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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Tewksbury Living Group, LLC, et al. v. KCP Advisory Group, LLC and EF Senior Living Management, LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-10130

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (245)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                          )                                      

TEWKSBURY LIVING GROUP, LLC, EC )

TEWKSBURY, LLC, and MH TEWKSBURY )

OPERATING, LLC, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) Civil Action

v. ) No. 25-cv-10130-PBS

)

KCP ADVISORY GROUP, LLC and EF )

SENIOR LIVING MANAGEMENT, LLC, )

)

Defendants. )

)

                     ORDER                                       

               February 26, 2026                                 

Saris, J.

This civil action is the latest in a series of lawsuits

arising from the receivership and closure of Wood Haven Senior

Living (“Wood Haven”), a memory care assisted living facility in

Tewksbury, Massachusetts. See, e.g., BI 40 LLC v. Tewksbury Living

Grp., LLC, et al., No. 21-cv-11904 (D. Mass. Nov. 24, 2021); Suny

v. BI 40 LLC, et al., No. 22-cv-11005 (D. Mass. June 26, 2022); BI

40 LLC v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., No. 23-cv-10480 (D. Mass.

Mar. 2, 2023); MacAulay v. BI 40 LLC, et al., No. 23-cv-11966 (D.

Mass. Aug. 25, 2023). Plaintiffs are the owners and operators of

Wood Haven that this Court put into receivership in December 2021.

Defendants KCP Advisory Group, LLC (“KCP”) and EF Senior Living

Management, LLC (“EF”) are, respectively, the court-appointed

receiver that took control of Plaintiffs’ operations and assets

and a company that managed day-to-day operations at Wood Haven

under KCP’s direction.

Plaintiffs allege in this lawsuit that KCP and EF engaged in

willful misconduct during the course of the receivership that led

to Wood Haven’s closure and a fire sale of its assets.

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that KCP and EF fabricated a

pretext to evacuate Wood Haven, failed to procure tail insurance

coverage, unnecessarily relinquished Wood Haven’s operating

license, and sold Wood Haven’s assets at a price below fair market

value. Based on these events, Plaintiffs claim that KCP breached

its fiduciary duty, that EF aided and abetted that breach of

fiduciary duty, that KCP and EF engaged in willful misconduct, and

that KCP and EF violated Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A.

KCP and EF now move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the claims

against them are barred by quasi-judicial immunity and that

Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for relief. See

Doe v. City of Boston, 145 F.4th 142, 149 (1st Cir. 2025)

(describing standard for motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)).

The First Circuit recently addressed KCP’s entitlement to

quasi-judicial immunity in another lawsuit arising from the Wood

Haven receivership. See Suny v. KCP Advisory Grp., LLC, 152 F.4th

25, 26 (1st Cir. 2025). The court explained that there are “two

recognized applications” of quasi-judicial immunity. Id. at 30.

First, quasi-judicial immunity protects “persons who,

‘irrespective of their title, perform functions essentially

similar to those of judges . . . in a setting similar to that of

a court.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bettencourt v.

Bd. of Registration in Med., 904 F.2d 772, 782 (1st Cir. 1990)).

This type of immunity does “not attach” when “the function

performed is not ‘truly judicial’” or when the relevant conduct

was “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (first

quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988); and then

quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991) (per curiam)).

Second, “persons who ‘carr[y] out the orders of an appointing

judge’” are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, unless they

perform “acts which are clearly outside the scope of their

jurisdiction.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cok v.

Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam)).

The First Circuit then assessed KCP’s argument that, as a

receiver, it was protected by quasi-judicial immunity from claims

that it engaged in an unlawful scheme to remove Wood Haven’s

residents from the facility. See id. Applying only the first type

of quasi-judicial immunity, see id., the court asked “whether KCP’s

particular acts ‘relat[ed] to a general function normally

performed by a judge,’” see id. at 31 (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S.

at 13). The court found that KCP’s “effort to remove residents

from an unsafe facility subject to a receivership” was “comparable

to a court exercising its equitable powers to take control of a

distressed asset and conducting an analogous evacuation due to

unsafe conditions.” Id. And if a judge had “order[ed] residents

removed from the facility . . . , she would have been immune from

claims related to that act.” Id. The First Circuit thus concluded

that the claims “relate[d] to a judicial function” and, as KCP

“did not act absent jurisdiction,” KCP was entitled to quasi-

judicial immunity. Id. Employing the mode of analysis laid out in Suny, this Court

concludes that KCP is also protected by quasi-judicial immunity in

this lawsuit due to its performance of judicial functions. Suny

expressly held that KCP is immune from claims related to the

evacuation of residents from Wood Haven. See id. Plaintiffs’ other

allegations against KCP concern its failure to procure insurance,

its relinquishment of Wood Haven’s operating license, and the sale

of Wood Haven’s assets. All these acts relate to KCP’s management

of “an unsafe facility subject to a receivership,” which is a

function “comparable to a court exercising its equitable powers to

take control of a distressed asset.” Id. Moreover, this Court “had

the authority to” make orders related to the insurance coverage of

the entities in receivership, to direct the relinquishment of the

operating license, and to require the sale of the receivership

assets. Id. Had the Court so ordered, it “would have been immune

from claims related to th[ose] act[s]” performed pursuant to its

judicial authority. Id. Under Suny’s reasoning, then, Plaintiffs’

claims in this lawsuit all “relate to a judicial function,” and

Plaintiffs do not contend that “KCP acted in ‘absence of all

jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12).

Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.

Plaintiffs try to distinguish Suny on the basis that they, unlike

the plaintiff in that case, are parties to the receivership action,

but nothing in Suny suggests that this distinction affects the

analysis of whether KCP’s acts relate to a judicial function.

Plaintiffs also emphasize that while the order appointing KCP as

a receiver generally protects KCP from personal liability “for any

actions taken pursuant to this [o]rder or carrying out the

[r]eceiver’s duties,” the order “except[s] . . . claims which arise

from the willful misconduct of such person.” Dkt. 6-1 ¶ 22. In

Plaintiffs’ view, KCP must be subject to liability under this

standard. The same point could have been made in Suny, however,

and the First Circuit did not indicate that this language in the

receivership order created an exception to KCP’s quasi-judicial

immunity for performing judicial functions. This Court is bound to

apply Suny’s very broad understanding of quasi-judicial immunity

for persons performing judicial functions.

EF contends that, as KCP’s agent, it is also protected against

Plaintiffs’ claims by quasi-judicial immunity. Plaintiffs do not

raise any argument specifically distinguishing between KCP’s and

EF’s entitlements to quasi-judicial immunity or dispute that EF

acted as KCP’s agent in connection with the conduct underlying

their claims.1 In any event, courts generally extend a receiver’s

quasi-judicial immunity to its agents because the receiver’s

protection “would be meaningless if it could be avoided by simply

suing” the agents. Chua v. Ekonomou, 1 F.4th 948, 955 (11th Cir.

2021) (quoting In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1241 (6th

Cir. 1993)); see Blacktail Mountain Ranch Co. v. Jonas, 611 F.

App’x 430, 431-32 (9th Cir. 2015) (mem.) (applying quasi-judicial

immunity to a receiver’s agent); Micha US LLC v. Benchmark

Healthcare Consultants LLC, No. 21-12573, 2022 WL 2867183, at *4

(E.D. Mich. July 20, 2022) (same); Jonas v. Jonas, No. CV 13-90, 2014 WL 978099, at *16 (D. Mont. Mar. 12, 2014) (same). Because

KCP is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity in this lawsuit for

performing judicial functions, EF is too.2

Accordingly, KCP and EF’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 31) is

ALLOWED.

1 Although EF began to work at Wood Haven before appointment of

KCP as a receiver, Plaintiffs’ claims do not rest on any conduct

undertaken by EF during the pre-receivership period.

2 The Court does not address whether EF would also receive quasi-

judicial immunity under the theory that it carried out judicial

orders.

SO ORDERED.

                          /s/ PATTI B. SARIS__________           
                          Hon. Patti B. Saris                    
                          United States District Judge