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Feb. 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of Louisiana v. Sirelderick Deon Hays

Louisiana Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 56,782-KA
• Judges: ROBINSON; HUNTER; ELLENDER

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (28)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

                        by Robinson

Judgment rendered February 25, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,782-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

---

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

SIRELDERICK DEON HAYS Appellant

---

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 382,230

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

---

LOUISIANA APPEALS AND Counsel for Appellant
WRIT SERVICE
By: Remy Starns
Holli Ann Herrle-Castillo

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

VICTORIA T. WASHINGTON
Assistant District Attorney

MORRIS & DEWETT, LLC
By: Eric Matthew Whitehead

---

Before ROBINSON, HUNTER, and ELLENDER, JJ.
ROBINSON, J.

SirElderick Deon Hays (“Hays”) was charged by indictment on July

21, 2021, with one count of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S.

14:30.1, one count of armed robbery in violation of La. R.S. 14:64, and one

count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of La. R.S.

14:95.1. A jury trial was held March 11-12, 2025. Hays was found guilty of

the responsive verdict of manslaughter in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 and

guilty as charged of armed robbery and possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon.

Hays filed motions for post verdict judgment of acquittal and for new

trial on April 11, 2025, which were denied. On April 16, 2025, the trial

court sentenced Hays to 40 years at hard labor for manslaughter, 75 years at

hard labor without benefits for armed robbery, and 15 years at hard labor

plus a $5,000 fine for felon in possession of a firearm, all to be served

consecutively. On April 17, 2025, the defense filed a motion to reconsider

the sentence, which was denied without a hearing. Hays filed a motion for

appeal on May 2, 2025, which was granted.

For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the convictions and

sentences.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 31, 2021, Xavier Griffin (“Griffin”) met up with Tyree

Marshall (“Marshall”) and a juvenile male at the Lakeside Gardens

Apartments complex on Marion Street in Shreveport. Griffin brought his

new AR rifle with him saying he wanted to shoot it. The group went to a

bridge at the apartment complex where Griffin fired the weapon. Another

male approached Griffin and asked to hold the rifle. Griffin hesitantly let
him hold it, but the man began to walk away with the rifle, stating “this bitch

is took,” while holding his own handgun. The group backed up, but then

Griffin argued with the man and fought over the weapon. A single gunshot

was fired and the shooter fled with both firearms. Griffin was pronounced

deceased at the scene.

Marshall remained at the scene until officers arrived and made a

statement recounting the events. He mentioned to the investigating officers

that he had been drinking and had smoked marijuana, but that he felt fine.

Multiple officers testified that Marshall did not appear intoxicated.

No firearms were ever retrieved, but three casings of different

calibers were located at or near the scene. One casing was recovered in the

area where Griffin was shot. The casings were all sent for testing or

comparison. Forensic firearms examiner Phillip Stout testified that he was

provided with three fired cartridge cases to test: a 9 mm, a .40 caliber, and a

.223 caliber. He advised that the different calibers of cartridge cases were

not compared to each other since there was no reason to believe a particular

caliber was fired in a different caliber weapon. He also testified that the 9

mm casing was matched to a 9 mm Taurus pistol recovered in an unrelated

shooting through a national database for fired cartridge cases.

Video footage from the apartment complex’s surveillance cameras

was obtained the day after the incident. Officer Saiz, of the Shreveport

Police Department, testified as to the events captured in the footage, which

were consistent with Marshall’s statement on scene. Four individuals can be

seen on the video, tracked camera-by-camera as they walked through the

complex, believed by officers to be Griffin, Marshall, the shooter, and the

minor teenager. The video was not detailed to the point facial features could
2
be recognized, but the barrel of the AR rifle could be seen in the right hand

side of Griffin’s jacket. Some of the struggle between Griffin and the

shooter over the gun was captured on video, but the two had moved mostly

out of view when the shot was fired. Griffin had lunged for his rifle and

the two fought back and forth. The footage showed the shooter’s posture

with his elbow out in a position to shoot and Griffin bent over with his head

at waist level, at the time the other individuals reacted to the gunshot.

The autopsy revealed that Griffin died as the result of a gunshot

wound to the neck that severed his aorta and perforated his right lung.

Based on the ring of soot around the entrance wound, the muzzle of the

firearm was approximately one to two inches from the skin when fired. The

findings were consistent with Marshall’s statement and the video footage.

A Crime Stoppers tip was received shortly after the incident that

provided a potential name of the shooter. Nothing was found after an initial

search of the records management system, so a search of only the last name

provided was run through a database of misdemeanor crimes, which resulted

in the discovery of a name that was similar in spelling to the one provided by

the Crime Stoppers tip as well as a physical description consistent with that

provided by Marshall. The individual from the search had also previously

committed a crime similar to the current offense. The name obtained was

provided to the Louisiana Fusion Center to obtain a six-person photo array.

At that point, Marshall was brought back in for a recorded interview.

He was presented with the photo lineup and identified the individual whose

name had been obtained through the Crime Stoppers tip and resulting

database searches. Marshall stated that he was “20 out of 10” sure that the

3
man identified in the lineup was the one who killed Griffin. The man

identified was Sirelderick Deon Hays.

During his trial testimony, Marshall stated that he was not

comfortable answering questions concerning Hays’ identification because it

had been four years since the incident and he was doing drugs at the time, so

he did not remember who all had been present the evening of the shooting or

how many officers he had spoken to that night. However, Marshall admitted

talking to detectives and positively identified himself in the video of his

interview and acknowledged a piece of paper in front of him in the video in

which he had identified Hays as the perpetrator.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of Evidence

The standard for appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State

v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905,

124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 248 (2004); State v. Cummings, 95-1377 (La.

2/28/96), 668 So. 2d 1132; State v. Crossley, 48,149 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/26/13), 117 So. 3d 585, writ denied, 13-1798 (La. 2/14/14), 132 So. 3d

410; State v. Murray, 36,137 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/29/02), 827 So. 2d 488, writ

denied, 02-2634 (La. 9/5/03), 852 So. 2d 1020. This standard does not

provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation

of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. McGehee, 15-2140 (La.

4
6/29/17), 223 So. 3d 1136; State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.

2d 517; State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La. 10/4/96), 680 So. 2d 1165.

An appellate court neither assesses credibility nor reweighs evidence

and great deference must be given to the trier of fact’s decision to accept or

reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Smith, 94-3116

(La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442; State v. Carr, 55,692 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/22/24), 387 So. 3d 886, writ denied, 24-00776 (La. 2/28/25), 402 So. 3d

486; State v. Myrick, 54,606 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/22), 349 So. 3d 92; State

v. Eason, 43,788 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/25/09), 3 So. 3d 685, writ denied, 09-

0725 (La. 12/11/09), 23 So. 3d 913; State v. Morrison, 40,852 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/12/06), 927 So. 2d 670. The jury’s reasonable credibility

determination is not to be second-guessed on a Jackson sufficiency of the

evidence review. State v. Marshall, 04-3139 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So. 2d 362,

cert. denied, 552 U.S. 905, 128 S. Ct. 239, 169 L. Ed. 2d 179 (2007).

However, a reviewing court may impinge on a trier of fact’s discretion to the

extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law. State v.

Casey, 99-0023 (La. 1/26/00), 775 So. 2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840,

121 S. Ct. 104, 148 L. Ed. 2d 62 (2000); State v. Turner, 51,228 (La. App. 2

Cir. 04/05/17); 217 So. 3d 601; State v. Woodard, 47, 286 (La. App. 2 Cir.

10/3/12), 107 So. 3d 70, writ denied, 12-2371 (La. 4/26/13), 112 So. 3d 837.

When the issue raised in a sufficiency claim is the defendant’s identity

as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the state is

required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v.

Mathis, 52,500 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/19), 263 So. 3d 613. However, in the

absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical

evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is
5
sufficient to support a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Fussell, 55,497

(La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 381 So. 3d 899; Myrick, supra; State v. Burd,

40,480 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/27/06), 921 So. 2d 219, writ denied, 06-1083 (La.

11/9/06), 941 So. 2d 35. The Louisiana Supreme Court held in State v.

Dorsey, 10-0216 (La. 9/7/11), 74 So. 3d 603, as follows:

A positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to
support a conviction. A victim’s or witness’s testimony alone is
usually sufficient to support the verdict, as appellate courts will
not second-guess the credibility determinations of the factfinder
beyond the constitutional standard of sufficiency. In the absence
of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical
evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the factfinder,
is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion.

Hays claims that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

who shot Griffin. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish

his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses, because it did not negate every

reasonable hypothesis of misidentification. Hays points out that the only

eyewitness refused to implicate Hays at trial, claiming he could not

remember what happened the night of the shooting because he was under the

influence of drugs and alcohol. Hays asserts that Marshall’s own testimony

that he was strongly under the influence the night of the shooting indicated

the possibility that he misidentified the perpetrator, a reasonable probability

that the State failed to negate. Hays, therefore, claims that no rational trier

of fact could have found the State proved the identity of the appellant as the

perpetrator, and the evidence was insufficient to uphold the conviction.

The State argues that any rational trier of fact would find that the State

proved the identity of Hays as the perpetrator of the offenses. It claims that

Marshall’s testimony regarding his use of drugs or alcohol at the time of the

6
crimes is a credibility determination that is prohibited from disturbance on

appeal.

Marshall made statements to officers the night of the shooting as well

as shortly after in a recorded interview, recounting the events and identifying

Hays as the shooter. His accounts were consistent with the evidence

presented consisting of surveillance camera footage, casings found at the

scene, the autopsy findings, and the Crime Stoppers tip. When presented

with a double-blind photo lineup in his police interview, Marshall circled the

photo of Hays as the perpetrator and signed his name next to the circled

photo. When asked how positive he was that the circled individual was the

shooter, on a scale of 1 to 10, Marshall responded, “20 out of 10.” This was

consistent with Marshall’s statement in his first interview, “I know exactly

what that [person] looked like. I know exactly what he looked like.”

Marshall also identified the shooter by his nickname, “Goop,” which was

confirmed through investigation to be the nickname of Hays.

Marshall was uncooperative in his testimony at trial, claiming he was

uncomfortable identifying anyone because he could not currently remember

the details of the incident. However, the only contradiction in his testimony

from his statements four years prior was the extent of his intoxication the

night the crimes were committed. Marshall never actually contradicted his

statements regarding his accounts of the events surrounding the shooting,

nor his identification of Hays that evening.

Marshall’s previous statements were consistent with the evidence

presented in the way of surveillance camera footage, casings found at the

scene, the autopsy findings, and the Crime Stoppers tip, were sufficient to

support the jury’s factual conclusion that Hays was the shooter. The jury
7
made a credibility determination pertaining to the truthfulness of Marshall’s

earlier statements. Considering the consistency of his statements with other

evidence presented in the case, as well as the fact that he did not recant the

statements concerning his accounts or his identification of Hays, there is no

basis to disturb the jury’s credibility determination and the resulting finding

that Hays was the perpetrator.

Excessive Sentence

Hays argues that the sentences imposed were excessive since they

were not only maximum or near-maximum for each offense, but the

resulting consecutive sentences resulted in an overall sentence of 130 years

when the offenses arose from a single scheme. He argues that the sentences

as imposed individually, and as imposed consecutively, are nothing more

than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. Hays claims that the trial

court overlooked the mitigating factors in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 that he

showed remorse at sentencing and that the jury found a mitigating factor

when they returned the responsive manslaughter verdict. He also claims that

the trial court improperly found that he had no ability to be rehabilitated,

because he was in his early twenties and only had one prior conviction.

However, the State asserts that because Hays neither objected to the

order that the sentences be served consecutively nor complained of the

court’s failure to adequately articulate reasons for the sentences per La. C.

Cr. P. art. 894.1, he is precluded from raising those issues and his sentencing

claims are limited to a bare constitutional excessiveness review. Per La. C.

Cr. P. art. 881.1, an appellant must file a motion to reconsider and set forth

the specific grounds upon which the motion is based in order to raise an

objection to the sentence on appeal. The State also refers to this Court’s
8
holding in State v. Butler, 37,226 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/25/03), 850 So. 2d 932,

particularly applicable to this matter:

The record reflects that the defendant timely filed a motion to
reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied. However, in
the motion, the defendant asserts only that his sentence is
excessive. The defendant neither objected to the order that the
sentences be served consecutively nor complained of failure to
adequately articulate reasons for sentence under La. C. Cr. P. art.
894.1. Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 881. l, the failure to include
a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence
may be based precludes the defendant from raising the ground
for relief on appeal. Thus, the defendant’s claim of sentencing
error is limited to the issue of constitutional excessiveness.

We agree with the State and find that Hays’ sentencing claim is

limited to constitutional excessiveness review.

A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of

proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Kennon,

19-0998 (La. 9/9/20), 340 So. 3d 881; State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La.

3/4/98), 706 So. 2d 672; State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State

v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980); State v. Bell, 53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307; State v. Jackson, 51,575 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17),

244 So. 3d 764. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when

the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it

shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So.

2d 166; State v. Scott, 50,920 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So. 3d 248,

writ denied, 17-0353 (La. 11/13/17), 229 So. 3d 478; State v. Modisette,

50,846 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/28/16), 207 So. 3d 1108. As a general rule,

maximum or near-maximum sentences are reserved for the worst offenders

and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 07-2031 (La. 2/15/08), 974 So. 2d

9
665; State v. Gibson, 54,400 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/25/22), 338 So. 3d 1260, writ

denied, 22-00978 (La. 3/7/23), 356 So. 3d 1053.

Trial courts have wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within

the statutory limits, and such sentences should not be set aside as excessive

in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v. Williams, 03-

3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116. A trial judge is in the best position to consider

the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case, and,

therefore, is given broad discretion in sentencing. State v. Gaines, 54,383

(La. App. 2 Cir. 2/22/23), 358 So. 3d 194, writ denied, 23-00363 (La.

6/21/23), 362 So. 3d 428; State v. Jeter, 56,386 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/25),

419 So. 3d 438. On review, an appellate court does not determine whether

another sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the trial

court abused its discretion. Bell, supra; State v. Burns, 53,920 (La. App. 2

Cir. 6/30/21), 322 So. 3d 928, writ denied, 21-01112 (La. 11/23/21), 328 So.

3d 78.

Hays was a convicted felon on probation for a previous violent

robbery and was prohibited from possessing firearms. He robbed Griffin of

his rifle while in possession of his own firearm, both of which he was

prohibited from possessing, fatally shot Griffin during the robbery, and fled

the scene with the stolen firearm. There was no evidence of any

provocation. Maximum sentences for manslaughter and felon in possession

of a firearm would be justified. Hays received less than the maximum

sentence of 99 years for a robbery that resulted in the shooting and death of

the victim.

10
Although the application of the La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 factors is not at

issue on review, the court’s thorough examination thereof supports the

justification for the sentences. The trial court also noted that Hays could

have easily been convicted of the charged offense of second degree murder

based on the evidence presented at trial and benefited from the reduced

sentence of the responsive verdict of manslaughter. The fact that evidence

might have supported a verdict of second degree murder is an appropriate

sentencing consideration when the defendant has been convicted of the

lesser offense of manslaughter. State v. White, 48,788 (La. App. 2 Cir.

2/26/14), 136 So. 3d 280, writ denied, 14-0603 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So. 3d

599. Therefore, although Hays received a maximum sentence for

manslaughter, the fact that he could have been subject to a much greater

sentence for second degree murder is supportive of the sentence.

The trial court’s imposition of the sentence was not shocking to the

sense of justice nor a needless infliction of pain and suffering, and it was not

an abuse of its discretion. Accordingly, Hays’ sentences are not

constitutionally excessive.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated hereinabove, Hays’ convictions and sentences

are hereby AFFIRMED.

11