Jump To

Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

Feb. 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Andree Lee Hilliard v. Clark, et al.

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:23-cv-00472

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (19)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ANDRE LEE HILLIARD,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 23-cv-00472

v.

Judge Mary M. Rowland

CLARK, et al.

Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                               

Plaintiff Andree Lee Hilliard required services for his medical needs while 

incarcerated at Joliet Treatment Center. He sues Defendant Elizabeth English-
Lindsey1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that she displayed deliberate indifference
to his medical needs. [19]. Defendant English-Lindsey has moved for summary
judgment on the basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
[152]. For the reasons explained below, Defendant’s motion is granted.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such

1 Hilliard sues several other defendants, including Defendants Warden Catherine Larry, CTO Lt.
Clark, CTO Adeymo, CCTIP Bilangan, CTO Campbell, Alfevort Wright, QMHP Lauren Bondi, BHT
Branner, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. See e.g. 12. Only Defendant
English-Lindsey has moved for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust. [152].
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The Court “consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, and [] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that
evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). The Court “must refrain
from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence.” Viamedia, Inc. v.
Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

In ruling on summary judgment, the Court gives the non-moving party “the benefit

of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its]
favor.” White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations
omitted). The “controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in
favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition
to the motion for summary judgment.” Id. BACKGROUND

I. Defendant’s request to strike

As a preliminary matter, Defendant English-Lindsey has requested that the 

Court strike several of Plaintiff’s statements of additional fact, arguing that these
statements are immaterial to the issue of whether Plaintiff exhausted his
administrative remedies. [178] at ¶¶ 1-8, 16-18. This Court maintains
broad discretion to enforce the Local Rules governing summary judgment
motions, Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014); Judson Atkinson
Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 382 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Court denies English-Lindsey’s request. The Court relies on statements of

fact to the extent they are relevant to resolving the summary judgment motion, and
the Court will only consider facts that are properly supported by admissible evidence.
See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); LR 56.1. With that issue resolved, this Court summarizes the
pertinent facts, which it takes from Defendant’s statement of facts (“DSOF”) [153],
Plaintiff’s additional statement of facts (“PSOAF”) [174], and Defendant’s response to
Plaintiff’s additional statement of facts (“DRASF”) [178].

II. Facts

At all relevant times, Plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC) at the Joliet Treatment Center. PSAOF at ¶¶ 1-3.
On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch. Id. at ¶ 3. Around
11:45 p.m. to 12:00 a.m., Lt. Clark came to his cell and stated that Plaintiff would be
“locked up for the rest of his life.” Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff responded by spraying an
unknown liquid at Lt. Clark. Id. Lt. Clark consequently sprayed Plaintiff with mace.

Id. Immediately after, Plaintiff requested a shower and medical care, but he was left
overnight without help and still covered in chemical spray. Id. at ¶ 5. Over the next
few days, Plaintiff’s face and body swelled. Id. at ¶ 6.

On February 26, 2022, two days later, correctional officers took Plaintiff to be
assessed by Nurses Peak and Saban who said they would contact a doctor. Id. This
was the first time Plaintiff was seen by a medical professional following the mace
spraying. Id. On February 27, 2022, Plaintiff was assessed by Nurse Lewis in triage.
Id. at ¶ 7. She suggested he needed a medical shower and would speak with a doctor
about medication for the swelling. Id. Plaintiff complained of his pain from the time

of the incident until March 10, 2022. Id. at ¶ 8.

Plaintiff filed two grievances, dated March 13, 2022, and April 5, 2022,
regarding the incident that occurred on February 24, 2022. DSOF ¶ 6. (Exhibit 153-
2). Plaintiff’s March 13, 2022, grievance was submitted directly to the ARB and
subsequently returned by the ARB for failure to follow the grievance procedure. Id.
at ¶ 7. Plaintiff’s April 5, 2022, grievance received responses from the counselor,

grievance officer, and chief administrative officer. Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff appealed those
responses to the ARB, which provided a response. Id.

In his April 5, 2022, grievance, Plaintiff identified several individuals after the
administration of the chemical spray: Lt. Clark; CTO Campbell; CTO Adeymo; CTO
Langley; QMHP Bondi; QMHP Brennda; CTO Walker; other John Doe CTOs
assigned to ERT; Nurse Peak; Nurse Sabin; Lieutenant Wright; CTOs working Dorm-
7-B wing; Nurse Lewis; and Dr. Korten. Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff admits that he did not

identify English-Lindsey or provide any description of a Jane Doe nurse or Health
Care Unit Administrator as someone that ignored his requests for medical care in his
grievances. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 11; PSAOF at ¶ 14. English-Lindsey served an interrogatory
asking Plaintiff to identify each grievance that he filed with his facility of record and
the ARB against her regarding the allegations contained in his amended complaint.
DSOF at ¶ 3. Answering pro se, Plaintiff responded, “I didn’t include Defendant
English-Lindsey in grievance because she is a supervisor[,] well was at the time.”2 Id.
at ¶ 4. According to Defendant, English-Lindsey was a Health Care Unit
Administrator and did not provide medical care to individuals in custody as part of

her job duties. Id. at ¶ 12.3

English-Lindsey moves for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies as to any allegations concerning her alleged
deliberate indifference before filing his claim in federal court. [152].

ANALYSIS

I. Exhaustion Requirements

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires inmates to exhaust all 

available administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). Proper exhaustion “demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and
other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively
without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Crouch v.
Brown, 27 F.4th 1315, 1320 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
90–91 (2006)). For decades, the Seventh Circuit has “taken a strict compliance

approach to exhaustion.” Id. (quoting Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir.
2006)). The PLRA prohibits an inmate from suing over prison conditions under

2 The Court has since recruited counsel to represent Mr. Hilliard. See [102]; [113]; 157.

3 Plaintiff responds that he lacks knowledge and information as to this statement of fact. He therefore
disputes on that basis, and requests leave to take discovery on this issue. [174] at ¶ 12. The Court
denies this request because it would be futile. Indeed, the Court grants Defendant English-Lindsey’s
summary judgment motion because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his allegations regarding her alleged
deliberate indifference, explained infra, not because she doesn’t provide medical care to individuals in
custody.

Section 1983 “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).
Exhausting administrative remedies requires inmates to follow each step

prescribed by the state’s administrative rules governing prison grievances. Chambers
v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 983 (7th Cir. 2020). Illinois maintains a multi-step grievance
process: First, a prisoner may file, within 60 days of an incident, a complaint to a
counselor or grievance officer. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(a)–(b). The counselor or
officer reports factual findings and recommendations to the facility’s chief
administrative officer (typically the warden), who provides a decision to the prisoner.

Id. § 504.830(d). If the prisoner remains unsatisfied, he can then appeal to the ARB
within 30 days of the decision. Id. § 504.850(a)–(f). The ARB then makes a final
determination of the grievance and sends a copy of its decision to the prisoner. Id. §
504.850(e).

II. Plaintiff did not adequately exhaust his administrative remedies

concerning Defendant English-Lindsey

In moving for summary judgment, English-Lindsey’s sole argument posits that 

Plaintiff failed to adequately exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not
specifically name her in his April 5, 2022, grievance. See generally [154]; [179].
Plaintiff responds that (1) English-Lindsey forfeited her defense because prison
officials responded to the merits of the grievance, and (2) Plaintiff was not required
to specifically name English-Lindsey to exhaust. [172] at 5-9. The Court addresses
each argument in turn.

The purpose of the grievance process is to “afford[ ] corrections officials time
and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a
federal case.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). “Where prison officials address an inmate's grievance on the merits without
rejecting it on procedural grounds, the grievance has served its function of alerting
the state and inviting corrective action, and defendants cannot rely on the failure to
exhaust defense.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff relies on Maddox here, arguing that because his grievance was
addressed on the merits, English-Lindsey cannot rely on a failure to exhaust defense.

But in Maddox, although the plaintiff failed to name the defendants, prison officials
were able to identify them and respond to the prisoner’s complaint. Id. (…”it belies
reason to suggest that prison administrators were unaware of who was responsible
for that decision.”). Indeed, the defendant responsible was involved in the grievance
response and denial. Id. To the contrary, here, the prison could not have known
Plaintiff was complaining of English-Lindsey, and therefore “could not address the
issue on the merits.” Olden v. Jackson, No. 23-1570, 2024 WL 4601042, at *3–4 (7th

Cir. 2024) (distinguishing Maddox and affirming the district court’s grant of
summary judgment as to the unidentified defendant) (citing King v. Dart, 63 F.4th
602, 608-09 (7th Cir. 2023)). Plaintiff’s argument, which was rejected by the Seventh
Circuit in Olden, is therefore unpersuasive.4

4 Plaintiff further cites Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 584-585 (7th Cir. 2005). In Conyers, the Seventh
Circuit analyzed the timeliness of the grievance, which is not at issue in this case. The case is therefore
inapplicable. Plaintiff also cites Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004), which similarly
Next, the Court agrees that Plaintiff need not name a defendant in order to
exhaust. See e.g. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219, 127 S. Ct. 910, 923, 166 L. Ed. 2d
798 (2007) (“[E]xhaustion is not per se inadequate simply because an individual later

sued was not named in the grievances.”). However, a plaintiff who fails to mention by
name or provide any identifying information that indicates the defendant to the
grievance officer fails to exhaust. Roberts v. Neal, 745 F.3d 232, 234-36 (7th Cir. 2014)
(failing to identify the target of a grievance is a fatal defect); see also Barrow v.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 793 F. App'x 420, 423 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Barrow did not
exhaust his remedies with respect to Dr. Trost because he did not name the doctor in

any grievance submitted before he commenced this lawsuit”). Here, Plaintiff has
conceded that he did not identify English-Lindsey by name. Whilst Plaintiff is correct
that he need not name her, he must still provide identifying information for the prison
to determine that she was accused of wrongdoing in the incident. See King, 63 F.4th
at 608-09 (7th Cir. 2023) (“Even if the Jail was aware that [plaintiff] thought some
correctional officers were liable, [plaintiff] did not provide sufficient information for
the Jail to determine that Szul was the accused.”) (emphasis added). Because Plaintiff

failed to do so, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies as to Defendant
English-Lindsey.

Accordingly, the Court grants English-Lindsey’s motion for summary
judgment [152].

focused on timeliness and an ambiguous request. For the same reason, that case is likewise
inapplicable here.

CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, this Court grants Defendant English-Lindsey’s motion
for summary judgment. [152]. Defendant English-Lindsey is terminated as
Defendant of record. The case continues against Defendants Clark, Bandi and
Branner.

                                   ENTER: 

                                      /] 

Dated: February 23, 2026 Mug Vf bt L/
MARY M. ROWLAND
United States District Judge