extent Sta nisreet addressed the potential effects that section 148.6(a) might have on protected speech, it did so only through the framework of the overbre adth doctrine, a variant of First Amendment jurisprudenc e law whereby “ a l aw may be invalidated as overbroad if ‘ a substantial number of i ts applications are unconst itutional, judged in relati on to the statute ’ s plainly legitimate sweep. ’ ” (United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S. 460, 473 (Stevens).) Stanistree t reason ed that because section 148.6(a) only applies to knowing ly false and officially filed claims o f m isconduct — a variant of sp eech it deemed to be categ orically unprotected — the statute could not be said to be overbro ad. (Stanistre et, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 511.)

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 51 effectivel y c oncluded that if a conte nt-based regulat ion f alls within any one of the R. A. V. categor ies, it is valid under the First Amen dment. However, with the benefit of subse quent case l aw, we believe that when assessing a conten t-based regulation wi thin a proscribab le category of speech, consideration should be given not only to wheth er the regula tion falls within one of the categories descr ibed in R. A. V., but also whether the r egulati on may incident al ly burden protected speech. (See Free Speech Coalition, 60 6 U.S. at pp. 482 – 483.) In other words, t he R. A. V. categories are best underst ood as examples of content discriminat ion that generally pose a lesser risk of either suppressin g disfavored viewpoints or consequenti ally burdening protected s peech. (Se e ante, at p p. 34 – 39.) As explain ed above, in this case we are concerned about section 148.6(a)’s potentia l effects on pro tected speech. Applying the first R. A. V. category, for example, LAPPL argues that the reason defamati on is proscribab le — to protect As explained above, however, the prob lem with section 148.6(a) i s not that the statute violates the ov erbreadth doctrine by criminalizing some forms of protected speech. Indeed, we agree with Stanistreet that, on its face, the statute o nly criminaliz es unprot ected speech (knowin g, defamat ory falsehoods). (See ante, a t pp. 32 – 34.) Rather, the pro blem is that under the framework R. A. V. provides for evaluating content discriminat ion with in a proscribabl e class of sp eech, we cannot say that the risk of o fficial suppress ion of ideas through section 148.6(a), including the risk of de terrin g citiz ens from filing truthfu l complaints of police m isconduct is so “inconseq uential” as to uphold the statute with no further scrutiny. (Davenport, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 188; see also Free Speech Coa lition, supra, 60 6. U.S. at p p. 482 – 48 3, 495.)

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 52 against “injury to reputation” (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (19 74) 418 U.S. 323, 348) — applies with special f orce in this context because section 832.5 requires that all claims of misconduct filed against law enforcement must be investigat ed, thereby exposing accused officers to heightened risks of reputati onal and professi onal harm. But even if we accept the premise that section 832.5’s investig ation requir ements transform know ingly false complaints against polic e officers into a particular ly injurious form of defamation, that does not mean that the mechanis m the Legis lature chose to address those problems is categorical ly immune from further scrutiny regard less of its effect o n protecte d speech. Al varez, supra, 567 U.S. 709, for example, illustrate s that while the government is frequen tly justified in regu lating false statem ents that are assoc iated with legitimat e harms (in the case of Alv arez, compr omising the integrity of the Congressiona l Medal of Honor), courts will nonethel ess apply heightened scrutiny when the govern ment ’s chosen means of deterring such falsit y unduly burdens protect ed speech. Similarly, as the high court explained in Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, heightened scrutiny is warranted when the government chooses to regulate an unprotect ed f orm of speech in a manner that incidentally burdens protected forms of speech. Th e o verarch ing principle we draw from these authorit ies is that even if the reason defamation is pro scribable appli es with speci al force in the context of false complaints against police officers, that does not license the Legislatur e to remedy tho se harms through a

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 53 mechanis m that unnecessarily deters citizens from fi ling truthful (or at least well-intentio ned) compla ints. 16 Thus, even assuming section 832.5 ’s investig ation requirem ents can be said to create a partic ularly injuriou s for m of defamati on that would justify s ome forms of conten t -based regulations involving false complaints against police, that does not alter our conclusion that the means the Legislature chose here raise constituti onal concerns due to their potential to excessiv ely d eter tr uthful (or at leas t well-intenti oned) cr iticis m of the government. (See Alvarez, supra, 56 7 U.S. at p. 723, pl ur. opn. o f Kennedy, J.; id. at p. 736, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.; Free Speech Coa lition, supra, 606 U. S. 461.) Similarly, we do not read R. A. V. ’s second category of regulations — speech- based restrictions “aimed only at the ‘secondary effects’ of the speech” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 394) — as creat ing a bright- line rule that immunizes from heightened scrutiny any content discrimination within a proscribab le c lass o f spe ech that target s the sec ondary eff ects of speech. Inde ed, Renton, su pra, 475 U. S. 41, wh ich R. A. V. 16 Sure ly the First Amendment must impose some boundaries on the government’s authority to regul ate w hat it perceives as a particularly harmful subset of proscribabl e speech. Assume, for example, that th e Legisl ature pass ed a law requiring the formal investigation of any claim of misconduct filed against a state representat ive. Would that justify a law imposing a mandatory 20-year prison sentence for any knowingly fals e complaint of miscon duct filed against a state represent ative? Woul d it justify a law that required complaina nts, in order to file such a co mplaint, to travel personally to Sacr ament o and take a sworn oath to tell the truth while standing in front of no less than fifty witnesses o n the Capitol ste ps?

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 54 repeatedly cites (see R. A. V., at pp. 389, 394), and other First Amendment cases addressing the s econdary e ffects doctrin e make clear that e ven regulat ions aimed at the se condary eff ects of speech cannot be des igned in a manner that un duly interferes with speech itself. (See Alameda Books (2002) 535 U.S. 425, 434, plur. opn. of O’Connor, J. [ord inance targeting secondary effects will be upheld only if govern ment demonstrates that “reasonab le alternativ e avenues of communicati on remain [] available”].) And again Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. 709, and Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, now make clear that even well-intent ioned regulations that target falsity or that target unprotect ed categories of speech can trigger heightened scrutiny when they are structured in a manner that risks unduly burdenin g protected forms of speech. We see no reason why a different rule should apply to well -intention ed content-based regulations that are meant to target only the sec ondary effects of speech. For the reas ons discussed above, to the extent se ction 148.6(a) c an be proper ly characteriz ed as b eing aimed only at the secondary effects of false complaints of police misconduct, the means that th e Leg islature chose to remedy those secondary effects still pose a sufficient threat of deterring a core form of protected s peech so as to warrant additi onal scrutiny. Finally, R. A. V. ’s third category — which Stanistree t coined as a “catchall” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 509) — applies to content-bas ed regulations that do not present any “realistic possibility” of “ su ppress i[ng ] ” any disfavored viewpoint s (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 390) or burdenin g any protected forms of spee ch (see Free Speech Coaliti on, supra, 606 U.S. at pp. 482 – 483, 495; see also Alvarez, supra, 567 U. S. at pp. 709, 723, plur. o pn. of Kennedy, J.; id. at p. 73 6, conc. opn.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 55 of Breyer, J.). With the benefit of subsequent cas e law, w e construe this “ general exception ” (id. at p. 393) as merely recognizing that there might be some forms of content regulation within proscribable classes of speech where the potential for favoring ce rtain view points or burdeni ng pro tected forms of sp eech ar e so obvious ly r emote as to warrant no further scrutiny. As an example, the high court posited that i t could “not think o f any Firs t A mendmen t in terest th at w ould st and in the way of a State’s pr ohibiting onl y those obscen e motion pictures wit h blue- eyed actresses. ” (R. A. V., at p. 390.) Stanistree t conclu ded that R. A. V. ’s “ catchall ” applied because section 148.6(a) does “not suppress [] all compla ints of police misconduct, only kn owingly false on es.” (Stanistree t, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 509.) Thus, the Stanistreet maj ority appears to have reason ed that knowingly false complai nts of official misconduct do not contribute to the marketplace of ideas. While that conc lusion may have been sound ba sed on the precedent that Stanistre et had available to it, subsequent case law indicat es tha t when evalu ating a statute th at d iscrim inates on the bas is of content wi thin a proscribabl e categ ory of sp eech, courts should additionally consider whether th e statute incidental ly burden s protected speech. (See Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at pp. 482 – 48 3; cf. Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 709, 723, plur. opn. of Kenn edy, J.; id. at p. 736, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) Thus, contrary to Stanistreet’ s suggesti on, the fact that section 148.6(a) only regulat es knowingly false claims of police misconduct does not foreclos e the possibility that it does so in a m anner that cons equentiall y burdens protected speech, th us warranting heightened scrutiny.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 56 For the reaso ns explain ed in detail above, while true that section 148.6(a) targets “only knowingly false” claims of misconduct (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 509), the elements of the statute n onethel ess present a conse quential risk of deterring p rotected spe ech (truth ful or not knowi ngly fals e complaints against police). (See ante, at pp. 39 – 49; Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 513 – 51 4, conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.; Hamilton II, supra, 32 5 F.Supp.2 d at p. 1094.) While we express no view whether any of thes e elements might unduly burden speech when consider ed in isolati on, we th ink it clea r that, considered together, they “threa ten censorsh ip of ideas” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 393) b y dissuading in dividuals from making truthful (or at least well-intentione d) complaints. As a result, R. A. V. ’s “general exception” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 393) is inapplic able. 17 17 I t also bears noting that section 148.6(a)’s restriction on knowingly false clai ms against police officers is far afield from the example that the high court provided to illustrate a form of regulation that would fall within the catchall — i.e., a statute that “prohibit[s] only those obscene motion pictures with blue - eyed actresses.” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 390.) That example hypoth esizes a category of regulation (no person s with blue eyes) that cannot conceivably suppress any viewpoints or ideas ass ociated with the type of sp eech to which the regu lation applies (obscene motion pictures). Unlike a law that targets police comp laints, eye co lor cannot p ossibly be ass ociated wi th a specific viewpoint. Section 148.6(a), in contrast, has numerous features that raise a substant ial risk of deterring not only knowingly false complaints against polic e, but truthful (or well- intention ed) ones as well.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 57 d. The dissent The dissent concludes that section 148.6(a) should not be subject to any form of heightened cons titutional scrutiny. We disagree. i. Alvarez did n ot establish a ne w catego ry of proscribab le speech The dissent argues that height ened scrutiny is unwarrante d because section 148.6(a) constitutes a regulation on falsity that is intended to “ ‘ protect the integrity of [g]overn ment processes. ’ ” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 3, quoting Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 7 09, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) In the dissent’s view, this qualifies as a “ ‘ “ ‘historic and traditional categor [y] [of expression ]’ ” ’ where ‘content -bas ed restrictions on speech have been permitted. ’ ” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 3.) We are not aware of any authority that has categorized falsities that threaten the “ ‘ integrit y of governm ent process es ’ ” (ibid.) as one of “ the few ‘ “ historic and tr aditiona l categories [of proscribable s peech] long familiar to the bar. ” ’ ” (Alvarez, at p. 709, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J., quoting Stevens, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 468.) The sole authorit y the dissent cites in support o f th at conclusion i s the plura lity opinion in Alvarez. (See dis. opn. of Liu, J., po st, at p. 3.) The dissent’s reliance on Alvarez is notable not only because plurality opinions do not constitute binding precedent (as they do “ not represent the views of a majority of the Court ” (CTS Corp. v. Dyn amics Corp. of America (1987) 48 1 U.S. 69, 81), but also becau se w e find nothing i n the A lvarez plural ity indicating that it i ntende d to proclaim a new category of proscribab le speech. While it is tru e that the pl urality sig naled

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 58 approval of stat utes that “prohib it fals ely repres enting that one is speaking on behalf of the Gover nment ” and de scribe d those statutes as “protect [ing] th e integrit y of Govern ment pr ocesses ” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 7 21, plur. opn. o f Kenned y, J.), we do not view those comments as endorsing an expansion of the “ ‘well -defin ed and narrowly limit ed classes of speech ’ ” that have histor ically been deemed proscriba ble. (Stevens, supra, 559 U.S. at pp. 468 – 469.) As the A lvarez plurality acknowl edge d later in its opinion, the Supreme Court has consistent ly rejected any “ ‘freewhee ling auth ority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope o f the First Amendment, ’ ” and will do so only when “ presented with ‘ persuasiv e evidence that a novel restr iction on content is part of a long (i f heret ofore unrecogn ized) tradi tion of proscri ption. ’ ” (Alvarez, at p. 72 2, pl ur. o pn. of Kennedy, J.) Agains t that backdrop, we are doubtful that the plurality’s reference to th e purpose of statutes that prohibit falsely repr esenting onesel f as a government actor was meant to endorse a new proscribabl e category of speech. Indeed, in the interven ing decade since i t was decided, we are not aware of any decision that has read Alvarez s o broadly. 18 18 We do not dispute that the Alvarez plurality signaled the constituti onal validity of many existing restrictions o n falsity that can be said to protect governm ent processes, including sections 1001 and 912 of the United States Code. (See Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 720 – 7 21, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.; accord dis. o pn. of Liu, J., post, at p p. 5 – 6.) We disagr ee, how ever, with the dissent’s further assertion that the p lurality reached that conclusion by creating a new categor y of proscribable speech, i.e., fals e statement s that can be sai d to threat en “ ‘the integrit y

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 59 In our view, the only category of proscribable speech that section 148.6(a) implicates is defamati on. More specifical ly, as we have construed it (and as Stanistreet construed it), section 148.6(a) regulates a subset of d efamatory speech consisting of allegations of professional misconduct targeted at l aw enforcem ent agents. A s discussed above, R. A. V. makes cle ar that heighte ned scrutiny may apply to content-base d regulations within a proscribabl e class of speech. (See R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387 [“the First Amendment imposes.. . a ‘content discrimina tion’ limitation upon a State’s prohibition of proscribab le speech”].) And while Stanistreet and the parties’ briefing in this ca se focus squ arely on R. A. V., the diss ent makes n o mention of the a llowance for the pot ential applicatio n of heightened scrutiny that R. A. V. establishe d in thi s context. Nor does the dissent di scuss the high court’s recent decision in Free Speech Coalit ion, supra, 606 U. S. 461, which confir ms that heightened scrutiny applies to statutes that regulate of [g]overnment processes. ’ ” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 3.) We are not aware of any auth ority th at has endors ed that novel proposition. While it may be that m any prohibitions on falsity that protect the integrity of government processes are valid because they are sufficientl y circumscribed to achieve that purp ose (see Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 721, plur. o pn. of Kennedy, J. [describing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 912 as “ targeted prohibiti ons”], italics add ed), we find nothing in th e Alvarez plurality that suggests such laws are categoric ally immune from constituti onal scrutiny because they regul ate a class of speech that qualifies as one of “the few ‘ “historic and traditi onal categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar. ” ’ ” (Alvarez, at p. 717, plur. opn. of Kenn edy, J., quoting Stevens, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 468.)

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 60 proscribab le speech in a manner that incidenta lly burdens protected s peech. Instead, the dissent grounds i ts defense of the statute in the proclamation of a new category of proscribable speech that no party in this long-runn ing litigation has ever proposed and that no court has ever endorsed. ii. The chilling effec t of section 148.6(a) The dissent’s secon d line of r easonin g is that it sees no risk (or at least no co nsequenti al risk) that the features of section 148.6(a) — part icularly its admonition require ment — would deter anyon e from m aking a “g ood -faith compl aint [].” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 11.) In support, the dissent argues that while focusin g on the admonition’s thr eat of criminal liability, o ur analysis ignores additiona l l anguag e in the ad monition e xplaining that wh ile the agency may u ltimately find there is no t enough evidence to tak e action on the complaint, the complainant still has the right to “ ‘ make the complaint and have it investiga ted. ’ ” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 11, quotin g § 148.6(a)(2).) According to the dissent, t his additional languag e “distinguishes between a good - f aith complai nt that lacks ‘enou gh evidence’ and ‘ a complaint that you know to be false. ’ ” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 11.) The dissent further reasons that because a well-inten tioned complaina nt would “know ” th ey ar e act ing in g ood faith, and not making “ a complaint [they] know [] to be false” (i bi d.), there is no reasona ble risk they would b e deterr ed. In our view, howev er, tellin g com plainants that they h ave a right to make a good -faith allegation of misconduct even if it is ultimat ely deem ed to be support ed by insufficient evidence

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 61 does little to mitigate the deterrent effect o f the n immediate ly telling them, but if we think you are lying, you can be charged with a crime. The problem with th e dissent’s argument is that it assu mes that simply be caus e the complainant believes that what they are saying is true — and becaus e th ey have been told that acting in good faith is not a crime — then they shou ld have no reason to be deterred from complaining. But as Justice Werdegar e xplained, allegat ions involv ing police misco nduct will frequently “ come down t o the word of the citizen against the word of the po lice officer ” (Stanistre et, supra, 29 Ca l.4 th at p. 513, conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.), and the admoniti on m akes prospecti ve complainants acutely aware that they could face “ criminal prosecution and the burden and expense of retain ing a de fense attorney ” if authoriti es think they are being knowingly untruthful. (Id. at p. 51 4.) Under such circumstanc es, “ some c omplainants are likely to choose n ot to g o forward. ” (Ibid.) The dissent di sagre es with that line of reasonin g. The fact that it may be a compla inant ’ s word against a police officer’s does no t alter the dissent’s view. No r does the fact that before citizens are even allowed to make a complaint, they are told they may face cr iminal pro secut ion if their stat ements are deemed knowingly untruth ful. The fact that the entit y that w ill make a determina tion o f falsity for purposes of effectuating an arrest may, i n the first instance, be the ve ry entity that the person is complain ing about? The dissent is unpersuaded. The fact that there is no materiality requir ement in the admonition? This, too, do es not alter the dissent ’s view because the average person will understand that materiality is inherent in its te rms. (See dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 15 – 16.) The language of the

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 62 criminal provision does not even match the languag e of the admonition? M ere “ ‘ worldplay, ’ ” says the dissent. (Id. at p. 15.) Some might construe the sc ope of the s tatute to be vague and ill- defined? That should only “ increase the latitude for citizens to make comp laints in good faith” (id. at p p. 14 – 15) argues the dissent, turning First A mend ment jurispru dence on its he ad. (See Grayned v. City of Rockford (197 2) 408 U.S. 104, 109 [“where a vague statut e ‘abut [s] upon sens itive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it ‘operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.’ Uncertain meanings inevitab ly lead citizens to ‘ “ steer far wider of the unla wful zone ”. .. than if the boundaries o f the forbidden areas were clearly marked’ ”], fns. omitted; see also RIPA Annual Report 2025, supra, at p. 170 [section 148.6(a) “could ha ve a chilling effect on m embers of the public. . . especially since there are no statutory limitations on what types of ‘false’ allegations that could result in prosecuti on”].) We tak e a differen t v iew: The quest ion we mus t ask is wh ether th e averag e person might be deterred from making even a truthfu l report of wrongdoi ng (or at least n ot a knowingly f alse one) wh en they ar e ad monished with the threa t of crimina l pros ecution — and re quired to sign a docum ent attesting to that admonishment — before they are allo wed to complain. We b elieve the answer t o th at question is cl early yes. The dissent conte nds, however, that a report sh owing that thousands of misconduct claims were f iled in 2018 and ultimately determi ned to be “ ‘ unfoun ded ’ ” belies any claim that citizens are det erred f rom pursu ing co mplaints. (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 12.) The di ssent appears to reason that because many citizens were willing to come forw ard with complaints i n 2018 that could not ultimately be substa ntiated,

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 63 it i s unlikely that section 148.6 (a)’s admonition require ment deters civilian complaints in any meaningful way. But the fact that thousands of compla ints were filed and dee med unfound ed (in a state with a population of 40 million) tells us little about how many people may have been deterred from filing complaints in the first instance. 19 The dissent next argues that our concerns regardi ng the deterring effects of section 148.6(a) are overstated because the dissent has identi fied some jurisdictions that allow the sign ed admonition to b e submit ted onli ne. (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 13 & appen.) A s a preliminar y matter, California is comprised of over 500 law enforc ement agencies. (See RIPA Annual R eport 2025, supra, at p. 18.) Thus, while true that some jurisd ictions have voluntarily ch osen to allow complaina nts to file their allegati ons online (perhap s recognizing how intimidatin g it may be to file i n person), there has been no showing that all jurisdictions do so and the RIPA Board ’s findings impl y otherwise. 20 (S ee RIPA Annual Report 19 The dissent appears to limit its arg ument to statist ics from 20 18 becaus e m ost o f the largest law enforcement agencies in California — indeed 10 of the 15 largest — do not currentl y include the admoniti on language in their complaint forms and many have not been d oing so since at least 2020. (See RIPA Annual Report 2025, supra, at pp. 171 – 172 & fn. 650.) Given that a vast m ajorit y o f our larges t law enforc ement agen cies are not employing the admonition, any mo re recent complaint statistics ar e particular ly unhelpful. 20 The RIP A Board was est ablished under The Racia l and Identity Profiling Act of 2015 (Stats. 2015, ch. 466, § 4) “for the purpose of eliminating racial and ide ntity profiling, and improvin g diversity and racial and identity sens itivity in law

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 64 202 0, at p. 70 < https: //oag.ca.g ov/sites/all/ files/agwe b/pdfs/ ripa/ ripa-board -report-2020.p df> as of N ov. 10, 2025 [indicating that some jurisdictions may have low numbers of reported complaint s because “ individuals. .. are required to. .. bring in compl aints in person ” ].) Wh ile la udable that s ome law enforcement agencies have elected to implement the statute in a less speech-deterring manner, that is cold comfort to residents who live in jurisdictions where that may n ot be the cas e. More crucially, even if the initial complaint is submitt ed online, that w ould no t seem to end the c omplai nant’s participati on in the matter. The language of the admonit ion and text of section 832.5 both make clear that the l aw enforce ment agency has an o bligati on to c onduct a fol low-up investigati on. As the di ssent e xpressl y acknowl edges, so me law enforc ement agencies “ requir e a n in-pers on interview for a fil ed comp laint to go forward. ” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 13.) And even in those jurisdictions that do not mandat e an in -person intervi ew, the complainant would presumab ly (at l east in most cases) be required to speak with an investigati ng law enforce ment agent in so me c apacity. And the ad monition makes complainants well enforcem ent. ” (§ 1 3519.4, su bd. (j)(1).) The board is made up o f represent atives of law enforce ment, appointees fro m the legislative and exec utive bran ches, attorneys, and c ommunity members, spiritual leaders and academics who speciali ze in policing and rac ial profiling. (See id. at subd. (j)(2).) Th e RIPA Board is required to conduct “evidenc e - based research” (id. at subd. (j)(3)(D)) on various police practices and issue an annual report making policy recom mendations for eliminating racial and ident ity profil ing (id. at sub d. (j)(3)(E)).

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 65 aware they can be charged with a crime if the investi gator thinks th ey are bei ng knowingly unt ruthf ul. The dissent sim ilarly argues th at an y risk of deterr ence is mitigated by th e fact that law en forcem ent “ agencies c ommon ly have structures designed to protect the integ rity of investigat ions. ” (Dis. opn. of Liu J., post, at p. 14.) Again, however, while some agencies may have such “ structures ” (ibid.) in place (the dissent i dentifies only four such agencies), the RIPA Board findings suggest that ot hers likely do not. (See RIPA Annual Repo rt 2020, supra, at pp. 67 – 70 [law enforcement agencies througho ut Californ ia lack “a uniform system to accept, document, investigate, and report complaints” ].) Nor are we p ersuaded that the average p erson would hav e any reason t o know about those “ structures ” (e.g., that s ome counties may refer the complaint to an independent Internal Affairs Bureau Office or Inspector General) when deciding whether to move forward with a complaint. The admonition certain ly does not inform th em of any such safegu ards. The dissent also expresses confusion as to how deterring well-intent ioned complaints of police misconduct could possibly be said to drive certain ideas or viewpoints from th e public sphere given that “ complaints alleging misconduct by a peace officer are general ly confidential.” (Dis. opn. of Liu J., post, at p. 18.) We think it clear, however, that when a regulatio n substantial ly burdens a citizen’s ability to engage in protected speech that relates to the conduct of government officials — even s peech that the larg er pu blic m ay not be privy too — heightened scrutiny i s requir ed. The fact that allegations within a complai nt are generally confident ial does nothing t o alter the sp eech det erring eff ects of th e statut e.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 66 On a more fundamental level, we s imply disagree with the dissent’s su ggestio n that there is no reas on to beli eve that section 148.6(a)’s features — in particular its admonition requirem ent — create a risk of deterring well- in tention ed reports of police misconduct. That is parti cularl y true among residents of communit ies that have historically experienced “disproporti onately.. . heightened levels of police scrutiny and racial pr ofiling.” (People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 105 4, conc. opn. of Evans, J.) As the d issent itself acknowledges, “ [M]any people, especially members of m inority, immigr ant, or low- incom e communities ” may be reluctant to pursue claims of police misconduct because “they may l ack confidence their complaints will be taken seriously” or they “may distrust law enforcem ent.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 4; cf. Flor es, at pp. 1053 – 1055, c onc. opn. of Evans, J.) The dissent non etheless finds no risk — or at least no meaningful risk — that i ndividual s who al ready ha rbor such concerns would be deterred by being told (in many cases in a police station by a police officer) that their complaint will not be accepted unless they agree to read and sign an admonition (written in all capital letters and in boldface print) warnin g that they m ay be charged with a crime if the l aw enforcement agency about whom they are complaining believes they are lying. The dissent i s confident that this is “not a m essage of deterrence” (dis. opn. of Liu, J., po st, at p. 11) and that o ur conc erns amount to nothing more than “ speculat ive assertions ” (id. at p. 4). But the entire point of the admonition is to deter. While the statute expli citly seeks to deter only knowingly f alse allegations of m isconduct, we think it entirely reasonab le (and indeed probab le) that threatening peopl e with

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 67 prosecuti on under an ill-defined standard of falsity would also give pause to those with well-intent ioned c omplaints. We are not alone in that conclus ion. The district court in Hamilton II, 325 F. Supp.2d 1087, for examp le, found that there is a “high likelihood” that subdivision (a)(2)’s admonition provisions “wil l cause individuals to refrain from filing a complaint agai nst law enforcement officers. ” (Id. at p. 1094.) The court further found that, “ Overall, [s]ection 148.6 creates a potent dis incentiv e for ci tizens t o file a complaint. ” (Ibid.) Multiple members of this court have expressed similar views. (See Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 513 – 514, conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.; Moreno, J., joining [§ 148.6 (a)’s criminal provision, coupled with its “unique” admonition req uirement, will “[r] ealistical ly, [cause] some complainants. .. to choose not to go forward — e ven wh en they ha ve legitimate c omplaints ”].) T he Attorn ey General’s RIPA Board (see § 13519.4, sub d. (j); see ante, at p. 64, fn. 20), which includes several represent atives of law enforcement (see id. at subds. (j)(2)(A), (C) – (F)), has also conclud ed that s ection 148.6(a)’s stat utory scheme risks deterr ing reas onable citizens from co ming for ward with truthful complaints about police misconduct. In its most recent annual report, the RIPA Board recommended (as it has in every report since its i ncepti on) that “the Legislature delete or amend” section 148.6(a)(2)’s admon ition requir ement, explaining that the “the advisory l anguag e.. . could have a chilling e ffect on members of the public seeking to file a complaint, esp ecially since th ere ar e n o statutory limita tions on what types of ‘false’ allegations that could result in prosecuti on. . . . [R ]equirin g a complainant to reveal their id entit y [by signing the advisor y] even if they wish to remain

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 68 anonymous, could [also] det er members of the public from submitting valid comp laints.” 21 (RIPA Annua l R eport 2025, supra, at pp. 170 – 171; see also RIPA Annual Report 20 20, supra, at p. 74 [“ requirin g complaints to be signed, in writing, and under penalty of criminal prosecution may create an unnecess ary chilling effect. . . particularly those that allege racial or identity profiling ”].) Those recommend ations are consistent with guidance from the U.S. Department of Justice (U.S. DOJ). (See Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. DOJ, Standards and Guidelines for Internal Affairs, p. 17 [as of Nov. 10, 20 25 ] [“[u]nless required by law, no threats or warning of prosecution or potential prosecuti on for filing a fa lse comp laint should b e mad e ora lly or in writing t o a com plainant or potenti al complainan t ” ].) 21 Sever al dec isions highlight the pot ential concerns with section 148.6(a). In Hamilton I, supra, 107 F.Supp.2d 1239, f or example, the plain tiff brought a civil rights action alleging that he was rep eatedly subjected to p olice misconduct but elected not to move forward with a citizen compla int after the watch command er questioned his story and read him the admonit i on required by s ection 148.6(a)(2). And in C uadra, supra, 2010 WL 55875, the defenda nt lodged a citizen’ s complaint allegin g that he had been unlawful ly stopped and beaten by sever al o fficers. The officers d enied the allegati ons, asserting that the defendant was intoxicate d and had sustained his injuries by “ r epeatedly bash[ing ] his head against the plastic divid er.” (Id. at *1.) The officers’ sup ervisor conducted an investigati on and ultimatel y believed the officers’ story. The defendant was there after charged under section 148.6(a), but the charges were later dismissed, and the defendant pursued a civil rights action against the c ity.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 69 Although the RIPA Board includes numerous experts in law enforcement, the dissent discounts its findings regarding the potential deterrent effects of section 148.6(a)(2) (and apparently the guidance of the U.S. DOJ) because those findings were unac companie d by empir ical evid ence such as “co mmunity surveys.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 17.) The dissent contends that we should not (and indeed cannot) conclude that section 14 8.(6) bur dens speech in the absence of “evidenc e” (dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 17) — presumably statistica l evidence or the like — conf irming that the admonition risks deterring well-intent ioned co mplaints of po lice misconduct. That approach, however, finds no support i n the law. In the recent ly decided Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, for example — again a case th e dissen t does not r eference — the high court did not require any statistical proof or other “evidence” that an age -verific ation require ment might deter adults from accessing sexually explicit websites as a preconditi on of finding that the regulation warranted heightened scrutiny. That decision is consist ent with other cases in w hich ou r high court has cons idered the potential deterring effects of speech regulations without looking to the type of empirical evidence the dissent appears to call for here. (See, e.g., Multimedia Holdings Corp. v. Circuit Court of Florida, St. Johns County (20 05) 544 U. S. 1301, 1304 [“A thre at of prosecution . . . raises specia l First Amendment concer ns, for it may chill protected speech. . . by putting that party at an added risk of liability”]; Denver Area Education al Telecommunic ation s Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C. (1996) 518 U.S. 727, 754 [written n otice re quirement would “ r estrict viewin g by subscribers who fear for their reputa tions should the operator

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 70. .. inadvertentl y [] di sclose the li st of tho se who wish to watch [explicit c ontent] ” ].) We join the many voices who have previously co nclud ed that as currently structured, section 148.6(a) prese nts a meaningful risk of deterring a core form o f protected speech — well-intent ioned reports of police misconduct — thus warranting h eighte ned scrutiny. iii. A dditi onal argu ments The d issent additional ly ar gues th at s ection 148.6(a) is no different than statutes that “mak e i t a crime to co mmit perjury ” or to “ lie t o a gover nment off icial conc erning an o fficial matt er. ” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 3.) Such statutes, h owever, merely target — in a neutral manner — the act of lying about any material issu e during a particular form of proce eding. They do not single out fo r specia l treatment lies that target a particular category of government employment. T he more apt comparis on would be a law b arring perjury that re lates to the misconduc t of a government official. And these laws certainly do not require that, as a condition of fil ing a fo rmal complaint against a govern ment employee, the complaina nt m ust sign an admonition warnin g that they can be charged with a crime if their allegat ions ar e deemed to be knowingly f alse. The dissent also notes that section 148.6(a)(1) ’s crimina l provision only applies when a person files a knowin gly false allegation of misconduct that triggers the citizen complain t procedure and thus leaves unregu lated claims of misconduct conveyed in any number o f ot her mediums, such as a “blog post, viral email, or TikTok.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 6.) B ut as we have explain ed above, the fact that sect ion 148.6(a) does

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 71 not regulate all for ms of statements concer ning police misconduct does little to negat e o ur concerns regar ding the burdens the statute places on the most accessible and effective mode of report ing police misconduct that is available to the citizens of Californ ia. (See ante, at p. 48.) Whi le th e statut e may n ot chill what a p erson chooses to say about polic e misconduct in a Tik Tok video, the fact that i t risks chilling what a person might report to the government (who has a duty to investigat e such reports) nonetheless raises constitutiona l concerns. 3. Section 1 48.6 is not narrowly t ailored t o achieve its purposes Because section 148.6(a) const itutes a content-based regulation within a proscri bable categ ory of speech that presents a c onsequenti al ris k of su ppressin g a core form of protected speech, further constitution al scrutiny is warranted. The level of scrutiny that applies to a regulation like section 148.6(a), which discriminat es on the basis of content within a proscribab le category of fals ehood (defamation), is somewhat uncertain. Wh ile R. A. V. appl ied strict scrutiny t o the conte nt- based regulation before it, that regulation was expressl y deemed to discriminat e on t he basis of v iewpoint — “a ‘m ore blatant’ and ‘ egregious [subclass] of content discriminat ion. ’ ” (Reed, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 1 68.) In this case, th e primary concern with section 148.6(a) is not t hat it disfav ors any part icular viewpoin t (as the statute in R. A. V. did), but rather its incidental burden on protect ed forms of sp eech. Moreover, section 148.6(a) does not directly regulate any protectabl e form of speech. Rather, as we have constru ed it, the statute only cr iminal izes malicious defamatory falsehoods. (See

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 72 ante, at pp. 33 – 34.) Thus, unlike many forms of content-based regulations, the constitutiona l concern here is not that the state is attempting to regulat e a protected form of speech or that the statute is written in such a manner that it sweeps protected speech within its actual prohibiti ons. Rather, the concern is that the means the stat e has selecte d to regu late a proscribable form of spe ech risks deterring citizens from engaging in a protected form of speech. The high c ourt’s recent opinion in Free Speech C oalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, su ggests that u nder such circumstanc es, i nterm ediate scrutiny is generally the appropriate st andard of r eview. (Id. at pp. 482 – 4 83, 495.) For purposes of this case, it i s ultimately immaterial whether intermediate or str ict scrutiny applies be cause we conclude that sect ion 148.6(a) canno t survive even the less exacting standard of inter mediate scrutiny. (See Packingham, supra, 582 U.S. at p. 105 [“Even making the assu mption that the s tatute is . .. su bject t o inte rmediate scrutiny, th e pr ovision cannot stand”]; McCutche on v. FEC (2014) 572 U. S. 185, 199, plur. op n. of Roberts, C. J. [because the statute “fail[s ] even under the [less demanding ] test,” the c ourt “need not pars e the differenc es between the two standard s in this case” ].) “In order to survive intermed iate scrutiny, a law must be ‘narr owly tailored to serve a significant govern mental interest. ’ [Citation.] In o ther words, the law must not ‘burden substantially more speech th an is necess ary to f urther the governmen t ’ s legitimate interests. ’ ” (Packingh am, at pp. 105 – 106; accord Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at p. 471.) “[T]h ese standards ensur e. . . that the [governmen t ’ s] inter ests are proport ional to the resulting burdens placed on speech. ” (Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. (2011) 564 U.S. 552, 572; accord Free Speech Coalition, at p. 471;

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 73 Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 73 0, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) [in the context of falsity, intermediate scrutiny requires the court “to deter mine whether the statute works speech - related harm that is out of proporti on to its jus tificati ons”].) Applying thos e standards here, we find that th e governm ent has a significant interest in de terring knowingly false c omplaints of misconduct levied against police officer s. As detailed in the legislative history, section 148.6(a) was pas sed in response to a substantial increase in false claims of misconduct that were causing professional and rep utati onal harm to law enforcem ent officers (and resultin g in the unnecessar y expenditur e of pub lic funds) du e to s ection 8 32.5’s inves tigation requirem ents. The state has a legitimate inte rest in curbing abusive f alse compla ints of police conduct, the negative effects of which take on added signif icance because of the statut ory investigat ion require ments. We are not persua ded, however, that section 148.6(a) has been crafted in a manner that “ ‘does not burden substantially more speech than ne cessar y to further those interests. ’ ” (Free Speech Coalition, supra, 60 6 U.S. at p. 471.) Whil e the o bjectiv e of curbing abusive false claims of police m isconduct is sound, the means the Legislat ure chose to accomplish those objectives — an ill- defined criminal provision that i s accompanied by an un usual admonition requirement — unnecessar ily risk chilling substantial ly more speech than is necessary to furthe r the governm ent ’ s interests. Indeed, there would seem to be any number of other, less speech-deterrin g ways o f addressi ng the

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 74 reputationa l and professional harms that m ay be caused by section 83 2.5’s inve stigation process. 22 The Legislatur e might, for e xample, provide peace o fficers heightened proc edural protections that insula te them against the potential ly damaging professiona l effects of false complaints. (See Gov. Code, §§ 330 0 – 3313 [the Public Safety Officers Procedura l Bill of Rights Act]; § 832.5, subd. (c) [any complaints that are found to be frivolous, unfounded, or exonerat ed are not maintained in the officer’s personnel fi le].) Alternative ly, i t might “more finely tailor[]” (Alv arez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 738, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) the scope of subdivision (a)(1)’s cri minal provision by, among other possibilities, “insist[ing] upon a s howing that the false statement caused specific harm” (Alvarez, at p. 738, conc. opn. of B reyer, J.) o r including a mater iality requirement (see Animal Lega l Defense Fund, supra, 8 F.4th at p. 787). The statute’s cri minal provision and its attendant admonition requirem ent might more precise ly (and cons istently) defin e what form of allegations might trigger criminal liability. The statute might treat knowingly false statements made in the context of a police misconduct investigati on mor e even- handedly, which would seem to accord wi th the state’s claims that section 148.6(a) is i ntended (at least in part) to protect the integrity o f the complaint investigation process. And perhaps most crucially, the Legislature might amend the admonition 22 The part ies have not identified any other state statute that criminalizes knowingly false allegations of poli ce misconduct while conditioning acceptance of any such complaint on signin g the type of admoniti on at is sue here.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 75 requirem ent in a manner that is less speech deterr ing. 23 While we expr ess no vi ew as to wheth er any of these alternative approach es wo uld be sufficient to survive constitu tional scrutiny, we think it clear that the current structur e of section 148.6(a) unnecessa rily risks chilling substantially more speec h than necessary to deter kno wingly false allegati ons of misconduct against police offic ers. Again, we acknowledge that the state has a legitimat e interest in curbi ng the deleterious e ffects of false compla ints against l aw enforcement. (Accord dis. o pn. o f Liu, J., post, a t p. 6.) And like the dissent, we reaffirm Stanistree t ’s conclusion that the Legislatur e has the authority “to protect the integrit y of complaint procedures by. . . deterring abuse. ” (D is. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 6; see Stanis treet, su pra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 510.) Unlike the dissent (an d Stanistreet), however, we concl ude that as presently drafted section 148.6(a) “wo rks disproport ionate constituti onal harm” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 73 9, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) by attem pting to achiev e thos e obj ectives i n a manner that unduly chills a core form of protecte d speech — truthful or well-intentione d complaints of government misconduct. It consequentl y fails intermediate scrutiny and thus violates the Firs t Amendment. 23 The RIPA Board’s most recent annual report shows that since at least 2020, many of the largest law enforce ment agencies in California have omitted the advisory langua ge s et forth in section 148.6(a)(2) from their citizen complain t forms. (See RIPA Annu al Report 2025, supra, at pp. 171 – 172.) L APPL has made no showing that these omissions have had any material eff ect on the nu mber of abusi ve police co mplaints filed against agencies that have chosen not to include the admonition.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF LO S ANGEL ES Opinion of the Cour t by Groban, J. 76 III. D ISPOSITION The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. GROBAN, J. We Concur: GUERRERO, C. J. CORRIGA N, J. KRUGER, J. EVANS, J. JENKINS, J. * * Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California C onstitu tion.

1 LOS ANG ELES POLIC E PROT ECTIVE L EAGUE v. CITY OF LOS A NGELES S275272 Dissentin g Opinion by Justic e Liu At least since the beating of Ro dney Ki ng by off icers of the Los Angeles Police Department in 1991, police misconduct has been a high-profile issue i n California and through out the nation. The conce rn has remained salient in light of many fraught and s ometim es dea dly p olice i nteractions with minor ity communit ies over the years. (See People v Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1049; id. at pp. 1053 – 105 4 (conc. opn. of Evans, J.); People v. McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal. 5th 429, 451 – 452 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.); B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 30 – 31 (c onc. opn. of Liu, J.).) As one recourse, our Legislature requir es every law enforcem ent a gency to “est ablish a procedure to investigate complaints by members of the public against the pers onnel o f these departments . . . , and. . . [to] make a written description of the procedur e available to the public.” (Pen. Code, § 832.5, subd. (a) (1); all undesignat ed stat utory references are to the Penal Code.) Such pro cedures enable everyday citizens to report misconduct and hol d officials acc ountable. As important as these procedures are, they are also susceptibl e to abuse. Section 148.6 makes it a misdemeanor to “file[] an y allegati on of misc onduct a gainst an y peace officer ... knowing the allegation to be false.” (§ 148.6, subd. (a)(1).) In addition, the statute re quires any c omplain ant to r ead and sig n

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 2 an advisory that says in capital letters and boldface: “YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST A POLICE OFFICER FOR ANY IMPROPER POLICE CONDUCT. C ALIFORNIA LAW REQUIRES THIS A GENC Y TO HAVE A PROCE DURE TO INV ESTIGATE CIVILIANS’ COMPLAINT S. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO A WRITTE N DESCRIPTI ON OF THIS PROCEDURE. THIS A GENC Y MA Y FIND AFTER INVESTIGATION THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDE NCE TO WARRA NT ACTION ON YOUR COMPLAINT; EVEN IF THAT IS THE CASE, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE COMPL AINT AND HAVE IT INVESTIG ATED IF YOU BELIEVE AN OFFICER BEHAVED IMPROPE RLY. CIVILIAN COMPLA INTS AND ANY REPORTS OR FINDINGS RELATI NG TO COMPL AINTS MUST BE RETAINED BY THIS AGENCY FOR AT LEAST FIVE YEARS. [¶] IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO MAKE A COMPLAINT THAT YOU KNOW TO BE FALSE. I F YOU MAKE A C OMPL AINT AGAINST AN OFFICER KNOWING THAT IT IS FALSE, YOU CAN BE PROSECUT ED ON A MISDEME ANOR CH ARGE.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).) In enacting section 148.6, th e Legislature observ ed that a “glaringly neg ative side -effect which has resulted [from the availabilit y of complaint procedures] has b een the willingn ess on th e part of many of our less ethical citi zens to mali ciously file false allegati ons of miscond uct against officers in an effort to punish them for simply doing their jobs. [¶] Unf ortunately for the officers, these comp laints usually beco me a permanent part of th eir personn el jack ets. . .. Additionally, most of the of ficers find th ey have very little recourse a gainst t he comp lainants.” (Assem. Com. on Publ ic Sa fety, Analysis of Ass em. Bill No. 1732

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 3 (1995 – 1996 Reg. Sess.) April 18, 1995, at p. 1.) The statut e “addresses the issue of knowin gly making false allegations o f misconduct against any peace officer. These false accusati ons can adversel y affect the officer’s po sition within the Departmen t, and this legislation will discoura ge such false reports. [¶]. . . [¶ ]. . . For example, a Deputy Sheriff on a list for promotion to Sergeant recei ves a false report of misconduct, after which his promotion i s deferr ed until the matter is resolved. After which, the complaint being found ungrounded, the Deputy has no recourse for any financial loss due to the delay.” (Id. at p. 2.) Further, by deterring knowi ngly false complaints, the statute enables law enforcement agencies t o focus on good-faith complaints, thereby saving time and resources. (Maj. op n., ante, at p. 12.) The quest ion is whether section 148.6 is an unconstitut ional restriction on freedo m of speech. The answer is simple: Section 148.6 is no more unconstitution al than laws that make it a crime to c ommit perj ury, file a false police report, submit a false document to a public agency, or lie to a governm ent official concerning an officia l matter. Such l aws “ protect the i ntegr ity of [g]overn ment processes, quite apart from merel y r estric ting false spe ech.” (United S tates. v. Alv arez (2012) 567 U.S. 709, 721 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) (Alvarez).) They belong to one of the “ ‘ “historic and traditional categori es [of expression]” ’ ” where “content -bas ed restrictions on speech have been per mitted.” (Id. at p. 717.) Today’s opinion invalidat es section 148.6 on t he groun d that it “det er[s] citizens from filing truthful (or at least not knowingly false) complaint s of police misconduct. ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.) But that

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 4 rationale rests on speculative assertions and d oes not wi thstan d scrutiny. To be sure, many people, e specia lly members of minority, immigrant, or low-inco me c ommunities, may be reluctant to fil e complaints. They may feel it is not their place to question authority; they may l ack confidence their complaints will be taken seriously; they may distrust law enforcement; they may not know the pr ocess or have time t o figure i t out. Thes e issues have long histori es and many complexities quite apart from section 148.6, and for police agencies, the re is perhaps no task more important th an gaining the trust of the communities they serve. But trust i s a two -way street, and our men and women in uniform have a hard enough job without having to deal with knowingly fals e allegati ons of misconduct. Because sect ion 148.6 targets unprot ected speech and has not been shown to pose a substantial risk of suppr essing protect ed speech, I cannot agree that it violat es the First Amendm ent. I. As the high court has made clear, there is no “ general exception to the First Amend ment f or false statements.” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 718 (plur. o pn. of Kenned y, J.); see id. at pp. 733 – 734 (conc. opn. of Breyer, J.).) But our statutes and common law have long recogniz ed categories of “knowing or reck less falsehood[s]” that may be proscribed without running afoul o f the First Amend ment. (Alvarez, at p. 719 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) The se include defamation, fraud, perjury, and false statements made to a g overnmen t official. (Id. at pp. 719 – 721; see id. at pp. 734 – 7 35 (conc. opn. of Breyer, J.).) T he common denominator of such laws is not merely that they proscribe false spee ch, but that they protect

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 5 against “legal ly cognizable harm associated with a false statement.” (Id. at p. 719 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.); see id. at p. 734 (conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) [such laws narrow the range of proscribed falsehoods “by specify ing that the lies be made in contexts i n which a tangible harm to others is especially likely to occur” or “by limiting the prohibited lies to those that are particular ly likely to produce h arm”].) One subset consists o f longstanding laws that protect the integrity of governmen t processes. Perjury lacks First Amendment protection “not simply because perjured statements are false,” but because “[p]erjur y underm ines the funct ion and province of the law and threatens the integrity of judgments that are the basis of the legal system.” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 720 – 721 (plur. o pn. of Kenned y, J.); see United States v. Dunnigan (1993) 507 U.S. 87, 97 [“the const itutional ity of perjury stat utes i s u nquestione d”].) The federal law proh ibiting false statements to government offi cials, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, likewise “protect[s ] the integrity of [g]overn ment processes, quite apart from merely restrictin g false speech.” (Alvarez, at p. 721 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.); see ibid. [same for “[s]tatutes that prohibit f alsely repr esenting that on e is speakin g on behal f of the Governm ent, or that prohibit impersonating a Governm ent officer,” such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 709, 712, 912].) The same is true of state laws m aking it a crime to submit a false document to a public agency (§ 115), file a false police report (§ 118.1), or offer false evidence in a trial or of ficial investi gation (§ 132). This i s not “a new category of proscribabl e speech.” (Maj. o pn., ante, at p. 60.) In “ou r law and tradition,” such prohibiti ons have not b een viewed as “somehow vulnerable ”

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 6 under the First Amendmen t. (Alvarez, at p. 721 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.); see id. at pp. 734 – 7 35 (conc. opn. of Brey er, J.).) Section 148.6 falls squarely within this category. It prohibits an individual from filing an allegation of peace o fficer misconduct “know ing the allegation to be false.” (§ 148.6, subd. (a) (1).) The “knowing” limitat ion is significant; the statute does not punish the filing of a good-faith allegation that turns out to be false or unsubstantiat ed. Further, the statute targets a knowin gly fal se “allegation of mi sconduct” (ibid.); it does not apply to a false st atement that is immaterial to a mi sconduct al legation. And criticall y, the statute is only triggered when a person “files” (ibid.) a knowingly false allegation of misconduct pursuant to a c itizen complaint procedure. If a person l ies about a police officer’s conduct in a blog post, viral e -mail, or TikTok video, the law of defamation may have something to say. But section 148.6 does not. In this respect, section 148.6 could not be more dif ferent from the law h eld unconstitut ional in Alvarez, which criminalized lying about having been awarded the Congress ional Medal of Honor whether in the public square or “within a ho me,” “whet her s hout ed f rom the roofto ps or made in a barely audib le whisper.” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U. S. at pp. 722, 723 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.); see id. at pp. 722 –723 [“The statute seeks to control and suppress all false state ments on this one subj ect in almo st limitless times and s ettings.”].) Section 148.6 i s not a general prohibition on defaming peace officers; it is a narrow measu re that targets kn owing abuse of an official process. Under California law, every complaint of misconduct filed against a peace officer must be investigat ed (§ 832.5), and “[c ]omplaints and any r eports or findings relating to these complaints . . . shall be retained fo r a

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 7 period o f no less than 5 years” (id., subd. (b)). Although complaints determined to be unfounded may not be used for punitive or promotiona l purposes (id., subd. (c)(2)), the mere fact of an investig ation may delay an officer’s promotion or cast a cloud over the offic er’s standing in the depart ment. (Ante, at pp. 2 – 3.) Although complaints are not filed under oath, the statute requir es complainants to read and sign the advisory quoted above. Complaints in this context are thus similar to sworn testimony in that they have “the formality and gravity necessar y to remind the [complai nant] that his or her statements will be the basis for official governmental action, action that often affects the rights and li berties o f others.” (Alvarez, supr a, 567 U.S. at p. 721 (p lur. opn. o f Kenne dy, J.).) The law takes ser iously any c omplaint filed against a peace o fficer, and the Legislature was well within its prerogative to protect the integrity of complaint procedures by punishing and deter ring abus e. S ection 148.6 is co mpatible with th e First Amendment for the same reason that perjury statutes and o ther laws against false statements in official proceedings have long endured. These laws are of “ ‘unquesti oned constituti onality’ ” because they sa feguard the integr ity of governm ent pr ocesses that inform legal ju dgments or official acti ons. (A lvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 720 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.), quotin g United States v. Grayson (1978) 4 38 U.S. 4 1, 54.) II. In Chaker v. Crogan (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 1215 (Chaker), the Ninth Circuit held section 148.6 unconstitution al on the ground that it “discriminates on the basis of a speaker’s viewpoint” (id. at p. 1217) by “holding.. . citizen complainants accountable for the ir kn owing falsehoods, while leaving

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 8 unregulate d the knowin gly false speech of a peace officer or witness” (id. at p. 1226). Today’s opinion similarly asserts that section 148.6 “is asymmetric al in its applicati on, criminalizing knowingly false complaints filed against law e nforc ement personne l — and expressly requiri ng complaina nts be told of that possibility — while leaving unregulated (and requiring no admonition against) knowing ly false claims that a witness might make against the complainant during any ensuing investigat ion.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 40 – 41; cf. R. A. V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 391 (R. A. V.) [invalidating local ordinanc e that targeted a subset of proscribable hate speech because i t went “beyond mere content di scri mination, to actual viewpoint discriminatio n”].) It is true that section 148.6 does not apply to knowingly false st atements mad e by polic e offic ers. But sect ion 14 8.6 d oes not exi st in a vacuum. Section 118.1, which was originally enacted in 1990 (Stats. 1990, ch. 950, § 3) and repealed and added as revis ed in 2021 (Stats. 2 021, ch. 267, §§ 1, 2), makes i t a crime for an y p eace officer to “knowingly and intentionally” “fil[e] a fal se report.” (§ 118.1, subd. (a); see ibid. [“[e]very peace officer” is “guilt y of filing a fals e report ” if the offic er mak es any material statement in a pe ace officer report or gives any such statement “to another peace officer and the statement is included in a peace officer report, regarding the commission or investigat ion of any crime, knowing the statement to be false”]; id., subd. (b) [where a statement is made by another person, “the peace officer writing or making th e report” i s criminall y l iable if the of ficer “kn ows the statem ent to be false and is inc luding the statement to prese nt the statement as being true”].) Se veral courts have susta ined charges or upheld conv ictions of law

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 9 enforcem ent officers under section 118.1 fo r filing false reports. (See People v. Kim (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 857, 861 – 862, 869; People v. Singleton (2010) 182 Cal.Ap p.4th 1, 5, 22; People v. Jimenez (Mar. 19, 2007, B186124) [nonpub. opn.]; Pe ople v. Scarsella (Jan. 3, 2006, C048011) [nonpub. o pn.].) When a complaint is made against an officer, the officer will typically have to put his or her ve rsion of events into a report o r give a statement to an invest igating officer to be included in a report. (E.g., Cuadra v. City of South San Francisco (N.D.Cal., Jan. 4, 20 10, No. C08-3439 TEH) 20 10 WL 55875 (Cuadra) [after Cuadra claimed police officers used excessiv e force w hen arr esting h im, the offi cers prep ared a report on the arres t and investigation of Cuadra’s complaint].) A knowin g falseh ood would expose the offic ers to criminal liability under sect ion 118.1, which provid es for more sever e punishment than sect ion 148.6. (Cf. § 118.1, subd. (a) [up to three years in prison] with §§ 148.6, 19 [up to six m onths in jail].) There is no asymmetry when section 148.6 is consider ed alongside secti on 118.1; if anything, the stiff er penalty prov ided by section 118.1 means the officer faces great er r isk than the complaina nt. Toda y’s opini on does not dispute this point. Further, al though section 148.6 does not proscribe knowingly false statements by a witness “against the complaina nt” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 40), the statute also does not proscribe kn owingly fals e statements by a witness in support o f the complain ant. The court does not di sput e this point either. And witness statements in either direction, to the extent they are to be used as evidence, are subject to o rdinary laws against false e vidence. (§§ 118, 132.) Whi le those laws have limitations (maj. opn., ante, at p. 42, fn. 12), that is equally true whether

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 10 they are applied to witness statements for or against the complaina nt, o r for or against the accused officer. The rules governing wi tness stat ements are evenhan ded and do not lea ve a complainant more exposed to liability under section 148.6 than an officer is expose d under secti on 118.1. In sum, knowingly false witness statements against either the complaina nt or the officer ar e on equal footin g, as are knowingly false statements by either the complainant or the officer. Wh ere is th e asymmetr y? III. The crux of the court’s reasoning today i s that several features of section 148.6, consid ered together, “ ‘ threaten censorsh ip of ideas’ [citation] by deterrin g citiz ens from filing truthful (or at least not knowingl y false) complaints of police misconduct.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.) “[A]symmet rical” application is purp ortedly o ne of the features (id. at p. 40), but as discuss ed, there is no asy mmetry. “More troubling sti ll,” th e court says, “sect ion 148. 6(a)(1)’s criminal provisio n i s accompanie d b y an adm onition requirem ent that contains various speech deterring elements.” (Maj. opn., ante, a t p. 42.) In elaborating this c oncern, the court focuses on the advi sory’s last two sentences: “ IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO MAKE A COMPLAIN T THAT Y OU KNOW T O BE FALSE. IF YOU MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAIN ST AN OFFICER KNOWI NG THAT IT IS FALSE, YOU CAN BE PROSECUT ED ON A MISDEME ANOR CHARGE.” (§ 148.6, subd. (a) (2); see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 42 – 43.) But the court conspicuous ly omits the advisory’s first fo ur sentences: “YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST A

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 11 POLICE OFFICER FOR ANY IMPROPER POLICE CONDUCT. C ALIFORNIA LAW REQUIRES THIS A GENC Y TO HAVE A PROCE DURE TO INV ESTIGATE CIVILIANS’ COMPLAINT S. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO A WRI TTEN DESCRIPTI ON OF THIS PROCEDURE. THIS A GENC Y MA Y FIND AFTER INVESTIGATION THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDE NCE TO WARRA NT ACTION ON YOUR COMPLAINT; EVEN IF THAT IS THE CASE, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE COMPL AINT AND HAVE IT INVESTIG ATED IF Y OU BELIEVE AN OFFICER BEHAVE D IMPROPE RLY.” (§ 148.6, subd. (a)(2).) The advisory twice informs the reader that “you have the right to make a complaint” (or “th e compla int”). (§ 148.6, subd. (a) (2), capital ization omitted.) And the fourth sentence makes clear that even if the agency finds insufficient evidence to act on a complaint, “you have the right to make the c omplaint and have it investigat ed if you believe an officer behaved improper ly.” (Ibid., capitalization omitted.) This is not a message of deterrence. The advisory, in plain language, properly distin guishes between a good-faith comp laint that lacks “enough evidence” and “a complaint that you know to be false.” (Ibid., c apitalizat ion omitted.) The court worries that “ the admon ition requ irement may well det er report ing by persons who merely suspect, but cannot be certain, that they were a victim of more subtle forms of pol ice misconduct su ch as racial profiling or an unlawful stop.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 44.) But why? A person who genuinely suspects but is not certain she was a victim of police misconduct would readily know that she is not making a complaint sh e knows to be fals e.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 12 Indeed, people through out California, including people in jurisdictions that require the advisory, have not been deterre d from filing thousan ds of comp laints that were investigated and determin ed to be “un founded” (allegation is not true), “exonerat ed” (officer did n ot vio late the law or a gency polic y), or “not sust ained” (evidence is ins ufficien t to prove or dispro ve the allegation). (Racial & Identity Profiling Advisory (R IPA) Board, Annual Report 2020, p. 60 (RIPA 2020 Report).) For example, among 8, 488 com plaints resolved by 453 agenc ies in 2018, whe n the admonit ion was widely used, a total of 7,569, or 89%, resulted in one of those three disposi tions. (Ibid.; see RIPA Board, Annual Re port 2018, p. 28 [revi ewing complaint forms from 85 agencies and finding that 63% “includ ed l anguag e informin g the civilian of his/her right to file a complaint and many featured [the advisory] language” and that 81% “include a l ine for the complainant’s signature, typically to confirm that they hav e re ad and understand t he [adv isory] sta tement”].) Sure, Californ ia is a big state (maj. opn., ante, at p. 63), but unless there is reason to think thos e thousands of compla inants are outliers — and the court offers none — this str ikes me as probative of whether the advisory poses a risk of deterring “the average person” from making a g ood -faith compla int (id. at p. 62). The court adds atmosphere to the advisory by positing that “ subdivis ion (a)(2) requ ires that: (1) complai nants walk into a police station and locate the appropriate person to complain to, who will likely be a uniforme d police officer; (2) complain ants make known that they want to levy a serious complaint of misconduct against one of the colleagues of the person they ar e comp laining to; (3) compla inants w ill then be

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 13 told that before the police will even accept a complai nt, they must sign an advisory acknowledging that they can be criminall y charged i f law enforce ment believes that anything they say is knowingly false; and (4) the entity that will make a determina tion of falsity f or pur poses of effectu ating an arrest is, in the first instance, likely to be the very entity that the person is complain ing about. ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 44.) This narrative does not track reality i n several respects. For one thing, the statute does not “requir e[]” anyone to “walk into a police statio n.” (Ma j. opn., ante, at p. 44.) On a cursory search of compla int pro cedur es through out the state, it i s evident that there are m any ways to file a complaint. Amon g the eight largest jurisdictions that g ive the adv isory — Alameda County, K ern County, Rivers ide County, Sacramento County, San Bernardino County, City of San Diego, San Diego County, and Ventura County — none requires complaints to be filed in person. (See Appendix, post [collecting websites on these jurisdictions’ complaint procedur es].) All of them provid e options such as filing online or by e -mail, mail, or phone. The Los Angeles Police Department “encourages” in -person filing but makes clear “it is not required”; a complaint may be filed online or by phon e, mail, fax, e- mail, mobile app, or even Facebook or X. (Ibid. [Los Angeles websites].) Although some agencies require an in-person interview fo r a filed complaint to go forward, today’s opinion does not identify a sin gle jurisdiction that requir es compla ints to be filed in person. (See R IPA 2020 Report, supra, pp. 88 – 90 [sum marizing compla int proc edures i n eight large j urisdic tions; none r equire s filing in p erson].) Moreover, it is inaccurat e o r at best oversimplifi ed to say that complaint procedures put people in the position of levyin g

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 14 “a serious co mplaint of mi sconduct against one of the co lleagues of the person they are complainin g to,” or that the entity assessing the merits of a complain t is “likely to be the very entity that the person is compla ining about.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 44.) In this day and age of professi onal policing, law enforcemen t agencies commonly have structur es designed to protect the integrity of invest igations. (See RIPA 2020 Report, supra, pp. 88 – 90.) An easy search reveals that complaints aga inst officers of the San Diego Police Department are handled by the Internal A ffairs Unit. I n Sacramento C ounty, complai nts are filed with the Internal Affairs Bureau of the Sher iff’s Office or with the county’s Office of Inspect or General. A complaint about a Los Angeles Police Department officer may be filed with the department or wi th the Office of the Inspector General of the Los Angeles Police Commission. In San Francisco, complaints are handled by th e Department of Police Accounta bility, an agency independen t of the police department and staffed by “[c]ivilians who have never been po lice officers in San Francisco.” (Appendix, post [collecting relevant websites].) These ar e but a few examples. Today’s o pini on says a further concern is that “ the language of subdivis ions (a)(1) a nd (a)(2) introduces uncertaint y and confusion as to the specific scope of statements that might fall within the criminal provision.” (Maj. o pn., ante, at p. 45.) The court s ays the term “misc onduct” (§ 148.6, subd. (a)(1)) is vague and not defined. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 45.) But doesn’t that increase the latitude for citizens to make complaints in good faith? (Se e People v. Nuckles (2013) 5 6 Cal.4th 601, 611 [rule o f lenity “ ‘generally requires that “a mbiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity, giving the defendant the

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 15 benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of interpret ation” ’ ”].) The court al so posits i nconsistenc y betwee n the statute and the advisory in that the advisory’s “ term ‘improper polic e conduct’ could be reasonably construed as encompass ing a broader category of behavi or than [the statutory term] ‘miscond uct.’ [Citation.] And whereas subdivisi on (a)(1) makes clear that it is a knowingly false ‘allegation of miscond uct’ tha t triggers the crim inal sanction, the ad monition in subdivision (a)(2) simply states it is a misdemeanor to file any ‘complaint’ that one knows to be false.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 46.) T o borr ow a phras e: “This is w ordplay.” (R. A. V., s upra, 505 U.S. at p. 392.) Parsing the distinction between “improper conduct” and “misconduct,” or between “allegation of misconduct ” and “complaint,” is a task (some) lawyers may love. But ordinary cit izens giving words th eir ordinary mean ings are not likely t o be confus ed. The court also says section 148.6, subdivision (a)(1) contains no requirement that “ the false statement be material to the allegations at issue.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 45.) But the statute does not punish any false statement in a complaint; it targets an “allegation of m isconduct against any peace officer” that is made “knowing the allegatio n to be false.” (§ 148.6, subd. (a) (1).) Statem ents extraneous to the allegation o f misconduct are not covered. The same m eaning is conveyed by the ad monition th a t you can be pro secuted “if you make a complaint against an officer kno wing that it is false.” (Id., subd. (a) (2), capitalizat ion omitted.) An ordinary person giving words their ordinary meanings would know that statement s unrelated to one’s “compla int against an officer” are not co vered.

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 16 If there were r eal con fusion or uncerta inty c oncerning the statute’s coverage, one would expect to find cases where defendants convicted under the statute challenged its scope or the sufficiency of the e videnc e. But no ne o f the cas es cited in today’s opin ion addressed such issues. (See Peop le v. Stanistreet (2002) 29 Cal.4th 497; Chaker, supra, 428 F.3d 1215; Hamilto n v. City of San Bernardino (C.D.Cal. 2004) 325 F.Supp.2d 1087; Hamilton v. City of San Bern ardino (C.D.Cal. 2000) 107 F.Su pp.2d 1239 (Hamilt on); C uadra, supra, 2010 WL 55875.) There i s one case where an appellate court no ted that the trial court dismiss ed a section 148.6 prosecution for lack o f evidence. (Grassilli v. Bar (2006) 142 Cal.A pp.4th 1260, 1268; see id. at pp. 1283 –1284 [finding “substantial evidence” that the section 148.6 charg e aga inst Grassilli was “object ively baseless ” in the context of affirming a jury verdict that officers had retaliated against Grassilli for reporting their m iscondu ct].) I am aware of no oth er case la w. And if the statute deters “truthful (or at least well - intention ed) complaints” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 6), one would expect to find evidence that good-faith complainants are in fact deterred. But the only actual instance of deterrence ci ted in today’s lengthy opinion is the Hamilton case. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 68, fn. 21.) There, two officers “pulled [Hamilto n, an African American man,] off his bicycle, searched him and handcuff ed him. One of the officers grabb ed [Ha milton] around the throat, kick ed his legs out from under hi m, landed on top of him, and placed a knee in his chest while continuing to choke him.” (Hamilton, supra, 107 F.Supp.2d at p. 1240.) Hamilton was released “after signing a c itation for not ha ving a bi cycle license.” (Ibid.) When Hamilton went to file a complai nt against

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 17 the o fficers, “[t]he watch com mander at the st ation gave [him] a complaint form and told [him] that if he know ingly filed a false complaint, he cou ld b e pros ecuted under [s ection 148.6]. The watch commander also told [Hamilton] that he had already talked to one of the officers out in the field who told him that [Hamilton] did not have any injuries. [Hamilton] displayed an injured wrist to the watch commander, and the watch command er respon ded that the injur ed wrist was the kind of injury which resulted fr om res isting arrest.” (Id. at p. 1241.) Even if this egregious circumstance amounts to an unconstitut ional appl ication of sect ion 148.6, it h ardly supports invalidat ing the sta tute across t he board. The court notes that the RIP A Board has said section 148.6 “risks deterring reasonabl e citizens from coming forwar d with truthful complaints about police misconduct.” (Maj. o pn., ante, at p. 67.) Although the RIPA Board pe rfor ms a valuable function, it is notable that the Board, which i s task ed wi th conducting “evidence - based researc h” on various police practices (§ 13519.4, subd. (j)(3) (D)), has cit ed no e vidence in any of its eight annual repor ts to support the clai m of deterrence — no communit y surveys, no declarations from affected individuals, no exampl es from c ase law or e ven the media. It is not clear what facts sup port the as sertion that secti on 148.6 creates “a risk” of deterr ence. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 66.) What is clear is that thousands of ordinary people hav e filed unfound ed comp laints notwithstand ing th e statut e and its advisory. The c ourt says this “tells us little about how many people may have been deterred f rom filing complaints in the first instance.” (Id. at p. 63.) But that just restates the speculative thesis. Against the undisputed fact that thousands

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 18 have not been deterred, the court does not s ay “how m any people may have been deterred.” It cannot even offer a rou gh est imate. There are many reasons people might be deterred from filing a compla int against th e p olice (ante, at p. 4), but t here are no facts showin g that section 148.6 is such a reason. This statute has been on the books for three decades. If it were genuinely confus ing or suppress ive of good-faith complaints, surely ther e woul d be so me objecti ve indicat ors to that ef fect by now. There may be scenarios, as i n Hamilton, where t he statute is wielded in a manner that makes i t unconstitut ional as applied. (Cf. maj. o pn., ante, at pp. 43 – 45 [conjuring police station scenari os].) But that dep ends on the circ umstanc es. Speculativ e assertions of a chilling effect, without facts, do not suffice to entirely j ettison th e statute on fr ee speec h grounds. IV. Finally, it is worth noting that compla ints alleging misconduct by a peace officer are generally confidential. (§ 832.7, subd. (a); see Pe ople v. Superior Court (J ohnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 710 – 711 [discussin g process for di scovery o f an officer’s personn el files pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior C ourt (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531].) Th ere ar e exceptions for so me categories of alleged miscondu ct and for sustaine d findings of specific types of misconduct; such records are subject to disclosure under the California Public R ecords Act. (§ 832.7, subd. (b)(1).) Yet disclosab le records may be redacted f or various reasons (id., subd. (b) (6)), includin g “where, on the facts of the particu lar case, the public interest served by not disclosing the information clearly outw eighs the pu blic interest served by discl osure of th e information ” (id., subd. (b)(7)). And for certain disclosabl e records, an agency may withhold the records for up to 60 days

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 19 (and someti mes longer) from th e date of the alleged misconduct pending an active investiga tion. (Id., subd. (b)(8).) What this means is that the vast majority of complaints are confidential. (Cf. RIPA 2020 Report, supra, p. 60 [10.8% (919) of complaint s statewid e that reached a disposition in 20 18 were “sustain ed”; 49.1% (4,167) w ere “unf ounded,” 27.2% (2,308) wer e “exonerat ed,” and 12.9% (1,094) were “not sustai ned”].) And some that are not confidential may be withheld for months after the alleg ed misconduct o ccurred. Against this backdrop, even if section 148.6 deters some good-faith complaints (and I doubt it does), it seems odd to conclude that the statute “raises substa ntial risks to the marketplac e of ideas.” (Maj. o pn., ante, at p. 39, italics omitted.) How can section 148.6 distort the marketplace of i deas when the vast majority of complaints, i nclud ing those hypothetica lly deterred, are by law not disclos able and thus not part of the marketplac e at all? The court seems to imply the statute especiall y d eters me ritori ous c omplaints (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6, 39, 45, 53, 56, 75 [“truthful” complaints ]), which can result in disclosure. But that seems implausible when thousands of people, includin g people required to sign the advisory, have not been deterred f rom filing complaints ultimately deemed “unfound ed,” “exonerated,” or “not sustained.” And even disclosab le complaints are not read ily accessibl e; a Public Records Act request is required. To the extent the statute deters good-faith complai nts at all, removing the deterrence would simply enlarg e c onfid ential personn el files whi le adding littl e to the marke tplace of ideas. Meanwh ile, everyon e agrees that section 148.6 does nothing to deter people from publicizing good -faith o r bad-faith

LOS ANGELES P OLICE PR OTECTIVE LEA GUE v. CITY OF L OS ANGELE S Liu, J., dissenting 20 allegations of police misconduct in whatever way they wi sh. They can post on social media. They can write an o p -ed. They can go on cable news. They can organize a protest. Although the law of def amation may set limits, none of this expre ssive activity is affected by section 148.6, which governs an official complaint process. If there are barriers to accessing the process, perhaps thos e barr iers could give rise to a claim under the right to “pet ition g overnment for redress of grievances.” (C al. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (a); see U.S. C onst., amend. I.) But that has little to do w ith t he marketplac e of id eas c oncerning police misconduct. In sum, the Legislatur e’s sensible effort to protect the complaint process from intentiona l abuse is f ully compatible with the right to fr ee speech. I respectfu lly dissen t. LIU, J

1 APPENDI X Below are websites providing information about the complaint procedures in v arious police jurisdictions di scussed in the dissenting opinion. These Internet citations are current of November 10, 2025, and are archived by year, docket number, and case name at . - Alameda Count y Sheriff’s Office, Citizen Co mplaint - Kern County Sh eriff’s Of fice, Comp laints - Los Angeles Po lice Dept., Report Em ployee Misc onduct, - Office of the Ins pector G eneral, Los Angel es Police Commission, How to F ile a Co mplaint, - Riverside Count y Sherif f, Compla ints - Sacramento County Sheri ff’s Offic e, Internal A ffairs Bureau - San Bernardin o County Sh eriff’s D epartment, P arking Citations, Commen dations, and Complaints - City of San Di ego, Polic e, File a Complaint

2 - San Diego Coun ty Sherif f’s Office, Commendat ions & Complaints - City and Count y of San Franc isco, Ab out the De partment of Polic e Accounta bility - Ventura County Sh eriff’s Office, Cit izen Complai nt Form

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles __________________________________________________________ Procedural Posture (see XX below) Original Appeal Original Proceeding Review Granted (published) XX 78 Cal.App.5th 1081 Review Granted (unpublished) Rehearing Granted __________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S275272 Date Filed: November 10, 2025 __________________________________________________________ Court: Superior County: Los Angeles Judge: Robert Broadbelt III __________________________________________________________ Counsel: Michael N. Feuer and Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorneys, Kat hleen A. Kenealy, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Blithe S. Bock, Assistant City Attorney, and Michael M. Walsh, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Appellants. Hanson Bridgett, Adam W. Hofmann and David C. Casarrubias for the League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defend ants and Appellants. Peter Eliasberg; American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Laura Moraff; Cooley, Kathleen R. Hartnett, David S. Louk, K.C. Jaski, Adam S. Gershenson, Matt K. Nguyen and Ryan Liu for the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, Blac k Lives Mat ter – Los Angeles, Check the Sheriff, First Amendment Coalition and JusticeLA Coalition as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defend ants and Appellants.

Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Richar d A. Levine and Michael A. Morguess for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): Michael M. Walsh Deputy City Attorney 200 North Spring Street, 14th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90012 (213) 978-2209 Matt K. Nguyen Cooley LLP 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 728-7123 Michael A. Morguess Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, PC 16130 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 600 Encino, CA 91436 (747) 221-7101