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Jan. 29, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Steven Todd Faircloth v. Deputy Paul Simmons, et al.

District Court, M.D. Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 5:25-cv-00439

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (25)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (25.5K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

MACON DIVISION

STEVEN TODD FAIRCLOTH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-CV-439 (MTT)

DEPUTY PAUL SIMMONS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

                    ORDER                                        

Plaintiff Steven Todd Farircloth filed this pro se lawsuit and contemporaneously
moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF 1; 2. On November 12,
2025, the Court granted Faircloth’s motion to proceed IFP and found his complaint
deficient pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e). ECF 3. Faircloth was thus ordered to recast
and has since filed an amended complaint. ECF 3; 6. Because Faircloth is

proceeding IFP, the Court must screen and dismiss his amended complaint: (1) if it
is frivolous or malicious; (2) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
or (3) if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). “A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim
is governed by the same standard as a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Thomas v. Harris, 399 F. App'x 508, 509 (11th Cir.

2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
I. DISCUSSION

A. Factual Allegations

Faircloth alleges he was unlawfully arrested on September 11, 2023 by a Deputy
of the Bibb County Sheriff’s Office. ECF 6 ¶ 15. At some point after his arrest, Faircloth
was transported to the River’s Edge Behavioral Health Center and was ultimately
transferred to the Houston County Detention Center. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 18, 19. Faircloth
alleges his transfer was unlawful because it was completed “without a warrant, without
paperwork, and without authorization.” Id. ¶¶ 11, 18, 19.

During his confinement in Houston County, Faircloth alleges that the defendants
“subjected him to conditions amounting to punishment, deprivation, physical assault,

and medical neglect.” Id. ¶ 13. Specifically, he alleges that he was placed in solitary
confinement on September 23, 2023 without a hearing, notice, or explanation. Id. ¶ 20.
According to Faircloth, the cell was small, it was between 50 and 60 degrees
Fahrenheit, it was “filthy,” and the emergency call button was broken. Id. ¶¶ 21.
Faircloth alleges that officers ignored him for four to five days at a time, despite his
attempts to knock on the door to signal for help. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. Faircloth’s attempts to
signal for help caused his finger to swell and bruise, so he “tied a sheet around his hand
and struck the metal desk to call for attention.” Id. ¶ 26.

On September 28, 2023, Faircloth alleges that Deputy Simmons approached his

cell with a taser drawn, entered his cell, and without warning, “grabbed Plaintiff’s
jumpsuit,” “lifted him off the ground,” “shook him,” and “slammed his head into the
concrete wall, causing a golf-ball [sized] hematoma.” Id. ¶ 27, 28, 30. Faircloth alleges
he was standing still with his hands at his sides when Deputy Simmons entered his cell.
Id. ¶ 29. After the alleged assault, Deputy Simmons screamed, “[i]f you bang on that
door one more time, I’m gone whoop your ass[.]” Id. ¶ 31.

After the assault, Faircloth alleges that Deputy Simmons removed Faircloth’s
mattress, blanket, cup, and his remaining belongings, forcing him to sleep “on bare steel
in freezing conditions.” Id. 32, 33. Faircloth alleges that two nurses examined his
hematoma through the door slot and never followed up on his injury. Id. ¶ 35. According
to Faircloth, the nurses acknowledged his head injury, “but provided only aspirin.” Id. ¶
33.

Faircloth alleges that he “filed immediate written complaints.” Id. ¶ 36. According
to Faircloth, Major Blanton received and acknowledged the complaints. Id. ¶ 37.
Additionally, Faircloth alleges that Captain Runyon received follow-up communications,

and Captain Westbrook reviewed Deputy Simmons’ use-of-force documentation.1 Id. ¶¶
36-40. According to Faircloth, none of the “supervisory”2 defendants interviewed
Faircloth, reviewed the camera footage, addressed Faircloth’s medical needs,
disciplined Simmons, or corrected the conditions of Faircloth’s cell. Id. ¶ 40.

Faircloth asserts ten claims arising from his detention in Houston County: (1)
Excessive Force under the Fourteenth Amendment against Deputy Simmons; (2)
Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs against Deputy Simmons, Major
Blanton, Captain Runyon, and Captain Westbrook; (3) Unconstitutional Conditions of
Confinement against Deputy Simmons and the supervisory defendants; (4) Failure to

Protect under the Fourteenth Amendment against Major Blanton, Captain Runyon, and
Captain Westbrook; (4) Supervisory Liability against Major Blanton, Captain Runyon,
and Captain Westbrook; (6) Municipal Liability against Houston County; (7) Assault and
Battery against Deputy Simmons; (8) False Imprisonment against Deputy Simmons and
the supervisory defendants; (9) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against

1 Faircloth does not allege what he wrote in his complaint, the nature of the follow-up communications, or
what information was included in Simmons’ use-of-force documentation. ECF 6 ¶¶ 37-39.

2 Faircloth refers to Major Blanton, Captain Runyon, and Captain Westbrook as “supervisory” defendants.
ECF 6 ¶ G. However, apart from their titles, Faircloth does not allege the level of supervisory authority
each defendant held.

Deputy Simmons; and (10) “Negligent Hiring/Retention/Supervision” against Houston
County. Id. at 3. Faircloth requests compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
costs and fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. at 3-4.

B. Excessive Force Claim

First, Faircloth asserts an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment against Deputy Simmons. ECF 6 at 3. The use of force against a pre-trial

detainee is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. Crocker v.
Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1246 (11th Cir. 2021). To state a claim, “[a] detainee must show
‘that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.’”
Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 69 F.4th 1277, 1300 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (11th Cir. 2023)). Courts consider six non-exhaustive
factors when evaluating the reasonableness of force used: (1) “the relationship between
the need for the use of force and the amount of force used”; (2) “the extent of the
plaintiff’s injury”; (3) “any effort made by the officer to temper or limit the amount of
force”; (4) “the threat reasonably perceived by the officer”; and (5) “whether the plaintiff

was actively resisting.” Id. at 1301 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

Faircloth alleges that Deputy Simmons entered his cell with a taser drawn and,
although Faircloth “stood still with his hands at his side,” Deputy Simmons lifted
Faircloth by his jumpsuit, shook him, and slammed him into the concrete wall. Id. ¶¶ 29
30. At this stage, Faircloth has plausibly alleged that Deputy Simmons purposefully and
knowingly used force against him that was objectively unreasonable.

Thus, Faircloth’s Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim against Deputy
Simmons will proceed for further factual development.

C. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs Claims

Next, Faircloth asserts a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against
Deputy Simmons, Major Blanton, Captain Runyon, and Captain Westbrook. ECF 6 at 3.
Like excessive force claims, deliberate indifference claims brought by pre-trial detainees
are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. Goebert v. Lee
County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007). “However, the standards under the

Fourteenth Amendment are identical to those under the Eighth.” Id. To state a claim for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must allege: (1) “an
objectively serious medical need”; (2) “that the prison official acted with an attitude of
‘deliberate indifference’ to the serious medical need;” and (3) a “‘necessary causal link’
between the challenged conduct and [the plaintiff’s] injuries.” Stalley v. Cumbie, 124
F.4th 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 863-40 (1994) and Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233); See Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1253
(11th Cir. 2024).

As for the first prong, a serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by

a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Hill v. DeKalb Reg’l Youth
Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Further, the condition must be one that would pose a “substantial risk of serious harm” if
left unattended. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). To state a claim
for deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) “was
subjectively aware that the inmate was at risk of serious harm”; (2) “disregarded that
risk”; and (3) “acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.’” Wade,
106 F.4th at 1255 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839).

While Faircloth’s allegations relating to Deputy Simmons’ knowledge of
Faircloth’s medical conditions are thin, Faircloth’s allegations that Deputy Simmons
assaulted him, which caused a “golf-ball [sized] hematoma” on his head, and forced him
to sleep on steel without a blanket, mattress, or his other belongings are sufficient, at
this stage, to state a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. ECF 6 ¶¶ 27-32.
However, as for Major Blanton, Captain Runyon, and Captain Westbrook, Faircloth

alleges only that Captain Blanton reviewed his written complaints, that Captain Runyon
received “follow-up communications,” and that Captain Westbrook reviewed Deputy
Simmons’ use-of-force documentation. Id. ¶¶ 37-39. Faircloth does not allege what was
written in his complaints, what was discussed in the follow-up communications, or what
was disclosed in the use-of-force documentation. Id. Thus, Faircloth has not plausibly
alleged that Major Blanton, Captain Runyon, or Captain Westbrook were “subjectively
aware that [Faircloth] was at a risk of serious harm.”3 Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255.

Thus, Faircloth’s deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against Deputy
Simmons shall proceed for further factual development. However, Faircloth’s remaining

deliberate indifference to medical needs claims are DISMISSED.

D. Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement Claims

Faircloth also asserts a claim for conditions of confinement against Deputy
Simmons, Major Blanton, Captain Runyon, and Captain Westbrook. ECF 6 at 3. The
Eleventh Circuit historically has applied the same standard for pretrial

3 Faircloth also mentions two nurses and medical staff who examined his hematoma. ECF 6 ¶¶ 34-35.
Faircloth has not named those individuals as defendants in this action. Id. at 1. Moreover, he does not
identify those individuals anywhere in his complaint. Id. at 1-4. Thus, to the extent Faircloth intended to
bring a deliberate indifference claim against the nurses and/or medical staff, Faircloth has failed to state a
claim against them, and those claims are DISMISSED.

detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claims and convicted
prisoners’ Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims. See Patel v. Lanier
Cnty. Ga., 969 F.3d 1173, 1188 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749
F.3d 1034, 1044 n.35 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that “the standard for providing basic
human needs to those incarcerated or in detention is the same under both the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments”) (quotations omitted). As stated above, to state a

conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) a substantial risk of
serious harm; (2) deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation. Goodman v.
Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013); Bowen v. Warden Baldwin State
Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2016).

Faircloth alleges that Deputy Simmons removed his mattress, blanket, cup and
belongings from his cell after slamming his head against the wall. ECF 6 ¶ 32. Because
he had no belongings, Faircloth alleges that he had to “sleep on bare steel in freezing
conditions.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 33. While Faircloth’s allegations related to his conditions of
confinement claim are thin, they are sufficient at this stage to state a claim against

Deputy Simmons. However, Faircloth has failed to plausibly allege that Major Blanton,
Captain Runyon, or Captain Westbrook knew, or were deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of serious harm arising from Faircloth’s conditions of confinement.

Accordingly, Faircloth’s conditions of confinement claim against Deputy Simmons
will proceed for further factual development. However, Faircloth’s conditions of
confinement claims against Major Blanton, Captain Runyon, and Captain Westbrook are
DISMISSED.

E. Failure to Protect Claims

Faircloth also asserts a failure to protect claim against Major Blanton, Captain
Runyon, and Captain Westbrook. ECF 6 at 3. Failure to protect claims brought by pre-
trial detainees are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, but
are analyzed using the same standard as Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims.
Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (1996). Under the Eighth Amendment, prison

officials have a duty to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
inmates.” Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014);
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828 (1994) (“A prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”). To state
a claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a substantial risk of serious harm;
(2) deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation. Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718
F.3d at 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013); Bowen v. Warden Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d
1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2016).

“The first element of an Eighth Amendment claim—a substantial risk of serious

harm—is assessed under an objective standard.” Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016). To prevail, a plaintiff must allege “conditions that were extreme and
posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health or safety.” Marbury v.
Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lane, 835 F.3d at 1307).
Plaintiffs can make this showing by demonstrating either a “general threat” to inmates
based on dangerous conditions in the prison or particular area of the prison, or by an
individualized risk based on a “specific threat” to the prisoner. Marbury, 936 F.3d at
1233, 1235; see also Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., Ga., 400 F.3d
1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005). The deliberate indifference for failure to protect is the same
as the standard for deliberate indifference to medical needs. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839).

Like his deliberate indifference to medical needs claims, Faircloth’s failure to
protect claims against Major Blanton, Captain Runyon, or Captain Westbrook are
supported only by the allegations that the defendants either read Faircloth’s complaint,
engaged in follow-up communications, or read Deputy Simmons’ use-of-force report.

ECF 6 ¶¶ 36-40. That is not enough to show that either defendant was subjectively
aware that Faircloth faced a risk of harm from Deputy Simmons or that they acted with
“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,” particularly not here, where any
reports or complaints occurred after the alleged assault. Id; Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255.
Thus, Faircloth has failed to allege that either supervisor acted with deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of harm to Faircloth.

Accordingly, Faircloth’s failure to protect claims against Major Blanton, Captain
Runyon, and Captain Westbrook are DISMISSED.

F. Supervisory Liability Claims

Additionally, Faircloth asserts a supervisory liability claim against Major Blanton,
Captain Runyon, and Captain Westbrook in their individual capacities. ECF 6 at 3.
Supervisory defendants can be liable for deliberate indifference under the Eighth
Amendment if they personally participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. See
Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1231 (addressing a warden’s deliberate indifference to substantial
risk of serious harm without the supervisory causal connection framework).
Alternatively, a supervisor can be liable if there exists a causal connection between the
“supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation” or if “a supervisor’s custom
or policy . . . result[ed] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights or when facts
support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or
knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.”

Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048. In relation to the latter causal connection, the Eleventh Circuit
has held that “[a] causal connection can be established if a supervisor has the ability to
prevent or stop a known constitutional violation by exercising his supervisory authority
and he fails to do so.” AFL-CIO v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1190 (11th Cir. 2011)

(citing Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 765 (11th Cir. 2010)).

As stated, Faircloth has failed to allege that Major Blanton, Captain Runyon, and
Captain Westbrook personally participated in or knew of the alleged constitutional
violations. Further, Faircloth fails to allege that either defendant created a custom or
policy that prompted or failed to prevent the alleged constitutional violations. Moreover,
Faircloth does not allege that either defendant had the authority to prevent or stop a
known constitutional violation. Faircloth has, thus, failed to state a supervisory liability
claim.

Accordingly, Faircloth’s supervisory liability claims against Major Blanton,

Captain Runyon, and Captain Westbrook are DISMISSED.

G. Municipal Liability Claim

Next, Faircloth asserts a municipal liability claim against Houston County. ECF 6
at 3. “A county’s liability under § 1983 may not be based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003); Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Rather, only when the City’s policy or
custom causes a constitutional violation may a municipality be held responsible. Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329; Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Specifically, “to impose § 1983 liability on a
municipality, a plaintiff must [allege]: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2)
that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to
that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.”
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

Here, the only constitutional violations alleged are those arising from Faircloth’s
detainment; Faircloth does not plausibly allege that Deputy Simmons’ actions were
prompted by any Houston County custom or policy that constituted deliberate

indifference to constitutional rights. See Craig v. Floyd County, Ga., 643 F.3d 1306,
1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not
sufficient to impose liability against a municipality.”). Thus, Faircloth has failed to state a
claim for municipal liability under § 1983 against Houston County.

Faircloth’s municipal liability claim against Houston County is DISMISSED.

H. Assault and Battery Claim

Faircloth asserts a state law assault and battery claim against Deputy Simmons
as well. ECF 6 at 3. Under Georgia law, “[a]ny violent injury or illegal attempt to commit
a physical injury upon a person is a tort for which damages may be recovered.”

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-14. Faircloth alleges that Deputy Simmons grabbed him, shook him,
and slammed his head on the concrete, causing a head injury. ECF 6 ¶¶ 27, 28, 30.
Faircloth’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim for assault and battery under
Georgia Law. ECF 6 ¶¶ 27, 28, 30.

Faircloth’s state law assault and battery claim against Deputy Simmons will
proceed for further factual development.

I. False Imprisonment Claims

Faircloth also asserts a claim against Deputy Simmons, Major Blanton, Captain
Runyon, and Captain Westbrook for false imprisonment. ECF 6 at 3. Under

O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20, “[f]alse imprisonment is the unlawful detention of the person of
another, for any length of time, whereby such person is deprived of his personal liberty.”
“Whoever arrests or imprisons a person without a warrant is guilty of a tort, unless he
can justify under some of the exceptions in which arrest and imprisonment without a
warrant are permitted by law.” McClendon v. Harper, 349 Ga. App. 581, 585-86, 826
S.E.2d 412 (2019).

Faircloth alleges that Bibb County Sheriff’s Office arrested him without “entering
the required OTA into GCIC/NCIC.” ECF 6 ¶ 11. Faircloth further alleges that Houston
County accepted him without a valid warrant, a valid OTA, or any other lawful basis for
his custody in Houston County. Id. ¶ 13. Finally, Faircloth alleges that upon his arrival at
Houston County, he was placed into solitary confinement without a hearing, notice, or
explanation. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. While Faircloth has plausibly alleged that he was arrested
and/or transferred without a warrant, he has failed to allege that any of the defendants
were responsible for his allegedly illegal arrest, his transfer to Houston County, or his
placement into solitary confinement. Faircloth has, thus, failed to state a false
imprisonment claim against any defendant.4

This, Faircloth’s state law false imprisonment claims against Deputy Simmons,
Major Blanton, Captain Runyon, and Captain Westbrook are DISMISSED.

J. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Next, Faircloth asserts a claim under Georgia law for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Deputy Simmons. ECF 6 at 3. To state a claim for intentional

4 Faircloth alleges that Bibb County officials Captain Wilton Collins, Deputy Dalton Palmer, Deputy Darius
Inzar, Detective Shaun Bridger, and Jodi F. Adams “orchestrated an unlawful 1013 seizure without
entering the required OTA into GCIC/NCIC.” ECF 6 ¶ 12. However, he does not assert a false
imprisonment claim or any other claim against those individuals, and he has not named them as
defendants in this action. ECF 6 at 1, 3. Thus, any claims against those individuals are DISMISSED.

infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) the conduct giving rise to the
claim was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the
conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe.”
Mayorga v. Benton, 364 Ga. App. 665, 875 S.E.2d 908, 913 (2022).

Here, Faircloth has not alleged whether Deputy Simmons’ actions caused
emotional distress or whether his emotional distress, if any, was severe. ECF 6.

Accordingly, Faircloth has failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress against Deputy Simmons.

Faircloth’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is DISMISSED.

K. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision Claims

Finally, Faircloth asserts a state law claim against Major Blanton, Captain
Runyon, and Captain Westbrook for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. ECF 6
at 3. “[N]egligent hiring, supervision, and retention are all separate theories of recovery
‘based on the alleged negligent acts of the employers.’” Friendship Enterprises, Inc. v.
Hasty, 889 S.E.2d 137, 14, 889 S.E.2d 137 (2023) (quoting Quynn v. Hulsey, [310 Ga.

473, 477](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10367320/quynn-v-hulsey/#477), 850 S.E.2d 725 (2020)). An “employer has a duty to exercise ordinary care
not to hire or retain an employee the employer knew or should have known posed a risk
of harm to others where it is reasonably foreseeable from the employee’s tendencies or
propensities that the employee could cause the type of harm sustained by the plaintiff.”
Drury v. Harris Ventures, Inc., 302 Ga. App. 545, 691 S.E.2d 356 (2010) (citation
modified). To state a claim for negligent hiring, a plaintiff must allege the employer knew
or should have known the employee posed a risk before hiring the employee. ABM
Aviation v. Prince, 366 Ga. App. 592, 597-99, 884 S.E.2d 8 (2023). To state a claim for
negligent retention, a plaintiff must allege the “employer discovere[d] the employee’s
incompetence after hiring.” Id. And to state a claim for negligent supervision, a plaintiff
must allege that “the employer reasonably knew or should have known of an
employee’s tendencies to engage in certain behavior relevant to the injuries allegedly
incurred by the plaintiff.” Id. (citation modified).

First, Faircloth does not allege that any of the supervisory defendants had any
authority to hire or terminate employees or that any defendant was responsible for the

hiring or supervision of Deputy Simmons. Moreover, Faircloth fails to allege that Deputy
Simmons engaged in behavior similar to the alleged assault, much less that any
supervisory defendant knew of similar past conduct by Deputy Simmons. ECF 6 at 1-3.
Accordingly, Faircloth has failed to state a claim for negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision.

Faircloth’s negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims against Major
Blanton, Captain Runyon, and Captain Westbrook are DISMISSED.

II. CONCLUSION

The following claims against Deputy Simmons will proceed for factual

development: (1) excessive force; (2) deliberate indifference to medical needs; (3)
conditions of confinement; (4) failure to protect; and (5) assault and battery under state
law. Faircloth’s remaining claims are DISMISSED. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that
service be made on Deputy Paul Simmons of the Houston County Sheriff’s Office.

Faircloth is advised that he must serve upon opposing counsel (or Deputy
Simmons if he is unrepresented by counsel) copies of all motions, pleadings, discovery,
and correspondence (including letters to the Clerk or to a judge) filed with the Clerk of
Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Faircloth shall include with any paper which is filed with the
Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of that
paper was mailed to Deputy Simmons or his counsel. The Clerk of Court will not serve
or forward to Deputy Simmons or his counsel copies of any materials filed with the
Court.

In addition, the following limitations are imposed on discovery: except with written
permission of the Court first obtained, (1) interrogatories may not exceed twenty-five to
each party (Local Rule 33.1), (2) requests for production of documents and things under

Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not exceed ten requests to each
party (Local Rule 34), and (3) requests for admissions under Rule 36 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may not exceed fifteen requests to each party (Local Rule 36).

Faircloth is responsible for diligently prosecuting his complaint, and failure to do
so may result in dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Faircloth is required to keep the Clerk of Court advised of his current address during the
pendency of this action. Failure to promptly advise the Clerk of any change of address
may result in the dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED, this 29th day of January, 2026.

                          S/ Marc T. Treadwell                   
                          MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE               
                          UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT