Wright v. Dicampli - Summary Judgment Motion Ruling

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWAREFRANKLIN WRIGHT,Plaintiff,V.ANTHONY DICAMPLI, ADRIANESCARCEGA GARCIA, HUBERTMORRIS, and REESE CLARK,Defendants.Civil Action No. 23-760-CFCFranklin Wright, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware- Pro se PlaintiffLorin Huerta, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington,DelawareCounsel for MEMORANDUM OPINIONMarch 13, Wilmington, Delaware

)LMF. CONNOLLYCHIEF JUDGESergeant Anthony DiCampli, Corporal Hubert Morris, andCorporal Adrian Escarcega Garcia (collectively, the Tier Staff Defendants) andOfficer Reese Clark' have moved for summary judgment on pro se PlaintiffFranklin Wrights's claims for damages under U.S.C. § and a related statelaw tort claim. D.I. 29.^ are officers at the James T.Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC). Wright, a prisoner at the facility, bases his§ claims on alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments ofthe United States Constitution.^' Counsel for identified Clark as the "John Doe unit to boothofficers" named in the Complaint. D.I. 9.^ The Complaint contains allegations and claims for injunctive relief against otherindividuals, but on April 17, 2024,1 issued an order dismissing all claims againstall the other defendants. See D.I. at 1. The Tier Staff and OfficerClark are thus the only remaining defendants in this case, and face only claims fordamages.^ The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment applies tothe states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v.California, U.S. 660, (1962).

1. BACKGROUNDA. The Verified ComplaintThe Verified Complaint, sworn by Wright under penalty of perjury, allegesthat officers at JTVCC failed to protect him from beatings by fellowinmates in December and June 2023. D.I. 1.On December 3, 2022, Wright "had a disagreement with his cellmate," whothen pushed him into his cell and physically assaulted him. D.I. 19-20. Whenthe Tier Staff came to lock down the cell tier for the evening, Wrightexpressed his fear of further assault and asked if he had to go in the cell. D.I. 25-28. Sergeant DiCampli ordered Wright into his cell, and the cellmateassaulted Wright again upon his entrance. D.I. 29-30. "While [Wright was]defending himself from assault[,] staff sprayed [Wright] and his cellmate. Both[prisoners] were removed off the tier." D.I. Tf 31.On June 28, 2023, Wright was physically attacked by his "recreationpartner," with whom he was locked in a room directly in front of a camera-monitoring booth then staffed by Officer Clark. D.I. 46^8, 62, 75. Wright'scries for help went unanswered for twenty to thirty minutes, even as his assailanttook two breaks between bouts of beating him. D.I. 51-57, 62. When officerseventually walked down the hall, they responded to Wright's pleas for help,stopped the beating, and took Wright to medical care. D.I. 63-65. Wright seeks compensatory and punitive damages. D.I. at 19—20.Paragraph of his Complaint states, in full, that "[t]he plaintiff has exhausted hisremedies available to him with respect to all claims anddefendants." D.I. ^ 68.B. Record Evidencesubmitted as evidence sworn affidavits (D.Is. 30-3-30-6), theDelaware Department of Corrections (DOC) Inmate Grievance Policy (D.I. 30-1),and portions of Wright's deposition (D.I. 30-2). The DOC grievance policy covers"any condition or incident within the institution that affects the grievant," andrequires an inmate to file a grievance within seven days of an incident. D.I. 30-1 at2, 8. In his deposition on April 15, 2025, Wright repeatedly stated that he did notfile a grievance regarding his claims against from either incident:Q: Okay. So you did not file a grievance related to the[December 2022] incident or the officers' reaction to theincident. Is that correct?A: No. I don't think so. It was the appeal. It was the appeal, theappeal to the disciplinary. That's what that was, yeah.Q: Okay. So instead of filing a grievance, you filed an appeal toyour disciplinary report. Is that correct?A: Yes. Yes.D.I. 30-2 35:10-21.Q: Okay. Did you file a grievance related to this incident on June28th, 2023?A: Did I file a grievance for that? I don't think. No, I don't thinkI did. No.

Q; Okay. Did you inform the unit commander—A: Did I file a grievance? I think— did I file a grievance? No.I put in medical slips for this. I put in medical slips.D.I. 30-2 54:8-19.II. LEGAL STANDARDA court must grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is nogenuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as amatter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden ofdemonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.Catrett, All U.S. 317, (1986). If the burden of persuasion at trial would be onthe nonmoving party, then the moving party may satisfy its burden of productionby pointing to an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case, afterwhich the burden of production then shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate theexistence of a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. ZenithRadio Corp., U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Williams v. Borough of West Chester,Pa., F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989).Material facts are those "that could affect the outcome" of the proceeding.Lamont v. New Jersey, F.3d 177, (3d Cir. 2011). "[A] dispute about amaterial fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury toreturn a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).A nonmoving party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support such an

assertion by: "(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, includingdepositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits ordeclarations, stipulations,. . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;or (B) showing that the materials cited [by the moving party] do not establish theabsence ... of a genuine dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The nonmovingparty's evidence "must amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (inthe evaluation of the court) than a preponderance." Williams, F.2d at 460-61.The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to thenonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. WishkinV. Potter, F.3d 180, (3d Cir. 2007). "[T]he facts asserted by thenonmoving party, if supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, must beregarded as true." Aman v. Cart Furniture Rental Corp., F.3d 1074, (3dCir. 1996).III. DISCUSSIONAlthough motion is unopposed, I still must address the motionon its merits. See Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., F.2d168, (3d Cir. 1990) ("[Failure to respond to a summary judgment motion] isnot alone a sufficient basis for the entry of a summary judgment. There must, inaddition, be a finding that judgment for the moving party is 'appropriate.'").

1. The § Claimsargue that Wright's claims are barred because of his failure toexhaust remedies at JTVCC. D.I. at 4. The Prison LitigationReform Act (PLRA) provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect toprison conditions under [§ 1983] or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confinedin any jail, prison, or other facility until such remediesas are available are exhausted." U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Porter v. Nussle,U.S. 516, (2002) ("[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to allinmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances orparticular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some otherwrong."). The PLRA requires "proper exhaustion," meaning exhaustion of thoseremedies that are "available." Woodford v. Ngo, U.S. 81, (2006).Because an inmate's failure to exhaust under PLRA is an affirmativedefense, the inmate is not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion inhis complaint. Jones v. Bock, U.S. 199, (2007); West v. Emig, F.App'x 812, (3d Cir. 2019); see also Small v. Camden Cty., F.3d 265, (3d Cir. 2013) ("Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense the defendant mustplead and prove; it is not a pleading requirement for the prisoner-plaintiff").Failure to exhaust remedies must be pleaded and proved by the defendant. Rinaldi v. United States, F.3d 257, (3d Cir. 2018); Ray v.Kertes, F.3d 287, (3d Cir. 2002).There is no factual dispute that Wright failed to exhaust his remedies. "Although conclusory assertions are insufficient to survive a motion forsummary judgment, such relief should be denied when there is a genuine issue ofmaterial fact on exhaustion." Paladino v. Newsome, F.3d 203, 205-08 (3d Cir.2018) (affirming grant of summary judgment on exhaustion when plaintiff offeredonly "a conclusory, self-serving affidavit^"). Here, Wright included in his verifiedComplaint the legal conclusion that he had "exhausted his remediesavailable to him," unsupported by any facts whatsoever. D.I. ]f 68. Further,Wright's own deposition testimony contradicts his Complaint's bare assertion thathe exhausted remedies. D.I. 30-2 35:10-21, 54:8-19, 56:24-57:4.Accordingly, under the PLRA, summary judgment on Wright's § claims forfailure to exhaust remedies is warranted.B. State Law Tort ClaimWright included in his Complaint a claim under Delaware tort law. D.I. ]| 81. With the grant of summary judgment on the § claims for Defendants,there are no longer any pending federal claims in this action. A district court "maydecline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim" if it "has dismissed allclaims over which it has original jurisdiction." U.S.C. § 1367(c). "In making

its determination, the district court should take into account generally acceptedprinciples of'judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants.'"Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware Cnty., F.2d 1277, (3d Cir. 1993)(quoting United Mine Workers v. Gihbs, U.S. 715, (1966)). Wright hasfailed to respond to the pending summary judgment motion and orders of theCourt, including a show cause order for failure to prosecute this case. D.I. 36.Accordingly, I decline to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over the state lawclaim and will dismiss it, thereby closing this case.IV. CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, I will grant motion for summaryjudgment with respect to Wright's § claims and will dismiss the state law tortclaim.The Court will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.