Connecticut court opinion release and modification procedures explained

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Stat e v. A nth o ny V. ST A TE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTHONY V. * (SC 21050) Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’ Auria, Ec ker, Alexander, Dannehy and Brig ht, Js. Syllabus The sta te appealed t o this court, on the granting of certifica tion, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had re versed the def endant’s con - viction of manslaug hter in the first degr ee with a firearm. T he defendan t’s conv iction s temmed from an incident in which he shot the vic tim in the head with a re vol ver while she w as sit ting in a small b athroom in their r esidence. At trial, there was a f actual dispute concerning the def endant’s conduc t leading up to the shooting. The prosecut or, rel ying on for ensic ev idence, argued tha t, while the vic tim was si t ting in the bathroom, the def endant had for cef ully pr essed the muzzle of the f ully-cocked, loaded revol ver ag ains t her head before i t dischar ged. In con tras t, the defense ad v anced the theor y that the rev olv er, which had a trig ger tha t did not require muc h f orce to fire, had accidentally disc harg ed when the def endant tripped on the doorframe of the bathroom. The trial court char g ed the jury on reckless manslaug hter in the first degree wi th a firearm, along wi th lesser included of fenses, but did not include any expr ess ref erence to gener al intent in its char ge. On appeal, the state claimed that the Appella te Court had incorrectly concluded that the trial court’s failure to instruc t the jury specifically on gener al intent con - stituted plain error r equiring rev ersal of the defendan t’s con viction. Held: The Appellate Court incorrectl y concluded tha t the trial court’s omission of a specific general in tent instruction in i ts jury charg e was plain err or, and, accordingl y, this court re versed the Appellate Court’s judgment and directed that court to affirm the def endant’s con vic tion. The trial court’s omission of a gener al intent ins truction w as not an error so obv ious and indisputable as to warrant r eversal, as the court’s c harg e, when read as a whole, apprised the jury of the r equisite element of g eneral intent. Specifically, the trial court, in char ging the jury on reckless manslaug hter in the first degree, ins tructed it on the elemen t of recklessness, the terms of which incorpora ted the concept of general in tent to engag e in voli tional conduct. Moreo ver, the trial court’s omission of a general intent instruc tion did not result in a mani fes t injustice because the def endant’s course of conduc t lead - ing up to the shooting invol ved many v oli tional acts that culmina ted in the creation of a gr a ve risk of dea th under circums tances evincing an ex treme indif fer ence to human life, and the s tate carried its burden of pro ving tha t * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of family violence, we decline to use the defendant’s full name or to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. the defendan t had the requisite gener al intent necessary f or a conv iction of reckless manslaug hter in the first degree wi th a firearm. There w as no merit to the def endant’s contention tha t this court’s rejec tion of the defendan t’s plain error claim viola ted the theory of the case doctrine insofar as the manslaug hter charg e w as based on the prosecutor’s allega tion that the def endant had placed the re vol ver ag ainst the victim’s head. The prosecutor not only relied on e vidence establishing tha t the defendan t had pressed the re vol ver ag ainst the victim’s head prior to its discharg e, but also focused on the dang erous natur e of the re vol ver and a trigg er tha t did not require muc h for ce to fire a bullet, the def endant’s a wareness of the safe t y deficiencies of this particular rev olv er, and the cramped na ture of the bathroom in which the v ictim w as killed, all of which served to clarify the prosecutor’s po sition tha t the jury should consider the def endant’s entire course of conduc t in determining whether he w as guilt y of reckless manslaughter in the first degr ee with a fir earm. Argued December 1, 2025—officially r eleased March 3, 2026 Procedur al History Substitute information charging the defendant with the crime of manslaughter in the first degree with a fire - arm, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven and tried to the jury before Alander, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defen - dant appealed to the Appellate Court, Clark, Seeley and Palmer, Js., which reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, and the state, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed. Danielle Koch, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s attorney, Lisa D’Angelo, deputy chief state’s attorney, and Adri - enne Russo, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellant (state). Denis J. O’Malley III, assistant public defender, with whom was Kevin Semataska, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant). Opinion ALEXANDER, J. A jury found the defendant, Anthony V., guilty of manslaughter in the first degree

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. with a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-55 (a) (3) and 53a-55a (a), in connection with an incident in which he shot the victim, his girlfriend, in the head with a revolver. The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on general intent was plain error requiring reversal of the defen - dant’s conviction. Because the principle of general intent was subsumed in the recklessness element of the man - slaughter offense under either of the state’s two theo - ries of the case at trial, we conclude that the failure to include a stand-alone general intent instruction was not plain error. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant and the victim were in an often volatile romantic relationship. They resided to gether in an apartment in New Haven. On October 17, 2020, shortly before midnight, the defendant called the police and reported that the victim had been shot at their resi - dence. The police found the defendant in a bathroom performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the victim, who was unconscious and covered in blood. The police also observed, and later seized, a revolver lying on the bathroom floor. At the time of the victim’s death, the defendant was handling the revolver, from which a single bullet was fired that fatally struck the victim in the head while she was sitting in the small bathroom. 1 The defendant’s revolver was later identified as a .44 caliber Pietta replica of a Civil War-era Colt 1851 Navy revolver (revolver). The revolver holds ammunition in a six chamber, rotating cylinder. To discharge a bul - let, each chamber must be loaded separately with black powder, a lead ball projectile, and a percussion cap, and the hammer of the revolver must be fully-cocked. Once the trigger is pulled, the hammer drops and strikes the percussion cap, which ignites the powder that will pro - pel the lead ball projectile. The hammer can be set in 1 The bathroom was approximately five feet wide by seven feet long.

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. three different positions—resting, half-cocked, and fully-cocked. To prevent an unintended discharge, the revolver’s hammer is kept in a resting or half-cocked position, which renders the revolver unable to fire. The half-cocked position should also be used when cleaning the revolver because it allows the percussion caps to be removed. For safety reasons, the revolver must be carried with the hammer resting on an empty chamber so that, in case of accidental fire, it will not discharge a bullet. 2 The hammer should be placed in the fully-cocked position only when the user intends to fire it. The distinguishing feature of the defendant’s revolver is its “hair trigger,” meaning that the force required to pull the trigger and to discharge a bullet is extremely light. Unlike a standard single action trigger pull, which requires approximately 6 pounds of pressure, the defen - dant’s revolver had a single action trigger pull of, on average, 0.98 pounds. Dennis Lyons, a criminalist with the Rhode Island State Crime Laboratory, testified that this was the lightest trigger pull he had ever encoun - tered. John Cavanna, a sergeant with the Hartford Police Department, testified that the hair trigger may have been the result of a manufacturing defect or postproduction modification. The defendant, who owned the revolver for many years, was aware of its safety deficiencies. The parties stipulated that, when interviewed by the detectives investigat - ing the incident, the defendant stated: “It’s an antique pistol. It’s a very complicated thing. It’s a revolver so it’s not really the safest thing. . . . That thing should’ve never been loaded. The [percussion] caps should’ve never been on it.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) He also told detectives that he did not allow the victim to handle the revolver because it was unsafe. 2 The owner’s manual for the revolver expressly warns: “When the hammer is uncocked, it is resting directly on a percussion cap when fully loaded. A blow to the hammer resulting from a fall/dropping of the gun can cause the gun to discharge. To prevent accidental discharges caused by a blow to the hammer: ALWAYS carry [the revolver] with the hammer down on an empty chamber . . . .”

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. Following an investigation, the state charged the defendant with reckless manslaughter in the first de gree with a firearm, and the case was tried to a jury. At trial, there was a significant factual dispute concerning the defendant’s conduct in the moments leading up to the shooting. Relying on forensic evidence, the state argued that, while the victim was sitting in the bathroom, the defendant forcefully pressed the muzzle of the fully- cocked, loaded revolver against her head before it dis - charged. 3 In contrast, the defendant relied on statements he previously made during police interviews in support of a theory that the revolver had accidentally discharged when he tripped on the doorframe of the bathroom. 4 Dur - ing those interviews, the defendant stated that, on the night in question, he had decided to clean the revolver, which he kept loaded for self-defense purposes. 5 While holding the revolver and trying to remove a percussion cap, he walked toward the bathroom to retrie ve napkins with which to wipe down the gun. When he arrived at the bathroom, the victim was sitting on the toilet with the door open. Then, according to the defendant, he stubbed his toe on the narrow bathroom doorframe, stumbled, and fell forward, causing the revolver to slip from his hands and to discharge a bullet that struck the victim in the head. The defendant relied on Cavanna’s testi - mony that the hair trigger may have been the result of a manufacturing defect or modification in arguing that he had failed to perceive the risks that the revolver posed. The trial court charged the jury on reckless man - slaughter in the first degree with a firearm, along with 3 The state supported this theory with testimony from James Gill, the state’s chief medical examiner, that the victim’s entrance gunshot wound indicated a “blowback laceration,” which typically occurs when a gun is discharged while pressed against the skin. The state also introduced evidence that the defendant’s revolver had hair like fibers on its barrel. 4 In support of the accident theory, the defendant’s father testified that the defendant and the victim were in a healthy relationship and “[got] along fine.” 5 The defendant explained that he kept the revolver loaded for self- defense purposes because he lived in a high crime neighborhood. He stated that he had fired the revolver only once in the many years that he owned it and that he routinely wiped it down to prevent the collec - tion of oil and dust.

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. lesser included offenses. Relevant to this appeal, nei - ther party requested an instruction on general intent, and the court’s instructions to the jury did not include any express reference to general intent. The jury found the defendant guilty of reckless manslaughter i n the first degree with a firearm. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to a term of twenty-five years of imprisonment, execution suspended after eighteen years, followed by three years of probation. The defendant appealed from the judgment of con - viction to the Appellate Court. See generally State v. Anthony V., 227 Conn. App. 281, 321 A.3d 403 (2024). In that appeal, he sought reversal under the plain error doctrine, 6 claiming that the trial court had erred in failing to instruct the jury on general intent for the charged offense. Id., 303. The Appellate Court agreed; id., 303–304; concluding that the element of general intent, namely, whether the defendant acted volition - ally by pressing the revolver against the victim’s head, was “[t]he critical issue” for the jury to resolve. 7 Id., 311. Without a general intent instruction, the Appel - late Court reasoned, “the jury reasonably could not have appreciated the significance of [the defendant’s] version of events” and “could have found [him] guilty on the basis of acts or movements . . . that were not volitional or intentional but, rather, accidental or involuntary.” Id., 308. This appeal followed. 8 The state claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the omission of an instruction on general 6 The Appellate Court concluded that the defendant’s claim of instruc - tional error was implicitly waived under State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447, 482–83, 10 A.3d 942 (2011), and considered his claims under the plain error doctrine. See State v. Anthony V., supra, 227 Conn. App. 303 n.13. 7 The defendant also claimed in the Appellate Court that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. State v. Anthony V., supra, 227 Conn. App. 283, 285. The Appellate Court disagreed, concluding that “the jury reasonably could have [accepted] . . . the state’s theory that the defendant [had] intentionally placed the muzzle of the revolver to the victim’s head.” Id., 299. 8 We granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that it

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. intent was plain error. The state argues that a separate general intent instruction was not required because the element of recklessness, which the trial court instructed the jury on in detail, necessarily included the concept of general intent. The state further contends that the Appel - late Court incorrectly determined that the issue of gen - eral intent turned on whether the jury believed that the defendant had pressed the muzzle of the revolver against the victim’s head. In the state’s view, that partic ular fact was “legally nonessential” because the defendant’s general intent was evidenced by his undisputed cours e of conduct of how he admittedly handled the revolver on the night of the shooting. The state argues that, even if the jury believed the defendant’s version of events, it still would have found him guilty of reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. We agree with the state. Our review of the Appellate Court’s application of the plain error doctrine is plenary. See, e.g., State v. Blaine, 334 Conn. 298, 305, 221 A.3d 798 (2019). A well established two-pronged test governs the plain error inquiry. See, e.g., State v. Kyle A., 348 Conn. 437, 446, 307 A.3d 249 (2024); see also Practice Book § 60-5. “This [test] requires that we first consider whether the error is indeed plain in the sense that it is patent [or] readily [discernible] on the face of a factually adequate record, [and] also . . . obvious in the sense of not debatable. . . . Second, we must determine whether the consequences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Daren Y., 350 Conn. 393, 405–406, 324 A.3d 734 (2024). Turning to the first prong of the plain error test, we conclude that the trial court’s omission of a general intent instruction was not an error so obvious and indis - putable as to warrant reversal. It is well settled that was plain error not to instruct on general intent when the state charged the defendant with manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of . . . §§ 53a-55 (a) (3) and 53a-55a (a), and the defendant’s theory of the case was that his conduct was accidental?” State v. Anthony V., 350 Conn. 914, 914–15, 324 A.3d 791 (2024).

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. “a defendant is entitled to have the jury correctly and adequately instructed on the pertinent principles of sub - stantive law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blaine, supra, 334 Conn. 308. Nevertheless, “[jury] instructions need not be perfect . . . .” (Internal quota - tion marks omitted.) Id. When reviewing a challenged instruction, “we . . . adhere to the well [established] rule that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts. . . . As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as improper.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bruny, 342 Conn. 169, 202, 269 A.3d 38 (2022). To secure the defendant’s conviction of reckless man - slaughter in the first degree with a firearm, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, (2) the defendant recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death to the victim, (3) the defendant caused the death of the victim, and (4) in the commission of the offense, he used a firearm. See General Statutes §§ 53a-55 (a) (3) and 53a-55a (a); see also Leon v. Commissioner of Correction, 189 Conn. App. 512, 539, 208 A.3d 296, cert. denied, 332 Conn. 909, 209 A.3d 1232 (2019). The state also bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defen - dant had the general intent to engage in conduct that created a grave risk of death to another person under circumstances evincing extreme indifference to human life.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Leon v. Com - missioner of Correction, supra, 539. The term “general intent” refers to whether a defen - dant intended to engage in the proscribed conduct delib - erately, consciously, or purposefully. See, e.g., State v. Juan J., 344 Conn. 1, 21, 276 A.3d 935 (2022). The element requires proof that the defendant acted volit ion - ally “to make the bodily movement [that] constitutes the act [that] the crime requires.” (Internal quo tation marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez, 300 Conn. 490, 502,

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. 15 A.3d 1049 (2011). Because a defendant’s intent “to perform the physical acts that constitute the crime . . . in the manner proved by the evidence [is] implicitly a part of the state’s burden of proof and, in that sense, an ele - ment of the crime,” a jury instruction on general intent is required only when that element has been disputed at trial and “there is evidence . . . that suggests that the defendant’s conduct was involuntary . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 502 n.14. The jury charge in the present case, when read as a whole, apprised the jury of the requisite element of gen - eral intent. The critical issue of intent for the jury was not whether the defendant acted volitionally by placing the revolver against the victim’s head. Rather, the issue was whether the defendant acted recklessly by enter - ing the bathroom, in close proximity to the victim, as he attempted to remove a percussion cap from what he knew to be a loaded, hair-trigger, and exceptionally dangerous revolver. Although there was no express ref - erence to general intent in the jury charge, the trial court instructed the jury on the element of recklessness, the terms of which incorporated the concept of general intent to engage in volitional conduct. The trial court instructed the jury in relevant part: “A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm when, under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct [that] creates a grave risk of death to another person . . . . * * * “The third essential element [of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm] is that the defendant engaged. . . in such conduct recklessly. Under our law, a person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circum - stance . . . when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. . . . There must be a great or substantial difference between, on the . . . one hand, the defendant’s conduct in consciously disre - garding a substantial and unjustifiable risk and, on the

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. other hand, what a reasonable person would have done or not done under the circumstances. “Here, the risk, which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was aware of but consciously disregarded when he engaged in his chal - lenged conduct is . . . [a] risk that such conduct would cause the death of [the victim], which was not only sub - stantial and unjustifiable, but grave or extremely serious. The state must further establish that disregarding that risk was a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would have observed in the defendant’s situation.” (Emphasis added.) A jury “charge . . . is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of state - ment, but it is to be considered rather as to its probable effect [on] the jury in guiding [it] to a correct verdict . .. .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blaine, supra, 334 Conn. 308. It is “especially rare for a jury instruction to be so clearly improper that . . . plain error review [is] necessary to correct it.” State v. Kyle A., supra, 348 Conn. 448. “An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a mis - statement of the law.” (Internal quotation marks omit - ted.) Id., 451. In the present case, under the instruction given at trial, the jury could find the defendant guilty of the charged offense only if it concluded that he had engaged in the challenged conduct—walking in close proximity to the victim as he handled a loaded, uniquely hazardous revolver—while aware of, but consciously disregarding, a grave risk of death to the victim. A general intent instruction, if provided, would have directed the jury to find the defendant guilty only if he intended—either deliberately, consciously, or purposefully—to engage in conduct that created a grave risk of death to another person under circumstances evincing extreme indif - ference to human life. See Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 2.3-1, available at https://www.jud.ct.gov/ JI/Criminal/Criminal.pdf (last visited February 24,

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. 2026). The omission of that language did not mislead the jury because the very same requirement was incor - porated in the instruction describing the mental state that defines recklessness. See, e.g., State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 573–74, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008) (conclud - ing that incomplete definition of intent did not mislead jury with respect to crime of unlawful restraint in the first degree because that mental state was accurately defined in connection with act element of restraint). General intent was necessarily implicit in the finding of conscious disregard. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, supra, 300 Conn. 502 n.14. Indeed, the core of recklessness is “a subjective realization of a risk and a conscious deci - sion to ignore that risk . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wade, 106 Conn. App. 467, 479, 942 A.2d 1985, cert. granted, 287 Conn. 908, 950 A.2d 1286 (2008) (appeal withdrawn June 11, 2008). In addition to the lack of an obvious error, we cannot conclude that a manifest injustice occurred in this case. In the Appellate Court’s view, general intent was the dispositive issue at trial; State v. Anthony V., supra, 227 Conn. App. 311; and, in order to secure a conviction, “the state was required to prove . . . that the [defendant] acted volitionally to use . . . [the revolver] . . . by intentionally placing it against the victim’s head.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 307. Thus, the Appellate Court reasoned that, without a general intent instruction, “the jury reasonably could not have appre - ciated the significance of [the defendant’s] version of events” and might have relied on an accident to find hi m guilty. Id., 308. Expanding on this point, the defendant cites this court’s decision in State v. Martin, 189 Conn. 1, 454 A.2d 256, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933, 103 S. Ct. 2098, 77 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1983), in arguing that the jury could not properly consider his claim of accident without a general intent instruction. We disagree. In Martin, the defendant was charged with risk of injury to a child, among other crimes, for pushing a child against a wall. See id., 2, 5–6. At trial, the defendant

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. argued that his conduct was accidental. Id., 10. He claimed that someone had grabbed him from behind, he spun around, and his kneecap locked, causing him to inadvertently fall into the child. Id., 11. The trial court’s jury charge did not expressly define the element of general intent. See id., 11–12. On appeal, this court concluded that “[t]he defense of accident raised by the defendant clearly presented the issue of whether his act. . . was an intended bodily movement . . . . The failure of the [trial] court even to allude to this defense as one which the state had to disprove was a serious deficiency in the charge.” Id., 13. Martin is distinguishable from the present case because the defendant was charged with reckless conduct, and his claim of accident here did not address the admittedly nonaccidental conduct that the jury was entitled to find established his criminal liabil - ity for reckless manslaughter with a firearm. Instead, the defendant claimed only that some of his conduct was nonvolitional, namely, tripping while handling the loaded revolver. We consider this to be a crucial distinc - tion in determining whether the claim of accident placed general intent at issue so as to render the absence of an instruction on the element a manifest injustice. See State v. Alston, 5 Conn. App. 571, 577–78, 501 A.2d 764 (1985) (trial court’s failure to instruct jury on general intent did not require reversal of manslaughter convic - tion when defendant claimed that “she did not intend to make the physical movement” of stabbing because grave risk of death was created by defendant’s entire course of conduct, including “picking up the knife,” grabbing her sister, and “slapping her with the knife”), cert. denied, 198 Conn. 804, 503 A.2d 1186 (1986). In the present case, the defendant’s entire course of conduct on the night of the victim’s death, nearl y all of which was undisputedly intentional, culminated in creating a grave risk of death under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life. The defendant’s claim that he tripped while holding the revolver did not negate these undisputed facts estab - lishing general intent—that is, he intentionally picked

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. up a loaded revolver with a hair trigger and, while trying to remove the percussion caps, carried it toward a small room where the victim was sitting. Thus, the claimed lack of an instruction was not manifestly unjust because the defendant’s course of conduct involved many volitional acts, and the state still carried its burden of proving that the defendant had the requisite general intent. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57, 67–68, 570 A.2d 193 (1990) (evidence was sufficient to sustain reckless manslaughter conviction when defendant, who relied on defense of accident, had possessed loaded revolver and engaged in struggle for weapon resulting in accidental discharge). Given these circumstances, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court’s failure to instruct it on general intent. See, e.g., State v. Alston, supra, 5 Conn. App. 578. The defendant argues that this conclusion violates the theory of the case doctrine because the state charged the defendant on the basis of the allegation that he placed the revolver against the victim’s head, and not as a course of conduct. He points specifically to the following state - ment by the prosecutor during closing argument: “The state’s theory is that the defendant showed an extreme indifference to the life of [the victim] and created a grave risk of her death when he pressed a loaded . . . revolver to the side of her head . . . .” This argument is premised on an incomplete view of the record. Under the theory of the case doctrine, the state on appeal may not change its factual theory of the case. See, e.g., State v. Alicea, 339 Conn. 385, 399–400, 260 A.3d 1176 (2021). “[T]hat theory must have been not merely before the jury due to an incidental reference, but as part of a coherent theory of guilt that, upon [review of] the principal stages of trial, can be characterized as having been presented in a focused or otherwise cognizable sense.. . . Accordingly, on appeal, the state may not construe evidence adduced at trial to support an entirely differ - ent theory of guilt than the one that the state argued at trial.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. omitted.) State v. King, 321 Conn. 135, 149, 136 A.3d 1210 (2016). The prosecutor’s reliance on evidence establishing that the defendant had pressed the revolver against the vic - tim’s head prior to its accidental discharge did not com - prise the state’s entire theory of the case. Throughout the trial, the prosecution focused on the dangerous nature of the revolver and its hair trigger, the defendant’s awareness of these safety deficiencies, and the cramped nature of the bathroom in which the victim was killed. This evidence supported the prosecutor’s response to the defendant’s claim that he tripped while handling the loaded revolver. The prosecutor, without objection, argued during rebuttal: “[T]he evidence supports no other verdict than manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, no other conclusion [than] that [the defendant] was extremely reckless that night. And that is true, frankly, regardless of which version you believe, whether he pressed the firearm up against her head forcefully or he was handling it and tripped.” 9 (Emphasis added.) This statement clarified the state’s position that the jury should consider the defendant’s entire course of conduct in deciding whether to find him guilty. There - fore, the state’s argument on appeal that the defendant could have been convicted under his version of events 9 The entirety of the relevant portion of the prosecutor’s rebuttal clos - ing argument is as follows: “[T]he evidence supports no other verdict than manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, no other conclu - sion [than] that [the defendant] was extremely reckless that night. And that is true, frankly, regardless of which version you believe, whether he pressed the firearm up against her head forcefully or he was handling it and tripped. He was extremely reckless that night. He was evincing an extreme indifference to her life. He knew handling that gun loaded with firing caps on was very dangerous. He knew if the gun were dropped with those firing caps on, it could discharge. He knew it was a hair trigger, and, yet, he’s still fiddling with the firing caps, not looking where he’s going, blind as a bat, as he called himself, in forward motion toward the incredibly small space where [the victim] was seated when she was killed. And what happened as a result of the confluence of that extreme recklessness was the product of [the] defendant’s disregard for [the victim’s] life at that moment.” (Emphasis added.)

Stat e v. A nth o ny V. does not constitute a “trial by ambuscade.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. King, supra, 321 Conn. 149. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appel - late Court incorrectly determined that the trial court’s omission of a general intent instruction was plain error. The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court. In this opinion the other justices concurred.