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March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Andrew Bradley Towbin v. John T. Fuller and Darren P. Lombard in His Official Capacity as Clerk of Court for Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans

Louisiana Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2026-CA-0152

• Disposition: Affirmed Atkins, J., Dissents With Reasons. Belsome, C.J. Dissents and Assigns Reasons. Lobrano. J., Dissents and Assigns Reasons Jenkins, J., Dissents and Assigns Reasons

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed Atkins, J., Dissents With Reasons. Belsome, C.J. Dissents and Assigns Reasons. Lobrano. J., Dissents and Assigns Reasons Jenkins, J., Dissents and Assigns Reasons

Concurrence Opinion

                        by Lobrano

ANDREW BRADLEY TOWBIN * NO. 2026-CA-0152

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL

JOHN T. FULLER AND * FOURTH CIRCUIT
DARREN P. LOMBARD IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS * STATE OF LOUISIANA
CLERK OF COURT FOR
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT *
FOR THE PARISH OF
ORLEANS *

---

JCL LOBRANO. J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS

I respectfully dissent. Although the parties did not directly litigate the

meaning of “the previous five tax years” in the district court, this issue presents a

pure question of statutory interpretation. It requires no additional fact-finding and

rests entirely on the undisputed date of qualification and the plain language of La.

R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) and La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7). Questions of law are reviewed

de novo, and an appellate court is obligated to apply the correct law to the record

before it. Where a judgment rests upon an incorrect interpretation of a statute, this

Court may correct that legal error even if the precise statutory argument was not

fully articulated at the district court. See Thompson v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery,

Inc., 15-0477, p. 11 (La. 10/14/15), 181 So.3d 656, 665 (citing La. C.C.P. art. 2164

and Uniform Rules Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3).

The statute requires certification “for each of the previous five tax years.”

See La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7). Mr. Fuller qualified on February 13, 2026. Measured

by calendar tax years, on that date, the previous five tax years are 2025, 2024,

2023, 2022, and 2021. Tax year 2020 is the sixth year back. The Legislature did

not qualify the phrase “previous five tax years” by adding “for which returns were

previously due,” nor did it condition the five-year window upon filing deadlines.

When the Legislature intends to reference obligations that are “previously due,” it
does so expressly elsewhere in the same statutory scheme. See, e.g., La. R.S.

18:463(A)(2)(a)(vi) (requiring candidate to certify that he has filed each report

required to be filed by the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, “if any were

previously due”). Courts may not insert words that the Legislature omitted.

Even if one were to conclude that the phrase “previous five tax years” is

susceptible to more than one interpretation, disqualification statutes are strictly

construed in favor of candidacy and the electorate’s right to choose. At minimum,

any ambiguity must be resolved against removal of a candidate from the ballot.

Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758, p. 7 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 541.

Because the only year litigated below was 2020, and because that year does

not fall within the plain, five-year statutory window for a 2026 qualification, the

objection fails as a matter of law. I would reverse the judgment sustaining the

objection to candidacy and dismiss the petition.

Although the five-year certification requirement resolves this appeal, I am

compelled to address the substance of the majority opinion. In doing so, I return to

the framework I articulated in my concurrence in Nixon v. Hughes, 15-1036 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 9/29/15), 176 So.3d 1135 (Lobrano, J., concurring). There, I explained

that false certification includes certifying facts of which the candidate lacks

“sufficient knowledge” at the time the Notice of Candidacy is executed. The

inquiry is temporal and objective. It asks whether, at the moment of signing, the

candidate possessed a sufficient and reasonable basis to attest to compliance. In

other words, did Mr. Fuller have sufficient knowledge, considering the surrounding

circumstances over the ensuing years, that his 2020 state taxes had been filed?

The jurisprudence in Russo v. Burns, 14-1963 (La. 9/24/14), 147 So.3d

1111, and its progeny requires that candidates ensure delivery so that they may

truthfully certify filing. However, those cases do not impose a categorical certified-

mail requirement, nor do they equate the present absence of a processed entry in
LDR’s records with a lack of sufficient knowledge. The operative principle is not

administrative confirmation. It is whether the candidate had a reasonable factual

basis, at the time of certification, to attest to compliance.

The record reflects that Mr. Fuller’s 2020 return was prepared by his

accountant in the ordinary course, transmitted to his office for execution, signed,

and placed in the mail pursuant to established office routine. Importantly, nearly

five years passed without any communication from LDR or his accountant

suggesting non-filing. That prolonged administrative and professional silence is

not dispositive, but it forms part of the factual context available to Mr. Fuller when

he executed the Notice of Candidacy.

Moreover, the law does not require a candidate to conduct a pre-

qualification audit of agency records in the absence of any notice or reason to

suspect non-compliance. The “sufficient knowledge” standard does not demand

retrospective verification where routine professional preparation, mailing in the

ordinary course, and years without notice of non-filing reasonably support the fact

that filing occurred. The majority’s reasoning effectively transforms the

certification requirement into a rule under which a candidate must affirmatively

secure documentary confirmation from LDR before qualifying, even when no

circumstance suggests non-filing. That is not what Burns requires.

Under the “sufficient knowledge” framework, the proper question is whether

these surrounding facts spanning over five years provided a reasonable basis for

Mr. Fuller’s certification at the time he signed. The record demonstrates that he

relied on routine professional preparation, established office practice,

corroborating communications, and nearly five years without notice of deficiency

or non-filing from the LDR or his accountant. These circumstances bear directly on

whether he lacked sufficient knowledge to certify compliance.
The majority’s reliance on Smith v. Charbonnet does not resolve this case.

My analysis today is consistent with the approach I took in Smith v.

Charbonnet, 17-0634 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/2/17), 224 So.3d 1055 (Lobrano, J.,

concurring). There, applying the same “sufficient knowledge” framework

articulated in Nixon, I concluded that the candidate lacked sufficient knowledge at

the time he signed his Notice of Candidacy because he had not reasonably ensured

delivery of the return and possessed no objective basis to confirm filing. Id., 17-

0634, p. 8, 224 So.3d at 1060. I expressly recognized that good faith alone was

insufficient. Id., 17-0634, pp. 8-9, 224 So.3d at 1060. In Smith, the surrounding

facts did not provide a reasonable foundation for certification. The question

remains whether the candidate possessed sufficient knowledge at the time of

signing. What differs in the case sub judice is the evidentiary context. Unlike in

Smith, this record reflects documented preparation of the return, corroborating

communications contemporaneous with qualification, established office mailing

practices, and nearly five years without notice of non-filing. Applying the same

sufficient knowledge analysis I applied in Smith, I conclude that the surrounding

circumstances here provided a reasonable basis for certification at the time it was

made.

Even assuming arguendo that tax year 2020 fell within the relevant statutory

window, I would conclude that the record does not establish, with the clarity

required by our jurisprudence, that Mr. Fuller falsely certified his tax compliance

at the time of qualification.