CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Property Solutions - Fair Housing Act and FCRA Case

23-1118(L) CFHC v. C oreLog ic Renta l Prop. S ols. In the United States Court of Appe als FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT A UGUST T ERM 2024 No s. 23-1118(L), 23- 11 66(XAP) C ONNECTICUT F AIR H OUSING C ENT ER AN D C ARMEN A RROYO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CONSERVATOR OF M IKHAIL A RROYO, Plaintiffs-Appellants-C ross-Appellees, v. C ORE L OGIC R ENTAL P ROPERT Y S OLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant-Appellee-Cr oss-Appellant. * On Appeal from th e United S tates Distr ict Court for the District of Connecticut A RGUED: N O VEM BER 20, 2024 D ECIDED: F EBRUARY 20, 2026 Before: C ABRAN ES, W ES LEY, and M ENASHI, Circuit Judges. Plaintiffs Connecticut Fair Housing C enter and Carmen Arroyo, for herse lf and on behalf of her son Mikhail, cla imed that Defendant CoreLogic Rental Propert y Solutions — which reports the * The Cl erk of Cou rt is direc ted to ame nd the ca ption a s set f orth ab ove.

2 credit and criminal h istories of pro spective ten ants to housing providers—violated the Fair Housing A ct when it facil itate d the denial of housing based on criminal history because that practice has a disparate impact on African American and Hispan ic rental applicants. Arroyo al so argued that Core Logic’s policy regarding the disclos ure of consumer re ports of individuals under conservators hips was inadequat e under the F a ir Credi t Reporting Act and had a disparate impact on handicapped individuals in v iolation of the Fair Housing Act. The district court conclude d th at (1) th e p laint iffs faile d to show CoreLogic was cove red by the Fair Housing Act, and (2) CoreLogic violate d the Fair Credit Reporting Act because it t o ld Arroyo that she ne eded to have a po wer of attorney to request Mikhail’s consu mer fil e even though she had a cons ervatorship over him. We vacate in part, affirm in part, a nd reverse in part. First, we conclude that the Connecticut Fair Housing Center lacked standing to bring this suit. “[A]n organiza tion that has not suffered a concrete injury caused by a defendant’s action cannot spend i ts way into standing simp ly by expending mone y to gather informat ion and advocate against the defendant’s action.” FDA v. All. for Hipp ocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. 1540, 1563-64 (2024). Se cond, while we disagree with the district court that the Fair Ho using Act excludes cert ain types of defendants, we nevertheless agree that CoreLo gic did not cause the denial of housing in this case. For that reason, Ar royo failed to establish a prima faci e case of disparate - impact discr imination. Third, Arroyo provided C oreLogic with a facially invalid copy of the cert ificate of conservatorship. Because she did not provide valid documentation o f a conservatorship even after being inform ed of the need to do so, she cannot show that CoreLogic’s doc umentation requirement s prevented her from obtaining Mikhail’s consumer file.

3 E RIC D UNN, National Housing L aw Project, Richmond, VA (Christine Webber, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Washington, DC; Greg Kirschner, Connecticut Fair Housing Cente r, Hartford, CT, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants-C ross-Appellees. T IMOTH Y J. S T. G EORG E, Troutman Pep per Hamilton Sanders LLP, Richm ond, VA (Jim M. O’Toole, O’Toole + O’Toole PLLC, Hartf ord, CT, on the brief), for Defendant- Appellee-Cross-Appell ant. Y AEL B O RTNIC K, Civi l Righ ts Divis ion, U.S. Depart ment of Justice, Wash ington, DC (Kris ten C larke, Nicolas Y. Riley, Civil Rights D ivisio n, U.S. Depar tment of Justice, Washington, DC; D amon Smith, Sasha Samberg - Champion, Aye let Weiss, Margaret D onahue, Paul Osadebe, U.S. De partment of Housing and Urban Development, Wash ington, DC, on the bri ef), for Amicus Curiae United States. Jennifer L. Sarvadi, Huds on Cook, LLP, Washington, DC, for Amicus Cur iae Consumer Data Association and Professional Backgrou nd Association. Yiyang Wu, Zoi la Hinson, Relman Colfax PLLC, Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae National Fair H ousing Alliance, Fair H ousing Justice Center, Long Island Housin g Services, Inc., Westchester Re sidential Opp ortunities, Inc., and CNY Fair Housin g, Inc.

23-1118(L) CFHC v. C oreLog ic Rental Prop. S ols. M ENASHI, Circuit Judge: Carme n Arroyo (“Ar royo”) appli ed to change ap artments in a building managed by WinnResidenti al, a national residenti a l property management company. W innResidential and other landlords use scree ning platforms to g ather information about a prospective tenant in order to evaluate the tenan t’s rental application. One such screening platform is CrimSAFE, a product of Cor eLogic Rental Property Solutions, LLC. When WinnResiden tial receives a rental application, it enters the applicant’s information into CrimSAFE and rece ives a credit and c rimina l history report. The management of Wi nnResidential has access to details about the applicant’s criminal history, bu t the on - site property m an ager will know only whether the appl ic ant’s criminal history meets the criteria that WinnResidential has established to disq ualify an applicant. WinnRe siden tial ul timately decides whether to accept or to rejec t an applicant. Arroyo alre ady lived in the buildin g, but she applied to move into a new apart ment with her son Mikhail, who had been injured in a serious acciden t. WinnResidential rej ected Mikhail’s app li ca tion because of his C rimSAFE crimin al history repo rt. For ove r a year follo wing the rejectio n, Arroyo and WinnRe sidential negotiated over Mikha il’s app licatio n. D uring that time, Arroyo learned that Mikha il’s report ha d identified a pen ding shop lifting char ge in Pennsylvania. She succe ssfully sought the dismissal of the shoplifting charge in Pennsy lvania state court. S he then reached a sett le ment w ith WinnResidential after she — with the assistance of the Connecticut Fair Housing Cente r (“CFHC”) — filed an action a lleging housin g discr iminatio n with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”).

5 Arroyo learned of the pending s hop lifting charge from WinnRe siden tial instead of C oreLogic because CoreLogic refused to provide her a cop y of Mikhail’s CrimSAFE report. Per Core Logic’s polic ies, Arroyo w as required to sub mit a po wer of attorney demonstrating that sh e was authoriz ed to request mater ials on Mikha il’s be half. Arroyo provided a c opy of her certifi c ate of conservatorship over Mikhail, but Core Logic rejected tha t doc ument because the copy did not show that the cer tifi c ate had an impr essed seal. Without such a seal, the certificate w ould be facia lly inv alid. Arroyo ar gues that CoreLogic viola te d the Fair Ho using Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., when it provided the C rim SAFE platform t hat allowed WinnResiden tial to deny a rental appl ication based on the applicant ’ s crim inal his tor y. She claims t hat su ch denials have a disparate impact on Hispanic applicants. The CFHC joins her comp laint as a pl aintiff, alleging t he s am e harm with respect t o African American applicants. Arroyo additio nally argues that CoreLogic’s pol icy of requiring a third party seeking a con s umer file to sub mit a po wer of attorney violate s the FHA as appl ied to handicapped individ uals who cannot execute a power of a ttorney but are un der a valid conservatorship. She argues th at CoreLogic’s conduct in this case showed willful noncompliance with the Fair Credit Reporting A ct (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., because CoreLogic should have accepted Arr oyo’s conservatorsh ip certificate. The dis trict cour t “ conducted a ten - day bench trial.” CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Pro p. Sols., LLC, No. 18- CV - 705, 2023 WL 4669482, at *1 (D. Conn. Jul y 20, 2023). It concluded that the FHA does not apply to CoreLogic because CoreLog ic did not itself disqualify applicants or ma ke housing unavailab le; instead, the housing provider decided wha t crimina l histor y it cons ider ed relevant and whether to disqualify an applicant. See id. at *17-20. The distric t court

6 additionally held tha t (1) Arroyo failed to show that CoreLog ic had a polic y of re jecting record requests based on c onservatorship certificates, and (2) it was permissibl e f or CoreL ogic to require a conservatorship cert ificate that was facially valid rather than accept the fa cially invalid certificat e Arroyo provided. See id. at *23. The distri c t co urt nevertheless held CoreL ogic liable under th e FCRA for making it “impossible” for Arroyo to request Mikhail’s report during the period in wh ich it asked for a power of attorney. Id. We vacate in part, affirm in part, and r everse in part. First, the CFHC lacked standing to br ing this suit, and the district court e rred in holding otherwise. “[A]n organ ization that has not suffered a concrete injury caused by a defendant’s action cannot spend its way into standing simply by expending mo ney to gather inf ormatio n and advocate against the defendant’s action.” FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. 1540, 1563 - 64 (2024). The C FHC has shown that it committed resources to address the dispa rate imp act it clai ms that CrimSAFE has on African American applicants, b ut “[a]n organization cannot manufacture its own standing in that way. ” Id. at 1564. Because the C FHC did not suffer an injury in fact cau sed by CoreLogic, the district court lacked s ub ject mat ter jurisdiction over its claim, which should have been dismissed for lack of standing. Second, whil e we di s agree w ith the district court that the FHA excludes c ertain types of defendant s, w e nev ertheless a gree that CoreLogic did not cause the de nial of housing in this case. For that reason, Arroyo fai led to establish a prima facie case of di s parate- impact discrimination. Third, Arroyo provi ded CoreLogic with a facially invalid copy of the certificate of cons ervatorship. Because s he did not provide valid documentation o f a conservatorship even after being informed of the

7 need to do so, she cannot show that CoreLogic’s doc umentation requirement s prevented her from obtaining Mikha i l ’s report. We vacate the judgm ent insofar as the district court cons idered the claim of the CFHC on the merits, and we dismiss the C FHC’s appeal for lack of s tanding. We affirm the judg ment insofar as the distr ict cou rt held th at CoreLogic was not liable to Arr oyo under the FHA. And w e reverse the judgment insofar a s the district court imposed liability on CoreLogic under the FCRA. BACKGROUND Carmen Arroyo is a resident of ArtSpace, a residential bui ldi n g in Windham, Conne cti cu t. At the time the comp lai n t was filed, Arroyo li ve d there with her son Mikhail who suffered a trauma tic brain injury i n a 2015 accident. A t the time of the accident, however, Arroyo lived alone and therefore was required to apply for Mikhail to join the lease. To facilitate the backgr ound check for s uch an applica tion, W innRe sidenti al, the property manager of ArtS pace, used CoreLogic’s scr eening platform Cri mSAFE. I CoreLogic is a comp any that offers tenan t screening products and services to housing provider s, including criminal hi story screening. One of Cor eLogic’s products is CrimSAFE, a progra m that searches for cr iminal records in CoreLo gic’s database and gen erates reports based on those records. C oreLogic’s database include s records from over 800 jurisdictions acr oss the United States. CoreLogic class ifies crim inal records into three primary categor ies: (1) Crimes Agains t Property, (2) Crimes Ag a in st Persons, and (3) Crimes Agains t Society. Each cate gory inclu des further sub - class ificat ions.

8 CrimSAFE f ilt ers criminal records based on criteri a set by the housing provide r. T he housi ng prov i der determ ines which records it want s Cri mSAFE to identif y based on (1) the type of of fense, (2) the severity or d isposition of the offense (s uch as a felony conv iction, a felony charge, a non -felony c onviction, or a non -felony ch arge), and (3) the age of offen se, also called the “lookback pe riod.” For convictions, the housing pr ovider may set a lookb ack period of between zero a nd n i n ety - ni ne years; for charges, it may set a lookback period of between zero and seven years. If Cri mSAFE identifies a criminal reco rd based on the hous ing provider’s criter ia, the provider receive s a report with all availab le inform ation about the record in the CoreLogic database. The pr ovider decide s whether to share with its property manager s and staff the f ull report or a more limi te d rep ort communicating only whether crimi na l rec ords w ere found. When a hous ing provider submits a rental applicat ion to CrimSAFE, the resulti ng tenant screening report i ncludes a “lease decision” based on the provider’s cri teria and the applicant’s credit score and criminal history. The housing provider determine s the language in the report that acco mpanies a found cr imina l record. I n Mikhail ’s case, the report stated: “Please verify the applicability of these records to your applicant and proce ed with your community’s scre ening po licies.” J. App’x 48 1. Even when CrimSAFE iden tifies a criminal record, th e h ousing provider may still decide to appr ove an applicant. If the housing provider elects to de ny the application, CrimSAFE can generate an adverse a ct ion letter template. The housing provider m ay custo mize th e letter and decide whet h er and when to trans mit it.

9 II In April 2016, Car men Arroyo informed the on- site property manager that she wanted to move fr om her one - bedr oom apartment to a two -bedroo m apartment so tha t her son Mikhail co uld liv e with her follow ing the accident. The on- site p ropert y manager informed Arroyo that she would need to submit Mikhail’s infor mation for WinnRe siden tial to cond uct a background check. Th e background check resulted in a report of “Record(s) Fo und,” reflecting a crimin a l histor y. Id. WinnRe sidential se nt an adver se action letter to the Arroyos expla ining that the applicat ion was denied based on the CrimSAFE report a nd that Mikhail ha d the right to ob tain the infor mation in his consu mer file. It a lso in dicated that CoreL ogic di d not make the decisio n to take the adverse action. The Arroyos never recei ved the advers e ac tion letter, bu t Arroyo learned that Mikhail ’s applicat ion was denied from the on- site prope rty manager, who gave her Core Logic’s tele phone number. Arroyo contacted bot h WinnResidential a nd CoreLogic. In her conver sations with Winn Residential, Arroyo exp laine d that M ikhail was disabled and asked why his application was denied. Management of WinnResidential became involved, and Ar royo asked the CFHC for assistance with M ikhail ’s application. In December 2016, Arroyo lear ned from WinnResidenti al that Mikhai l ’s application h ad been denied because of a criminal reco rd identif ied in his CrimSAFE report th at related to a pen ding shoplifting charge in Pennsylvania. Arroyo contacted the court in Pennsylvani a about th e charge, and in A pril 2017 she was inf ormed that the char ge had been wi th drawn. In the me antime, she filed a co mplaint w ith the CHRO for a r ea s onable accommodation for Mikh ail fr om WinnRe siden tial. I n its answer to the complain t, WinnResiden tia l

10 denied that it knew “the exact details as to the denial of each applicant” or “the facts behind the criminal background findings” because it ha d “trust” in CoreLogic’s re ports. Answer at 4-5, CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental P rop. Sols., LL C, No. 18- CV -705 (D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2019), ECF No. 10 5-6. The C HRO held an e videntiary hear ing o n June 13, 2017. T e n days later, WinnR esiden tial a llowed Mikha il to m ove into ArtSpace. While negot iations with W innRes iden tial were ongoin g, Arroyo asked Cor eLogic to provide the details of M ikhail ’s CrimSAFE report. After Mikh ail ’s appl ication was denied on April 26, 2016, Ar royo calle d CoreLogic to request Mikh ail’s fi le, exp lainin g that she was her son’s conservator. Core Logic sent her a c onsumer disclosure form. Arroyo sub mitted an inco mplete form on June 24, 2016. Arroyo inc lude d a copy of a State of C onnecticut Probate Court Certificate of Conser vatorship. The certificate included the w arning that it was “NOT VALID WI T HOUT C OURT OF PROB ATE SEAL IMPRESSED,” but an impressed seal w as not visible on the copy. J. App’x 475. After recei v in g Arroyo ’s packet, CoreLogic sen t her a lette r instructing her to contact the company. Even though it was se nt to the address Arroyo listed o n the consu mer d isclosure form, the letter was returned t o the sender. CoreLogic’s intern al note system docu mented that it could no t accept the conservatorship certifi c ate and nee ded a spec ial a uthorization for a power of attorney as well as Mikhail ’s signature. Because she had not heard from the compan y since sending the form, Arroyo co ntacted CoreLogic i n September 2016. At that time, CoreLog ic advised Arroyo that it re quired a notarized power of attorney from Mikh ail an d that it could not accept a conservat orship certifi c at e pursuant to its standard p oli c ies for thir d pa rty authorization. Th ose p olicies — as r ecorded in CoreLogic’s

11 Authentication Proc edur e Guide — explained that CoreLogic could “accept a th ird p arty reque st” in circumstances inc luding “but n ot limited to” when the third party submits a “[v]al id (including notarization) Power of Attorney.” Id. at 577. The Authentication Procedure Gu i de further provided that “[f]or any scenarios not covered in this sectio n, including how to determine if a PO A is valid, please reac h out to the Supervisor.” Id. Arroyo spoke with the attorney hand ling Mikhail’s probate case, who told h er that she should not need a power of at torney because a conservators hip affords her broader rights under sta te law. In fact, it would h ave been impossible fo r Arroyo to obtain a p ower of attorney because Mikhail lacked the capacity to authorize one as a conservatee. On No vember 1, 2016, she again called CoreLogic to relay the law yer’s advice. The m atter was escalated to the legal departm ent at CoreLogic, an d two weeks later CoreLogic calle d Arroyo to info rm he r that the copy of the conservatorship certificate would be accept able if the se al w ere visible. The nex t day, Arroyo resubmi tted the form wi th the accompanying materials, bu t the copy of the conservator ship certificate again lacked a visib le seal. CoreLogic called Arroyo three ti mes about this s ub mi ssion, but she did not respond. In stead, the CFHC called CoreLogic at Arr oyo’s request and was infor med that the copy of the conse rvatorship cert ificate needed a visible seal. Th e interaction bet w een Arroy o and CoreLogic was t he fi rst and only instance of a “con served individual who has requeste d a file disclosure” from Cor eLogic. CFHC v. Cor eLogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC, 478 F. Supp. 3d 25 9, 282 (D. Conn. 202 0).

12 III Arroyo and the CF HC filed this laws uit against CoreLogic on April 24, 2018, a lleging six causes of action: on behalf of all plaintiffs, (1) discr iminat ion on the basis of race and national origin in vio lation of the FHA and (2) discrimination on the b asis of a handicap in violation of the FHA; on behalf of the Arroyos, (3) d iscrim inati on on the basis of a h andicap in violat ion of the FHA and (4) violations of the Connecticut Un fair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”); a nd, on behalf of Mikh ail, (5) violat ions of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 g, and (6) violations of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 168 1h. A CoreLogic moved for s umm ar y judgment on each claim and to dismiss the FHA disc rimination claims on behalf of African Amer ica n applicants because t he Arroyos are not African American a nd the CFHC lacked organ izational standing. 1 Arroyo and the CFHC cr oss- moved for summar y judgment on the FC RA claims, the CUTPA 1 CoreLogi c also move d to dismis s Arroyo’s c laims under th e FHA as to discrimination on the basis of a ha ndicap and under t he CU TPA because she lack ed “ statu tory standin g. ” CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 284 -85. The statutor y standing inquir y asks whether a plaintiff ha s interests that “fall withi n the zone of i nt eres ts protected b y the law in voked,” Lexmark Int ’l, Inc. v. Static Control Componen ts, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014) (quotin g Alle n v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)), and ther efore “has a cause of action unde r the sta tute,” id. at 128. That inquiry “does n ot implicate su bject - matter jurisdictio n.” I d. at 128 n.4 (quoting Verizo n Md., Inc. v. P ub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 643 (2002)). Because the question is not jurisdictional and CoreLo gic has not challenged the decision of the distr ict court tha t Arroyo fa lls withi n the zone of in terests, w e do not address t he issue. See City of Almaty v. K hrapunov, 956 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9t h Cir. 2020).

13 claims, and the FHA claims regarding r ace and nationa l origin. See CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3 d at 272-73. The district court held that the CFHC had stand ing to pursue its claim under the F HA. According to the district court, organ izations that “allege t hat a defendant’s acti ons have ‘frustrate d the organization pl aintiff’s services, wi th a consequent dr ain on resources’ have s tanding to bring FHA c laims.” Id. at 286 (alterations omitted) (quoting Havens Realty Co rp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 369 (1982)). In this case, the CFHC a lleged that “ the disparate im pact of CrimSAFE on Afric an American and Latino applicants frus trates CFHC ’ s mission [of] ensuring that al l people have equal access to the housing of the [ir] choice.” Id. And the C FHC has devoted r esources to providing “g uidance on the us e of criminal records” and to re vising “ its public trainings and presentations to account for [CoreLogic’s] policie s regarding crim inal records.” Id. The distric t court he ld that Arroyo co uld not establish that CoreLogic fail ed to d isclose Mikhail’s consumer report in vio lation of the FCRA because the FCRA ob ligates a c onsumer reporting agency to require “tha t the consumer furni sh pr oper i dentification” before any information is discl os ed. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(a)(1). Th e requi red ident ificatio n must b e suff icient to “match consumers with their files” and “commensura te with an identifiable risk of harm ar ising from misid entifyi ng the consumer.” 12 C.F.R. § 1022. 123(a). The dis trict court explained that “ [w] here state law defines the va lidity of an identification docume nt,” the state- law requi rements for establi shing validity inform what qualifies as “‘prop er identification’ unde r the FCRA.” CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 307. Under the laws of Connecticut — as the conser vatorship certificate stated on i ts face —a conservators hip cer tifica te is “NOT VA LID WIT H OUT CO URT OF PROBATE SEAL I MPRESSED.” Id.

14 T he distr ict court co ncluded, however, that CoreLogic mig ht have “violated i ts duty under 15 U.S.C. § 1681g by failing to ‘p rovide a statement that the consumer’s ident ity cannot be ver ified; and directions on how to complete the request, including what additional inform a ti on or do cumentation will be require d to complete the request, and how to submi t such informa tion.’” Id. at 308 (alteration omitted) (quot ing 12 C.F.R. § 1022.137 (a)(2)(iii)(C)). The district court said that this violation might have occur red between the June 2016 inter nal no t e that CoreL ogic require d a power of attorne y and the November 2016 decis ion to accept a conservatorship certificate. See i d. at 308 -09. I t therefo re granted su mmary judgment to CoreLog ic on the FCRA clai m only with respect to cond uct preceding June 2016 and follo wing Nove mber 2016. The distri ct court granted sum mary judgment to C oreLogic on the claim that it violated the FHA by ad opti ng a poli cy with a disparate impact on the handicapped. The district c ourt concluded that the record d id not sugge st that Cor eLogic h ad a policy of not allow ing conservato rs to obtain the files of conserv atees or of requir ing conser vators always to subm it a power of attorney to receive those files. Instead, Core Logic had a policy of referring uncommon circumstances — such as a con servatorship — to a supervisor. To the extent that Arroyo argued that Cor eLogic should have been cl earer about how a conserv ator could obtain files, the district c ourt concluded that the reco rd did not suggest that CoreLogic ha d a pol icy of telling consumers th at a power of attorney is required whe n a conservators hip certificate would suff ice. The district court also granted su mmary judgment to CoreLogic on the cla ims that it violated the FHA thr ough d isparate treatm ent on the bas is of a handicap and a failure to accommodate. The district court co ncluded that the record di d not suggest that the

15 policy of supervisor y review masked an in tent to discriminate a gainst handicapped consumers. The district c ourt furth er concl uded that it would not be a reasonable acc ommodation for CoreLog ic to accept a copy of the conservatorship certificate wi thou t a visib le seal b ecau se the FCRA requires CoreLogic to obt a in proper i dentification, which in this c ase meant a facially valid certificate. Thus, t he distric t court granted summary judgmen t to CoreLogic on the FHA handicap claims. Bu t it a llowe d the F HA cla ims asse rting disparate impact and disparate treatment on the basis of race and national origin — as well as the CUTPA clai m—to proceed to trial. B T he district court held a bench trial. To resolv e the claims under the FHA, the distr ict court considered the “initial matter” of “whether CoreLogic is subject to the FHA.” CFHC, 2023 WL 466 9482, at *16. It decided t hat CoreLogic was not s ubject to the FHA because it had not been shown that CoreLogic “sets the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental,” id. (referenci ng 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)), or “makes unava ilable or denies housing,” id. (altera tions omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)). The d istrict court exp lained that Cr imSAFE does not disqualify applican ts because the housing provider decides w hether to a ccept or declin e an applica tion. The distric t court further concluded that “[f]or the same reasons that the FHA claims failed, th e CUTPA claims relati ng to the use of CrimSAFE fail.” Id. at *26. It dismissed as aband oned the CUTPA claims related to the file disclosure. See id. at * 27. The distr ict court dec ided that Arroyo showe d a violation of the FCRA for the June to Nove mber 2016 period. The distr ict court reiterat ed that Arroy o never submit ted proper identificati on, see id. at *21, but it con cluded tha t CoreLogic was neverth eless lia ble for

16 “making it impossible for a consu mer to exerci se its rights t o their cons umer file ” dur ing th e four- mo nth period, id. at *23. 2 The di strict court dec ided that the violat ion was willful because Cor eLogic adopted policies th at “supported the position [set out] by th e consumer re presentati ves that they needed a powe r of attorney. ” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *24. I t was “entirel y fore seeable” that a person who might “lack phys ical and/or mental capacity to make a valid power of attor ney” would request records, and “CoreLogic’s writt en polic ies entirely overlooked this grou p of people with the effect of deny ing Mr. Arroyo his right to his consumer report.” Id. Arroyo did no t prove actual damage s, however, because there was no evidence that (1) Ar royo would have submitted a valid conservatorship certificate or (2) CoreLogic’s delay caused WinnRe siden tial no t to move the Arroyos into the two -b edroom apartment. See i d. at * 25. As a result, the district court imposed $1,000 in statutory da mages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n and treble punitive damage s. See id. at *26. Arroyo and the CF HC appealed the judgment insofar as the district c ourt rejected the FHA race and national or igin c laims a t trial and the claims regar ding a reasonable acco mmodation and discr iminatio n on the bas is of a handicap a t summar y judgment. CoreLogic cross -app eal ed the judgmen t insofar as the dist rict c ourt impos ed liability under th e FCRA. 2 The d istric t cou rt did not rely on the regu lation it ref erenced at s u mma ry judgment, see CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 308 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 1022.137(a)(2)(iii)(C)), because “the regulation was only raised for th e first time in a reply brief without any meaningful analysis of its application to the fact s of this case,” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *22.

17 DISCUSSION “We review a district court’s decis ion to grant sum mary judgmen t de novo, r esolvin g all am biguitie s and d raw ing all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary j udgment is s ought.” Garcia v. Heath, 74 F.4th 44, 47- 48 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2010)). “Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorab le to the non - movant, ‘there is no ge nuine dispute as to any material fact a nd the movant is ent itled to judgment as a matter of law. ’” Kravit z v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 1 18 -19 (2d C ir. 2023) (quoting Donin ger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3 d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011)). “On appeal from a judgment after a bench trial, we review the district court’s f indings of fact for clear err or and its conclusions of law de novo.” Mayer v. Ringler Assocs. Inc., 9 F.4th 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Hartford R oman Cath. Dio cesan Corp. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 905 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 20 18)). “The district court’s finding of pr oximate cause is a factual finding that is subject to clea r error review.” Liberty In s. Corp. v. Hudson Ex cess Ins. Co., 147 F.4th 249, 258 (2d C ir. 2025). We will set aside a factual finding only if “we are ‘left with the definite and fir m conviction that a mistake has b een committed.’” Barrows v. Becerra, 24 F.4th 116, 135 (2d Cir. 2022) (quot ing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 36 4, 395 (1948)). I Before r eaching the meri ts, we a dd ress the threshold issue of whether the CFHC h as standing to raise its cla im against CoreLogic. The C FHC alle ged that Cor eLogic discr iminate s agains t African American and Hispanic app licants in vio lation of the FHA. Because it is “a jurisdic tiona l req uirement, stand ing to l itigate cannot be wa ived

18 or forfeited.” Va. Hou se of Delegates v. Bethune -Hill, 139 S. C t. 1945, 1951 (2019). W e hold that the CFHC lacks standing to raise its discr iminatio n cla im. A “Article III of the Constitution li mits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Murthy v. Mis souri, 144 S. C t. 1972, 1985 (2024) (quotin g U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). By limiting t he judi cial power to cases or controversies, Article III “confines the federal court s t o a properly jud icial role.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). For a dispute to qualify as a genuine c ase or controversy, the p laintiff must have “such a per sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant [its] invocation of feder al - court jurisdiction.” Summers v. Earth Isl and Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (internal quotation m arks omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). To es tablish standing to invoke th at jurisd iction, the plain tiff “ must demonstrate (i) that [it] has suffere d or likely will suffer an inj ury in fact, (ii) that the inj ury likely wa s caused or will be caused by the defen dant, and (iii) that the injury likely would be redressed by th e request ed judici a l rel ief.” All. for Hippocrat ic Med., 144 S. Ct. at 1555. “[O]rganizations m ay have standing ‘to s ue on their own beha lf for injuries they have sustained. ’” Id. at 15 63 (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. at 3 79 n.19). When i t sues on its own behalf, the organizat ion m us t show that “it was directly injured as an organization.” Conn. Parents Union v. Russell-Tuck er, 8 F.4th 167, 172 (2d C ir. 2021). Two decisions of t he Suprem e Court address the issue of organizational s tanding as it arises in this case. In Haven s, the Supreme Cou rt considered whether a h ousing organ ization called HOME h ad standing to sue under the F HA. HO ME, which offered

19 counsel i ng a nd referral services, al leged that an owner - oper ator of apartm ent complexes had provided fa lse information to HOME as part of the raci al stee ring practi ces of the owner -operator. See 455 U.S. at 368 -69. HOME asserted standing to sue on its own behalf, reasoning that (1) i t “has b een frustrated by [the] defendants’ racial steering practices in its effort to assist equa l access to housing through counsel i ng and other referral services, ” an d (2) it “has had to d evote signi f ica n t resou rces to id en ti fy and counteract the defe ndant [s’ ] racia lly disc rimin ator y steerin g prac tices.” Id. at 379 (quot ing the comp laint). The Suprem e Cour t a greed: “I f, as broadly alleged, [the defendants ’] steering pract ices have percepti bl y im paired HOME’s ability to provide c ounseling and refer ral services for lo w - a nd moderate- income homeseekers, there ca n b e no question th at the organization has su ffered injury in fact.” Id. The Court reasone d that the “in jury to the organizat ion’s activities — with the consequent drain on the organiza tion’s resources — constit utes far more than si mply a setback to the organ ization’s abstract so cial interests.” Id. Following the decis ion in Havens, our court held that the “expenditure of res ources and frustration of an organ ization’s miss ion” are s ufficient “to estab lish an injury in fact.” Moya v. DHS, 975 F.3d 120, 130 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Centr o de l a Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[W]here an organization diver ts its resources away from its curre nt activiti es, it ha s s uffered an injury that has been repea ted l y held to be independently sufficient to c onfer orga nization al sta ndin g.”). More recentl y, however, the Supreme Court revi sited the issue and clarified that Havens has been overread. In FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, four medical associat ions sue d the FDA over

20 modifications to the conditions of use for mifepristone. See 144 S. Ct. at 1553. The associations asserted standing to sue on their ow n behalf “based on the ir incurring costs to oppose [the] FDA’s actions.” Id. at 1563. The costs in cluded “conduct[ing] their o wn studies on mifepr istone,” “drafting citizen pet itions,” and “engaging in public advocacy and public education” t o “inform their members and the public about mifepristone’s risks.” Id. Relying on Have ns, t he associations argue d that “standing ex ists when an organi zation diverts its resources in response to a defen dant’s actions.” Id. at 1564. The Supreme Court rejected tha t proposition: [A] n organization th at has not suffered a con crete injury caused by a defe ndant ’ s action cannot sp end its way into standing simp ly by expending mon ey to gather information and adv ocate against the defendant ’ s act ion. An organization c annot manufacture its own standing in that way. The medical associations respond that unde r [Havens ], standing exists when an organ ization diverts its resources i n response to a defendant ’ s actions. That is incorrect. Indeed, that theory wou ld mean that all the organizations in A merica would have standing to chall en ge alm ost every federal policy that they d isli ke, provided they spen d a single dollar opposing those polic ies. Havens does not support such an ex pansiv e theory of standing. Id. at 1563-64 (citations omitted). The Cour t explained that Havens involved an or ganization tha t “n ot only was an issue -advocacy organization, but als o operated a housing counseling se rvice.” Id. at 1564. The alleged ly un lawful conduct — provid ing false information to HOME — “direct ly affected and interfered with HOME’s core business activiti es” in a way tha t was “ not diss i mil ar to a retailer who

21 sues a manufacturer for sel ling defective goods to the retaile r. ” Id. T he medical association s, by contrast, did not allege “any simila r imped iment” to their business es. Id. The C ourt emphas ized that “ Hav ens was an unusua l case” and that courts mus t be “careful not to extend the Havens ho lding beyond its contex t.” Id. B At sum mary judg ment, the district co urt concluded tha t the CFHC had standing to sue CoreLogic based on a sho wing that (1) “the disparate impact of CrimSAFE on African American and Latino applicants frustrates [the] CFHC’s mission [of] ensur ing that all people have eq ual access to the housing o f the[ir] choice,” and (2) the “CFHC has changed its public trainings and prese ntat ions to account for [CoreLogic’s] p oli c ies regarding crimina l records.” CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 286. Tha t decision relied on the premise that an advocacy organ ization may establish standing by sho wing a frustration of missio n and diversion of resources. The distric t court did not have the benefit of the decision of t he Supreme Court in Alliance for Hippocrati c Medicine reject ing that pre mise. In l ight of that decision, we ho ld t h at the CFHC lacks st anding to main tain it s FHA claim against Cor eLogic. The theory on whic h th e CFHC relied in this li tigat ion is precise ly the theo ry that the Supreme Court rej ected in Allia nce for Hippocratic Medicine: that “ sta nding exists when an organization diverts its re sources in response to a defendant’s a ctions.” 144 S. Ct. at 1564. The C FHC alle ge d that it diverted resources t o inve sti gate CoreLogic’s conduct, to assist individuals whom the CFHC suspected were denied housing because of CoreLogic, and to develop educational programs about the use of crim inal reco rd sc reening

22 products by hous ing providers. See J. App’ x 44-45. When aske d at oral argument to identify its injuri es in fact, the CFHC said that “frustration of missi on and diversion of resource s” are injuries that fall “ s quarely within th e Havens traditio n.” 3 The circu mstances of the CFHC, however, do n ot resem ble the “unusual” context o f Havens. The organizat ion i n Havens of fered counseling and refe rral services and alleged that the de fendants’ conduct “perceptibly impaired” th o se “core business activities.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. C t. at 1564. The CFHC, by con trast, engages in advocacy and informational program ming. The choice of the CFH C to focus its resourc es on CoreLogic “to the detriment of other spending priorit ies” does not qua lify as a n injury in fact that confers standing under Ar ticle III. Id. at 1 563. The CFHC sugges ts that the d is tri ct court prevented it from presenting evidence at t rial th at would have establ ished a n inju ry in fact. Indeed, the d istrict cour t decided prior to trial that the CFHC had standing, and C oreLogic did not dispute that issue at tr ial. B ut t he CFHC neverthele ss e licit ed te stimony about its diversi on of resources. 4 To the e xtent that the CFHC would have presente d additional evidence, the CFHC acknowledges that the e vidence would have furthe r demonstrated fru stration of mission an d 3 Oral Argu ment Audio R ecordin g at 1:02. 4 See, e.g., J. A pp’x 700 -15 (testim ony from a former e xecutive d ir ector of the CFHC about th e r esources t he organiz ation devote d “ to take on the crimi nal history s creening w ork,” its “ diversion logs,” and t he activities i t declined to pursue during t he relevan t t ime p e riod).

23 diversion of resour ces. 5 “That argument does not work to demonstrate stand ing.” All. for Hippocrati c Med., 144 S. Ct. at 1 563. The CFHC a rgues that th is case is differe nt from Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine because the medic al associations in th at case alleg ed only an ideologi cal disagreement with the FDA rather t han an actual diversion of resources. 6 But that is incorrect. The Supreme Court ex plained th at the medical a ssocia tions cla imed “ to have standi n g not based on thei r mere d isagreement with FDA ’ s po licies, but based on their incurr ing costs to oppose FDA ’ s actions.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. C t. at 1563. Those co sts includ ed the expendit ure of “considerable tim e, energy, and resources” in petitioning the FDA “ as well as eng aging in public advocacy and public education.” Id. This c ase is indist inguish able f rom Al liance for Hippocratic Medicine. The CFHC may oppose the pr oducts and policies of CoreLogic, but it “cannot spend its way into st anding simply by expending money to gather infor mation and advoca te against the defendant’ s action. ” Id. at 1563 -64. We conclude that the d istrict cour t erred by holding that the CFHC had standing to sue. We vaca te the judgment of the district court insofar as it addressed the CFHC’s claim on the merits, and we dismiss the CFHC’s appeal for lack of jurisd iction. 5 See Oral A rgument Au dio Recordin g at 3:56 (Q: “The evidence you wante d to intr oduce was about diversi on of resou rces and f r u stration of mission, right?” A: “Ex actly.”). 6 See Oral Argu ment Aud io Record ing at 2:18.

24 C F ive months after oral argumen t in this appeal, the CFHC moved to dis miss its claims with prejudice and without costs. 7 CoreLogic oppose d the dismissal of the claims without costs. 8 “An appeal may be d ismissed on the appellan t ’ s m o ti on on terms agreed to by the parties or f ixed by the court.” Fed. R. App. P. 42(b)(2). But we may deny a motion for voluntary dism issal when it “raises questions about pr ocedural propriety on [the movant ’s ] part.” JP Morgan Chase Ban k v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 421 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005); see a lso Khouza m v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3 d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2004) (“For the gove rnment to agree to a vacatur two weeks after ora l argument suggests t hat it is trying to avo id having this Cou rt r ul e on that i ssue. We therefore decline to gra nt th e order that the parties ha ve agreed to.”). Other c ourts have den ied such a motion when the mov ants “may be ac ting strate gically” to dismiss an “appeal on an iss ue they can later press aga in before a different pane l.” In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 778 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2015). Those courts have explain ed that a “party should not be able to ‘manipulate the for mation of precedent by dismissing an appeal,’” i d. (alteration omitted) (quoting Albers v. Eli Lilly & Co., 354 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2004)), especially when “the motion was filed ‘after ful l briefing, extended oral argu ment, and several months of d eliberation,’” i d. (qu oting Ford v. Strick land, 696 F.2d 804, 807 (11th C ir. 1983)). 7 See Motion to Di smiss, CFHC v. CoreLogi c Rental P rop. Sols., No. 23-1118 (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2025), ECF No. 138. 8 See Op position to Mot ion to Dism i s s, C FHC v. C oreLogic Rental Prop. Sols., No. 23-1118 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2025), ECF No. 140.

25 In its mo tion, the CFHC clai ms that it “became aware of re cent authority further supporting its posi ti on that it has s tanding.” Mot ion to Dis miss, supra note 7, at 2. It has not iden tified that auth ority, however, and instead of doing s o argues that d ismissal of its claims would “sa ve the parties’ res ources and avo id further delay in resolving the substa ntive claims which are fully address ed by … Arroyo.” Id. Becaus e dis missal o f the claim a fter b riefin g and argument woul d not save resour ces or avoid delay, we deny the motion. II T he FHA makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent … or otherwise make un available or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race … o r national origin.” 4 2 U.S.C. § 3604(a); see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(b). A pl ai ntiff may establish a disparate - impact claim under the FHA by showing that the chall en ged practice had “ a disproportionate ly adverse effect on minor iti e s” and the prac tice is “otherwise unjust ifi e d by a legitimate rati onale.” Tex. D ep’t of Hous. & Community Affs. v. Inclusive C ommunities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 524 (2015) (internal qu otation marks omitted). Arroyo argues that CoreLogic discriminated aga inst Mikhail because its platform has a disproportionately advers e effect on the availability of hous ing for Hispanic ap plican ts. T he distric t court concluded that Arroyo failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that “Core Logic’s use of CrimSAFE denies or make s housing unavailable. ” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *17. The district court framed its ana lysis as a threshold inqu iry into whether th e FHA applied to CoreLogic. See id. at *16 -17. We believe the analysis is more straightf orward. Th e FHA does not exclu de any class of defendants f rom its scope. Wheth er a ny defendant is subje ct

26 to liab ility un der the FHA turns on whether the p laint iff has establish ed a prima facie case of discr imination — including whether the defendant proxi mately caused the alleged harm. Unde r that understan ding, we agree with the distri ct co urt that Arroyo f ailed to estab lish tha t Cor eLogic viola ted the FHA because Arr oyo did not prove by a preponde rance of the evidence that CoreLogi c “denies or otherwise makes un available housing.” Id. at *20. We affirm the judgmen t insofar as the dis trict c ourt rejected Arroyo ’s disparate - impact claim on the basis of race and nati onal origin. A We apply a thre e - ste p burden - shifting framework “ in discriminatory effec ts cases.” 24 C.F. R. § 100.500(c); see M hany Mgmt., Inc. v. C ounty of Nass au, 819 F.3d 581, 617 - 19 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying § 100.500(c)). Fir st, t he plain tiff must establish a prima f a cie case by showing that that the “challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discr iminatory effect.” 24 C.F. R. § 100.500(c)(1). Seco nd, the burden shifts to the defendant to s how that “the challenged practice is necessary to ac hi eve one or mo r e subst antial, legit imate, nondiscriminatory in terests.” Id. § 100.500(c)(2). Third, the b urden shifts back to the p laintiff to show that th e “interests supporting the chall en ged pra ct i ce c ou ld be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.” Id. § 100.500(c)(3). This appeal implicat es the causation req ui rement at step one. To establish a pr ima face case, a pl aintiff must show that the chall en ged pra ctice was the proximate cause of t he a ll eged injury. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 581 U.S. 189, 201 - 03 (2017). The prox imate cause an alysis asks “whe ther the harm alleged has a sufficiently close connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.” Id. at 201 (quoting Lex mark, 572 U.S. at 1 33). “[F]oreseeability alone is not

27 sufficien t to establish proxim a te ca use under the FHA” because it “does not ensure the close connection t h at proxi mate cause requires.” Id. at 201 -02. Ra ther, the p laintiff must show a “direct relation between the i njury asserted and the in j uri ous conduct.” Id. at 202 -03 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protecti on Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)). Th e requirement of a direct relation ens ures that disparate - impact liability unde r the FHA does not e xtend f u rther t han Congress intended. “The housing market is interconnected with economic and social life” such that a violatio n of the FHA may “‘ be expected to cause ripples of harm to f low ’ far beyon d the defendant’s misconduct.” Id. at 2 02 (quoting Associated Gen. Contracto rs of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Co uncil of Carpe nters (AGC), 45 9 U.S. 519, 534 (1983)). T he FHA does not ind icate “ that Congress intend ed to pr ovide a remedy wherever tho se rippl es travel.” Id.; see al so In re Am. Express Anti - Steering Rules Antit rust Litig., 19 F.4th 127, 139 (2d Cir. 2021) (“ Proximate cause s tands for the proposition that ‘ the judicial remed y cannot encompass every conceivable har m t ha t can be traced to alleged wron gdoing. ’”) (quot ing AGC, 459 U.S. at 536). As a result, the Supreme Court has cautioned that liability under the FHA will not ex tend “beyond the first step.” Bank of Am., 581 U.S. at 203 (quoting He mi Grp. v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 10 (2010)). Under the firs t - step rule, “ injuries that happen at the fir st step following the h armful behavior are considere d proximately caus ed by that behavior.” Am. Express, 19 F.4th a t 140. In that way, the directnes s requirement “limits liability to parties injured at the first st ep of th e causal chain of the d efendants’ actions. ” Id. at 135. The directness requirement “may also” make it “difficult to establ ish causation

28 because of the multiple fac tors that go into [housing] decisions.” Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. a t 543. 9 B Arroyo argue s that the distr ict court erred by decidi ng as a threshold matter that the FHA did not apply to CoreLogic rather than proceeding to consid er whether Arroyo had establishe d a prima facie 9 The Supreme Court has described the FHA as including a “ robust causality requirement.” Inclusive Communitie s, 576 U.S. at 542. This co urt has said that “we do not r ead Inc lusive Communities to s et forth a ne w rule requiri ng use of the words ‘rob ust caus ality’” in a j ury instruc tion, Saint - Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., 129 F.4th 124, 152 n.13 (2d Cir. 2025), but “we agree t hat a defendant may not be held liable for racial disparities it did not cause,” id. at 152. Ot her courts have sugge sted th at the “robus t causal ity” language is more sig nific a nt. See, e.g., Sw. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Maricopa Domestic Water I m pro vemen t Dist., 17 F.4th 950, 962 (9th Cir. 2021) (expla ining that the FHA requ ires “robu st caus ality that show s, beyond mere evidence o f a statistical disparity, t hat the challenged policy, and no t some oth er factor or p olicy, cau sed the disprop ortionate eff ect”); Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 902 (5th Cir. 2019) (“We read the Supreme Court’s opinio n in I CP to undoubtedly announce a more dem anding test than tha t set forth in the HUD regulation.”); Oviedo Town Ctr. II, L.L.L.P. v. City of Oviedo, 759 F. App’x 828, 834 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Th e Supreme Court’s solution w as to impose a rob ust causali ty requirem ent ensuri ng that raci al imbalan ce does not, wi thout more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.”) (internal quotation marks and al teration s omitte d); Ellis v. City o f Minneap olis, 860 F.3d 1106, 1111 (8th Cir. 2017) (“The ‘cautionary standards’ announced in I nc lusive Co mmunities include a ‘r obust cau sality req uirement.’”). Regardless of that possible dispute, our precede nt s do not depart from the requirement that a plaintiff must establi sh a direct re lation. Cf. Saint - Jean, 129 F.4th at 152 n.13 (expla ining that the “‘robust caus ality’ … langua ge is not at odds with th e instr uctions in th is case”).

29 case of discrimination. Ar royo additionally argue s tha t the district court did not appl y the proper causation standard. We agree that t he dist rict cou rt mis conceived the three - step framework for a disparate- impact claim under the FHA by adding an additional threshold step. But that error did not funda mentally affect the an alysis. The dis trict court concluded that the disparate- impact claim failed because Arroyo did not establish tha t CoreLogic caused the denial of Mik hail’s application. Tha t means Arroyo fa iled to establish a prima facie case of discr imination — not that Cor eLogic is beyond the reach of the FHA. Properly conce ived, we see no error in the conclusion of the d istrict court. Nor did the dist rict court err in requiring a showin g of direct causation. 1 T he distr ict cour t stated th at it “ cannot address th e discriminatory impact and discr iminatory treatment claims without deciding,” as “an in itial matter,” “ whether CoreLogic is subject to the FHA.” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *16. The district court thereby treated t he question of whether “CoreLogi c denies or otherwise makes housing unav ailable ” as a thresho l d i nquiry that precedes the three - step bu rden - sh ifting framewor k. Id. at *17. Arroyo argues that the framework includes no such threshol d inqui r y. We agree. We be gin with the st atutory text. CoreLogic does not “sell” or “rent” housing, so its liab ility u nder the FHA must turn on whether it has acte d to “otherwise make unavaila ble or den y, a dwelling t o any person ” because of a protected cha racteristi c. 42 U.S.C. § 3 604(a). “[T]he phrase ‘otherwise make un available’ refers t o the consequences of an a cti on.” Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. at 534. The “operative text” of the FHA thus “looks to results.” Id.

30 Th e “results - oriented phra se” in t he statute h as two implic ation s h ere. Id. at 535. First, a defendant may not avoi d liability under the F H A simply be cause it is not itse lf the housing provider. The distr ict court re ached the same conclusion. See CFHC, 20 23 WL 4669482, at *19 (“An entity can be liable under the FHA even when they are not the ultimate decisionm a ker. ”); id. (“[A]n entity other than a landlord or proper ty seller can be liabl e for violating the FHA.”). And we have long re cognized as much. See, e.g., Saint-Jean, 12 9 F.4th at 140 (ex plainin g that a bank m ight be l i abl e under the FHA based on its lending pract ices); Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 624 (affirming a judgment against a mun icipality on a disparate - trea tment cla im); Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 3 72, 393 (2d Cir. 1994) (ex plain ing that a real estate agen t might be liable under the FHA based on “racial steering”). 10 Second, the FHA d oes n ot insulat e from liabil ity certain types of condu ct. “The phrase ‘otherwise make unavaila ble’ ha s been interpreted to re ach a wide variety of discriminatory h ousing practices.” Mh any Mgmt., 819 F.3 d at 600 (quotin g LeBlanc- Sternberg v. 10 So have other c ourts. S ee, e.g., Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 600 F.3d 1205, 120 8 (9th Cir. 2010) (evaluating a discrimination claim under t he FHA base d on “the denial and pricin g of homeowner’s insurance”); Nation wide Mu t. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1359 - 60 (6t h Cir. 1995) (sam e); N AACP v. Am. Famil y Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 301 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Mich. Prot & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Bab i n, 18 F.3d 337, 345 (6 th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the F HA may reach “tho se who, in pr actical effect, assisted in those transactions of owner s hip and dispositio n”); Casa Mar ie, Inc. v. Superior C t. of P.R. for Dist. of A reci bo, 988 F.2d 252, 257 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that the FHA “may pros cribe dis criminatory acts by persons w ho are neither sell ers nor le ssors of proper ty”); Edwards v. Johnston Cnty. Health Dep’ t, 885 F.2d 1215, 1221 n.14 (4th Cir. 1989) (explai ning that the op erative provisions of t he FHA “are no t directed on ly to thos e persons who sell, rent or finance real estate”).

31 Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 424 (2d C ir. 1995)). Congress appears even to have envisioned that the FHA wo uld reach the use of crimina l records to make housing decisions. Con gress amended the sta tute in 1988 to state th at “[n]oth ing in [s ubchapter I of the FHA] proh ibits conduct against a person because such person has been convicted by any court of competent j urisdiction of the illegal manufacture or distribu tion of a controlled substan ce.” Fair Housing Ame ndments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(d)(2), 102 Stat. 16 19, 1623 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(4)). Congress would not have ne eded to add this safe harbor if the FHA did not o therwise apply to denials of housin g based on crim inal his tor y. See Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. at 538 (“[C]ertain criminal convictions are correlated with sex and race. By adding an exempti o n from liabil ity for exclus ionar y practice s aim ed at individuals with dr ug convictions, Congres s ensured disparate - impact liability wou ld not lie if a landlord excluded tenants with such convictions.”) (citatio n omitted). We avoid interpretations of statutes under which some p rovisions “would be s uperfluous.” Id. at 537. The ap plica ble r egulat ion reflects th is understanding of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The regulati on provides that a discrim inatory housing practice is “a n act that is unlawful under section 804, 805, 806, or 818 of the Fair H ousing Act.” 24 C.F. R. § 100.20. And a “ practice has a discriminatory effect” when “it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of person s.” Id. § 100.500(a). Because the FHA does not categoric ally e xclude types of actors or actions, we see no basis for engaging in a thr eshold in quiry before proceeding to the plaintiff’s prima facie case. In fact, the iss ue the district court treated as a t hreshold question — whether Arroyo proved that “Core Logic denies or otherwise makes housing unavailable,” CFHC, 2023 WL 46 69482, at *17 — is an elem en t of th e prima facie case. At s tep one, “ [t] he charging party … has the b urden

32 of proving that a chal lenged practice caused or pre dict ably wi ll cause a discriminatory effe ct.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.5 00(c)(1). The district court should have s tarted its a nalys is by considering whe ther Arroyo had estab lished a prima fac ie case of discrimination, including whether she had established by a preponderanc e of the evi dence that Cor eLogic proximate ly cause d the unavailabi li t y of housing. We recogni ze that the distr ict cour t did not exclude CoreLogic from the scope of the FHA simply because CoreLogic was “not the ultimate dec isionmaker.” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *19. But the d istrict court still purported to address whether CoreLogic makes housing unavailable “before ” it could “evaluate whether the Plainti ffs have met their burden on the element s ” of the ir claims. Id. at *17. Th at was erroneous. 2 Despite t he error in how the district court d escribed the applicabl e framework, Core Logic argues that the district court properly c onsidered whether CoreLogic pro ximate ly caus e d the denial of housing to Mikhail. We agree. The district court cons i dered whether Arroy o had establish ed a direct relation bet ween the alleged injury and the allege dly u nlawfu l prac tice of C oreLogic. W e see no error in th e determ ination of the dis trict c ourt that she fai led to do so. Although the district court did not use the phr ase “proxim ate cause, ” it properly applied tha t standar d. The distr ict court ob served that “the FHA does not reach entities whose involvement is ‘tenuous.’” Id. at *19 (quoting Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 621). And it determi ned that Arroyo had “shown only a tenuous conn ection between CoreLogic and the housing prov ider’s decision, which is not enough to find Core Logic ‘makes unavailable or denies’ housing.” Id. at *20. After reviewing the role of C oreLogic in eval uating a rental

33 application, the district court conc luded that Arroyo had “fail ed to prove by a prepond erance of the eviden ce that CoreLogic’s use of CrimSAFE denies or otherwise makes unavail able housing pursuant to section 3604(a).” Id. In oth er words, the di strict court decided that Arroyo had failed to establish proximate c ause. Th at conclusion fo llowed from the trial record a nd the district court’s factual findings. Alt h ough CoreLogic ca tegoriz ed avail able criminal records and offered filterin g opti ons to housing providers, i t was the housing provider that con tro l l ed every o ther aspect of the application process. In addition to establishing its own screening polic ies, the h ousing provider dec ided (1) the configuration of CrimSAFE, inclu ding the criminal records that would be considere d relevant and the lookback pe riod that wo uld a pp ly; (2) which employees would have access to the f ull crimin al record report; (3) what m essa ge would accompany the CrimSAFE report and appear in any adverse action letter; (4) whether a report wo uld result in an action or furthe r investigation and whether an adve rse action letter would be sent; and (5) whether the application would be approved or denied. CoreLogic also in form ed the housin g provider of its control over the platform an d the application proce ss. CoreLogic instructed the hous ing provider to app ly its own screening p olic ies and to designa te an employee to recei ve the full cr iminal record report. Th e default message in the CrimSAFE report instructed the housing provider to “verify t he applicability of these r ecords to your applicant and proceed with your com mu n ity’s screening policies.” J. App ’x 481. At the time of Mikhail’s applicat ion, WinnResidential had configured the CrimSA FE settings to include that default message.

34 Based on this record, we ag ree w it h the district court that CoreLogic’s CrimS AFE product did not disqualify housin g applicants or prevent hous ing providers from assessing each candidate. T he attenuated c onnect io n betw een CoreLogic’s creation of a tool th at allows a housing provider to access criminal records and the ultimate decision of the pr ovider to deny a n application falls sh ort of the required “direc t relation” between t he con duct and the harm. B ank of Am., 581 U.S. a t 202 (quoting Holme s, 503 U.S. at 268). CrimSAFE may assist a housing p ro vid er by filtering records the housing pr ovi der deems relevant, but “no housing prov ider who uses CrimSAFE could reasonably believe that CoreLogic ma kes housing decisions for them.” CFHC, 2023 WL 46694 82, at *18. 3 Arroyo rai ses several objections to the conclusion of the distr ict court. None is persuasi ve. First, Arroyo argues that the proximate cause standa rd required her t o establish only t hat CrimSAFE made housing “more difficult to obtain.” Appellants’ Br. 22-24. But the Suprem e C ou rt has explained that because “[t]he housing market is interconnected with economic and socia l life,” any number of actions by any num ber of actors migh t make housing m ore difficult to ob tain. Bank of Am., 581 U.S. at 202. T he FHA do es not “provide a remedy wh erever those ripples travel.” Id. It instead i mposes liability for harms tha t occur at the first step followi ng the alleged misconduct. In this c ase, what followed CoreLo gic’s provision of the CrimSAFE p latform were a number of discreti onary decisions of the housing provider — including the ult imate decision of the ho using provider to appr ove or to deny an app lication. The denial of hous ing did not occur a t the first

35 step following CoreLogic’s cond uct and therefore w as not directly caused by that cond uct. Arroyo purp orts to accept that the FHA requires a direct relati on betw een the alleg ed injury an d the cha l l enged conduct, see Appellant s’ Br. 24, but she repeated ly frames her argument i n term s of foreseeability, s ee id. at 24, 29, 31, 38 - 39. We agree with the Fourth Circuit that, althoug h Arroyo “claims that this pro vision reaches every practice havin g the effect of making housing more diff icult to obtain, the text of th e statute does not ex tend so far.” Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 192 (4th Cir. 19 99). “In the conte xt of the FHA, foreseeability alone does n ot ensure the close connection that proximate cause requires.” Bank of Am., 581 U.S. at 202. Second, Arroyo arg ues that “CoreLogic was in a position to prevent [the housing provider] from usi ng discriminatory criminal histor y scree ning po licies by lim iting th e par ameters within which CrimSAFE would r eturn adverse reports.” Appe llants’ Br. 46 -47. Arroyo claims, for example, th at CoreLogic could have excluded non - conviction records a nd older records from the CrimSAFE database. But federal law a llows CoreLogic to report crimin al record s and non - conviction recor ds that are less than seven years ol d. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (2), (5). Making t hat information available to a hous ing provider does n ot separately vi olate the FHA. To impose liability on CoreLogic for failing to restri ct the accessibility of infor mation that a housing provider mi ght consider— o n the theor y that restricti ng the information wo uld reduce the like lihood that the hous ing provider will u ltimate ly mak e a discri minato ry dec ision — woul d exte nd liab ility far “bey ond the first step” in th e causal chain. Bank of Am., 581 U.S. at 203.

36 Third, Arroyo claims that CoreLog ic “chose to report adverse CrimSAFE resul ts to propert y staff while denying them access to the underlying criminal records relevant to individualized reviews. ” Appellants’ Br. 45. But that is incorrect. T he distr ict cour t found that “[e]ach new user” of Cr im S AFE “is, by default, author ized to receive the full data” and tha t “CrimSAFE does not limit how many use rs can have full access.” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *5. T he housing provider “must affirmatively go into th e CrimSAFE config uration settings” to l imit the information to “senior level managers.” Id. Arroyo does not ch allenge tho se fin dings. See Appellants’ Re ply Br. 15. In this case, Winn Resident ial con figured CrimSAFE to “suppress repor ts from onsite staff” because of a concer n that “the staff will use personal i n terests (su ch as leasing commissions) in making a leasing dec ision that the executives be li e ve should be made by someone in a more elevated p osition.” CFHC, 2023 WL 46 69482, at *5. The leasing age nt, who lacked access to the full report, di d not follo w the message to “verify the applicability of these records to your applicant and proce ed with your community’s sc reening policies” but instead told Arroyo that M ikhail’s application was denied. Id. at * 9- 10. And in deed the only reason th at CrimSAFE iden tified a criminal record for Mikhail is th at WinnResident ial configured CrimSAFE to search for th ose records. WinnResidential ’s discretionary decisions that followed CoreLogic’s provisi on of the platform — its configuration of the settin gs, se lection of relevant records, and decision on the housing application— led to t he initia l de nial of h ousing to Mi khail. CoreLogic did not proximate ly cause that denia l.

37 Fourth, Arroyo argues that even if WinnResidential denied Mikhail’s applic ation, CoreLogic shou ld still be cons idered the proximate c a use of the denial based on the “cat’s paw” theory described i n Stau b v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411 (2011). In St aub, a supervisor submitted false c omplaints about an em p loy ee d ue to bias. See i d. at 414. The vice president of human resources credited t he complaints an d “decided to fire h im.” Id. at 415. The Supreme Court held that the compan y could be liable for the discr iminatory conduct of the sup ervisor even though a diff erent person made the adverse emplo yment d ecisio n. The Court expl ained that “the ultima te decisi on ma ker’s exercise of judgment ” did not “ automa tic ally render [] the li n k to the su pervisor’s bias ‘remote’ o r ‘purel y contingent.’” Id. at 419 (quo ti n g Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 9). “[T]he ultimate decisionmake r’s judgment” could “be deemed a superseding caus e of the harm” on ly if it was “a ‘cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.’” Id. at 420 (quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)). “But the supervisor’s biased report may remain a causal factor if the independent invest igation [by the dec isionmaker] takes it into account withou t determining that the adverse action was, apart from the supervi sor’s recommend ation, entirel y justified.” Id. at 421. In other words, th e cat’s paw theory appl ies when the decisi on ma ker does not exercise indep endent judgment. Inst ead, another person “man ipulates [the decisionmaker ] into acting as a mere conduit for h is discriminatory intent.” Menaker v. Hofstra Univ., 935 F.3d 20, 38 (2d Cir. 2019) (al teration omitted) (quot ing Vasquez v. Empress Ambula nce Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 272 (2d C ir. 2016)). The theory does n ot apply to the facts establis hed in this case. C oreLogic provided a service that allowed W innResidential to access accurate information based on Winn Residential’s own decis ions about which

38 records were rel evant. And CoreLog ic expressly disclaime d any suggestion that the information in i ts database dic tated a particular disposition of the ren tal ap plication. Th e dis positio n w as instead a matter of ap plying the housing pro vider’s own “screening po licies.” CFHC, 2023 WL 466 9482, at *5. Even as suming that those p olicies could be shown to have a disparate i mpact that violates the FHA, those policies did not originate with C oreLogic. The trial did not establish th at WinnRe sident ial was “acting as a mer e conduit” for Cor eLogic’s p olicie s when it evaluated Mikhai l’s application. Menaker, 935 F.3d at 38 (q uoting Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 272). As a result, the cat ’s paw the ory does not apply. It canno t rescue Arroyo’s disparate- imp act claim regar ding race and national or igin. III In addition to the di sparate - impact claim, Arroyo alleged that CoreLogic violated t he FHA by discriminating against Mikhail on the basis of his handicap. The FHA makes it unlawful to “discri minate against an y person in the term s, conditi o ns, or p rivileges of sale or rental of a d welling, or in the pr ovision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling” based o n the person’s “handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). “Discrimination” includes “a refusal to make reasonable acco mmodations in rules, policies, practices, or ser vices, when such acc ommodations may be ne cessary to afford such pe rson equal opportuni ty to use and enjoy a dwe lling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Arroyo argue d that CoreLogic discrimin ated on the basis of Mikha il’s handicap in two ways. First, CoreLogic’s polic y reg arding the disclosure of consum er report s had a disparate impact on the handicapped. Second, C oreLogic refused to provide the reas onable accommodation o f allo wing A rroyo to a ccess Mihail’s report based on the documentati on she provided.

39 The dist rict court granted summ ary judgment to CoreLogic o n both c laims. The d istrict court conclud ed that the require ment of submit ting a copy of the conservatorship certificate with a visib le s eal befo re discl osing Mikhai l’s file was reasonable rathe r than discr iminato ry. We agree with the di s tri ct cou rt. A We evaluate this disparate- impact cl aim under the bu rden - shifting framework described above. Se e Rodriguez v. Vill. Green Realty, Inc., 788 F.3d 31, 40 n.11 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff first mus t establish a prima faci e case of discrimination. T hen “the burden shift s to the defendant to assert a legitimate, nondiscrimin atory rationale for the challenged decision.” Id. (qu oting Mitchell v. Shan e, 350 F.3d 39, 47 (2d C ir. 2003)). At th at point, “the burden sh ifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that discr imination was the real reason for the defendant’s acti on.” Id. (quoting Mitchell, 350 F.3d at 47). Arroyo alleged that C oreLogic discriminated against Mi khail by requiring t hat all third parti es requesting a di sc l osure provide a power of at torney. Because a p erson subject to an involuntary conservatorship c annot provi de a power of attorney, this pur ported requirement “effec tively prevent[s] sub stantially any cons erved person in Connecticut from obtaining copies of their tenant - screening reports from CoreLogic.” Appel lants’ Br. 49. T he record at sum mary judgment, ho wever, did not sug gest that CoreLogic main tained a policy of requiring a court -ap pointed conservator to pro vide a power of attorney t o receive the conserv atee ’s consu mer file. Arroyo was “ re sponsible for is olatin g and identifyin g the specific [hous ing] practices that are allegedl y responsible for any obse rved statistical disparities.” Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (quotin g Wards Cove Packing Co. v.

40 Atonio, 490 U.S. 64 2, 656 (1989)); see Inclus ive Communities, 576 U.S. at 533 (noting tha t Smith and other cases “provide essenti al background and instruction” for t he FHA). Altho ugh Cor eLogic initia lly to ld Arroyo that she needed to submit a power of attorne y to receive Mikhail’s file, the record did not indicate that Core Logic generally imposed t h is requ irement. CoreLogic’s Au thentication Procedure G uide s tated that a re quest er could receive a third party’s file b y providing a power of attorney and instructed employees to “reach out to the Supervisor ” regarding “any scenario s” in which the requester coul d n ot sat isfy that requirement. J. App’x 192. The fa ilure of an e mployee to fol low the writte n polic ies in a particular instance does not establish a policy that may serve as the basis of disparat e- impact l iabilit y. See Inclusive C ommun ities, 576 U.S. at 543 (“ [A] plain tiff c halleng ing the dec ision of a p rivate developer to c onstruct a new building in one location rath er than another will not eas ily be able to s how t his is a p olicy c ausing a disparate impact because such a one - time decision ma y not be a policy at all.”). 11 On appeal, Arroyo argues that the district court’s post - tr ial findin g that Core Logic willful ly vio lated th e FCRA contr adict s th e 11 A s ing le discriminatory incident might lead to liability under a theory of disparate treatment rather than disparate imp act. See Rodriguez v. Bear Sterns Cos., Inc., No. 07- CV - 1816, 2009 WL 5184702, at *16 (D. Conn. Dec. 22, 2009) (“While isolated incidents may g ive rise to a discriminatory treatment claim under the F HA, t hey do not support a disparate impact claim. ”); see also Benn ett v. Roberts, 295 F.3d 687, 698 (7t h Ci r. 2002) (“To establish a prima facie case of dispar ate impact, … [i]solated an d singular incidents ge nerally are insufficie nt.”). Arro yo r aised a disparate - treatment claim in her compl aint, but s he did not oppose CoreL ogic’s moti on for su mmary judgm ent on that cl aim, see CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 312, and she does not raise it as an issue on appeal.

41 conclusion it reache d at sum mary judg ment. Fo llowing the trial, th e district c ourt determined tha t CoreLogic willfull y vio lat ed the FCRA because the insistence on a power of attorney was “not a one -off circumstance invol ving one or two emplo yees who made a mistake” but reflected the fac t that “[t]he p olicy only identifies a power of attorney as a mean s of validating a third party’s agency over a consumer.” CF HC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *24. But the ne ed to account for conservatorships was “ an entirely foreseeable ci rcu m stance as many people are subject to conservato rships,” and “CoreLogic’s writt en polic ies entirely overlooked this grou p of people.” Id. Even if the written pol icies overlooked the foreseeabl e circumstance that a c onserv ator might request a consu mer file —and that the request might therefore result in a perio d in which the company requested a power o f attorney before the interve ntion of a supervisor— it does not fo llow tha t the polic ies “predictably resul t[] in a disparate impac t.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (a). Arroyo argue s that she did not need to provide statistical ev idence of a disparate impact because the policies inevita bly resu lt in a dispar a te impact. See Appellants’ Reply Br. 48 & n.17 5. But in this case, the record established that the policies had no such i mpact. Th e uncontroverted evidence iden tified at summary judgme nt —and t hen presented at trial — showed that Core Logic had never encountered a request fro m a conservator for a conserv atee ’s consumer file. See CFH C, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 282. Not only did Arroyo pre sent “no statistics or other proof demonstrati ng that the [challe nged] practices have a significantly adver se or disproportiona te impact on the physically disabled,” Schwarz v. City of Treasur e Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1218 (11th Cir. 2008) (quot ing Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1997)), but the re cord established the abse nce of such an impact. Cf. id. (“[I]t ‘is n ot sufficient for disparate impact purposes’ to sh ow

42 only that an ordinance ‘prevents a handicapped person from living i n a particular ho use.’”) (quoting Tsombanidis v. W. Ha ven Fire Dep ’t, 352 F.3d 565, 576 (2d C ir. 2003)). Arroyo argues tha t some statistical evidence ide ntif ied at summary jud gment suggest ed a dispar ate impact. She says that “people with disab ilities comprise only 11% of Con necticut’s population, but comprise 100% of tho se harmed by Core Logic’s policy.” Appellants’ Re ply Br. 50 n.184. But it does not follow from these da ta that con servat ees other than Mikhail were or will be affected by Cor eLogic’s policies. It is also not cor rect that all conserv atees will necessari ly be consid ered disabled for purpo ses of th e FHA. The FHA excludes from the d efinition of “handicap” an “addiction to a con troll e d substance.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h). But “substance use disorder” is a reason to impose a conservator ship in Connecticut. 12 Arroyo argue s that at su mmary ju dgment th e di stri ct cour t should not have credited the affidavit of a CoreLogic employee asserting that CoreLogic h ad never received another conser vator’s request for a c onsumer file. But the distric t court was not req uired to discount testimo ny by makin g a cre dibility determ ination at summary jud gment. See Kaytor v. Electric B oat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 - 46 (2d Cir. 2010). Arroyo was instead required to identify ev idence sufficient to raise a q uestion of material fact as to whether another conserv atee had be en affected by CoreLog ic’s policies. See Ander son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 47 7 U.S. 242, 251-52 (19 86). 13 12 Offic e of the Proba te Court Admini strator, Con necticut P robate Courts, 2018-2019 Biennial Report, at 11 (Jan. 13, 2021). 13 The d istric t court later d ecided that t rial testim ony by the sam e affian t about a d ifferent issue was unpersuasiv e. See CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at

43 T he dis trict c ourt considered whether the disparate- i mpact claim could survi ve summary judgmen t on the theory that Cor eLogic required conser vators to “provide more onerous documentation of their authority than an individual holding a powe r of attorney.” CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 310. We agree with the distr ict cou rt that CoreLogic was st ill entitled to summ ary judgment on th e c laim even if this theory establis hed a prima facie case of discrimina tion. At the second step of the burden - shifting framework, C oreL ogic identified a legitimate business justification for re quiring Arroyo to submit additional documen tation before disclosing Mikhail’s file. Feder al law requires C oreLogic to obtain “ p roper id entifica tion ” from a party before disc losing a consumer report. See 15 U.S.C. § 16 81h(a)(1). CoreLogic must a lso “adopt reasonable procedur es … with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, rele vancy, and prope r utilization of such information.” Id. § 1681(b). In this case, Arroyo submitted with her discl os ure reques t a copy of her conse rvator certi f icate that lacked a visib le se al. T he certificate, however, state d that it wa s “no t valid without court of probate s eal impressed.” J. A pp’x 463. Re quirin g that the documen tation establish the va lidity of the conservatorship certificate was a legi timate reason for re quiring Arroyo to s ubmit a copy of the cer tifica te with a visib le seal. B Arroyo’s failure - to - accommodate c laim fails for similar reasons. S he needed to s how at summar y judgmen t that “the accommodation requ ested was reasonable.” Olsen v. St ark Homes, Inc., *12 n. 6 (di sagreei ng with her “interp retation of the internal notes”). Not only wa s that issu e u n rela ted to the su mmary judgm ent decisi on, but “the district court’s gra nt of summary judg ment must be ex amined independently of t he evidence pr esented at trial.” Griffin v. Sirv a Inc., 835 F.3d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

44 759 F.3d 140, 156 (2d Cir. 2014). “ Requested accommo dations are reasonable where th e cost is modest an d they do not pos e an undue hardship or a sub stantial burden on the ho using provider.” Id. Arr oyo requested that Core Logic accommodate Mikhail’s han dicap by accepting the conservatorship certificate as she submitted it — witho ut a visib le seal. But that was not a reasona ble accommodation reques t because it would h ave require d CoreLog ic to ignore the certificate’ s own proviso that it wa s valid on ly with an imp ressed seal, which was not vis ible in the c opy Arroyo sub mitted. Arroyo relies on cases involv ing other doc uments and laws. I n Warfield v. Byron, fo r example, the Fift h Ci rcu it rejected the argument that the lack of a seal on a pho tocopy of a summons dep rived the distr ict cou rt of juris diction. See 137 F. Ap p’x 651, 656 (5th C ir. 2005). But the conserv atorship certificate, unlike th e summons, expressly required an impressed sea l to establ ish its validity. I n Sch wab v. GMAC Mortgage Cor p oration, the Third Circuit held that the lack of a notary’s embossment on a photocopy of a mortgage did not affect the validity of the mortgage for r ecording purposes. See 333 F.3d 135, 137 - 38 (3d Cir. 2003). T he a pplicab le st atute required a visible seal on the photocopy but did not re quire that the embossment be visible. “The statute thus makes a sharp distinction between the se al, wh ich must be visible on photographic recording pro cesses, and the embossing, which need no t have that at tribute.” Id. at 138. Th e Third C ircuit adhered to t he sta t utory requ irement regarding the visibilit y of t he seal. Its opinion did not suggest that it would be unreasonable to adhere to the requi re ment of th e conservato rship certificate that it be impressed w it h a seal by requesting a co p y tha t reflected one. Arroyo says that “there is no apparent r e as on to apply vi s ible seal requi re ment s more strenu ously in Connecticut than other states. ” Appellants’ Br. 53. B ut th e certificate s tates o n its face that it is n ot

45 valid without the i mp ressed se al. See J. App’x 463. I t was not unreasonable f or CoreLogic to confirm the validity of the certificate and thereby Arroyo’ s legal auth ority to o btain Mikhai l’s report. T he FCRA req uire s CoreLogic to “adopt reas onable procedures … with regard to … confide ntialit y.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b), and it di d not exceed that mandate h ere. 14 Arroyo sugges ts that CoreLog ic’s delay in telling her that a copy of the conservatorshi p certificate would be a ccep ta ble if the copy had a vis ible seal was “tantamount to a de nial of a reasonable accommodation.” A ppellants ’ Br. 56 (citing Loga n v. Matveevskii, 57 F. Supp. 3d 234, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 201 4)). Even if in some circums tances an “indeterm inate delay” ma y be equated with “an ou tright denial,” Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 199 - 200 (5th Cir. 2000), that equation does n ot hold when Arroyo’s behavior contributed to the de lay. Cf. Logan, 57 F. Su pp. 3d at 271 (“In assessing whether a defendant has constructively denied a plaint iff’s request for an accommodati on through unreasonable delay, courts often consider whethe r the delay was cau sed by the defen dant’s unreasonabl eness … as opposed to mere bureauc ratic incompetence or other comparati vely benign reasons.”). 14 Arroyo references 12 C.F.R. § 1022.137, which imposes special requirements on a “nationwide specialt y consumer repor ting agenc y.” The distr ict court rejected an y argument bas ed on the regulati on beca use “the regulati on was only r aised for th e first time i n a reply brief without any meani ngful analys is of its appl i c ation to the fac ts of this cas e” and Arroyo “prese nted no legal au thority o r argument th at this regu lation es tablishes a private right of a cti on.” CFHC, 2023 WL 4669482, at *22. On appeal, Arroyo acknow ledges that th e regulation mi ght “not pr ovide a private cause of action” and that she “never pleaded a claim ” pursua nt to th e regula tion. Appellants’ Reply Br. 38 -39. Under these circumstanc es, we see no error in the con clusion of the district c ourt.

46 Arroyo’s first d isclo sure request form was inc omple te and CoreLogic attempted to send her a letter in June 2016 to notify her of the deficiency. See J. App’x 148-49. She called back two month s later, but she did not s ubmit any new forms after tha t call. See id. at 149. CoreLogic referred the matt er to a supervisor and leg al counsel, and Arroyo finally sent new mat erials in November 2016. S ee id. at 150. When CoreLog ic called to discuss th at for m, it did not hear back until mid - Dece mber, when the CFHC became invol ved on her behalf. See id. at 151. This record does not permit the inference that the del ay amounted to a constructive denial of Arroyo’s request. S ee Logan, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 271 - 72 (rely ing on “affirmative e vidence of [the housing authority’s] good faith in responding to Plaint iff’s request,” including that “[d]e spite th [e] lack of response, THA never theless followed up”). IV A claim under the FCRA may be a sserted on Mik hail ’s behal f because a defendan t that violates the s tatute “ with resp ect to any consumer ” is “liable to that consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 16 81n(a). Mikha il’s c laim r elies on the proposition that he had a right for his mother to receive his consumer report. A consu mer has a r ight to a disclos ure only if he “furnish[es] proper identification.” Id. § 1681h(a)(1). The f urnishing of proper identification is a “con dition precedent ” to Mi khail’s right to r eceive his file. Og bon v. Beneficial Credit Servs., In c., No. 10- CV - 3760, 2013 WL 1430467, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2013); see al so Clay v. Equifax, I nc., 762 F.2d 952, 960 (11 th Cir. 1985) (“We emphas ize that a disclosure under section 1681g is required only ‘upon prop er request and identification’ of the consumer.”). Neither Arroyo nor Mikhail su bmitted “proper ident ificatio n” that would allow CoreLogic to conclude tha t a vali d request came on behalf of Mikhai l. See CFHC, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 306.

47 For that reason, Mikhail was never enti tled to have his mother recei ve his consumer file. Arroyo ar gues that t he FCRA imposes liabil ity based not o n CoreLogic’s fai lure to disclose the consu mer report but on its “willf ul failure to properly inform Ms. Arroyo what addi tional identification was needed,” which “effectively preven ted her from obtaining the file disclosure on Mr. A rroyo’s behalf.” Appellants’ Rep ly Br. 33. The district c ourt similar ly concluded that CoreLogic set an i m p ossibl e condition that functi oned as a constructi ve denial of the disclos ure request. See CFHC, 2 023 WL 4669482, a t *23 (“A consumer report ing agency cannot circumvent its lega l obligation to disclo se a consumer repo rt by ma king it imposs ible for a consumer to properl y r equest it. … CoreLo gic required Ms. Arroyo to produce a documen t that she legally could not pr oduce, thereby maki ng it impossible for her t o obtain her conserved son’s c onsumer report. ”) (emph asis added). Th e argu ment fails because Ar royo could not establish that, absent th e “ impo ssible condit ion,” s he would have submitt ed proper ident ificatio n. The undisputed e vidence show ed that even after Arroyo received cle ar inst r uctions to subm i t the conservatorship certific ate with a vis ible seal, she did not do so. As a result, she did not show that her fail ure to subm i t proper identification and to obtain the disclo sure resulted from CoreLogic’s conduct. See id. at *25 (“[T]he evidence does not sh ow whether, and if so when, Ms. Arroyo would have furnished proper identificat ion for the consumer report …. There was no evidence presented that she ever furnished proper identification even after she knew what was needed.”). 15 15 CoreLogi c argues tha t the FCRA c laims should be dismissed for l ack of standin g because whether Mikhail suffer ed an injury from the lat e disclosur e relies on undue spe culati on. But the disclosure of the file would

48 CONCLUSION We vacate the judg ment of the district court insofar as it considered the clai m of the CFHC on the merits, an d we dismiss the CFHC’s appeal f or lack of standing. We a ffirm the judgment i nsofar as it held that CoreLo gic w as not liable to Ar royo under the FHA. We reverse the judg ment insofar as the d istrict court imposed liability on CoreLogic under the FCRA. have al lowed Arroyo to ob tain an earlier dismissal of Mikhail’s then - pending charge in Pennsylv ania. That suffice s to establ ish an injury caused by the delayed disclosure.