Jones v. City of North Las Vegas - Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

FOR PUBLICAT ION UNITE D STATES COURT OF APPE ALS FOR THE NI NTH CIR CUIT GENOA JONES; COR NELL TINSLEY, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS; SCOTT SALKOFF; M ICHAEL ROSE, Defendants - Appell ees. No. 24-3374 D.C. No. 2:21- cv -00241- CDS - DJA ORDER AND AMENDED OPINION Appeal f rom the United States Distr ict Court for the District of Neva da Cristina D. Silva, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted May 22, 2025 San Fran cisco, California Filed September 8, 2025 Amended March 6, 2026 Before: Mi chelle T. Friedland and Salvador Mendoza, Jr., Circuit Judges, and Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge. * * The Honor able R obert S. Lasni k, United S tates D istric t Judge f or the West ern Dist rict of W ashington, sit ting by de signation.

2 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS Order; Opinion by Judge Mendoza; Dissent from Order by Judge Collins SUMMARY ** Fourt h and Fourt eenth A mendments The pan el filed (1) an order amending the opinion filed on September 8, 2025, and denying rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion affirming in part a nd reversing in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of North Las Vegas and two police officers in plaintiffs’ action alleging that defenda nts violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the offic ers physically intruded into plaintiffs’ bac kyard without permission while searching for a suspect, and one of the officers shot and killed two of plaintiffs’ dogs after the dogs attacked the police K -9. The panel reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity and summary judgment to the individual police officers with respect to t heir s earch o f plai ntiffs ’ backyard. Relying on United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001) (en ba nc) (per curiam), the panel he ld that defendants could not avail themselves of the “hot pursuit” exception to the Fourth Amendm ent’s warrant requirement, which only applies when officer s are in “immed iate” and “conti nuo us” pursuit of a suspect from the ** This s ummary consti tutes no part of t he opinion of t he court. It has been pre pared by c ourt staff for the convenie nce of t he reader.

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 3 scene of the crime. Here, the continuity of the pursuit was broken when defendants lost t rack of the suspect’s whereabouts for at least eightee n minutes. Because defendant s lack ed an exigen t circum stan ce to s earch plaintiffs’ yard under c learly establishe d law at the time of the incide nt, they were not en titled to qualifie d immunity. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs ’ state law claim beca use the district court dec lined to exer cise supplementa l jurisdiction over the claim solely based on its grant of summary judgment to defendants on all of plaint iffs’ fede ral clai ms. The panel aff irmed the district court’s summary judgment for Lieutenant Salkoff, holding that he was entitled to qualified immunity with respe ct to his use of force against plaintiffs’ dogs because, given the spont aneous confrontation, the panel could not say that he vi olated clearl y establ ished l aw. The panel aff irmed the district court’s summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Monell claims pe rtaining to both the warrant less s earch and use -of- fo rce claim s. Plaintiffs offered no eviden ce o f a patt ern o f warrant less search violations or other evidence establishing that the City was deliber ately indiffe rent to plaintiffs ’ Fourth Ame ndme nt rights or that its conduct had become a traditional method for carrying out policy. The panel remanded for further proceedings. Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Collins, joined by Judges Callahan, Bennett, R. Nelson, Lee, Bress, Bumatay, and Tung, wrote that by hol ding that Johnson clearly est ablis hed t he relev ant l aw, the panel reli ed on an overbroad reading of precedent and thereby

4 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS disregarded the Supreme Court’s repeated admoni tion that courts must not define clearly established law at a high level of generality. Judge Collins also wrote that the new footnote added to the panel’s amended opinion introduced f urther error by explicitl y reaffirmi ng Johnson ’s overbroad comment that a fleeing suspect’s c ommission of a “misdemeanor” “weighs heavily against” a f inding of exigent circums tances be cause th at sweepi ng com ment d id not survive the Supreme Court’s decision in Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295 (2021), and also cannot be squared with Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3 (2013). COUNSEL Margar et A. McLet chie (ar gued) and L eo S. Wolpert, McLetchi e Law, Las Vegas, Nevada; Jen nifer L. Bras ter, Naylor & Braster, Las Vegas, Nev ada; f or Plain tiffs - Appellants. Rhiann J. Denman (argued), Chief De puty City Attorney; Noel E. Eid smore, Assista nt City Attorne y; Micae la R. Moore, Former City Attorney; Andr ew D. Moore, City Attorney; North Las Vegas Office of the City Attorney, North Las Vegas, Nevad a; for D efendan ts -A pp ellees.

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 5 ORDER The opinion filed September 8, 2025, is hereby amended. The amended opinion will be filed conc urrently with this order. Judges Friedland and Mendoza vote d to deny the petition for rehearing en banc, a nd Judge Lasnik so recommended. The full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en banc. A judge requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. The matte r failed to re ceive a majo rity o f the votes of the nonrecused active judge s in favor of en banc consideration. Fed. R. App. P. 40. The petition for rehea ring en banc (Dkt. No. 46) is DENIED, and no further petitions for rehear ing wil l be entertai ned. OPINION MENDOZA, Circuit Judge: When does a hot pursuit turn cold? Today we conclude that a pursuit was at b est lukewarm, and certainly no longer hot pursuit, w hen o fficers lo st a s uspect’s trai l in a resi dential neighborhood for at leas t eighteen minutes. A pol ice o fficer s aw a s usp ect flee from the bac k of a house into a neighboring backyar d. Instead of directly following t he s uspect, the office r hurried t o his car, called for backup, and drove two blocks south to establish a perimet er aroun d th e area. At l east eigh teen min utes passed before a K - 9 unit alert ed in the direction of Plaintiff s’ backyard, s ev eral hous es away fro m wher e the suspect had

6 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS disapp eared. An o fficer with a K -9 search ed t he yard, rousing Plaintiffs’ thre e dogs. T wo o f the dogs at tacked t he police K-9 and were shot and killed by an officer. Plaintiffs Genoa Jones and Cornell Tinsley sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the officer s and the C ity of N orth Las Vegas vi olated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unw arranted search es and s eizures. T he dist rict cou rt granted summary judgment for the off icers, reasoning that the officers’ intrusion was permitted by the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement and that the use o f force was reason able und er the circum stanc es. The d istri ct court also granted summary judgment for the city, finding no support for Plaint iffs’ fai lure - to - train the ory. W e r evers e, in part, holding that there was no hot pursuit whe re offi cers lost track of a suspect for at leas t ei ghteen minutes. We affirm with res pect to t he K - 9 handl er’s use of force and th e claim s agai nst t he city. We remand for furth er proceedings. I. On February 15, 2019, at 3:47 p.m., North Las Vegas Poli ce Departmen t (“N LVPD”) O ffice rs Jos eph Mi nelli (“Offi cer Minell i”) and Michael Rose (“Offi cer Ro se”) responded to a possible dome stic battery at a house on a resident ial cul - de - sac. While Officer Mine lli spoke with a woman at the door, Officer Rose moved to the side of the house, where h e witnes sed a p erson flee ove r the back wall to the south into a neighboring yard. Of ficer Rose ran to his patrol car to reques t assi stan ce. He drove two streets south hoping to cut off whomever had fled but did not catch si ght of the p erson again. Several units quickly responded and helped Officer Rose establish a multiple - block peri meter around the area.

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 7 Meanwhi le, Offi cer Mi nelli stayed at the ho me to investigate the domestic battery allegati on. The woman who answered the door denied that there w as any domest ic violence, but Officer Minelli observed injuries on her face, including several injuries around her eyes and a long cut across her ch in that had been st itched. The woman told Officer Minelli that police were not welcome at her house and that her boyfriend — whom office rs suspected had battered the woman a nd whom they believed to be the per son who fle d— would be back that evening and police w ould need a warrant to apprehend him at the home. Officer Minelli rema ined at the addres s in case t he suspect returned. With a pe rimeter in plac e, o fficers believ ed nobody could leave the area without crossing their line of sight. A sergeant o n scen e decided t o call for a K- 9 unit to search for th e s uspect. NLVPD Lieutenant Scott S alkoff (“Lieutenant Salkoff”) and his police K-9 Storm (“Storm”) responded to the scene around 4:05 p.m., appr oximately eighteen minute s after Offic er Rose s aw th e suspect flee. Lieutenant Salkoff used Storm — who is trained to detect the odor of apocrine, a hormone some people release when they ar e afraid — to search within the perimeter. Lieutenant Salkoff i nformed resid ents of the s earches us ing his patrol car’s public address s ystem. He also sen t NLVP D Officer Lee Young (“Officer Young”) ahead to seek consent from resident s to s earch th eir yar ds. Lieutenant Salkoff was searching a b ackyard four h ouses east and one house south of where the su spect va nished when

8 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS Storm al erted to an odo r coming from a distant, ele vated position in the direction of P laintiffs ’ walled - in b ackyard. 1 Lieutenant Salkoff decided to searc h Plaintiffs’ backyard. He had Offi cer You ng check th e gate, which was locked and posted with a “Beware of Dog” sig n. Officer Young knock ed on Plaintiffs’ door to requ est their consent to search the ya rd but received no response because th ey were not home. To g ain a v antag e, Li eutenan t Sal koff jumped onto the six - foot cinderblock wall that enclo sed Plaintiffs’ yard. He observed trash cans, where he thought the suspect might be hiding, and a fenced - in kenn el area wi th an open gate and three dog houses and bowls but did not see any dogs. With neithe r a war rant n or P laintiffs’ conse nt, Lieutenant Salkoff hopped down from the wall into their backyard. Officer Ro se then passed Storm over the wall. Plaintiff s’ three dogs were stirred f rom their doghouses, em erging to investigate the unwel come strang ers in thei r yard. Lieutenant Salkoff attempted to keep the dogs at bay, kicking them and placi ng trash cans betwe en the m and Storm. His efforts deterred one dog, but the other two — Shadow and Whitewall — attack ed Storm. Lieu tenant Salkoff drew his service wea pon and killed both Shadow and Whitewal l. 1 We know Storm’s alert came at least eighteen minutes after officers had last seen the person they we re looking for — and, o n the re cord be fore us, it may have been m uch late r. Officer Rose saw someone flee at around 3:47 p.m. and Lieute nant Sal koff res ponded to the sc ene with Storm at app roxima tely 4:0 5 p.m. Lieute nant Salkoff d oes not recall precisely when or where he started his search and says he may have searche d one yar d or more than a dozen ya rds bef ore Storm smelled fear i n the air. Officer Rose recal ls that the search lasted for more t han an hour and possi bly for two or t hree hour s.

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 9 Despite offic ers scourin g the neighborhood, they never found the person they were looking for. Plaintiffs sued Lieutenant Salkoff, Officer Rose, and t he City of North Las Veg as (“the C ity”), as sertin g sever al claim s under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Lieu tenant Salkoff violated the Fourth and Fou rteen th Amendment s when, without a warrant, he enter ed Plai nti ffs’ backyard, and Off icer Ros e violat ed the s ame wh en h e pass ed Sto rm into the y ard; Lieuten ant Salkoff violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when he unreasonab ly sei zed their dogs by shooting them dead; and the City was delib erately in different to the risk of the se violations. Plaintiff s also brought a state law cla im that Lieuten an t Salkoff and the City violated Nevada Rev ised Statu tes § 41.130. T he district court granted Defendants ’ moti on for summary judgment on t he c onstitutional claims, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state l aw claim, and entered judgment for Defendants. Plaintiff s timel y appeal. II. We review a distric t court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, Spenc er v. Pew, 117 F.4th 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2024), including officers ’ entitlement to qualified immunity, Sanderlin v. Dwyer, 116 F.4th 905, 910 (9th Ci r. 2024). In conducting this review, we take “the fac ts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all i nferences in that party’s favor.” Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Qualified immunity protects government official s from liability unde r § 1983 “ unless (1) they viol ated a feder al statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of

10 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS their co nduct was cle arly establishe d at the time.” Waid v. County of Lyon, 87 F.4th 383, 387 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting D istrict of Columbia v. Wesb y, 583 U.S. 48, 6 2–6 3 (2018)). “Either prong can be adjudicated on appeal by taking the facts as most favorable to the plaintiffs and applying the pertinent legal standards to those facts.” Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2017). Defe ndants are entitled to qualified im munity whe re we find “a neg ativ e answer at eit her step. ” Sabbe v. Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 84 F.4th 807, 819 (9th Cir. 2023). III. “ When a law enfo rcem ent o fficer phy sically intrud es on the cur tilage ” of a home, like a wall ed - in backyard, “ a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment ha s occurred.” Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 593 (2018). “ [A] small, enclosed yard ad jacen t to a h ome in a r esid ential neighborhood . . . is ‘curtilage’ subje ct to Fourth Amendment protection.” United States v. Stru ckman, 603 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Unite d States v. Romero -Bustament e, 337 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003)). Such sear ches are “pr esumpt ively unreas onable absent a warrant.” Collins, 584 U.S. at 593. But the Fourth Amendment ’s warr ant requ irem ent “ is subject to certain exceptions. ” Brigham Cit y v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). An “e xigen t circu mstan ce” such as “the hot pursuit of a fleeing suspec t,” “the need to prevent the imminent destruction of relevant evidence,” and “the need to p rev ent the escap e of a su spect ” may constitute such an exception. Struckma n, 603 F.3d at 743. To r el y on the exigent circu mstances ex ception, the government “ must satisfy two requirements: first, the government must prove that t he officer h ad prob able cau se to sea rch,” and “second,

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 11 the government must prove that exigent circumst ances justified the warran tless intrusion.” United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 905 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (p er curiam). P rob able cau se exists wh ere “th e ‘fact s and circums tances ’ before t he officer are s uffici ent to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe” that a suspect would be found in a place. Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)); see also Newman v. Underhill, 134 F.4th 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2025). Lieutenant Salkoff and Off icer Rose do not dispute that they physic ally intruded in to Plaintiffs’ wa lled - in backyard — Lieutenant Salkoff by entering the ya rd and Officer Rose by passing Storm over the wall. Such a warrant less s earch is presump tivel y unreas ona ble. See Collins, 584 U.S. at 593. The district c ourt assumed, without explanation, that Lieut enant Salkoff and Officer Rose conducted this warr antl ess s earch wh ile i n hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. We disagree. Hot pursuit fundamentally “ means som e sort of a ch as e. ” United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976). To qualify as hot pursuit, a chase “need not be reminiscent of the opening scene of a James Bond film.” Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 329 (2021) (Rober ts, C.J., concurring). “Th e hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement only applies when officers are in ‘immediate’ and ‘continuous’ pursuit of a suspect from the sc ene of t he cri me.” Johnson, 256 F.3d at 907 (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984)). As to immedi acy, offi cers act with suf ficient speed to qualify as hot pursuit when they act immediately, making a “spli t - second decision ” to pursue a suspect. Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 10 (2013) (per curiam).

12 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS But there is no hot pursuit where “the continuity of the chase [has b een ] terminated ” definitiv ely. Joh nson, 256 F.3d at 90 8. In Johnson, a sus pect “ran into a wo oded area where he was free to run for over a h alf hour” rath er tha n “ into a con fined area wh ere [th e police] could monitor his movements.” Id. On that basis, we d etermined that “the continuity of the chase was clearly broken and a warrant was required. ” Id. We furt her not ed that, “[a] lthough this requirement may be inconvenient to law enf orcement, any other outcome renders the concept of ‘ hot pursuit ’ meaningless and allows the police to conduc t warrantless searches while i nvesti gat ing a sus pect’s wh ereab out s. ” Id. W e recent ly observed in Newman that whether a pursuit ’s continuity has been de finitively broken i s a function of “ two in terrel ated considerations.” 134 F.4th at 1033. F irst, “whether, and to what degree, the offi cer [] lost track of the suspect’s whereabouts. ” Id. Second, whet her, after losing sight of a suspect, the o fficer “ continued to act with speed in attempting to apprehe nd the suspect. ” Id. Timing is relevant to both considera tions. As seconds and minutes tick by, the officer ’ s once - clear knowledge of a suspect’s position fades till they are no longer chasing a suspect but instead searching for him. “The more time passes without the officer’ s physically chasing after the suspect. . . the more likely the continuity of the chase is to break.” Id. In Newman, offi cers foll owed a s uspect ’s truck down a dead - end street wh ere th e susp ect exited his vehi cle and ran directly to ward the back of the plaintiff’s house. Id. at 1028 – 29. O fficers lost sight of the suspect for nine minutes but h ad probable cause to bel ie ve he was in the plaintiff’s house, given that the suspect had been head ed in that direction, he was not in the backyard, the terrain and f ences would have

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 13 hindered his flight to an adjacent property, the plaintiff’s backdoor was unlocked, and the offi cer p erceiv ed so meone interacting with the backdoor a t some point during the pursuit. Id. at 1031. W e held that the pursuit’s continui ty was unbroken because t he officers “had a reasonably good idea whe re [th e susp ect] was hidi ng” fo r the duration of the nine minutes after the y lost sight of him. Id. at 1033. Comparatively, here, Officer Rose last saw the su spect fleeing toward a different property— three hous es west of Plaintiffs’ home— rat her th an directly to the property that was later s earched. O ffi cer Rose n either chas e d after the person nor peer ed ove r the wall to monitor the person’s movements, and instead unsuccessfully attempted to cut the suspect off by patrol car. Officers had seen neither hide nor hair of the s uspect fo r at least eighteen minute s preceding their s earch, in whic h time the sus pect’s movement s through a suburban neighborhood were comple tely unknown. In light of those c ircumstances, the continuity of the chase here was broken, so the hot pursuit exception no longer applied. 2 2 We note that exigent circumstances are less likely to exist when the allege d offense i s a mis demeanor a nd there is no ri sk of “i mminent ha rm to others.” Lan ge v. C aliforni a, 594 U.S. 295, 308 (2021); s ee also id. at 313 (“ The fli ght of a suspe cted mis demeana nt does not al ways jus tify a warrantless entry into a h ome. An officer must consi der all the circumstances in a pursuit case to determine whether there is a law enforcement emergency.”); Johns on, 256 F.3 d at 908 (“[A ]ppl ication of the exige nt circumst ances exc eption in the context of a home entry should ra rely be sanctione d when ther e is pro bable caus e to believe t hat only a mi nor offe nse. .. has been committed. ” (quotin g Welsh v. Wisc onsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984))). In this case, t he gravit y of the allege d offense and the lack of ri sk of imminent harm to ot hers weigh against applyin g the exige nt c ircumsta nces except ion. J ohnson, 256 F.3d at 908 (e xplaini ng that t he allega tion that t he suspect committe d only a mis demeanor “doe s not def initely pre clude a fi nding of exi gent

14 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS Defend ants suggest that t hey reasonably believed the suspect was somewhere within the neighbor hood, and therefor e, the continuity of their search was unbroken. If we were to accept this ar gument, it would threa ten to swallow the warr ant requi remen t who le. Officers may not riffle through private spaces i n an entire neighborhood m erely because police hav e los t track of someone who e arlier fled from them in the gener al vicinity. Lieutenant Salkoff and Officer Ro se had no “reasonably good” basis for knowing where th e susp ect was — beyond that he was likely still in the neighborhood. Id. at 1033. Therefo re, Defend ant s may n ot avail themselves of the hot pursuit exce ption to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Defend ants urge tha t Storm’s alert salvaged the hot pursuit and gave them probab le cause t o search Plaintiffs’ yard. N ot so. Even assuming the dog alert did give t h e officers probable cause to believe the suspec t was in P laint iffs’ yard, by that time, “the continuity of the chase was terminate d” so there was no hot pursuit to salvage. J ohnson, 256 F.3d at 908. Our cas e law was clea r when these unfortu nate events unfolded in February 2019 that a pursuit’s c ontinuity is broken when officers completely l ose a sus pect’ s trai l for more tha n a short time, as happened her e. We no te that Newman, decided th is y ear, is not only distinguishable but circumstances, it weighs heavi ly against it”). Defendants conceded that the suspect was alleged to have committed a misdemeanor, domestic battery. Although t he Supreme Court has recognized t hat dome stic violence is a ser ious misde meanor, L ange, 59 4 U.S. at 308, t he dange r involved is general ly to co - habitants. Here, one officer remained at the victim ’s address in case t he suspect re turned, thereb y ens uring that neither s he nor any othe r member of the ho usehold wa s at ris k of imminen t harm.

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 15 also d oes not bear on what was clearly establ ish ed law in 2019. See Sanderlin, 116 F.4th at 916 (noting that “neither favorable nor damning subsequent legal developments can be used t o dem onstrat e what law was or was n ot clearl y establ ished at the tim e of an offi cer’s chal leng ed con duct”). But Johnson, decided in 2001, made it clear to offic ers in 2019 that they may not sweep through an area and search the properties within it simply because they believe a suspect is somewhere therein. 256 F.3d at 907 –08. Allo wing such searches would turn back the c lock to the age of English general warrants, which our founder s firmly rejected with the inclusion of the Fourth Amendment. See Payt on v. N ew York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980). Because D efendants lacked an exigen t circum stan ce to search Pl ainti ffs’ yard u n der clearly establi shed law at th e time of the incident, they are not entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment was improper. IV. We turn no w to the fate of Shado w and Whitewal l. “Reasonableness is the touchstone of any seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 96 2, 975 (9th Cir. 2005). “To determine whether the shooting of the dogs was reas onabl e, we b ala nce ‘t he nat ure and qual ity of the intrusion on the individual’s F ourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governme ntal interests at stake.’” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). W e must judge the reason ablenes s of a p articu lar us e of for ce “ from the p erspectiv e of a reas onable off icer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

16 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS When w e eval uate an off icer ’s use of force following a warrantless intrusion into private space, w e must not conflat e the unreas onab le seizur e claim w ith the unreason able s earch clai m challen ging t he ent ry. County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 428 (2017) (“[T]he objecti ve reas onablen es s analys is mus t be co nducted separat ely for each sear ch or seizu re that i s alleged to be unconstitutional.”). E v en where o ffic ers hav e vi olated clear ly established law with a warrantl ess sea rch, we cannot rely on that warrantles s sear ch to s ay that an officer’s otherwi se reaso nable subsequent use of force was excessiv e. See i d. at 428–29. Plaintiffs arg ue that Lie utenant Salkoff violated rights that were cl early establi shed un der Hells Ange ls when he shot their dogs. In Hells Angels, re cognizing “that dogs are more than just a personal effect,” we f ound that kill ing dogs is a “severe” intrusion on Fourth Amendment protections. 402 F.3d at 975. But, i n that case, o fficers had a week t o plan the execution of the warrants, were aw are guard dogs resided at the pr emises to be sear ched, and d evis ed only to use a shotgun to handle any encounters with the d ogs rath er than employing less - intrusive means. Id. at 97 6. We emphasi zed in our decision that i t was not a case “ where t he officer was r e acting to a sudden unexpected sit uation” or needed to make a s plit -second judgment. Id. at 97 8. By contrast, in this cas e, offic ers had minutes —not days— to discover and plan for handling an y dogs in Pl aintiffs’ backyar d. Lieutenant Salkoff attempted to stir any dogs that might have been home before he entered the yard but saw no indications tha t dogs were present. Office rs were un aware that the resident dogs were pit bull s, as opposed to a breed that may have been less se nsitive to the intr usion or more readily controllable by Lieutenant Salkoff.

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 17 For these reasons, the facts in t his case are s uffi cientl y distinguishable from those in Hells A ngels that we can not say Lieutenant Salkoff’s actions in th is m ore spontaneous confrontation violated clearly established law. Because Plaintiffs do not offer, and we cannot find, any cases cl early establi shin g that Li eutenant Sal kof f’s acti ons were unreasonable, he is entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment with respect to his use of force against Plaintiffs’ dogs. We note, h owever, that Lieutenant Salkoff an d Office r Rose may still be liable to Plaintiffs for the deaths of their dogs as a natural consequence of the w arrant less search of their yard. Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Under § 1983, ‘a person is responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.’” (simplified)) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), ov erruled in part on other grounds by Mon ell v. Dep ’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)); Mend ez, 5 81 U.S. at 431 (stating that, even where p laintiffs “cannot recover on their excessive forc e claim, tha t will not for eclose reco very for injuries proximately caused by the warrantless entry ”). V. Cities may be held liable under § 1983 for c onstitutio nal violations c ommitted by the ir officers. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. T o establish such liability, P laintiffs mu st prove “(1) [they were] deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliber ate indifference to [the ir] constitutional r ight; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Lockett v. County of Los Ang eles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020). A municipa l policy can be, among other

18 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS things, “ a failur e to train [or] supervise.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2019). Plaintiffs contend that the City failed to provide o fficer s with adequate training and supervision regarding warrant less s earch es and the lawful use of a s ervice weapon on pet dogs. To e stablish munic ipal liability under such a theory, the failure to train must “amount to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.’” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (alteration in or iginal) (quoting Ci ty of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Because the m uni cipali ty mus t have h ad “act ual o r construc tive notice [of] a particu lar omission in the ir trainin g program” to demonstrate deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must typically provide evidence of “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by unt rained employees.” Id. at 61 – 62. Plaintiffs’ Monell cl aim o n warrant less search es fai ls because Plaintiff s have no t offered any evid ence o f a pattern of warran tless search vi olati ons or other evidence of constructive notice such tha t the City was deliberat e ly indifferen t to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. As fo r the use-of- force claim, Plain tiffs note that the City settled three prior suits involving dog -shootings, each wit h di fferent facts th an thos e presente d here, during a five - year period. Even if those settlements suggest that the police may have acted wron g ful l y in t hose cases, evi dence o f “sp oradic” o r “isolated” wrongdoing is ge nerally insuf ficient to esta blish “that t he conduct has be come a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Tre vino v. Gat es, 99 F.3d 91 1, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 – 63. Therefo re,

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 19 the City is entitled to summar y judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell claims. 3 VI. We revers e the district court’s grant of qualified immunity and su mmary judgment to Lieutenan t Salkoff and Officer Rose with respect to the ir search of Plaintiffs’ backyard. B ecause t he di strict court decl ined t o exercise supplemen tal jurisdiction ov er Plaintiffs’ sta te law claim solely based on its grant of summary judgment to Defendants on all of Pla intiffs’ fed eral claims, its dismissa l of tha t claim is als o reve rs ed. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2009). We a ffirm the distr ict court’ s grant of summary judgment in all other respects. W e rem and for further proceedings. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERS ED IN PART; REMANDED. 3 Plaintiffs al so do not a rgue t hat the c onsequenc es of a failure to train on warrantless searches are so “patently obvious ” that the City could be liable “without pr oof of a pre - existin g pattern of vio lations.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 64.

20 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS COLLINS, Circuit Judge, with whom CALLAHAN, BENNETT, R. NELSON, LEE, BR ESS, BUMA T A Y, and TUNG, Circuit Judges, join, diss enting from the denial of reheari ng en ban c: This case is another in a long — and se emingly unending— string of cases in which our court continues to ignore controlling Supreme Court precedent concerning qualified immunity in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the Court has reiterated, “officer s are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violate d a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of Co lumbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62 –63 (2018) (emphasis added) (simplified). “A right is clearly establ ished wh en it is suff icientl y clear th at every reason able official would have understood t hat what he is doing violates that right.” Rivas - Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (simplified). Time a nd again, however, we have evaded this demanding standard f or defeating qualified immunity by defining “clearly established” law in broad and general t erms t hat di sregard th e legal and factual nuan ces of the part icular situation that the officers fa ced. We have done so despite the Supreme Court’s having “re peatedly told courts— and the Ninth Circuit in partic ular — not to define clearly establ ished l aw at a high level of gen erali ty.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (simplified). The panel’s decision in this case is a par ticularly egregious example of our stubborn adherence to this oft -condemned practice. The underlying Fourth Amendme nt claim in this case presents the important and interesting question whether the “hot pursuit” of a suspect will justify a warrantless entry into

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 21 a property if the pursuing police officers temporarily lose the suspect ’s trail but t hen bel ieve th at they h ave r ecovered it. Specifi cally, the pan el h eld that where po lice of ficers are engaged in continuous efforts to pursu e a fleeing dangerous suspect b ut then “lose [the] suspe ct’s trail,” the continuity of any “hot pursuit” is irretriev ably broken for purposes of the warrant except ion for the “exi gent circu mstance” o f a pursuit, and that the continuity remains broken even if the trail is only te mporarily lost a nd is promptly re covered (h ere, within about 18 minutes). Jones v. City of Nort h Las Vegas, 150 F.4th 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2025); see also Jones, Amended Opin. at 1 4. De spite the fac t that, at the time of the Defendant Officers’ entry into Plainti ffs’ property in this case, no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit decision had ever squarely addressed this sort of recove ry -of-a-hot-pursuit scenario, the pane l sum marily announced that its (dubious) answer to that novel question had ac tually been the clea rly established law of this court for nearly a quarter of a century. The panel did so by improperly over - g enerali zing th e principle s established in a “materially distinguish ab le” 2001 Ninth Circuit decision that “does not gover n the f acts of this case” and that did not put the Defendant Officers “on notice that [their] specific conduct was unlawful.” Riva s - Villegas, 595 U.S. at 6. Indee d, that sol e 2001 decision invoked by the panel here — United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) — did not even addre ss, much less resolve, whether a trail tha t is temporar ily lost can promptly be recovered. It should go without saying that a precedent cannot “cl early establi sh” the answer to a question that was not even presented or considered in that case. We should have grante d rehearing en banc to address the panel’s troubling disregard of Supreme Court precedent

22 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS concerning the application of qualified immunity. I respectfully dissent from our failure to do so. I A Around 3:47 p.m. on February 15, 2019, two of ficers from th e Nort h Las V eg as Poli ce Depart ment (“NLV PD”), Officer Minell i and Offi cer Rose, respond ed to a w elfare check request regarding a possible domestic battery incident at a speci fic add ress, whi ch was a house on a resi dent ial cul - de- sac. The person making the report had received texts of photographs from her sister showing various injuries to her face. The person re porting tol d the dispatch that he r sister’s boyfriend, Demario Shapiro, had battered h er sis ter befo re and that “she was s care d for her s ister’s safet y.” Up on arrivin g at the residen ce t o condu ct a wel fare ch eck, Of ficer Minelli recalled that he had pe rsonally responded to the very same house in the past for a domestic- related in ciden t. The officers rang the doorbell, and in response, the front door opened slightly and then was immediately closed. Officer Minelli attempted to open the door, but it was locked. He knocked on the door shouting “Police,” and a few moment s later, a woman res ponded. Officer Minelli thought that she was stalling, but she finally stepped outside a fter he asked her s ever al tim es to com e out. Meanwhile, Officer Rose positioned himself so that he could view the side of the house in case anyone fled the scene. Officer R ose th en witnes sed a man — who the officers suspect ed was Sh apiro — fleeing from the bac k of the house, running southbound, and jumping over the wal l into the neighboring yard. In response, Officer Rose quickly got in his patrol car and drove two streets to the south in an

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 23 unsuccessful attempt to cut off the fleeing suspect. Believing tha t the suspe ct was hiding o ut in the immediate vicinity, Officer Rose promptly reque sted assistance, and several nearby units responded and “very quickly” establishe d a multi - block perimeter to contain the suspect. The officers took up spots around the perimete r such that they believed the suspect would not be a ble to get out without crossing their line of sight. Be lieving that the suspect was a “da ngero us offender” who not only put the all eged victim at risk bu t also “anybody else he comes in contact with in the neighborhood,” the offic ers made announcements over their public address s ystems that were audible throughout the neighborhood, and they began knocking on doors to make contact with the residents. While the perimeter wa s being set up, Off icer Minelli stayed behind to talk with the woman regarding the domestic battery alleg ations. He o bserved that she had sev eral s ever e injuries on her face, including a long, stitched cut ac ross her chin. Of ficer M inelli broadcasted this information over the radio to the other responding officers. The woman, however, was uncooperative and re layed inconsistent narratives regarding Shapiro’s location and her injuries. She denied any allegations of domestic violence and told Of ficer Mine lli that Shapiro would be back home later that evenin g, that the police were not we lcome at her house, and that they would need to obtain a warrant to apprehend Shapiro. Among those who responded and a ided in the search for the sus pect was a K -9 un it consisting of NLVPD Lieutenant Salkoff and his police dog, “Storm.” They arrived at the scene around 4:05 PM, approximately 18 min utes after Officer s Minel li and R os e had arr iv ed at the victim’s home. Prior to deploying the police dog, Lieutena nt Salkoff conducted a records check of Shapiro, which revealed that

24 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS Shapiro had an active domestic battery misdemeanor warrant and an active traffi c warrant, as w ell as an ext ensive criminal history that included 11 prior a rrests for domestic battery with strangulation, obstruction, robbery, a ssault wit h a deadly weapon, b attery w ith substantial bod ily harm, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a stole n vehicle, and traffi c cha rges. After making announcements about the use o f a police dog from his vehicle’s public address system, Lieutenant Salkoff took Storm and began to search for the suspect within the perimeter. Lieutenant Salkoff searched a proper ty that was located about one house south and four houses east of the victim’s home, when Storm — who was trained to detect apocrin e, an odor that hu mans r eleas e whe n they a re scared — gave an indication of “high alert” from the direction of Plaintiff s’ walled - in ba ckyard. NLVPD Officer You ng, who had been sent ahead by Lieutenant Salkoff to seek consent from residents to search their yards, att empted to make contact with someone in Plaintiffs’ home, but no one responded. Officer Young went to chec k the gate, and it was locked. He also not iced a “B eware of Dog ” sig n, and h e relayed that f act to Lieut enant Salko ff. Li euten ant S alkoff also observed three doghouses enclosed by a chain -link fence with an open gate. The officers whistled, shook the locked g ate, and s lapped the wall to determi n e if any dogs were in the yard, but they did not obser ve any signs of movement or animals. Lieutenant Salkoff then decided to jump the wall into Plaintiffs’ backyard, and Officer Rose lifted Storm and handed him to Lieutenant Salkoff over the wall. Lie ut enant Salkoff and Storm began searching Plaintiffs’ yard when Plaintiffs’ three pit bulls emerged f rom their doghouses. Two of the dogs started to attack Storm, and after failing to keep the dogs at bay through non - lethal

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 25 means, Lieutenant Salkoff dre w his department -issued firearm and shot the tw o dogs, killing them. D espite the search, the officers never found the suspect. Plaintiffs sued Lieutenant Salkoff, Offic er Rose, and the City of North Las Veg as (col lectiv ely “Def endant s”). Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs asserted two Four th Amendment claims against Lieutenant Salkoff and Officer Rose (“D efend ant Offi cers ”), o ne for unreasonabl e search of their property and one for unreasonable seizure of their dogs. Plain tiffs al so asser ted a Monell claim against th e City of North Las Vegas (“ City”) based on the theory that the City had failed to adequately train and supervis e i ts office rs. Plain tiffs al so asser ted a s tate law cl aim und er Ne vada law. The district court granted the Defendant Officers qualified immunity, granted summary judgment in favor of Defend ants on al l federa l claim s, and d eclined t o exercise supplemen tal jurisdiction ov er the re maining state la w claim. Plaintiffs time ly appealed. B As relevant here, the panel reversed the gra nt of summary to the Defendant Officers with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim that they had violated th e Fourth Amendment by entering and sea rching Plaintiffs’ backyard. Jones, Amended Opin. a t 6. 1 As the panel acknowledged, see id. at 9–10, the qualified immuni ty inquiry involves “a two - pronged inquiry”: (1) the first prong asks whether “the 1 The panel a ffirmed t he dist rict court ’s grant of qualifi ed immuni ty to the Defendant Officers with respect to Plaintiffs’ separate Fourth Amendment claim concerning the seizure of the two do gs, as well as the distri ct court’s grant of summa ry judgment t o the City as to Plaintiffs’ Monell claim. Jones, Amended O pin. at 1 5–19. I do not questi on either of those r ulings.

26 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS officer’s conduct violated a federal right,” and (2) the “second prong . . . asks whe ther the right in question was clear ly established at the time of the violation,” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655 – 56 (2014) (simplifi ed). The panel held that Plaintiffs had e stablished both prongs, thereby defeating qualified immunity. Jones, Amended Opin. at 14–15. As to the first prong, the pa nel acknowledged that the warrantless entry into Plaintiffs’ backyard would be reasonabl e if (1) it w as supported by probable cause, and (2) “exig ent circu msta nces ju stifi ed the warrant less intrusion.” Jones, Amended Opin. at 10–11 (citation omitted). The panel assumed, without deciding, that Storm’s alert “ did gi ve th e offic ers prob able cause to b elieve t he suspect was in Plaintiffs’ yard.” Id. at 1 4 (emphasis added). But the panel held that the search was nonetheless invalid because there were no “exigent circumstances” to justify the warrantless intrusion. Id. at 11–14. Speci fically, the panel rejected t he Def endant Office rs’ cont ention that exigent circumstances were present in that they were “in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.” Id. at 11. The panel held that, under the en b anc decision in United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001), “[t]he hot pursuit exception to the wa rrant requirement only applies when officers are in ‘immediate’ and ‘continuous’ pursuit of a suspect from th e scen e of the cri me. ” Jones, Amended Opin. at 11 (quoting Johnson, 256 F.3d at 907). The panel held that the Defendant Officers responded to the suspect’s flight fro m the victim’s home with sufficie nt alacrity to count as ac ting “immediately.” Id. But the panel concluded that the “continuity” requirement wa s not met because, in its view, t he Defend ant “O ffi cers had seen n either hide no r hai r of the suspect for at lea st eighteen minutes preceding their

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 27 search [of Plaintiffs’ backyard], in which time the suspe ct’s movements through a suburban neighborhood were completely unknown.” Id. at 1 3. Th e panel h eld t hat t he fact that t he Defendant Officers knew th at the su spect was “somewhere within the neighborhood” was not enough, because that information was too non - specific and would justify searching “through private space s in an entire neighbo rhood.” Id. at 1 4. In response to the Defendants Officer s’ argument that “Storm’ s alert salvaged the hot pursuit and gave them pr obable cause to search Plaintiffs’ yard,” the panel held that there w as no exigent circumstance to jus tify t he warrantl ess entr y becaus e “‘the conti nuity of the chase was terminated’ so there was no hot pursuit to salvage. ” Id. (quoting Johnson, 256 F.3d at 908). Turning to the second prong of the qualified immunity inqui ry, the p anel held that “[o] ur case l aw was cl ear wh en these unfortunate events unfolded in February 2019 that a pursuit’s continuity is broken when off icers completely lose a suspect ’s tr ail for m ore than a short time, as happened here.” Jo nes, Amended Opin. at 1 4. In support of this conclusion, the panel stated that “ Johnson, decided i n 2001, made it clear to officers in 2019 that they may not sweep through an area and search the properties w ithin it simply because they believe a su spect i s somewh ere t here in.” Id. at 15. II Even assuming arguendo the panel’s dubious premise that the Defendant Of ficers violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered Plaintiffs’ yard without a warrant, the panel’s further holding that the Defendant Officers violated clearly established law plainly contravenes contro lling Supreme Court precedent concerning qualified immunity.

28 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS A “Although ‘th [e] [Supre me] Co urt’s casel aw do es not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing prec edent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (citation omitted). “Specif icity is especially important in the F ourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes dif ficult for a n officer to dete rmine how the relevant legal doct rine ... will apply to the fac tual situation the offi c er confronts.” Id. (simplified) (noting that, in that case, th e rel evant Fourth Amendm ent doct rine at is sue was “excess ive for ce,” wh ich “i s an area o f the l aw ‘i n whi ch the result depends v ery mu ch on the facts o f each case’ ” (citat ion omitted)). “An officer ‘cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficie ntly definite that any r easonable offic ial in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.’” Id. at 105 (citation o mitted). Conse quently, in the absence of an “obvious case,” the party seeking to defea t qualified immunity — here, Plaintiffs — “must iden tify a case that put [th e officer s] on not ice that [their] s pecific conduct was unlawful.” Rivas - Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6 (2021). B ut if a precedent is “ materially distinguishable” from the instant case, then it c annot be said to “govern the facts of thi s case” for purposes of qualified immunity. Id. (emphasis added). Under th ese stand ards, the Defen dant Offi cers a re clearl y entitled to qu alified im munity. Given the distinc tive and difficult Fourth Amendment question prese nted here — namely, whether the prompt recovery of a t emporarily lost hot pursuit of a dangerous sus pect j usti fies a w arrantl ess entry i nto a speci fic p ropert y — this is not an “obvious case”

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 29 in which the general Fourth Amendment stand ards will supply a clear answer “even without a body of relevant case law.” Ri vas - Villegas, 595 U.S. at 6 (citation omitted). Nor did the panel contend that it was. Consequently, “ to show a violation of clearly established law,” Plaintiffs had to “identify a case that put [the Defendant Officers] on notice that [t heir] speci fic cond uct was unlawfu l.” Id. In holding that Plaintiffs had carried that burde n, the panel relied solely on this court’s 2001 deci sion i n United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). See Jones, Amended Opin. at 1 4–15. But Johnson is “mate rially distin guishable and thus does not govern the facts of this case. ” Rivas - Villegas, 595 U.S. at 6. 2 In Johnson, an offi cer att empt ed to ar rest a misd emeano r suspect (Smith) who was wanted on “ five outstanding arrest warrants for misdemeanor offenses,” including DUI a nd resisting arrest. 256 F.3d at 899 & n.1. Smith, however, broke free and ran away. Id. at 899. The officer got in his vehicle and attempte d to follow Smith but lost sig ht of him when Smith went off the road into the “thick brush” of the woods. Id. at 899. The rural area was “sparsely p opulated,” and each property, including defendant Johnson’s adjacent property, spanned multiple acre s. Id. at 906. The officer “radioed for backup a nd requested a canine unit.” Id. at 899. 2 The Supreme C ourt has yet to cla rify whethe r even a n on - point circu it precedent can qua lify as contr olling aut hority for pur poses of qualifi ed immun ity, see District of Columbia. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 66 n.8 (20 18) (“We have not yet decided what precedents — other than our own — qualify as contr olling a uthorit y for p urposes of qualifi ed immuni ty.”); Reichle v. Howards, 56 6 U.S. 658, 665 – 66 (201 2) (res erving the questi on whether co urt of app eals de cisions can be “a dis positive s ource of clearly established law”); see als o Rivas - Villega s, 595 U.S. at 5 (same).

30 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS While waiting for backup to arrive, the officer followed a nearby driveway and arrived at Johnson’s gated property, which was locked. Id. The officer then left the trail completely and returned to the scene of his ini tial confrontation with the suspect to grab a pepper spray cannister that he had dr opped earlier. Id. He returned to the locked gate and wa ited for an additional 15 minutes for backup to arrive. Id. at 899 – 900. Finally, over 30 minutes since t he offi cer las t saw t he susp ect di sappea r in to the woods, the officers broke into Johnson’s yard b ased on a “gut feeling” that the suspect would be there. Id. at 898, 905. While searching Johnson’s property, the officers detected the clear smell of marijuana coming from a she d. Id. at 900. However, they did not find Smith. Id. After obtaining a warrant to search the shed, t he officers found 553 marijuana plants, and Johnson was later indicted. Id. Johnson moved to suppress the evidence, but the district court denied the motion, stating that the warrantless search was justified under the hot pursuit exception. Joh nson, 256 F.3d at 900. A panel of this court affirmed, but after en banc reheari ng was gr anted, the en banc cou rt rev ersed an d remanded. The e n banc court remanded as to whether the area of the shed was within the “curtilage” of Johnson’s home that is protected by the Fourth Amendme nt against warrantless searches, but the court held that, if it wa s, then the warrantless search w as not justified. Id. at 897–98. The court held that the officers did not have probable cause to believe that Smith was on Johnson’s proper ty, because once Smith entered the woods, “Smith’s options were unlimited” and his choices for “hiding places [were] potentially endless,” and the officers had nothing more tha n a “gut feeling” that he might be on Johnson’s proper ty. Id. at 906 – 07. The court also held that the warrantless nature of the

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 31 entry was not justified by the “hot pursuit exception to the warrant requir ement. ” Id. at 907. The officers had lost sight of Smith, and for the ensuing 30 minutes they “received no new information about where Smith had gone.” Id. at 908. Meanwhile, Smith had “not run into a confined a rea,” but had instead run “into a wooded area where he was free to run for over a half hour.” Id. Under th ese ci rcumst ances, th e court held, “the continuity of the chase was terminated permanently.” Id. (emphasis added). The court also held that Smith’s flig ht from t he misdemea nor offense of resisting arrest “weighs heavily” aga inst a “finding of exigent circums tances.” Id. Johnson is materia lly distinguishable in multiple respects from this case. Mos t importantly, the pursuit here was not “terminat ed per manen tly,” Johnson, 25 6 F.3d at 908, because the Defendant Officers’ continued investigation led them to develop probable caus e that the suspect was in Plaintiffs’ yard. This is thus not a case, like Johnson, in which the officers, during the period after losing sight of the suspect, “no longer had any idea where [the suspect ] was. ” Id. Unlike Johnson, the suspect here did not run into a vast woods th at afforded “unlimited” options to escape, id. at 906; on the contrary, the officers reasonably believed that he had “r un into a confined area,” namely, the limited per imeter the offic ers had estab lished before developing probable cause as to which sp ecific yard he might be in, id. at 908. (The fact that Shapiro ultimately turned out not to be in Plaintiff’ s yard or within the perimeter makes no differen ce; the ex a nte authority to conduct a search does not turn on the ex post result.) And, in contrast to the off icer in Johnson, who made no efforts to pursue Smith for 30 minutes while he w aited for backup, the officers here were continuously working to establish a

32 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS perimeter and then to find the suspect. Most importantly, because th e offi cers in Johnson never developed any subsequent information to establish probable cause that they had re covered a temporarily lost trail, Johnson simply cannot be viewed a s having cl early est ablis hed the answe r to the ques tion whether a temporar ily lost trail can be promptly recovered. Finally, in contrast to the minor misdemea nors at issue in Johnson, the suspe ct here was suspected of a violent domestic battery misdemeanor. See Lan ge v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 305 (2021) (noting that, because “many perpet rato rs of d omesti c viol ence are charged with misdemeanors, despite the harmfulness of their conduct,” “a felon is not always more dangerous than a misd emeanant” (s impl ified)). T he pan el was t hus flatly wrong in concluding that Johnson clearly es tabl ished t hat th e officers’ conduct here was unlawful. The panel’s amended opinion only makes things worse and underscores that qualified immunity was wrongly denied here. In its amended opinion, the panel att empts to make Johnson look like a better fit to the f acts of this case by improperly altering its prior quotation from Johnson ’s key holding. The panel’s original opinion acc urately quoted Johnson ’s holding that “there is no hot pursuit whe re ‘the continuity of the chase was terminated permanently.’” Jones, 150 F.4th at 1036 (quoting Johnson, 256 F.3d at 908). But t his case d oes n ot fi t that rule b ecause, as I have explained, the continuity of the chase here was not “termina ted permanently” g iven that the trail was promptly recovered. R ather th an ack nowledg e that Johnson is thus materially distinguishable and does not govern this case, the panel instead now doctors its quotation from Johnson so as to reframe that decision’s holding in a broader way that will better fi t thi s case. Sp ecifi cally, t he above - quoted p hrase has

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 33 been changed to now say that “there is no hot pursuit where ‘the continuity of the chase [has been] terminated’ definitive ly.” See Jones, Amended Opin. at 12 (alterations in original) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1 4 (a dding this same quote in a truncated f orm that deletes the word “perma nently”). This a lteration is signif icant, because it attempts to r ecast Johnson ’s holding so that it would extend, not merely to a pursuit whose continuity was terminated “perman ently ” (and t herefore never recov ered), but also to one that was in some sense “termi nated definitively” (such that it would no t count that the tr ail was promptly recovered). But qualified immunity turns on what the relevant precedents actually say and not how they might be misquoted by future panels. See Estate of Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles, 139 F.4th 790, 827 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (Collins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that, under a proper understanding of qualified immunity doctrine, officers must be able to “r ely on what our opinions actually say” and should not have to “ consider that future panels m ay tak e consi derabl e libe rties wi th s electiv ely quoting the opinion’s language”). For all of these reasons, Johnson does not “squarely govern[]” this case and does not place its outcome “ beyond debate.” Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104 (citations omitted). By holding that Johnson did cl early establi sh the rel evant law here, the panel once a gai n relied on an overbroad reading of preceden t and th ereby d isregard ed the Supreme Court’s repeated admonition that we must not “defin e clearly establ ished l aw at a high lev el of general ity. ” Id. (simp lified). The D efen dant Offi cers here w ere entit led to qualifie d immunity.

34 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS B In addition to its erroneous reliance on Johnson as having clearly est abl ished t he relevant law, there are sev eral additional respects in which the pane l’ s dec ision here conflicts with relevant Supreme Court authority. The panel’ s original o pinion held that it is “clea rly establishe d” law that th e loss of a suspec t’ s tr ail for as few as 18 minutes means any hot pursuit has been definitively terminated and cannot be recovered, and it remarkably reached this conclusion without giving any consideration to the nature of the underlying crime at issue or the dangerousness of the suspec t in this case. See Jones, 150 F.4th at 1036 – 38. In its a mended opinion, the panel has now belatedly added a footnote minimizing the dangerousn ess of the suspect here, but the amendment only makes things worse because the new footnote square ly conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. See Jones, Amende d Opin. at 1 3 n.2. The panel’ s new footnote introduces a further error by explicitly r eaf firming Johnson ’ s overbroad comment that a fleeing suspect ’ s commi ssion of a “m isdemean or” “weigh s heavily against” a finding of exigent circumstances. See Jones, Ame nded Opin. at 13 n.2 (quoting Johnson, 256 F.3d at 908). That sweepin g comment did not survive the Supreme Court’ s decisio n in Lange, wh ich emph asi zed the importance of danger ousness to the hot pursuit inquiry and expressly noted — citing “domes tic vio lence” o ffenses in particu lar — that “a f elon is not always more dange rous than a misd emeanan t.” 594 U.S. at 305 (simplified). The panel’ s new footnote, and its r eliance on Johnson ’ s dismissal of misdemeanors, also cannot be squared with Stanto n v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3 (2013), in wh ich the Supreme Court summarily

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 35 and unanimously reversed this court for denying qualified immunity based on a similar overreading of Johnson ’s discounting of the seriousness of misdemeanors. Citing the very same discussion in Johnson, this court denied qualified immunity in Stanton, holding that “[i]t should have been clear to Stanton, however, from Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions that law enforcement actions involving a misdemea nor off ense will rare ly, if ever, justif y a warrantle ss entry.” Sims v. Stanton, 706 F.3d 954, 964 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing, inter alia, “ Johnson, 256 F.3d at 908 (clearly established since 2001)”). The Supreme Court rever sed, holding that this court had read such statements in Johnson “far too broadly.” Stanton, 571 U.S. at 9 (noting the Stanton panel’ s reliance on a simi lar accompa nying footnote in Johnson). The Court instead held that the law governing the hot pursuit of misdemeanants, including the role of dangerousness in that analysis, was not clearly established, given the post - Johnson con flicti ng precedent within the Ninth Circuit its elf and give n that “the federa l and state courts of last resort around the Nation were sharply divided.” Id. at 10. The panel’ s resuscitation of this discredited aspect of Johnson is plainly wrong, and it shows that we have learned nothing from the unanimous reversal we suffe red in Stanton. 3 3 The panel’s dow nplaying o f the sus pect’s dange rousness here is al so factually inaccurate. T he panel’s suggestion that an y danger here was mitiga ted by the fact tha t an officer st ayed wit h the vi ctim duri ng t he pursuit m akes no sens e: the whole poi nt of the pur suit was to detain the dangerous suspect whose fli ght requ ired the officer to t emporarily guard the vict im during t he pursui t. To the extent that the pane l’s a mended opinion now sugges ts that the pursuit could perhaps have been maintai ned if t he officer s had left the vi ctim unguarded, that s trikes m e as perversely i llogic al. More over, a fleei ng suspect with a known hi story of domesti c violence w ho l eaps into a neighbor’s backya rd would

36 J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS Stanton unders cores the panel’ s error i n thi s case in a further res pect. Here, jus t as i n Stanton, a variety of federal and stat e court decisi ons that hav e addres sed th e specifi c question presented here have reached results contrary to the panel’ s claim that that question has actually been long settled by gene ral prin cipl es fro m a decad es -old case. See Stanton, 571 U.S. at 9 – 10 (citing two sta te intermedia te appellate decisions and two federal district court opinions). Her e, several po st - Johnson cases have upheld, as f alling within the hot pursuit exception, pursuits in which the officers briefly lost track of the suspect but t hen, through quick and continuous ef forts, promptly regained the trail. See, e.g., Prado v. Police Dep’ t of East Palo Alto, 2018 WL 4103175, at *1, 4 (C al. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2018) (findin g hot pu rsuit where an officer lost sight of th e suspect disap pearing into privat e pro pert y at a d ead - end st reet and fl eeing to t he west, and oth er offic ers cre ated a p erim eter while th e chas ing of ficer, making us e of inform ation developed d uring the pursui t, ma de war rantl ess entri es into two s epar ate y ards n ear the resi den ce wher e the su spect disapp ear ed and u ltim ately shot the plaintiff ’ s pit bull i n one of the yards); United States reasonabl y be co nsidered to be a da nger t o the comm unity ge nerall y and not only, as the panel w ould have it, to “co - habitants.” See Jo nes, Amended Opi n. at 1 3 n.2. Ind eed, it is surpris ing to s ee the panel make such a point in this case, given that the canine officer’s report s tated that he conduct ed a records check of the fle eing s uspect be fore he dep loyed his poli ce dog and that he thereby lea rned that the suspec t “had an extensi ve criminal history, whic h included se veral vi olent of fenses such as domes tic [viol ence] with s trangulation, assault with a dea dly weapon, carrying a concealed weapon a nd r obbery.” Based on w hat the y knew about Shapi ro, the office rs conc luded that he was a da nger t o “anybody else he comes i n contac t wit h in the neighbor hood.” The pa nel is therefore quite wr ong to s uggest that this violent s uspect di d not pres ent any danger to the nei ghbors whose yards he was s uspected of j umping into.

J ONES V. C ITY OF N ORT H L AS V EGAS 37 v. Fuller, 572 F. App’x 819, 819 – 21 (1 1th Cir. 2014) (holding that the passing of 12 mi nutes between th e suspects’ fleeing from th e st olen car and a det ecti ve’ s entr y into d efenda nt’ s property after an other dete ctive driving n earby announced that there were suspi cious peopl e in defendant’ s backyard did not render the hot pu rsuit “cold” because th e detectives were “engaged in a single pu rsuit that was conti nuous”); Unit ed States v. Red Bi r d, 2020 WL 7209760, at *1, 6 – 7 (D.S.D. Au g. 20, 2020) (finding h ot pur sui t wh ere o fficer, seei ng a s usp ect flee, drove one st reet down to unsu ccessfully cut him off but recovered trail using foo tprints in snow); Unit ed States v. White, 185 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1299 – 1301, 1304 – 10 (D. Utah 2016) (finding hot pursui t exception applied to a warrantless entry where, after losi ng tra ck of a susp ected f elon when he entered into a multi - building complex, t he officers recovered the trail by using th e information develop ed during the purs uit to narrow down to on e apartme nt unit on the t op floor). This conflicting casela w further “bolste r[s]” the conclusi on that qualified immunit y should have b een granted here. Stanton, 571 U.S. at 10. * * * For the foregoing reasons, the panel’ s decision is flatly contrary to controlling Supreme Court authority, and we should have reheard this case e n banc. I res pect full y diss ent from our denial of rehearing en banc.