Kellogg v. Nichols - Amended Opinion on Judicial Immunity and Firearms Licensing

23- 8093 - cv Kellogg v. Nich ols United States Court of Appea ls for the Se cond Circuit August Term, 2024 (Argued: Septe mber 25, 2024 Decided: August 1 8, 2025 Amended: March 5, 2026) Docket No. 23-8093- cv __________________ ______________ _____ JEREMY KELLO GG, JONATHAN HAR MON, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JONATHAN D. N ICHOLS, ind ividually an d in his capacity a s statutory licensing officer purs uant to Pena l Law 265.00(10); 4 00.00 et seq., Defendant-Appellee. * Before: RAGGI, WESLEY, an d LOHIER, Circuit Ju dges. The Plaintiffs are New York Sta te residen ts who applied for co ncealed carry li censes under the Stat e’s fire arms licens ing laws. Jonath an D. Nichols, a state court judge serving a s a statutory firearm s licensing officer, r eviewed and * The Cl erk of Cour t is direc ted to amend the ca ption as set forth ab ove.

2 denied the ir applica tions for fa iling to meet the stat utory criter ia for eligibility for a licen se. The Pla intiffs sued Judge N ichols in his indiv idual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Ne w York’s fir earms licensing laws violat e their rights under t he Second and Fourt eenth Amendments to the Constitu tion. Th e Unite d State s Distr ict C ourt for th e Northe rn D istrict of New York (Hurd, J.) dis missed the Pl aintiffs’ § 1983 clai ms, ho ldin g that a bsolute immunity barred the ir in divi dua l - capacity claims because Jud ge Nichols act ed in his jud ic ial ca pac ity in r uling on the ir a pplic atio ns, and that § 1 983 and Artic le III’s case -or- controversy requi rement barred their claims for injunctive relief and declarat ory relief, respecti vely. We reaffirm this Court’ s precedent that j ud ic ial officers act in a ju dici al cap acit y when they decide f irearms license applications and, therefore, e njoy abso lute imm unity fr om su it in t heir ind ividu al ca pac itie s. W e further hold that the Plaintiffs’ spe cific claims for injunctive relief and declaratory relief a gainst Judge Nich ols in h is official capacity are barre d by Artic le I II’s cas e -or- c ontroversy requirement. AFFIRM ED. A MY L. B EL LA NTONI, The Bel lantoni Law Firm, PLLC, Scarsdale, NY, for Pla intiffs-Appellant s. J ONATHAN D. H IT SOU S, Assistant Solic itor General (Barbara D. Under wood, Solicitor Gene ral, Andrea Oser, Deputy Solicitor General, on the bri ef), for Let itia James, Attorney General for the S tate of Ne w York, Albany, NY, for Defendant-Appellee. P ER C URIAM: This appea l from a dis missal of an action b rought un der 42 U.S. C. § 1983 concerns jud icial i mmun ity an d federal j urisdiction to rev iew the decis ions of a state cour t jud ge. It ar ises from a federal lawsu it f iled by Jeremy Kel logg and Jonathan Harmon agains t New York s tate court Jud ge Jonat han D. N icho ls. Judge Nic hols, the Plaintiffs claim, uncons titutionally rejected their applications

3 for a firearms l icense under New York State’s Penal Law § 400. 00 in v iolat ion o f their Seco nd and Fourteenth Ame ndment rights. The Pl aint iffs s ue d Jud ge Nic ho ls in b oth his in div idua l and of ficia l capacities. T he D istr ict Co urt dis missed the individual-capac ity cla ims as b arred by absolute judic ial immunity. S ee Liberta rian Party of Erie Cnty. v. Cuomo, 970 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2 020), abrogated on oth er grounds by N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol As s’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). T h e Dis trict Co urt als o dis mis sed th e P laintif fs ’ official- capacity claims for in jun ctive and declaratory relief. We agre e with the Di strict Co urt tha t the Plaint iffs’ in dividu al - capacity claims are barred b y absolute jud icial immunity. We further conclude that Artic le I II ’s case-or- controversy requirement bars official- capacity claims under § 1983 against state c ourt judges who ru l e on firearm s licens e applications under New York st ate law. Affirmed. B ACKGROUND “New York main tains a gene ral prohibitio n on the possession of ‘firearms’ absent a license.” An tonyuk v. James, 1 20 F.4th 941, 974 (2d Cir. 2024) (q uoting Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westcheste r, 701 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2012)). New York Pen al Law § 400.00 “is the exclusive statu tory mechanism for the lice nsing of firearms

4 in New York State.” Id. Other sect ions of New York’s Pen al Law provide criminal penalties for possession of a f irearm withou t a license. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 265.00(3), 265.01 et seq., and 26 5.20(a)(3). New York resi dents can be licensed to “have and carry concea led [pistols or revolvers], w ithout regard to empl oyment or place o f possession subjec t to the restrictions of sta te and federal l aw.” Id. § 400.00(2)(f). To be eligible for a concealed - carry or pistol license, an applican t must demonstrat e “ good moral character, ” defined as “the essenti al character, tem perament and judgement necessary to be en trusted with a wea pon and to use it only in a manner that does not endanger onesel f or other s.” Id. § 400. 00(1). New York resi dent s seeking a firearms li cense mus t ap ply to the ir loca l licens ing o ff icer. Id. § 400.00(3). In C olumbia C ounty, New Yor k, where the Plain tiffs res ide, t he licensing officer is “a judge or jus tice of a cour t of record having his office in the county of issu ance,” including, as rele vant here, a county court ju dge. 1 Id. § 265.00(10). After a l ocal police investigation, the licensing officer reviews the a pplication and must “e ither deny the app lication for reas ons 1 In Nas sau Cou nty, Suff olk County, an d the fi ve coun ties that c ompris e New York City, the police c ommiss ioner or cou nty sheri ff se rves as the licensi ng officer. N.Y. Penal La w § 265.00(10).

5 specifically and concisely stated in writing or grant the ap plication and issue the license applied for.” Id. § 400.00(4-b). In 2022 Kellogg and Harmon se parat ely a pp lied f or pis tol lice nse s with the Columbia County Sh eriff’s Office. Their a ppli cations were assigned to Judge Nichols in his capac ity as a statutory licensing off icer for Co lumb ia C oun ty. After hearings on the applications, Judge Nic hols dete rmin ed t hat Ke llo gg’s crim inal a rre st his tor y and inadequate e xplanations for fa iling to disc lose that histor y in his application de monstrated that he lacked the requ isite maturity or responsibility to ho ld a license. As for Harmon, Ju dge Nichols ruled that Harmon’s criminal history, incl uding a youthfu l-offender adju dication for first- degree robbery, likewise de monstrat ed that he lacked the requisite m aturity or res ponsib ility to h ave a licen se. In June 2023 Kellogg and Har mon filed thi s action aga ins t Judge Nichols, asserting si x § 1983 cl aims f or vio lat ing the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, as we ll as o ne st ate law c laim. The P laint if fs’ § 1983 claims a gainst Judge N ichols in his individua l capacity sough t nominal monetary damages. The federal claims against Judge N icho ls in his o ff icial capa ci ty sou ght b oth declar atory and injunc tive re lief. The y sou ght a de claratory judg ment that Ne w York’s licens ing

6 scheme violates the Second and Fourteent h Amendments. The y also so ught an injunction against th e enforcement of Ne w York Penal L aw Sections 2 65.01, 265.02(5)(i), 265.03(2), 265.03(3), and 26 5.04(2), wh ich criminalize the unlicensed possession of fire arms, and New York Executive Law Se ction 296(16), wh ich concerns cri minal history di sclosures on firearm s license applications. Judge Nicho ls mov ed to dis mis s the c laims for lack of sub ject matter j urisdiction and for failure to state a c laim unde r Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court granted the mot ion to dismiss. Kel logg v. N ichols, 703 F. Supp. 3d 367, 376 (N.D.N.Y. 2023). R elying on our decis ion in Libertarian Part y, t he Distr ict C ourt co ncluded that judicial immunity barred the Pla intif fs’ individual-capacity c laims aga inst J udg e Nich ols, who had act ed in his j udic ial capacity in de nyin g the ir applications. Id. at 371– 73. T he D istr ict Co urt also dismissed the Plaintiffs’ official-capac ity claims for declaratory relief as barred by Artic le I II’s cas e -or- c ontroversy requirement, and their claims for injunctive reli ef as barred by § 1983. Id. at 373–75; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (permitti ng suit “except that in any action brought ag ainst a judici al officer for an act or omission t aken in such officer’ s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

7 declaratory decre e was violated or de claratory r elief was unava ilable”). T he District C ourt the n d eclin ed to exercise supplem ental jurisdiction over th e remain ing sta te la w cla im. K ellogg, 703 F. S upp. 3d at 375. D ISCUSSION We review de novo both the grant of a motion to dism iss under Rule 12(b)(6) as well as th e grant of a Rule 12(b)(1) mo tion that “is b ased solely on the complaint and the attached exhibits.” SM Kids, LL C v. Google L LC, 963 F.3d 206, 210–11 (2d Cir. 202 0); see Costin v. Gl ens Falls Hosp., 1 03 F.4th 94 6, 952 (2d Cir. 2024). “[A] moti on under Rule 1 2(b)(1) may also re ly on evide nce beyond the pleadings. When a defendant m akes such a fact- bas ed motion, the plaintiff may respond wi th evidence of its own. We then review the district court ’ s leg al conclusions de nov o and its factu al findings for clear error.” S M Kids, 963 F.3 d at 210 (cleaned up). I We be gin w ith th e Plaint iffs’ § 1983 c laims aga inst Judge Nich ols in h is individual capacity. “[J] udges gene rally h ave absolute [judic ial] immunity from suits for money dam ages for their jud icial actions, ” but not for actions taken in an administrat ive, leg islat ive, or executiv e capacity. Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204,

8 209–10 (2d Cir. 200 9); see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227– 30 (1988). “ In determi ning whether an act by a judge i s ‘judicial,’ thereby wa rranting absolute immunity, we are to take a functional approach, for such ‘immunit y is justified and defined by the fu nctions it protec ts and serve s, not by the per son to whom it attaches. ’ ” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209– 1 0 (quo ting Forrester, 484 U. S. at 227). Generally speak ing, “acts arising o ut of, or related to, individu al cases before the judge are considere d judicial in n ature.” I d. at 210. “The pr incipal hallmark of the judicial funct ion is a decision in re lation to a part icular case.” Id. at 211. In Libertarian Party, th is Cou rt a ddressed whethe r state co urt judges a re immune from indiv idual-capacity c lai ms for actions taken as fi rearm s licen sin g officers in New York. We determined that two N ew Yor k sta te cour t judge s functioned in their ju dicia l capacity when they denied firearm s licens e applications. Libertar ian Party, 970 F.3 d at 123–25. F irearm s licensing officers render “[a]ctual rul ings,” we explained, that “directly addr ess[] the specific applications, refer [] to relevant re quirements of § 400.00, and d ecide[] the merit s of the applicants’ re quests.” Id. at 124. Because these rulings are “judic ial decis ions ” rather tha n administrative act ions, we h eld that s tat e court ju dges are

9 entitled to absolu te immunity fro m claims ass erted against the m in their individual capacities as firearm s licens ing offic ers. Id. at 125. The Plaintiffs ackno wledge that L ibertarian Party forecloses their individual-capacity c laims. They nevertheless ask us to overtu rn it as wrongly decided. Appellants’ Br. 6, 36–38. They a rgue that Libert arian Party is in “c onf lict with New York St ate’s interpretat ion” of Pen al Law § 400.00 that firear ms licensing officers act in an “adminis trative capacity.” Appellants’ Br. 37. A s the Plaintiffs recogn ize, however, “we.. . are b ound by the decis ions of prior pane ls until such time as the y are overruled e ither b y an en banc pane l of our Court or by the Suprem e Court.” United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2 d Cir. 2004). The Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, a rgue that either exception applies to Libertarian Party in so far a s it a ddre sses judic ial immun ity. Shipping Cor p. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3 d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 2 009). Here, the Pl aintiffs’ firearm s license applicati ons were referred to Jud ge Nichols because he s erved as “a ju dge . . . of a court o f record h aving his office in” Columb ia Count y, New York. N.Y. Penal Law § 265.00(10). In th at capacity, Judge Nichols rev iewed the P laintiffs’ fir earms license applications, decided the merits of th ose app lications based on the requirements of Penal Law § 400.00,

10 and explained why he denie d the licenses. Consistent with Libertarian Party, w e must conclude, as th e Distr ict Co urt did, th at both den ials cons tituted “ jud icial decis ions ” for which J udge Nic hols was e nt itled to absol ute ju dicia l im munity from suit for damage s in his ind ivid ual c ap acity. 970 F.3d a t 125. We therefore affirm the District Co urt’s dismissa l of the Plain tiff s’ in divid ual -capacity c laims. 2 II We turn next to the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Judge Nich ols in his official capacity. These claims seek to en jo in enforcement of Ne w York’s f irearms licens ing l aws and criminal stat utes punis hing possession of f irearms for self- defense and also see k a declarator y judgment th at the Sta te ’s licensing sche me violates the Second and Fourteent h Amendments and that Jud ge Nichols violated the Plain tiffs’ Second and Fo urteenth Amend ment rig hts. The Dis tr ict Court h eld t hat Artic le I II barred the claims for declaratory r elief and tha t the Plain tiffs ’ spe cif ic cla ims f or injunctiv e relief were not su bject to § 1983’s n arrow 2 Because L ibertarian Party controls o ur de cision und er t he circumst ance s of thi s case, we expr ess no v iews on wh ether decisio ns leg islat ivel y entr usted t o judges in ce rta in communities and to law enfo rcement officers in o ther communities are properly viewed differently depending on the decisionmaker for the purposes of recognizing whet her the officials are entit led to absol ute judicial i mmunity.

11 exception to Eleven th Amend ment immunity for judicial office rs. We conclude that Article III bars t he claims for bo th declaratory and injunct ive relief. A Artic le I II of t he Co ns titutio n l imits the “jud icial Powe r ” of the United States to actual “Cas es” or “Con troversies.” U.S. Const. art. I II, § 2; see TransUnion LLC v. R amirez, 594 U.S. 413, 4 23 (2021); S. Jackso n & Son, Inc. v. Cof fee, Sugar & Cocoa Exch. I nc., 24 F.3d 427, 431 (2d Cir. 1994). “A con troversy that is appropriate for jud icial determ ination . . . must be definite and concrete, touching the lega l relations of par ties having adver se legal inte rests.” In re Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135, 1 68 (2d Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). Without a case or co ntroversy b etween advers e parties, a feder al court does not have subject ma tter jurisdiction ove r an action. S. Jackso n & Son, 24 F.3 d at 431; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (19 68) (ex plaining that Art icle III’s case-or- controvers y requirement “limit[s ] the business of federal courts to questions presented in an a dversary con text”). And we may have jurisd iction over some claims bu t not o thers. Artic le I II juris dic ti on “is not dispens ed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must dem onstrate ” that we ha ve Artic le I II jur isd icti on ov er “ each

12 claim that they pr ess and for each for m of relief that they s eek.” TransUnion, 5 94 U.S. at 431. In general, “no case or controvers y” exists “between a judge who adjudicates cla ims under a statu te and a litigant who attacks the constitut ionality of the statute.” Pulliam v. Alle n, 466 U.S. 5 22, 538 n.18 (1984) (citing In re Justices of Sup. Ct. of P.R., 695 F.2d 17, 21 (1st C ir. 1982) (Bre yer, J.)); see Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39– 40 (2021). “Judges sit as arb iters without a personal or institut ional stake on either side of the constitution al controver sy.” In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 21. That is why a litigan t “seeking to e njoin the enforcement of a stat ute on constitut ional grounds ordinarily s ues the enforcement official authorized to br ing suit under the statute,” not “the court or judges who are supp osed to adjud icat e the merits of the suit that the enf orcement official may bring.” I d. at 21–22. For that reason, a liti gant challengin g the constitutionality of a state law under § 1983 and a sta te court judge tasked with applying that law in a judicial proceed ing are typic ally n ot adver se parties. Mendez v. Heller, 530 F.2d 457, 459–61 (2d Cir. 1976). Mendez is instructive. There w e considered whethe r a New York resident chall enging the state’s divorce law s could properly sue a New York Suprem e

13 Court Justice in conn ection with the judge’s adjud ication of divor ce proceedings. See id. at 458–60; Men dez v. Heller, 380 F. Supp. 985, 987–88 (E. D.N.Y. 1974). We determi ned that the judge’s ruli ng on the divorce complai nt reflected “a judi cial function.” Mendez, 5 30 F.2d at 460. As such, we held, the plaintiff’s su it against the judge was proper ly dismissed for la ck of a justic iable contro versy because it did “not present the honest and ac tual antagonistic assertion of rights” that is “indispens [a]ble to adjud ication of consti tutional quest ions.” I d. (quotation marks omitted); s ee id. at 461 (“We h old that . . . this action doe s not present the exigent advers ity . . . which is an e ssential condition pr ecedent t o federal court adjudication. This, of itself, was a s ufficie nt basis for the distr ict court’ s d is missa l of [the] complaint.” (quotation m arks omitted)). 3 3 Bruen, Antony uk, and Libertarian Part y are not to the contrary. While the courts there exer cised jur isdicti on i n cases i nvolv ing jud ge de fendant s, beca use the first t wo case s included non - judge defendant s, the presence o f judge defendants had no pr actical impa ct on the Cou rts’ pow er to declare the la w. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 16; Anto nyuk, 120 F.4th at 958. Ev en if these t wo case s exist ed in t ension with Whol e Wom an’s H ealth, it appears that t he question of adver sity between the plaintiffs and the judicial defendant s in tho se cases was sim ply n ever conside red. See Kiobel v. Roya l Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2010). Libertarian Party, in turn, was dec ided befor e Whole Woman’s Health v. Jacks on, 595 U.S. at 40 (2021) (stating “no case or controversy exists betwe en a jud ge who adju dicates claims un der a statute an d a litiga nt wh o attacks the cons titutional ity of the statute” (quotation m arks om itted)). In any e vent, “it is well established that sub silentio assum ptio ns of jur isdict ion” in prio r cases “h ave no precedential va lue on the [relevant] jurisdictional q uestion.” Gallego v. Northland Grp. Inc., 814 F.3d 123, 128 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016); see Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124–25; see also Pennhurst

14 Decis ions f ro m other circuits support our conclusion that there is no live case or cont roversy between New York st ate cou rt judges serving as firea rm s licens ing o ff icers and litigants challenging the State’s licensing scheme. “[T]he threshol d consideration is whether t he judge is acting, under t he statute at issue, in an adjudicator y capacity or as an e nforcer or administrator.” Lindke v. Tomlinson, 31 F.4th 4 87, 491 (6th Cir. 20 22) (citing In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 21–23); see Reule v. Jackson, 1 14 F.4th 360, 36 5 (5th Cir. 2024); Frazier v. Prince George’s Cnty., 140 F.4th 556, 562 (4th Cir. 2025). 4 Most obviously, a judge acts in an adjudicatory capac ity when the judge resolves dis putes betwe en adverse par ties. State S chool & Hosp. v. Halde rman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 (1984) (“[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Co urt has nev er considered itself bound when a s ubsequent case finally brings the jur isdictional issue before us.” (quot ation ma rks omi tted)). 4 See also Whole Woman ’s H ealth, 595 U.S. at 45–46 (allowing claims to pr oceed against “executive licensing o fficial [s] who may or mu st take enforc ement ac tions against the petition ers if th ey viol ate” state law (emphasis added)). The Fourth, Fif th, and Si xth Circuit s have hel d that there i s no cas e or contro versy be tween a s tate court j udge ac ting in an adjudic atory capac ity under a s tate stat ute and a litigant c hallen ging the cons titutional ity of the same s tatute. See Frazier, 140 F.4 th at 561–63; Reule, 114 F.4th at 365; Lindke, 31 F.4th a t 490– 95. Similarly, prior to Wh ole Woman ’s Health, the First, Third, Eighth, and Nin th Circu its have h eld on non constitution al groun ds that j udges adju dicatin g cases p ursuant to a s tate statute may not b e sued u nder § 1983 in a su it chal lenging th at state sta tute. See In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 22; Allen v. DeBello, 861 F.3d 433, 440–42, 443 n.49 (3d Cir. 2017); R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1232 n.10 (8th Cir. 1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990); Grant v. Johnson, 15 F.3d 146, 147–48 (9th Cir. 1994).

15 See generally Adjudica tion, Black’s Law Dictionary (12 th ed. 2024) (defining “adjudication” as “[t ]he legal proces s of resolvin g a dispute; t he process of judicially deciding a case”). But a judge a lso acts in an adjud icatory— rather than an enforcement or a dministrative —capacity when t he judge, in various non- adversarial contexts, decides whether s ingle-party a pplications satisfy relevant legal requirements, e.g., when authorizing search or arrest warrant s, or the interception of electronic communication s, or when ruling on attorney - licensure applications. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 47 9 (1983). So, too, when New York state judges rule on firearm license applic ations, they are adjudicating whethe r the appl ication satisfies the r equirement s of state law. Our Court’s rationale for recognizing such decisions as judicial rath er than administrative for purposes of determining judic ial immun ity in Libertaria n Party, 970 F.3d at 125, applies equal ly for purposes of deter mi ning j uris dict ion. 5 5 We do not s uggest that our con clusi on in Libertaria n Party that ju dges rulin g on licensure applications are entit led to judicial immunity because their decisions are judicial rather than administrative is binding with r espect to our Article III adversity analy sis here. But Libertarian Party’ s analysis of a judicial funct ion for the pur poses of immunity — t hat judges un der this scheme “refer[] to relevant requiremen ts of § 400.00, and decide[] the merits of the applicants’ request s .. . referring in detail t o the factual and statutory basis for the denial,” 970 F.3d at 124–25— infor ms our functional analy sis here even th ough it is not disp ositive.

16 Circuits have adop ted a functiona l approach to e valua te whether a state court judge has ac ted in a judicia l capacity in adjudicating a s tate statutory c laim that is then challen ged on constitution al grounds. See I n re Justices, 695 F.2d at 21–25; Allen v. DeBell o, 861 F.3d 433, 4 40– 42 (3d Cir. 2017); Frazi er, 140 F.4th a t 562–63; Reule v. Jacks on, 114 F.4th 36 0, 365–66 (5th C ir. 2024); R.W.T. v. Da lton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1232–33 (8 th Cir. 1983), abroga ted in part o n other grou nds by Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. C orp. v. Bonjorno, 4 94 U.S. 827 (19 90); Grant v. Johnson, 15 F.3d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1 994). Using the sa me approach, we consider factor s such as whether th e judge may initiate proceedi ngs under the statute, see Lind ke, 31 F.4th at 493; whether the judg e who has issued the order i s responsible for enf orcing it, see id.; whether the ju dge played a role in enacting the statute pursuant to wh ich the order wa s issued, see Allen, 861 F.3d at 442; wh ether the jud ge is adequately alleged to have a pe rsonal or in stitutional stake in upholdin g the statute, see In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 2 1; whether the challenged act is “a tra ditionally administrative task,” o r min ister ial t ask, like “fee col lection,” Mendez, 5 30 F.2d at 460; and whether the challenged statutor y sche me “allows for traditional jud icial safeguards,” Reule, 1 14 F.4th at 36 5–66.

17 Applying these factors here, we conclude, based in part on Libe rtarian Party, that Jud ge Nichols acted as a judici al officer in denying the Plaintiffs’ firearm s license applications and that the Plaintiffs and Judge Nichols are decidedly not parties “having advers e legal interes ts” with re spec t to the Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and i njunctive relief. S ee Motors Liqui dation Co., 829 F.3d at 168. In par ticu lar, unlike licensing offic ers in New York who are not judges, New York j udges s erving as licensing off icers do not h ave the author ity to initiate enforce ment actions. Wh ile the y adjudicate the merits of the applications sub mitted to the m, see N.Y. Penal L aw § 400.00, they have no independent enforcement authority or rol e in criminal prosecutions to enforce the statu te. Put mor e concre tely, to the e xtent tha t the P laintif fs se ek to enjo in Judge Nichols fro m enforcing N.Y. Penal Law §§ 2 65.01, 265.02 (5)(i), 265.03(2), 265.03(3), and 265.04(2), they chose the wrong tar get. Under N ew York law, Judge Nichols has no authority t o charge the Pla intiffs for unla wfully carrying firearm s. 6 6 The issue of wh ether st ate judge s act as enfor cer s when t hey “ su a sponte revoke or cancel a l icense ” is no t pro perly befor e us. O’Brien v. Keegan, 87 N.Y.2d 436, 439 (1996) (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(11)), abrogated on other grounds by N.Y. State Rifle & P istol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Judge Nichols never revoked or canceled t he Plaintiffs’ fire arm lice nses, because they never had licenses in the first place. We

18 By contrast, New York State, acting throu gh various law e nforcement officers, and not the judge who adju dicates an application for a firearm s licens e, is aut horized to enforce the li censing regime by prosecutin g the unlicensed possession of a con cealed firearm. See N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01 et seq. 7 L icensing officers in New York who are not judges, as county and ci ty police commissioners, sh eriffs, or the supe rinten dent of state police, s ee N.Y. Penal La w § 265.00(10), th us appear to have a role in enforcing the state st atute, see id. § 400.00(8) (noting t hat “[u]pon demand, the license s hall be ex hibited for inspection to any peace officer, who is acting pursuant to his or her special duties, or police off icer”); see also B ruen, 59 7 U.S. at 16 (de scribing the New York State Poli ce Superintendent as “ oversee[ing] the enf orcement of the State ’s licens ing l aws ”). An d although N ew Yor k state judges may revoke or suspend an iss ued licens e, a judge revoking a lice nse must then “n otif y i mmed iate ly the accordingly take no po sition on whether there is Article III adversit y between a plaintiff who holds a firear m license and a st ate judge who revokes or cance ls that li cense. 7 Although we ulti mately take n o posi tion on th e issu e, see infra at 25–27, t he fact th at New Yo rk ha s entr usted such la w enfor ceme nt o fficers wit h licen sin g as well as enforcement re sponsibilities could explai n why they would be subject to sui t when judge s are not. See ge nerally Whole Woman ’ s Health, 595 U.S. at 45–46 (allowing claims to proceed against “ executive licensing official [s] who ma y or must take e nforcem ent action s agains t the petiti oners if th ey violate the terms of” the c hallen ged law).

19 duly constituted pol ice authorities of the locality,” and notice of such a revocation “shall a lso include in formation regar ding the abilit y to appeal.” N. Y. Penal Law § 400.00(1 1). Thus, the authori ty of Judge Nichols in the context of this case was narr owly confined to adjudicating the f irearm- eligibil ity determination. Further, jud ges act ing as lice nsing officers in New York have no role in determi ning Penal Law § 400.00(1)’s cr iteria for issu ing licenses; 8 if those cri teria were ever to ch ange or be declared uncon stitutional, jud ges wh o issued or decli ned to issue firearms licen se s under the statuto ry scheme, in contras t to non- 8 The P laintiff s conten d that a group of New York cou nty cou rt judge s had a stake in th e cons titutional litigatio n relatin g to the pen al statu te becau se they com mented on the 1963 bill that was later codified as Penal Law § 400.00. But a care ful review of the legis lative his tory reve als tha t the 1963 b ill merely r eordered e xistin g statuto ry standards and made “absolutely no substantive changes.” App’x 62. In any event, no n - bind ing comm ents by judges on legis lation do n ot suggest a subs tantive rol e in promul gating the l aw tha t affords j udges a stake in any l itigation on the la w. Rather, for this factor t o come to bea r, we woul d expec t judges to “have po wer to eff ectuate plaintiffs ’ reques t by promulgati on of a ru le or is suanc e of an order” amendi ng the challenged criter ia, rule, or law. Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078, 1087–89 (3d Cir. 1985) (permitting suit challeng ing parole pr ocedures to proceed ag ainst judges who served not as “as neutral adjudicators of disputes,” but “as administrators of the parole power” who could be or dered to “follow certain due process pro cedures” implemented by judicial rule or or der); see In re Justs. of Supreme Ct. o f Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d at 23 (holding that judges ac ting in legislativ e capacity had “institutio nal stake in the litigati on's outc ome”). That is not this c ase.

20 judge licen sin g off ice rs, would “ not even have an ins titutional interest in follo wing the ir pr ior decis ions. ” In re Justi ces, 695 F.2d at 21. Next, the nature of the proceedings b efore Judge N ichols was not merely minis teria l or a dm inis trativ e. See Me ndez, 530 F.2d at 460; Feld man, 460 U.S. at 478–79. This is to be contrasted with, for example, a ci ty clerk’s issuance of marria ge licenses —an operational, non -discretionary fu nction. See Cooga n v. Smyers, 134 F.3d 479, 484 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The duties o f the City Clerk are large ly ministe rial and include record keepi ng and the nondiscretionary issuance of permits and license s.” (emphas is added)). The latter is ministerial; the former is not. Fina lly, New York’s licensing regime “allows for tradi tio nal jud icia l safeguards.” Reule, 1 14 F.4th at 36 6. Indeed, the P lain tiffs do not de ny that they had a formal hear ing where they were allowe d to be represented by an a ttorney, to call witnesses, and to testify under oath, and were informed — in wr itin g— why their ap plications were denied. Appellee’s Br. 4, 19. The right to further judicial review provides ye t another importan t guardrai l. “The conclusion th at there is no justiciable con troversy be tween the pl aintiffs and the ju dicial defendan ts does not leave the plain tiffs without a r emedy against poten tially u nlawf ul ju dicia l

21 conduct. When a par ty believes that a judge h as violated their rights while acting in an adjudic ative capaci ty, ‘the tra ditional remedy h as been some form of appeal’ rather than a lawsuit agains t the judge.” Frazi er, 140 F.4 th at 563 (citin g Whole Woman’s Healt h, 595 U.S. at 39). A New York judge’s licensing dec isions are subject to judicial review by the Appellate D ivision in Article 78 proceedings. S ee N.Y. C. P.L.R. § 7801 et se q.; see, e.g., Diperna-Gille n v. Ryba, 187 N. Y.S.3d 442, 443 (3d Dep’t 2023) (an nulling a state judge’s licensin g determination in an Article 78 pr oceedi ng after a provision of N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 was r endered unconstitut ional by Bruen, 5 97 U.S. at 7). “An Article 78 pr oceeding per mits a petit ioner to submit af fidavits and other written evidence, a nd where a material issue of fact is raised, have a trial of the disput ed is sue, inc lud ing co nst itut iona l cla ims. ” Locurto v. Saf ir, 264 F.3d 154, 174 (2d Cir. 2001). Faced with constit utional challen ges to New Yor k state statute s, the Appellate Divis ion can conduct a “hyb rid . . . [A]r ticle 78 proce eding and declaratory judgmen t action,” Loehr v. Admin. Bd. o f Cts. of Stat e of N.Y., 29 N.Y.3 d 374, 378 (2017), or “ convert the pr oceedin g into an action for a declaratory judgment pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L. R. § 103 (c) in order to addres s [the

22 plain tiff ’s]. .. c hal lenges to th e cons titut ionality of the statute s at issu e,” Selkin v. State Bd. for Pro. Med. Conduct, 63 F. Su pp. 2d 397, 40 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“All challenges to the constitutional ity of the re levant statutes, as a pplied to [the plaintiff], may be r aised in the Ar ticle 78 procee ding.” (citatio ns omitted)); see also Seymour v. Nichols, 80 1 N.Y.S.2d 42 6, 427 (3d Dep’t 200 5) (converting constitutionality challenge to N.Y. Penal L aw § 400.00, initiate d as Artic le 78 proceeding against state judge, in to declaratory judg ment action). Importantly, plainti ffs can sue judges in the se state proceedings as pe rmitted by state law. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 78 04(i) (recogn izing state judges as permissib le Article 78 respondents); see als o Seymour, 801 N.Y.S.2 d at 427 (consider ing constitutiona l challenge to pena l law as declara tory judgment a ction against state judge). New York’s sche me thus mainta ins “traditional jud icial safegua rds” by keeping t he doors to state cou rt review open for parties to cha llenge a judge’s licensing determination. Reule, 114 F.4th at 366. 9 The Plaintiffs were thus free t o 9 Although in New Yor k, “cha llenges to admini strative ag ency dec isions .. . take the form o f [A]rti cle 78 procee dings,” Le vandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 541 (1990), a state’s characterization of its proceedings does not control our Article III analy sis, cf. Bliven, 579 F.3d at 212 (“Notwi thstand ing the New York Court of Appeals’ characterization of 18– B Panel fee awar ds as administrative for purposes of ensuring their r eviewability, we are not persuaded that a judge’s decision as to a reasonable attorney’s fee is an administrat ive, rather than a judicial, de cision for purpos es of dete rmining w hether the judge is to have abs olute im munity f or that

23 seek state judicial review of the const itutionality of the ir applic ation denials through Article 78 pr oceedings or dec laratory judg ment actions. See Diperna- Gillen v. Ryba, 187 N.Y.S.3d at 443; Se ymour, 801 N.Y.S.2d at 427; see also Disabilit y L. Ctr. v. Cox, No. 2:25- CV -00307-RJS, 202 5 WL 2050235, a t *8 (D. Utah Ju ly 22, 2025) (“[A]ppealab ility can be a proxy to determine whether c hallenged conduct is adjudicatory, an d, in turn, whe ther there is a case or controv ersy.” (citing Whole Woman’s Healt h, 595 U.S. at 39)). B ut the y ele cted no t to do s o. The Plaintiffs arg ue that firear m- licensing judges are enforcers, not adjudicators, beca use a number of s tate-court cases label them as such. Appellant s’ Br. 8–16. 10 We are not persuade d. Regardless of t he labels or titles decision.”); Feldman, 460 U.S. at 478 (“[I]n determi ning the nature of the proceedings w e must for ourselv es appraise the circumstances of the [challenged dec ision].” (quota tion marks om itted)). 10 This same argu ment was m ade to and recently rejec ted by a di ffere nt distric t court: Though these [state - court] ca ses may r efer ence th at judg es were acting in an adm inistrative c apaci ty, the focu s and holdin g of those c ases was not on addressing whether judges wer e acting in an administrativ e or judicial capacit y as a licen sing officer but whether Article 78 proceedings were the proper vehicle for appeal. . . . The references to judges acting in an administrative capac ity were mere dicta, therefore, these ca ses do not compel a different re sult. Morales v. Everet t, No. 7:24- CV -5437-NSR, 2025 WL 1549030, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2025) (citations and par entheticals omitt ed). Because an appeal has been docket ed, see

24 that a state attaches t o a particular r ole, the functional analysis is for the fe deral courts to undertake. See Feldman, 46 0 U.S. at 478. And even if s tate cour t appellate procedure cases were rel evant for Article II I purposes —a point we do not here deci de — the cases themselves are f ar from clear. While some refer to firea rm lic ens ing as “a dminis tra tive, ” others refer to them as “q uasi- judic ia l.” See, e.g., McGreevy v. Casale, 558 N.Y.S.2d 442, 444 (Sup. C t. 1990) (“The granting of pist ol permits and gun dealer licenses is a quasi - judic ial f unc tion of the court.”); Goldstein v. Schwartz, 125 N.Y.S.3d 881, 882 (2d D ep’t 2020) (subst antially same). The lack of advers ity and Article III jurisdiction app lies equally to the Plain tiffs ’ off icia l -capacity cla ims for declar atory and injunctive relief. B oth sets of cla ims seek to bar the enforcement of a licensing scheme that Judge Nichols has no personal or institutional s take in de fending. We therefore affirm the Distr ict Co urt ’s d ismis sal of the off icial - ca pacity claims on that basis. 11 Morales v. Everet t, No. 25-1611 (June 27, 2025), we express no view as to the merits of the decision. 11 We thus avo id addressing whether t he injunctive re lief claims against Judge Nichols fall within § 1983’s bar t o such relief against judicial o fficers “unless a declaratory decree was violat ed or declaratory r elief was unavailable.” Monter o v. Travi s, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

25 B Our decision is nar row. The functional appr oach necessar il y co ntemp lates a case- by - case ana lys is. A ll that we consider is our jurisdict ion to review the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 cl aims against Judge Nichols in h is official capacit y under the circumstances of this case. 12 We do not t ackle whether Artic le I II would bar claims for declarator y or injunctive re lief against state court ju dges in other circumstances. Nor do we deci de whether our analysis would differ if the Plain tiffs had also na med defendants w ith a sufficient per sonal or ins titut iona l stake in defending the challenged la w, 13 c f. Bruen, 597 U.S. a t 16; Antonyuk, 120 12 We limit our holding in this case to the re cord before us, in which plaintiffs were denied licenses, sued on ly the judge who adjudicated their elig ibility for licenses, failed to request any prospective re lief in the form of requiring Judge Nicho ls to issue a license, and instead so ught broad facial equit able relief declaring New Yo rk’s entire firearms licensing s tatutory sche me unc onstitutional, and enjoining enforcement of th e criminal penalties for po ssession of firearms without a license. Under these circumstances, a declar ation and order enjo ining Judge Nichols, who the P laintiffs do not cla im has any personal or i nstituti onal st ake in up holdin g this statute, would n ot alter the P laintiffs ’ legal right s as to the previously denied appli cations and would have no eff ect on the e nforceme nt of New Y ork’s cri minal l aws. 13 Our decision in Libertarian Party does n ot forec lose the Plaintiffs’ standing in any action that they mi ght have b rought a gainst non - judge defendant s. In Libertarian Party, we un derstood the plaintif fs to all ege that the y were in jured by t he denial of their license applic ations. In t hose cir cumstance s, we explain ed that “th e only def endan ts to whom [plaintiffs ’ ] alleged inj uries were fairly t raceable w ere the judges who denied their respective applications.” 970 F.3d at 122. Our sta tement in Libert arian Party did not reflect a broa d holding that U pstate plaint iffs have standing to bring pre - enforcement cons titutional challe nges to New York’s li censi ng sche me onl y agains t judges who deny

26 F.4th a t 9 58; Libertari an Party, 970 F.3 d at 116–17 (obser ving “ there was no allegati on tha t. . . claimed injuries had be en inflicted by any persons other than the [judicial] defendants who had denied their respect ive license requests ”); compare United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 763 (2 013) (an alyz ing advers ity for the case as a whole), with Whole Woma n’s Health, 59 5 U.S. at 40 (analyz ing adversity par ty - by - p arty), or if the P laintiffs had r aised an as- a pplie d constitutional challenge, cf. Anto nyuk, 120 F.4th at 999. Add itionally, we d o not address whether Ar ticle III wou ld bar a si milar action brou ght against a Ne w York state police co mmissioner or county sheriff, say, who de nies a firear ms license application, see N.Y. Pen al Law § 265.00(10), where those officers po ssess both the a uthor ity to adjudicate such app lications and the po wer to enforce violations of New York’s firearms licen sin g law s. Our decision does not speak to the availability of a pre- enforcement constitutional challen ge to “a component of license applications. We said nothing about a plaintiff’s standing to sue various non - judge state officials for alleged injuries ar ising from t heir pro cessing of license applications or potential enforcement of licensure requirements. See, e.g., Frey v. City of New Yor k, 157 F.4th 118, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2025); Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 977–78. Nor do we do so he re. We note only tha t insofa r as the Plaintiffs seek t he invalidation o f the licensing scheme a nd an injunct ion against the enfor cement of crimina l penalties for possessio n of a fi rear m wit hout a license, they appear to s eek remedies for alleg ed injuries potentially traceable to, and redr essable by, non - judge actor s.

27 the application process” where the plainti ff’s “injury flows from the application itself, not from the as serted ineligib ility for a license.” See Anto nyuk, 120 F.4th at 976, 979. We decide only that the Pla int iffs a nd J udg e Nich ols are not adverse parties wi th respect to the Plainti ffs’ claims for equit able relief and that th ere is no live case or contro versy b ecause rulings on firea rm s lice nse s are judic ial decis ions and Judge Nichols lack s a pers onal or ins tit ution al in ter est in defending New Yor k’s firearms licensing scheme. C ONCLUSION We have consider ed the Pl aintiffs’ remain ing arguments and c onclude that they are wit hout merit. For the foreg oing reasons, the judgmen t of the Dis trict Cour t is AFF IRMED.