Jump To

Top Caption Disposition [Combined Opinion

                  by Stephens](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10800483/state-of-louisiana-v-12039-us-currency-seized-from-delancey-r-kent/about:blank#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

Feb. 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of Louisiana v. $12,039 U.S. Currency Seized from Delancey R. Kent

Louisiana Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 56,732-CA
• Judges: STEPHENS; ROBINSON; HUNTER

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.6K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

                        by Stephens

Judgment rendered February 25, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,732-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

---

STATE OF LOUISIANA Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

$12,039 U.S. CURRENCY SEIZED Defendant-Appellant
FROM DELANCEY R. KENT

---

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2021-1504

Honorable B. Scott Leehy, Judge

---

DELANCEY R. KENT In Proper Person

ROBERT S. TEW Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

G. SCOTT MOORE
Assistant District Attorney

---

Before STEPHENS, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ.
STEPHENS, J.,

This civil appeal arises from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish

of Ouachita, State of Louisiana, the Honorable B. Scott Leehy, Judge,

presiding. The defendant, Delancey R. Kent, filed this pro se appeal

following the trial court’s judgment granting the State’s motion for summary

judgment for seizure for forfeiture pursuant to La. R.S. 40:2610. For the

following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 20, 2021, the State of Louisiana filed an application for

warrant of seizure for forfeiture, alleging that Kent had engaged in conduct

giving rise to forfeiture. Agent Tim Klick of the Metro Narcotics Unit

alleged in his supporting affidavit that Kent was taken into custody

following his failure to stop after the Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office had

initiated a traffic stop. While in pursuit of Kent, officers observed him throw

something out of the passenger window of the vehicle Kent was driving.

Kent later admitted to the officers that he had discarded a small plastic bag

of methamphetamine; a bag containing four grams of methamphetamine was

later recovered from the vicinity. Following Kent’s arrest, a check of his

criminal history revealed that he had been arrested several times for

distribution of narcotics.

Klick’s affidavit further stated that, after they got Kent’s verbal

consent to search the vehicle, officers located $12,039.00 on the front seat of

the vehicle, proceeds consistent with street level narcotics sales. Also, Kent

stated throughout the investigation that he did not have a job and had no

means by which he could earn money. Agent Klick further alleged in his

affidavit that Kent gave several stories as to the source of the money. On
May 20, 2021, the trial court issued a warrant of seizure for forfeiture

allowing the seizure of $12,039.00.

On July 22, 2021, the State filed its petition for forfeiture alleging that

the $12,039.00 was obtained in exchange for a controlled substance in

violation of La. R.S. 40:961 et seq. and/or was intended to be furnished in

exchange for a controlled substance. Kent filed his answer on September

27, 2021, claiming that the $12,039.00 was from his employment doing odd

jobs, from stimulus check monies, and out of his retirement fund.

Approximately three years later, on July 16, 2024, the State filed a

motion to compel, complaining that there were inadequacies in Kent’s

responses to the State’s discovery and that Kent had neither filed a

supplement to his responses nor had provided any response to subsequent

discovery.

At a hearing held on October 29, 2024, a stipulation was entered by

the parties that in the event that Kent failed to produce additional relevant

responses to the State’s discovery on or before December 2, 2024, Kent

would be barred from further introducing any testimony or evidence of any

money he may have received beyond the following: 1) income derived from

his retirement account as evidenced in the Fidelity document for the period

of January 1, 2017, through December 31, 2018; 2) income referenced in his

IRS transcripts for the years 2017, 2018, and 2019.

The parties reconvened on December 2, 2024, at which time it was

admitted that no relevant documentation had been produced by Kent, and the

interrogatories had failed to specifically identify the employment Kent had

alleged or the sources of income Kent had alleged existed that resulted in

him obtaining the $12,039.00. The trial court issued an order on December
2
2, 2024, setting forth that Kent had failed to produce additional relevant

responses to the State’s discovery, and that Kent was barred from further

introducing any testimony or evidence of any money he may have received

beyond what was referenced in the parties’ stipulation.

On March 12, 2025, the State filed a motion for summary judgment,

claiming that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that, as a

matter of law, the State is entitled to summary judgment based on Kent’s

failure to comply with the provision of La. R.S. 40:2610 and the trial court’s

order precluding Kent from introducing testimony or evidence of money he

may have received after December 31, 2019. Kent filed an opposition to the

motion for summary judgment on April 11, 2025, claiming that there were

genuine issues of material fact as to whether the currency seized was a drug

asset. Kent claimed in an affidavit executed on April 11, 2025, that the

money sought to be forfeited was his life’s savings accumulated prior to the

May 2021 seizure. He also alleged that he was employed in the years prior

to the seizure in various odd jobs that paid cash, such as lawn mowing and

car washing, which were not reflected in his IRS earnings. He urged that the

money seized had no nexus or connection to any illegal activity.

The State objected to Kent’s affidavit, arguing that it was barred by

the trial court’s December 2, 2024, order. At the summary judgment hearing

held on June 10, 2025, the State reiterated that it was entitled to summary

judgment and that Kent’s affidavit was improper due to his failure to

produce further evidence to show the source of the currency at issue. In the

judgment signed on June 24, 2025, the trial court granted the State’s motion

for summary judgment and preempted Kent from further participation in the

drug asset forfeiture proceedings. The court granted the State the right to
3
proceed with an application of order of forfeiture pursuant to La. R.S.

40:2615(A). Kent has appealed from this adverse judgment.

DISCUSSION

In his pro se brief,1 Kent argues that he has newly discovered evidence

that was not available during the forfeiture proceedings.2 He urges that the

document included in his appeal, Exhibit 1, corroborates his claims that the

$12,039.00 is an accumulation of funds earned through odd jobs, received as

stimulus check payments, and withdrawn from retirement accounts or

investments. Kent maintains that the State failed to meet its burden in

showing that the value of the contraband was intended for commercial sale

and that the seizure was constitutional. He states that the incident took place

during the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in him being laid off and having

to perform freelance work. He contends that the Eighth Amendment of the

United States Constitution protects him from this unreasonable, excessive

seizure. He requests that this Court reopen the case, and he states that he is

willing to reconcile with 75% of the currency being returned as adequate to

the value of the contraband seized.

In reply, the State asserts that the trial court did not commit reversible

error when it found that Kent failed to comply with the provisions in La.

R.S. 40:2610(B)(4) and (5) and granted summary judgment in its favor,

1
Although Kent’s brief is not compliant with the URCA, this Court reads pro se
filings indulgently and will attempt to discern the thrust of his position on appeal and the
relief he seeks. Pentecost v. Grassi, 56,113 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25), 408 So. 3d 1022;
Linn v. Ouachita Parish Police Jury, 55,480 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/24), 383 So. 3d 1171;
Fobbs v. CompuCom Sys., Inc., 55,173 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 371 So. 3d 1146; Magee
v. Williams, 50,726 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So. 3d 265.
2
Kent’s pro se brief was not timely filed. Furthermore, as pointed out by the
State, he did not properly make assignments of error, but rather set forth arguments which
the State characterized as irrelevant in an appeal of the trial court’s grant of the State’s
motion for summary judgment.
4
ultimately dismissing Kent’s proof of claim. The State urges that Kent’s

bare claim that the $12,039.00 seized was from odd jobs, stimulus check

monies, and retirement funds did not satisfy the disclosure of information

requirement which includes disclosure of the date(s) the money was

acquired, identification of the transferor(s) of the money, and explanation of

the circumstances in which the money was acquired.

Finally, the State contends that Kent’s attachment of “newly

discovered evidence” to his brief is not reviewable by this Court as it is not

part of the trial court record. The State also argues that Kent has raised

several issues before this Court that he failed to raise before the trial court.

Specifically, the State claims that Kent asserts the following arguments for

the first time on appeal: (1) the State did not meet its burden in showing that

the value of the contraband was intended for commercial sale and prove that

the seizure was constitutional; (2) the State failed to prove each element of

its case beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the seizure took place during COVID

which forced Kent to take on freelance work as a result of being laid off

from his job; and (4) Kent’s rights are safeguarded by the Eighth

Amendment. Because these issues were not argued before the trial court, the

State urges this Court not to consider these issues on appeal.

Appellate courts review motions for summary judgment de novo,

using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether

the summary judgment is appropriate. Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co., 12-

2292 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So. 3d 791; Dupree v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 56,091

(La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25), 408 So. 3d 468, writ denied, 25-00368 (La.

6/3/25), 410 So. 3d 787; Bank of Am., N.A. v. Green, 52,044 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/23/18), 249 So. 3d 219. Summary judgment is favored by law and
5
provides a vehicle by which the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination

of an action may be achieved. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). We view the

record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Hines v. Garrett, 04-0806 (La. 6/25/04),

876 So. 2d 764; Dupree, supra. A motion for summary judgment shall be

granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show there

is no genuine issue as to material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).

A genuine issue is one about which reasonable persons could disagree.

Hines, supra; Dupree, supra; Franklin v. Dick, 51,479 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/21/17), 224 So. 3d 1130. In determining whether a fact is genuine for

purposes of summary judgment, courts cannot consider or weigh the merits,

make credibility determinations, or evaluate testimony. Suire v. Lafayette

City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 04-1459 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So. 2d 37; Sepulvado

on Behalf of Sepulvado v. G-Rock Climbing, LLC, 55,637 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/22/24), 387 So. 3d 870, writ denied, 24-00800 (La. 10/15/24), 394 So. 3d

1. A material fact is one that potentially ensures or precludes recovery,

affects the ultimate success of the litigant, or determines the outcome of the

dispute. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines

materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material for summary

judgment purposes can be seen only in light of the substantive law

applicable to the case. Jackson v. City of New Orleans, 12-2742 (La.

1/28/14), 144 So. 3d 876; Richard v. Hall, 03-1488 (La. 4/23/04), 874 So. 2d

131; Sepulvado on Behalf of Sepulvado, supra.

La. Const. art. I, § 4(D) provides authority for civil forfeiture

proceedings related to certain drug-related criminal matters:
6
The following property may be forfeited and disposed of in a
civil proceeding, as provided by law: contraband drugs;
property derived in whole or in part from contraband drugs;
property used in the distribution, transfer, sale, felony
possession, manufacture, or transportation of contraband drugs;
property furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for
contraband drugs; property used or intended to be used to
facilitate any of the above conduct; or other property because
the above-described property has been rendered unavailable.

Through the Seizure and Controlled Dangerous Substances Property

Forfeiture Act of 1989 (“Act”), the Louisiana Legislature established a civil

system of expressly delineated procedures which allows the State to seize

and have forfeited property that is related to, is a proceed from, facilitates, or

is itself a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.

La. R.S. 40:2601, et seq.; State v. 2003 Infiniti G35 VIN No.

JNKCV51E93MO24167, 09-1193 (La. 1/20/10), 27 So. 3d 824; State v.

$3,136 in US Currency, 53,703 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/3/21), 314 So. 3d

1090, writ denied, 21-00481 (La. 5/25/21).

La. R.S. 40:2608 sets forth the procedure to be followed by the district

attorney to commence forfeiture proceedings, including providing notice of

pending forfeiture to the owner and interest holder in the property. The

district attorney may bring a forfeiture proceeding in rem or in personam or

both. See La. R.S. 40:2612 and 2613; State v. Watson, 49,331 (La. App. 2

Cir. 10/1/14), 151 So. 3d 120, writ denied, 14-2528 (La. 11/6/15), 180 So. 3d

305. Hearings are then held by the trial court to determine whether the

property is to be forfeited. State v. Watson, supra; State v. Birdwell, 47,126

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/16/12), 92 So. 3d 1107.

In a civil forfeiture proceeding, the trial court’s findings of fact are

subject to the manifest error/clearly wrong standard of appellate review.

State v. $3,136 in US Currency, supra; State v. Birdwell, supra. The State
7
has the initial burden of showing the existence of probable cause for

forfeiture of property under the provisions of the Act. State v. $3,136 in US

Currency, supra; State v. $2,540.00 U.S. Currency Seized from Foster,

47,127 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/16/12), 92 So. 3d 1153. The evidence admissible

for meeting the State’s burden can be the same as that admissible in

determining probable cause at a preliminary hearing or by a judge in issuing

a search warrant. La. R.S. 40:2611(F); State v. $2,540.00 U.S. Currency

Seized from Foster, supra. Probable cause for forfeiture is satisfied when

the totality of the facts and circumstances provides reasonable ground for

believing the property in question is connected to illegal drug trafficking.

State v. $144,320.00, 12-0466 (La. 12/4/12), 105 So. 3d 694. The Act does

not require proof of a specific drug transaction. Id.

It is unnecessary for the State to trace the property to a particular drug

transaction – it is the totality of the circumstances that leads to a finding of

probable cause. State v. $3,136 in US Currency, supra; State v. $2,540.00

U.S. Currency, supra. The fact that money or a negotiable instrument was

found in proximity to contraband or an instrumentality of conduct giving rise

to forfeiture shall give rise to the permissible inference that the money or

negotiable instrument was the proceeds of conduct giving rise to forfeiture

or was used or intended to be used to facilitate the conduct. La. R.S.

40:2611(G). If the State meets this burden, the claimant must show by a

preponderance of the evidence that his or her interest in the property is not

subject to forfeiture. State v. $3,136 in US Currency, supra; State v.

$2,540.00 U.S. Currency, supra.

8
The owner or interest holder in the property must take affirmative

steps to preserve his interest in the property by filing a claim under La. R.S.

40:2610, which reads as follows:

A. Only an owner of or interest holder in property seized for
forfeiture may file a claim, and shall do so in the
manner provided in this Section. The claim shall be mailed
to the seizing agency and to the district attorney by certified
mail, return receipt requested, within thirty days after Notice
of Pending Forfeiture. No extension of time for the filing of
a claim shall be granted subject to forfeiture.

B. The claim shall be in affidavit form, signed by the claimant
under oath, and sworn to by the affiant before one who has
authority to administer the oath, under penalty of perjury or
false swearing and shall set forth all of the following:

1) The caption of the proceedings as set forth on the
Notice of Pending Forfeiture or petition and the name
of the claimant.
2) The address where the claimant will accept mail.
3) The nature and extent of the claimant's interest in the
property.
4) The date, identity of the transferor, and the
circumstances of the claimant's acquisition of the
interest in the property.
5) The specific provision of this Chapter relied on in
asserting that the property is not subject to forfeiture.
6) All essential facts supporting each assertion.
7) The specific relief sought.

The mandatory plain-language requirements for the filing of a timely,

valid claim are clear and, if not met, carry significant consequences. State v.

2003 Infiniti G35, supra; State v. Watson, supra. The failure to fulfill any of

those requirements – whether it be missing the deadline, filing a claim not in

affidavit form, or not setting forth the necessary averments – precludes the

owner or interest holder from further participation in the forfeiture

proceeding. Id. The failure of a claimant to specify the date, identity of the

transferor, and the circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest

in the property is fatal to the claim. Id.

9
We first address Kent’s argument that he acquired the $12,039.00

through odd jobs, stimulus check monies, and retirement funds. Although

Kent is self-represented in this appeal, we note that he retained counsel

throughout the trial court proceedings. After the State propounded discovery

upon Kent, the trial court gave him ample opportunity to prove the source of

the money. The record clearly indicates that Kent failed to specify the date,

identity of the transferor, and the circumstances of his acquisition of any of

the money recovered from his vehicle following his arrest. His responses to

the State’s initial discovery requests were vague, indicating that his sources

of income were from “income tax, cleaning service, and auto detail shop.”

Kent failed to not only name the cleaning service and auto detail shop from

which he allegedly received money, but he also failed to provide an address

of these alleged businesses and indicate the time frame he received this

money and amount of money he received. Nothing Kent provided to the trial

court amounted to evidence of money acquired 17 months prior to the

seizure of the $12,039.00. The simple allegations that Kent acquired this

money through odd jobs, stimulus check monies, and retirement funds are

inadequate to preserve his interest in the property, and it has proven fatal to

his claim. La. R.S. 40:2610; see also State v. $144, 320.00, supra; State v.

2003 Infiniti G35, supra; State v. Watson, supra. Consequently, we find no

error in the trial court’s judgment granting the State’s motion for summary

judgment.

Finally, appellate courts will not consider issues that were not raised

in the pleadings, were not addressed by the trial court, or are raised for the

first time on appeal. Thomas v. Bridges, 13-1855 (La. 5/7/14), 144 So. 3d

1001; Maxie v. Bates, 54,256 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/22), 338 So. 3d 564;
10
Hatfield v. Herring, 54,048 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/11/21), 326 So. 3d 944, writ

denied, 21-01377 (La. 12/7/21), 328 So. 3d 424; Jacobs v. GEICO Indemnity

Co., 52,372 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/18), 256 So. 3d 449. We find merit to the

State’s argument that Kent cannot first raise the issues relating to the State’s

failure to meet its burden and the alleged violation of his Constitutional

rights in the appellate court as they were not raised by Kent at any point

during the trial court proceedings. Furthermore, the account transcript from

the Internal Revenue Service, attached to Kent’s brief as Exhibit-1, does not

qualify as newly discovered evidence according to La. C. Cr. P. art. 854 and

will not be considered on appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the trial court’s judgment granting the

State of Louisiana’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Delancey

Kent’s claim to the $12,039.00 seized, and preempting him from further

participation in the drug asset forfeiture proceedings is affirmed. Costs of

this appeal are assessed to the defendant, Delancey Kent.

AFFIRMED.

11