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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Rhonda K. Oliver v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans

Louisiana Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-CA-0551
• Judges: Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase; Judge Dale N. Atkins; Judge Rachael D. Johnson

• Disposition: Reversed and Remanded

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.6K)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed and Remanded

Lead Opinion

                        by Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase

RHONDA K. OLIVER * NO. 2025-CA-0551

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
SEWERAGE & WATER *
BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA

---

APPEAL FROM
CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ORLEANS
NO. 9684

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Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase

---

(Court composed of Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge
Rachael D. Johnson)

Rhonda K. Oliver

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Ashley Ian Smith
Darryl Harrison
SEWERAGE AND WATER BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS
625 St. Joseph Street, Room 201
New Orleans, LA 70165

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

REVERSED AND REMANDED
MARCH 4, 2026
TGC
DNA
RDJ

This case involves an appeal from a decision issued by the Civil Service

Commission for the City of New Orleans (hereinafter “the Commission”).

Appellant, Rhonda K. Oliver (hereinafter “Ms. Oliver”), seeks review of the

Commission’s decision, which affirmed the termination of her employment by the

Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans (hereinafter “S&WB”). After

consideration of the record before this Court and the applicable law, the decision of

the Commission to uphold Ms. Oliver’s termination is reversed and the case

remanded to the S&WB to reinstitute termination proceedings that comply with

procedural due process.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Oliver began working for the City of New Orleans in 2015 in the

Department of Housing and Urban Development. In 2021, she was promoted and

transferred to the S&WB, obtaining permanent classified employee status in 2022.

Ms. Oliver briefly transferred to another City of New Orleans agency but

eventually returned to the S&WB, as a classified employee, on January 29, 2024.

In late October 2024, Ms. Oliver began notifying her supervisors that she

would not be reporting to work. On October 21, 2024, she emailed her supervisors,

1
Nicole Kelly (hereinafter “Ms. Kelly”), Utility Customer Service Manager and

Susannah Kirby (hereinafter “Ms. Kirby”), Interim Chief Customer Service Officer

the following: “Just emailing to inform you that I will be out today for a personal

matter.” Similar emails were sent on October 22, 23, 25 and 28. On November 4,

2024, Ms. Oliver sent an email stating that she was “still dealing with a personal

issue and will be out again this entire week.” Ms. Kelly responded to Ms. Oliver’s

email with the following: “Do you have an expected return date? Or have you

reached out to Benefits or [Human Resources] to see if your circumstances qualify

for an extended leave[?]” A week later, on November 11, 2024, Ms. Oliver

responded that she planned to return to work no later than December 2, 2024.

Throughout the duration of her absence and until her eventual termination, Ms.

Oliver self-coded her time sheets as Leave Without Pay (hereinafter “LWOP”).1

On November 11, 2024, the S&WB sent Ms. Oliver, by email and United

States Postal Service mail, a letter advising her that a pre-termination hearing

would be scheduled for November 21, 2024. The letter explained that Ms. Oliver

had been absent for three consecutive weeks, and that “failure to report to work or

communicate when/if [she] would be returning to work has been determined to be

job abandonment.” The letter quoted only to the following provision of the

S&WB’s Attendance Policy: “If an employee fails to report to work or call in to

inform their supervisor of their absence for three (3) consecutive days or more, the

employee will be considered to have voluntarily resigned employment.” The letter

also noted, “you have chosen to code your time sheets as [LWOP]” and “while this

was not formally approved, you have the discretion to code your time sheets in

this manner.” (emphasis added). Finally, it stated that if Ms. Oliver was “unable to

1 The time sheets were not introduced into evidence by either party.

2
appear in person, [she] may submit a written statement of response in lieu of [her]

attendance[,]” and her response would be presented at the hearing. Ms. Oliver sent

a written response and did not appear at the hearing.2 However, testimony at a

subsequent hearing revealed that the S&WB did not consider her response.

On November 25, 2024, the S&WB notified Ms. Oliver of her termination,

effective November 21, 2024. The letter again explained that she was being

terminated for job abandonment for failure to report to work or indicate a return

date. The letter cited the following violations as the reason for her termination: (1)

S&WB’s Attendance Policy; (2) Civil Service Rule IX, Section 1.1: Disciplinary

Actions, Maintaining the Standards of Service3, and; (3) Civil Service Rule VIII,

Section 5.1: Leave of Absence Without Pay, (a)-(c).4 The termination letter also

2 Ms. Oliver submitted a written statement, by email, on November 20, 2024. In her response,

she stated that she did not abandon her job because she communicated with her supervisor[s] by
email regularly.
3 Civil Service Rule IX, DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS:

Section 1 MAINTAINING STANDARDS OF SERVICE

1.1 When an employee in the classified service is unable or unwilling to perform the duties of
his/her position in a satisfactory manner, or has committed any act to the prejudice of the
service, or has omitted to perform any act it was his/her duty to perform, or otherwise has
become subject to corrective action, the appointing authority shall take action warranted by
the circumstances to maintain the standards of effective service. The action may include one
or more of the following:

(a) termination from the service.

4 Civil Service Rule VIII, 5.1. states in pertinent part:

ANNUAL AND OTHER FORMS OF LEAVE
Section 5 LEAVE OF ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY,
5.1:

(a) An appointing authority may grant an employee leave without pay for
a period not to exceed one (1) year, whenever such leave is considered to
be in the best interests of the service. Leave without pay for an additional
period of time may be granted only with the approval of the Civil Service
Commission.
(b) Appropriate personnel forms must be submitted by the appointing
authority during the initial days of the period for which leave without pay
was authorized in accordance with the provisions of this Section of these

3
pointed out that Ms. Oliver’s LWOP was never formally approved and noted that

“you do not have the discretion to code your time sheets in this matter.” (emphasis

in original). For the first time, the termination letter provided a more expansive

version of the S&WB’s Attendance Policy, which stated:

An employee who fails to report to work as scheduled for
three (3) consecutive working days without notice or
without approval may be considered to have voluntarily
resigned from his or her position due to job
abandonment. Since job abandonment is not a
disciplinary action and therefore not subject to a Pre-
Termination Hearing. (emphasis added)

Finally, the termination letter specifically highlighted that Ms. Oliver “failed to

attend the scheduled [pre-termination] hearing.”

Ms. Oliver timely appealed her termination to the Commission. At the

hearing, she argued that she did not violate the S&WB’s Attendance Policy

because she regularly notified her supervisors that she would not report to work

due to personal reasons. Ms. Oliver also explained that she coded her time sheets

as LWOP because “that’s what S&WB does all the time.[]”5

Testimony and evidence were taken by a Hearing Officer at the Civil Service

hearing from Ms. Oliver, Ms. Kelly and Sharita Curtis (hereinafter “Ms. Curtis").

Ms. Kelly testified that she signed the time sheets that were unilaterally coded by

Rules. Personnel forms need not be submitted for periods of leave without
pay which constitute less than a total workday.
(c) At the discretion of the Appointing Authority, any employee who is
absent from work without prior authorization may be carried on leave
without pay for that time period on all payroll records. Such action shall
not be termed as disciplinary and hence shall not warrant an appeal to the
Commission.

5 Ms. Oliver issued subpoenas to eleven witnesses, two of whom she intended to elicit testimony

regarding the LWOP practices of the S&WB. The S&WB filed motions to quash which were
granted; therefore, the witnesses did not testify.

4
Ms. Oliver as LWOP. She stated that she also conferred with the payroll

department to determine if Ms. Oliver’s self-coding was acceptable.

Ms. Curtis, Employee Relations Specialist, testified that pursuant to Civil

Service policy, the only time an employee can use LWOP is if it was approved by

the S&WB at the time the request is made, or for disciplinary reasons. Ms. Curtis

explained that Ms. Oliver violated the S&WB’s Attendance Policy when she

unilaterally placed herself on LWOP. She further testified that she had never seen

the November 11, 2024 email from Ms. Oliver that mentioned a return to work

date of December 2, 2024. Ms. Curtis also testified to the implications of Ms.

Oliver’s failure to appear at her pre-termination hearing. She stated, “if there is a

pre-termination hearing scheduled and the employee does not show up, then we

just proceed with the actual termination.” She emphasized that Ms. Oliver’s

emailed response (submitted in lieu of her attendance) was available to those

conducting the pre-termination hearing, but that it was “rejected” and not

considered.

After hearing testimony and examining the evidence, the Hearing Officer

provided a written report. The report concluded that Ms. Oliver did not formally

request LWOP and that the S&WB had no obligation to grant leave, even if Ms.

Oliver provided notice that she would be out. The Hearing Officer found that the

S&WB established, by a preponderance of evidence, just cause in its decision to

terminate Ms. Oliver.

The Commission reviewed the hearing transcript, exhibits, and the Hearing

Officer’s Report and determined that Ms. Oliver’s three-week unapproved absence,

without a return date, constituted job abandonment. In its report, the Commission

concluded that Ms. Oliver abandoned her job by failing to report to work from

5
October 21, 2024 to November 8, 2024. The report acknowledged that Ms. Oliver

advised her supervisors of her impending absences but disregarded that fact as

irrelevant since she never sought approval from the S&WB. Citing to Civil Service

Rule VIII, Section 5.1(a)-(c), the Commission concluded that since the S&WB

never authorized Ms. Oliver’s LWOP, she was in violation of the S&WB’s

Attendance Policy. Finally, the Commission concluded that Ms. Oliver’s absence

affected the operation of the S&WB and affirmed Ms. Oliver’s termination. This

appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[T]he standard of review in a case from the Civil Service Commission is

established by the constitutional rule that the Commission’s decision is subject to

review on any question of law or fact.” Dukes v. New Orleans Police Dep’t, 2022-

0746, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/10/23), 368 So.3d 159, 163 (citing La. Const. art. X, §

12). “A multifaceted standard of appellate review applies.” Id. The Commission’s

factual findings are not disturbed upon review unless clearly wrong or manifestly

erroneous. Id. (citation omitted). When “evaluating the Commission’s

determination as to whether the disciplinary action is both based on legal cause and

commensurate with the infraction, the appellate court should not modify the

Commission’s decision unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an

abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Ms. Oliver challenges her termination arguing that the

Commission erred in determining that the S&WB satisfied its burden that she

violated the S&WB’s Attendance Policy. While Ms. Oliver challenges the

substantive ruling, our review of the record does not permit us to reach the merits.

6
During our multifaceted review, this Court identified a procedural defect which

preempts our consideration of the merits. Namely, whether Ms. Oliver was

afforded procedural due process.

In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, our United States Supreme Court

held that civil service employment is recognized as a property right, and therefore

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. 470 U.S. 532, 533, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1489, 84 L.Ed.2d 494

(1985); see also Matusoff v. Dep’t of Fire, 2019-0932, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir.

5/20/20), 364 So.3d 240, 244 (citation omitted). Due process rights are further

enumerated in the Louisiana State Constitution, stating that “[n]o person shall be

deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law.” La. Const. art.

I, § 2. “The due process clause provides that the right to life, liberty, and property

cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.”

Moore v. Ware, 2001-3341, p. 11 (La. 2/25/03), 839 So.2d 940, 948 (citations

omitted). In a public employment context, a due process claim depends upon

having a property right in continued comparable employment. Id. at p. 12, 839

So.2d 948. As a classified Civil Service employee, Ms. Oliver has a vested

property right which is therefore protected by constitutional procedural due

process.6

6 “An employee with permanent status in the classified city service may only be terminated, or

otherwise subjected to disciplinary action, in writing and for good cause.” Stephens v. New
Orleans Police Dep’t, 2019-0641, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/4/19), 286 So.3d 519, 523 (citation
omitted). “Legal cause exists whenever an employee’s conduct impairs the efficiency of the
public service in which the employee is engaged.” Cittadino v. Dep’t of Police, 558 So.2d 1311,
1315 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “The burden of proof on appeal [to a
commission], as to the facts, shall be on the appointing authority.” La. Const. Ann. art. X, § 8.
“[T]he appointing authority must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the occurrence of
the complained of activity and that the conduct did in fact impair the efficient and orderly
operation of the public service.” Dukes, 2022-0746, p. 6, 368 So.3d at 164 (citations omitted).
“[T]he Commission has a duty to review whether good or lawful cause exists for taking. . .

7
Prior to discharge, a public employee is entitled to notice of the charges

against them, an explanation of the employer’s evidence and an opportunity to

present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken. Loudermill, 470 U.S.

at 545-546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495, 84 L.Ed. 2d 494. The essential requirements of due

process for a public employee are notice and an opportunity to respond. Id. “The

purpose behind this notice requirement is to apprise the employee in detail of

the charges and to limit any subsequent proceedings to the stated reasons.” Fox v.

Dep’t of Sanitation, 485 So.2d 651, 652 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986), (citation

omitted). Thus, we must determine whether the S&WB’s notice was sufficient.

Our inquiry begins with the initial notice of violations issued to Ms. Oliver,

as set forth in the November 11, 2024 pre-disciplinary letter (hereinafter referred to

as the “November 11th letter”). We focus on four (4) specific provisions of the

letter. First, the November 11th letter stated that a hearing was scheduled for

November 21, 2024 at 10:00 a.m. to allow Ms. Oliver to respond to the “proposed

termination for violating the following policies: [S&WB’s] Attendance Policy and

[Civil Service Commission] Rule IX, Section 1- Disciplinary Actions, Maintaining

the Standards of Service.” Second, the November 11th letter referred to Ms.

Oliver’s coding of her time sheets in the following manner, “[y]ou have chosen to

code your time sheet as Leave Without Pay (LWOP). The Payroll Department

informed that, while this was not formally approved, you have the discretion to

code your time sheet in this manner.” Third, the November 11th letter provided the

following explanation of the S&WB’s leave policy: “if an employee fails to report

to work or call in to inform their supervisor of their absence for three (3)

disciplinary action against an employee.” Stephens, 2019-0641, p. 6, 286 So.3d at 523 (citation
omitted).

8
consecutive days or more, the employee will be considered to have voluntarily

resigned employment.” Finally, the November 11th letter gave Ms. Oliver the

option of appearing at the hearing or to submit a response. Specifically, the letter

stated, “[i]f you are unable to appear in person, you may submit a written statement

of response in lieu of your attendance. If submitted, this statement will be

presented in the hearing. Written statements should be submitted…at least one (1)

day prior to the hearing date.” On November 20, 2024, Ms. Oliver submitted, by

email, a written statement. In her response, she stated that she did not abandon her

job because she communicated with her supervisor[s] via email regularly.

On November 25, 2025, the S&WB sent Ms. Oliver a letter notifying her

that a determination had been made to terminate her employment. The letter stated

that the “separation is in accordance with the [S&WB] Policy and [Civil Service

Commission] Rules.” The termination letter cited, for the first time, Civil Service

Rule VIII, Section 5- Leave of Absence Without Pay. The S&WB explained that

Ms. Oliver continued to be absent for three (3) consecutive weeks without

approval. Second, it stated that Ms. Oliver chose to code her “[t]ime sheet as Leave

Without Pay (LWOP). The Payroll Department informed you that, while this was

not formally approved, you do not have the discretion to code your time sheet in

this manner.” (emphasis in the original). Third, the letter noted that Ms. Oliver

failed to appear at the hearing. No reference was made to Ms. Oliver’s November

20, 2024 written response.

In Matusoff, this Court, noted that “[the] right to notice and opportunity to be

heard must be extended at a meaningful time and [in] a meaningful manner.” 2019-

0932, pp. 6-7, 364 So.3d at, 244-45 (citing Moore, 2001-3341, p. 11, 839 So.2d at

949). A “tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges

9
against him. An explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to

present his side of the story.” Loudermill., 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495, 84

L.Ed.2d 494 (citation omitted).

The basis of Ms. Oliver’s termination was her failure to report to work for

three (3) consecutive weeks and that she did not seek approval from the S&WB to

designate her absences as LWOP. We find this conclusion to be inconsistent with

the notice first given to Ms. Oliver. The November 11th letter did not reference the

LWOP approval requirement. Rather, the November 11th letter only stated the

following: “if an employee fails to report to work or call in to inform their

supervisor of their absence for three (3) consecutive days or more, the employee

will be considered to have voluntarily resigned employment.” The only reference

to LWOP were two (2) sentences that stated, “For the past three consecutive

weeks, you have chosen to code your time sheet as Leave Without Pay (LWOP).

The Payroll Department informed that, while this was not formally approved, you

have the discretion to code your time sheet in this manner.” In response to the

November 11th letter, Ms. Oliver consistently referenced the emails sent to her

supervisors. In fact, Ms. Oliver’s testimony before the Hearing Officer was that she

“followed procedures” by emailing her supervisors throughout the three (3) week

time period. The November 11th letter, the initial notice of the violations, neither

referenced the need for approval from the S&WB nor did it suggest that Ms. Oliver

was prohibited from coding her time sheet as LWOP. Rather, the letter stated that

it was in her discretion to code her time sheet as LWOP. Finally, the termination

letter highlights Ms. Oliver’s failure to attend the hearing and states that “[Y]our

failure to report to work or communicate when/if you would be returning to work

has been determined to be job abandonment.” Both statements are inconsistent

10
with the November 11th letter on both points. Ms. Oliver was given the option not

to appear at the hearing and was allowed to submit a statement in lieu of

appearance, which she did. Ms. Oliver submitted an email on November 11, 2024

indicating that she intended to return on December 2, 2024. The November 11th

letter and termination letter were signed by two different people and reflect

numerous inconsistencies. Teira R. Woodridge, Employee Relations Specialist,

S&WB Human Resources Department signed the November 11th letter while

Ghassan Korban, Executive Director of the S&WB, signed the termination letter.

These inconsistencies and discrepancies reinforce our conclusion that the

procedures were fundamentally flawed from its inception. The purpose of the

notice requirement is to apprise the employee, in detail, of the charges and to limit

any subsequent proceedings to the stated reasons. Ms. Oliver was not properly

apprised of the charges levied against her and the subsequent proceedings

exceeded the charges stated. Therefore, considering the law, we find Ms. Oliver

was denied procedural due process.

CONCLUSION

We note that our finding today pretermits any substantive discussion as to

whether Ms. Oliver violated the S&WB’s Attendance Policy and corresponding

Civil Service Rules regarding LWOP or the necessity of approval. Instead, we

focus on the procedural due process violation. The essential guarantee of the Due

Process Clause is to ensure a person is afforded a fundamentally fair proceeding

prior to depriving that person of their life, liberty, or property. The threshold

requirement to a fair proceeding begins with the initial notice of the violations. As

a civil service employee, Ms. Oliver has a vested property right that may not be

infringed upon without due process of the law. Ms. Oliver was not afforded proper

11
procedural due process by the S&WB because the ultimate basis for her

termination exceeded the violations set forth in the initial pre-termination notice.

This initial procedural defect tainted the findings of the Hearing Officer as well as

the Commission. Accordingly, we remand this case to the S&WB for it to

reinstitute the termination proceedings against Ms. Oliver consistent with this

opinion.

DECREE

Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Civil Service Commission is

reversed and the case is remanded to the Sewerage and Water Board to reinstitute

termination proceedings that comply with procedural due process.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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