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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

J.R. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, D. Colorado

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-03045

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Civil Action No. 25-cv-03045-REB

J.R.,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

ORDER REVERSING DISABILITY DECISION AND REMANDING TO AGENCY

Blackburn, J.

The matter before me is plaintiff’s Complaint [#1],1 filed September 29, 2025,
seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision denying plaintiff’s claims for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. I have jurisdiction to review the
Commissioner’s final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). The matter has been fully
briefed, obviating the need for oral argument. I reverse and remand.2

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges she is disabled as a result of seizure disorder, Torsades de

1 “[#1]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a specific
paper by the court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). I use this convention
throughout this order.

2 Although the parties consented to have the matter referred to and determined by a United
States magistrate judge (see [#12], filed October 12, 2025), I exercise my discretion under
D.C.COLO.LAPR 72.2(d) to decline to enter an order of reference under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c).
Pointes,3 right homonymous hemianopsia,4 depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and a mild neurocognitive disorder. After her
applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits
were denied, plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. This
hearing was held on September 12, 2024. At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was 41

years old. She has an associates degree. Because plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity in the five years prior to the hearing, the ALJ found she had
no past relevant work experience. Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since January 12, 2019, her alleged date of onset.

The ALJ found plaintiff was not disabled and therefore not entitled to disability
insurance benefits or supplemental security income benefits. Although the medical
evidence established plaintiff suffered from multiple severe impairments, the judge
concluded the severity of those impairments did not meet or equal any impairment listed
in the social security regulations. Other impairments were found to be non-severe. The

ALJ found plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a reduced range of
light work involving, relevantly for purposes of this appeal, the ability to “understand,
remember, and carry out simple tasks and instructions.” Although plaintiff had no past

3 “Torsades de Pointes is a rare, dangerous type of fast heart rhythm (tachycardia), which may
cause “heart palpitations, dizziness and fainting.” although also can be asymptomatic. “Cardiac arrest is
also possible.” (Cleveland Clinic, Torsades de Points (Nov. 21, 2025) (available at:
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/21915-torsades-de-pointes) (last accessed: March 9,
2026).)

4 “Homonymous hemianopia refers to an absence of vision towards one side of the visual world in
each eye. The vision loss is on the same side in each eye (for example, the right half of each eye). The
damage that caused this problem is in the brain and not in the eyes.” (North American Neuro-
Opthalmology Society, Homonymous Hemianopsia (available at: https://www.nanosweb.org/i4a/pages/
index.cfm?pageid=4166) (last accessed: March 9, 2026).)

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relevant work, the judge determined there were other jobs existing in sufficient numbers
in the national and local economies she could perform. She therefore found plaintiff not
disabled at step five of the sequential evaluation. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the
Appeals Council. The Council affirmed. Plaintiff then filed this action in federal court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act only if her
physical and/or mental impairments preclude her from performing both her previous
work and any other “substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42
U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2). “When a claimant has one or more severe impairments the Social
Security [Act] requires the [Commissioner] to consider the combined effects of the
impairments in making a disability determination.” Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518,
1521 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(C)). However, the mere existence of
a severe impairment or combination of impairments does not require a finding that an
individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. To be disabling, the

claimant’s condition must be so functionally limiting as to preclude any substantial
gainful activity for at least twelve consecutive months. See Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d
335, 338 (10th Cir. 1995).

The Commissioner has established a quinquepartite sequential evaluation
process for determining whether a claimant is disabled:

1. The ALJ must first ascertain whether the claimant is

engaged in substantial gainful activity. A claimant who is
working is not disabled regardless of the medical findings.
2. The ALJ must then determine whether the claimed

impairment is “severe.” A “severe impairment” must

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significantly limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability to
do basic work activities.

3. The ALJ must then determine if the impairment meets or

equals in severity certain impairments described in Appendix
1 of the regulations.

4. If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant

can perform her past work despite any limitations.

5. If the claimant does not have the residual functional capacity
to perform her past work, the ALJ must decide whether the

claimant can perform any other gainful and substantial work
in the economy. This determination is made on the basis of
the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4)(I)-(v).5 See also Williams v. Bowen 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988). The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a disability in the first
four steps of this analysis. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S.Ct. 2287,
2294 n.5, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show
that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. Id. A finding
that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review is
conclusive and terminates the analysis. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services, 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991).

Review of the Commissioner’s disability decision is limited to determining
whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and whether the decision is
5 Throughout this opinion, although I cite to relevant sections of Part 404 of Title 20 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, which contain the Commissioner’s regulations relating to disability insurance
benefits, identical, parallel regulations can be found in Part 416 of that same title, relating to supplemental
security income benefits.

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supported by substantial evidence. Hamilton v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 961 F.2d 1495, 1497-98 (10th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194,
1196 (10th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Brown, 912 F.2d at 1196. It requires

more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Hedstrom v.
Sullivan, 783 F.Supp. 553, 556 (D. Colo. 1992). “Evidence is not substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or constitutes mere conclusion.”
Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). Further, “if the ALJ failed
to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of
substantial evidence.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).
Although a reviewing court should meticulously examine the record, it may not reweigh
the evidence or substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner. Id. III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

In a single point of error, plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by relying on jobs
identified by the vocational expert at step five of the sequential evaluation. (See Tr. 32,
63-64.) Specifically, plaintiff maintains the limitation in the ALJ’s residual functional
capacity assessment to jobs requiring the ability to carry out only “simple instructions”
conflicts with the demands of the jobs on which the ALJ relied to find plaintiff not
disabled. I agree. Although the ALJ’s decision is otherwise impressively
comprehensive, because she neither identified nor resolved this apparent conflict, I
reverse.

The Commissioner recognizes that “[o]ccupational evidence provided by a
[vocational expert] or [vocational specialist] generally should be consistent with the
occupational information supplied by the DOT [Dictionary of Occupational Titles].”
Social Security Ruling 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 at *2 (SSA Dec. 4, 2000). If it is not,
the ALJ has an affirmative duty to inquire as to the conflict on the record. Id. at *4.
“When vocational evidence . . . is not consistent with information in the DOT, the

adjudicator must resolve this conflict before relying on the . . . evidence to support a
determination or decision that the individual is or is not disabled.” Id. See also
Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084, 1091 (10th Cir.1999) (“[T]he ALJ must investigate
and elicit a reasonable explanation for any conflict between the Dictionary and expert
testimony before the ALJ may rely on the expert’s testimony as substantial evidence to
support a determination of nondisability.”).

That duty was not discharged properly in this instance. The ALJ limited plaintiff
to jobs requiring the ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions.
(Tr 22-23.) However, the jobs identified by the vocational expert on which the ALJ

relied all have a General Educational Development (“GED”)6 reasoning level of 2 (see
Tr. 32, 63-64), indicating they require the ability to “[a]pply commonsense understanding
to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions.” Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”), App. C § III: Components of the Definition Trailer
hereinafter “DOT, App. C § III”

The law of this circuit is clear that jobs requiring level three reasoning are
incompatible with a residual functional capacity limited to simple and routine tasks, see

6 GED is comprised of three variables – Reasoning Development, Mathematical Development,
and Language Development – and “embraces those aspects of education (formal and informal) which are
required of the worker for satisfactory job performance.” DOT, App. C § III.
Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005), as well as one providing
only for the ability to follow simple instructions, Paulek v. Colvin, 662 Fed. Appx. 588,
594 (10th Cir. 2016). On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit has not definitively held that
jobs which require level two reasoning also are beyond the residual functional capacity

of a claimant who is limited to simple instructions. See T.J.G. v. Commissioner,
Social Security Administration, 2025 WL 1862840 at *8 (D. Colo. July 7, 2025). The
Eighth Circuit has found such jobs compatible with a limitation to simple instructions.
See Galloway v. Kijakazi, 46 F.4th 686, 690 (8th Cir. 2022) (finding “no direct conflict
between carrying out simple job instructions . . . and a vocational expert’s identification
of occupations involving instructions that, while potentially detailed, are not complicated
or intricate”) (citing Moore v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 599, 604-05 (8th Cir. 2010)). The Fourth
Circuit has at least entertained the idea. Keller v. Berryhill, 754 Fed. Appx. 193, 198
(4th Cir. 2018) (while noting that “[a] limitation to short and simple instructions appears

more consistent with Reasoning Development Level 1 or Level 2,” conceding “it is not
entirely clear to us that a person limited to short and simple instructions can also carry
out Level 2 jobs that include ‘detailed but uninvolved’ instructions”).

In this district, however, courts which have considered the question consistently
have found the requirements of level two reading presumptively incompatible with a
limitation to simple instructions. See T.J.G., 2025 WL 1862840 at *11 (remanding to
resolve apparent conflict but “declin[ing] to find that a limitation to simple instructions is
always incompatible with jobs requiring level-two reasoning.”) (emphasis in original;
footnote omitted); M.D. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 3227621 at *13 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2022)

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(“[B]ased on the plain language of the GED reasoning levels, a limitation to ‘simple’
instructions is more in line with jobs requiring level-one reasoning, rather than
level-two.”); C.H.C. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 2022 WL
950433 at *8 (D. Colo. March 29, 2022) (“The plain language of [the DOT] suggests that

jobs with level 2 reasoning skills require one to comply with ‘detailed instructions’ rather
than mere ‘simple instructions.’); Deveraeaux v. Astrue, 2013 WL 2393075 at *8 (D.
Colo. May 31, 2013) (“[I]t is near impossible to reconcile the ALJ’s determination on this
issue[.]”)

Having considered the authorities and arguments advanced on both sides of the
debate, I agree with my colleagues in this district that there is an apparent conflict
between a reliance on jobs requiring level two reasoning and a residual functional
capacity determination that a claimant is limited to simple instructions. I see no reason
to provide my own festooned reiteration of their well-reasoned and cogent decisions on

this point.

I write further only to add that, in addition to the persuasive, interlocking
rationales which support these decisions, the very lingual structure of the DOT supports
a conclusion that the word “simple” is not coterminous with the word “detailed.”
Whereas reasoning level 1 jobs are those that require the ability “to carry out simple
one- or two-step instructions,” reasoning level two jobs require the ability “to carry out
detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions.” DOT, App. C § III (emphases
added). Thus, structurally, “simple” is correlated with “detailed,” while “one- or two-step

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instructions” is correlated with “uninvolved” instructions.7 I find inescapable the
conclusion that “simple” and “detailed” are intended to mean different things in this
context.

The ALJ has an affirmative duty to inquire as to and resolve any apparent conflict
between the job requirements identified in the DOT and the vocational expert’s

testimony. Social Security Ruling 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 at *4. See also Akbichi
v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 1737206 at *3 (D. Colo. April 11, 2018). This she did not do.8 I
also decline the Commissioner’s tacit request that I engage in harmless error review.
The ALJ’s finding that plaintiff has the ability to “complete attention tasks” and
accomplish various tasks of daily living (see Tr. 22) does not speak clearly or directly to
her ability to carry out detailed instructions. Likewise, while the ALJ found the opinion of
the state agency physician persuasive (Tr. 31), in so doing, she did not address the
doctor’s conclusion that there was “[n]o evidence of limitation” in plaintiff’s ability to carry

out detailed instructions (Tr. 116). Instead, she again relied principally on plaintiff’s
ability to engage in activities of daily living, i.e. tasks, to support her determination. (Tr.
31.)

For these reasons, reversal is required.9

7 To echo somewhat the court in T.J.G., “simple” and “detailed” appear to describe the complexity
vel non of the instructions, while “one- or two-steps” and “uninvolved” appear to denote the number of
instructions involved. 2025 WL 1862840 at *9.

8 Although the ALJ stated that she had found the vocational expert’s testimony to be consistent
with the DOT (see Tr. 32), she failed to explain how she reached that conclusion, which failure also
constitutes error, see Social Security Ruling 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 at *4 (“The adjudicator will explain
in the determination or decision how he or she resolved the conflict.”). Moreover, in explaining her
testimony that there was no such conflict, the vocational expert identified only “items that fall outside the
scope” of the DOT – which identifying the appropriate GED level of various jobs does not – and the
suggested limitations on plaintiff’s capacity to climb as supporting this purported consistency. (See Tr.
64.)

9 By this decision, I do not find or imply that plaintiff is or should be found to be disabled.
IV. ORDERS
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. That the conclusion of the Commissioner through the Administrative Law
Judge that plaintiff was not disabled is reversed;
2. That this case is remanded to the ALJ, who is directed to
a. Resolve the apparent conflict between the vocational expert’s
testimony and her determination that plaintiff could perform the jobs
identified at step five of the sequential evaluation;
b. Solicit further medical or vocational expert testimony, recontact any
treating or other medical source, or otherwise further develop the
record as he deems necessary; and
C. Reassess the disability determination; and
3. That plaintiff is awarded her costs, to be taxed by the clerk pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), D.-C.COLO.LCivR 54.1, and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (a)(1).
Dated March 10, 2026, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:

                                   Robert £. Blackburn 
                                   United States District Judge 

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