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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Chicago Headline Club v. Kristi Noem

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-3023

• Judges: Easterbrookdissents

• Opinion

• Authorities (22)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.6K)

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Combined Opinion

                        by Easterbrookdissents

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

---

No. 25-3023
CHICAGO HEADLINE CLUB, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.

KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of Homeland Security, in her official
capacity, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:25-cv-12173 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge.

---

DECIDED MARCH 5, 2026

---

Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and
SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. During the fall of 2025, federal immigration
authorities ramped up their enforcement activities in Chi-
cago, an effort known as “Operation Midway Blitz.” Many
Chicagoans protested these efforts. Some demonstrations
were peaceful, while others turned into clashes between pro-
testers and federal officers.
2 No. 25-3023

In early October 2025, a group of protesters and journalists
sued a host of federal defendants. They believed officers from
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) violated their First and Fourth Amendment
rights by using tear gas and other chemical agents to break up
protests without justification. The district court agreed with
the plaintiffs and entered a sweeping preliminary injunction
regulating all federal immigration enforcement efforts dis-
trictwide. The government promptly appealed that order.
The plaintiffs then abruptly changed course. They asked
the district court to voluntarily dismiss the case because “it
appears that Operation Midway Blitz has ended.” They also
told this court that the government would move to dismiss
the appeal and vacate the preliminary injunction under United
States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950), once the district
court wrapped up its proceedings.
The promised motion is now before us. For the reasons be-
low, we vacate the district court’s preliminary injunction or-
der and then dismiss this appeal.
I
A
This case centers on several conflicts between officers and
protesters outside ICE’s detention center in Broadview, Illi-
nois. Protesters have long gathered to demonstrate outside
the Broadview facility. After the federal officials announced
an increase in enforcement activity, these protests grew in size
and intensity. The plaintiffs allege that throughout September
and October 2025, federal agents repeatedly targeted and at-
tacked protesters outside the Broadview center. The plaintiffs’
No. 25-3023 3

original complaint chronicles instances of agents shoving pro-
testors, shooting pepper balls at them from the facility’s roof,
and throwing canisters of tear gas into crowds without justi-
fication.
Three days after plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, the district
court entered a sweeping temporary restraining order not
limited to the Broadview facility. It enjoined all law enforce-
ment officers in the Northern District of Illinois, as well as fed-
eral agencies and the Secretary of the DHS, from using certain
crowd control tactics and tools. It also required the defend-
ants to regularly inform the court of its efforts at implement-
ing the injunction.
To enforce these reporting requirements, the district court
mandated that one defendant, DHS Chief Gregory Bovino,
appear in court daily and answer the court’s questions about
compliance with the TRO. This court granted the govern-
ment’s request for a writ of mandamus. Noem v. Ellis, No. 25-
2936, D.E. 11. The mandamus order summarized the “two
principal failings” of the district court’s demands:
First, it puts the court in the position of an in-
quisitor rather than that of a neutral adjudicator
of the parties’ adversarial presentations. Sec-
ond, it sets the court up as a supervisor of Chief
Bovino’s activities, intruding into personnel
management decisions of the Executive Branch.
These two problems are related and lead us to
conclude that the order infringes on the separa-
tion of powers.
Id. at 2.
4 No. 25-3023

Meanwhile, the plaintiffs asked the district court to certify
a class of “all persons who are or will be peacefully present at
demonstrations in the Northern District of Illinois, and who
intend to non-violently participate in, observe, or record the
demonstrations, or engage in news gathering, reporting, or
prayer.” Their amended complaint also added non-Broad-
view plaintiffs to justify the requested relief. Over the next
several weeks, the plaintiffs filed eight notices of violations of
the TRO. None of these notices involved the Broadview facil-
ity. They instead describe incidents in neighborhoods all
around Chicago.
On November 6, the district court granted the plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction. Certifying the proposed
class, the injunction enjoined all federal law enforcement offi-
cials in Chicago, as well as multiple federal agencies.
Two weeks after granting class certification and prelimi-
nary relief, the district court issued a full opinion. It contained
over 170 pages of fact-finding, including many incidents that
did not involve named plaintiffs and occurred far beyond the
Broadview facility. The court also found that all the plaintiffs
had Article III standing to sue for injunctive relief and con-
cluded they were likely to succeed on the merits. Finally, the
court explained why it thought such a sweeping injunction
was necessary to provide complete relief.
B
The government filed an interlocutory appeal. It also
moved for an emergency stay pending appeal, arguing the
district court exceeded its authority by entering such a broad
injunction. The plaintiffs opposed this stay request, asserting
No. 25-3023 5

that the injunction remained necessary to prevent the “unre-
lenting pattern of violence against Plaintiffs.”
We granted the government’s motion to stay the injunc-
tion pending appeal. Our stay order emphasized that the in-
junction was overbroad. “In no uncertain terms,” we said,
“the district court’s order enjoins an expansive range of de-
fendants, including … the entire Departments of Homeland
Security and Justice, and anyone acting in concert with them.”
The “practical effect” of the injunction “is to enjoin all law en-
forcement officers within the Executive Branch.”
As in the mandamus order, we also noted that the district
court set itself up as supervisor over the Executive Branch.
“[T]he order requires the enjoined parties to submit for judi-
cial review all current and future internal guidance, policies,
and directives regarding efforts to implement the order—a
mandate impermissibly infringing on principles of separation
of powers on this record.” And the order was “too prescrip-
tive” because “it enumerates and proscribes the use of scores
of riot control weapons and other devices in a way that resem-
bles a federal regulation.”
Finally, we flagged concerns about whether the district
court had properly analyzed Article III standing in this case.
It was not obvious that the plaintiffs had satisfied the require-
ments of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983).
And “public reporting suggest[ed] that the enhanced immi-
gration enforcement initiative may have lessened or ceased,
which could affect both the justiciability of this case and the
propriety of injunctive relief.” Then we announced our inten-
tion to expedite oral argument to respond to the urgency of
the situation.
6 No. 25-3023

C
Soon after issuing the stay, we set a date for oral argument
and received an opening brief from the government. But the
proceedings took an unexpected turn. In early December, the
plaintiffs informed us they had moved to dismiss the case
with prejudice before the district court.
The plaintiffs asked this court to stay the appeal while the
district court wrapped up the case. Noting this case had “in-
volved extensive, time-consuming litigation in a compressed
time period,” plaintiffs told us “the situation that precipitated
this litigation has changed in a material way” because “the
roughly 200-225 DHS agents” involved in Operation Midway
Blitz “are no longer operating in the Northern District of Illi-
nois, and Plaintiffs’ counsel have not received a report of un-
constitutional behavior … since November 8, 2025.”
According to the plaintiffs, the government consented to
their stay motion. In turn, plaintiffs agreed to consent to a fu-
ture motion by the government to stay the appeal and vacate
the district court’s preliminary injunction.
Back before the district court, the plaintiffs sought a court
order to dismiss this case. Normally, early in litigation plain-
tiffs can dismiss a case without a court order. FED. R. CIV. P.
41(a)(1)(A). But that rule does not apply when the district
court certifies a class. See id. at Rule 23(e). Instead, the court
may dismiss the case only after holding a hearing, giving no-
tice to the class, and offering an opportunity for members of
the class to object or opt out. Id. at 23(e)(1)–(2), (5).
At first, the district court followed the Rule 23 procedures.
It conducted the necessary hearing and provided four weeks
for any objectors to make their concerns known. No members
No. 25-3023 7

of the certified class objected to the plaintiffs’ proposal to dis-
miss the case with prejudice. 1 And the government did not
oppose the motion to dismiss.
At the final hearing, the district court dismissed the case.
In doing so, the court deviated from Rule 23 and the plaintiffs’
motion. It sua sponte de-certified the class. Then the court dis-
missed the case without prejudice—even though plaintiffs had
asked for dismissal with prejudice.
The government returned to this court seeking to dismiss
this appeal and flagged these concerns. In many ways, the
government submitted, the district court did not “grant” the
plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss at all because it disregarded the
terms of the plaintiffs’ motion. Still, the government asked us
to vacate the preliminary injunction and dismiss the appeal.
II
The government filed its unopposed motion to dismiss un-
der Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b)(2). This court
grants such motions as a matter of course. But “dismissal is
discretionary” under Rule 42(b). Albers v. Eli Lilly & Co., 354
F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). “Doubtless there is
a presumption in favor of dismissal, but the procedure is not
automatic.” Id. This court is especially hesitant to dismiss
when “it would be irresponsible to dismiss the case without
review.” Alvarado v. Corp. Cleaning Servs., Inc., 782 F.3d 365,
373 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Americana Art China Co., Inc. v.
Foxfire Printing & Packaging, Inc., 743 F.3d 243, 246 (7th Cir.

1 Two intervenors expressed concerns about the preclusive effects of

such an order. Those were discussed at a hearing, at which the district
court noted its own concerns about preclusion. Ultimately, the intervenors
declined to lodge a formal objection.
8 No. 25-3023

2014)) (citation modified). And Rule 42 acknowledges the
power to vacate before dismissing the appeal. FED. R. APP. P.
42(b)(3) (“A court order is required for any relief under
Rule 42(b)(1) or (2) beyond the dismissal of an appeal—in-
cluding … vacating an action of the district court”).
In our view, the extraordinary circumstances of this case
require us to review this order before dismissing the appeal.
Vacatur is therefore appropriate for two independent reasons.
This case appears to be moot, and the district court’s order
risks spawning serious legal consequences if it is not vacated.
We address each point in turn.
A
Congress has given federal appellate courts the power to
vacate “any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully
brought before it for review … as may be just under the cir-
cumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2106. This “supervisory power over
the judgments of the lower federal courts is a broad one.”
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40.
The government asks us for a specific kind of vacatur,
called “Munsingwear vacatur.” When a case becomes moot on
appeal due to happenstance or the unilateral actions of the
winner below, Munsingwear vacatur is appropriate. U.S. Ban-
corp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 22–23 (1994).
Courts have long “disposed of moot cases in the manner most
consonant to justice … in view of the nature and character of
the conditions which have caused the case to become moot.”
Id. at 24 (quoting United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Pack-
etfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U.S. 466, 477–78 (1916)) (citation
modified). This remedy ensures that “the rights of all parties
are preserved” for possible future review, protecting losing
No. 25-3023 9

parties from adverse judgments when the underlying contro-
versy is no longer live. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40. “The point
of vacatur is to prevent an unreviewable decision from
spawning any legal consequences, so that no party is harmed
by … a ‘preliminary’ adjudication.” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S.
692, 713 (2011) (citation modified).
Here, the plaintiffs originally moved to stay the appeal
due to the change in circumstances on the ground. They had
“not received a report of unconstitutional behavior” for
nearly a month before moving to dismiss the case. And they
told us that many DHS agents were “no longer operating in
the Northern District of Illinois.” Because the plaintiffs sought
forward-looking injunctive relief, rather than damages for
past harms, no case or controversy remained for the district
court to resolve.
The Supreme Court also treats cases as moot when the
plaintiff, who prevailed in the district court, asks that court to
voluntarily dismiss the case. See, e.g., Chapman v. Doe, 143 S.Ct.
857, 857 (2023). All parties, then, have given us reason to va-
cate for mootness.
There are certain classes of cases in which Munsingwear va-
catur should not be granted, such as when two parties settle
while the case is on appeal. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 23–24. And
when the unilateral actions of the losing party make the case
unreviewable, appellate courts also hesitate to grant Mun-
singwear vacatur. See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 83 (1987).
Features of this case might call to mind these categories.
For one, the plaintiffs consented to the government’s request
for Munsingwear vacatur, hinting at a settlement. The remedial
powers of this court are not bargaining chips for parties to
10 No. 25-3023

leverage in their arm’s length negotiations. Cf. In re Mem’l
Hosp. of Iowa Cnty., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988). For an-
other, the government did not prevail in the district court, yet
federal officers were withdrawn from Chicago. Though the
absence of any further instances of allegedly unconstitutional
behavior strongly suggests this case is moot, there may be
some uncertainty on that point.
B
Vacatur is still the right remedy here, even if the case is not
moot. The determination of whether to grant vacatur “is an
equitable one, and exceptional circumstances may conceiva-
bly counsel in favor of such a course.” Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29.
Vacatur, at heart, “is rooted in equity,” so “the decision
whether to vacate turns on the conditions and circumstances
of the particular case.” Azar v. Garza, 584 U.S. 726, 729 (2018)
(per curiam) (citation modified). It is especially appropriate
for appellate courts to exercise this power when supervising
the district courts and ensuring that an order does not spawn
unfair, adverse legal consequences. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at
40–41 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2106).
This case involved extraordinary circumstances. Working
on a highly compressed timeline, the district court granted an
overbroad, constitutionally suspect injunction. This decision
was supported with hundreds of pages of factfinding, cover-
ing incidents from over a dozen locations around the North-
ern District of Illinois. That decision treated the claims of lead
plaintiffs, class members, and non-class members as essen-
tially interchangeable—both for Article III standing and for
the merits. Yet when this court stayed the district court’s or-
der, the plaintiffs quickly and voluntarily withdrew their
case. Vacatur is therefore proper to ensure the district court’s
No. 25-3023 11

injunction order does not affect future litigation, which would
present its own facts and legal issues.
As noted in this court’s stay order, the district court’s in-
junction enjoins an expansive range of defendants, including
the entire Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, as
well as anyone acting in concert with them. The district court
required these defendants to submit all current and future in-
ternal guidance, policies, and directives regarding efforts to
implement the order for the court’s review.
The court’s injunction also impermissibly infringes on
separation of powers principles. It effectively established the
district court as the supervisor of all Executive Branch activity
in the city of Chicago—a role another federal court of appeals
has found problematic. See Tincher v. Noem, 164 F.4th 1097,
1100 (8th Cir. 2026). “[F]ederal courts do not exercise general
oversight of the Executive Branch,” so the district court likely
abused its discretion by issuing such a sweeping injunction.
Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025). As we exercise
our “broad” “supervisory power” over district courts, vacat-
ing this order signals district courts to avoid issuing similarly
expansive injunctions against the Executive Branch. Mun-
singwear, 340 U.S. at 40.
The district court’s order may also spawn adverse legal
consequences. Because the district court dismissed this case
without prejudice—against the plaintiffs’ unopposed request
for a dismissal with prejudice—any class members or the lead
plaintiffs could refile these claims tomorrow. They could ask
the district court to reinstate a near-identical preliminary in-
junction, adopting the facts and legal reasoning from the dis-
trict court’s order.
12 No. 25-3023

This is especially worrisome because the factual and legal
foundations of the preliminary injunction are up for debate.
Consider two examples out of many.
On the facts, the district court found the government’s wit-
nesses categorically not credible. This tilted all the testimonial
evidence in the case in the plaintiffs’ favor. The plaintiffs’ de-
cision to dismiss this case deprived appellate courts of the
chance to decide whether that evidentiary ruling was an
abuse of discretion.
On the law, the district court concluded that all the lead
plaintiffs had Article III standing at a high level of generality.
“Standing is not dispensed in gross,” so a “plaintiff must
demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for
each form of relief that is sought.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724,
734 (2008) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996),
and Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006))
(citation modified); see also Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 61
(2024). The same is true for the lead plaintiffs in a class action.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 n.6 (2016) (quoting Si-
mon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)).
Moreover, plaintiffs suing for injunctive relief cannot estab-
lish standing by mere speculation. As the Supreme Court
stated in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), “spec-
ulation is insufficient to establish the existence of a present,
live controversy.” Id. at 105 (citation modified).
The district court found as a matter of fact that “incidents
have calmed down at Broadview” after state and local police
took over security at the site. It also noted that October 3, 2025
was “the last day that federal agents used chemical munitions
at the Broadview facility,” and it recorded no further inci-
dents involving defendants at that location. Yet it found
No. 25-3023 13

standing for the Broadview plaintiffs based on speculation,
saying, “[N]o guarantee exists that state and local police will
continue to patrol” at the facility. Because the plaintiffs allege
no further harm to almost all of the Broadview plaintiffs after
October 3, the district court’s standing analysis appears to be
in substantial tension with Lyons.
At the least, then, it would not be appropriate for a future
case to incorporate the district court’s findings of fact or legal
conclusions without further, more detailed analysis. We can
help avoid that pitfall by vacating the order that depends on
these conclusions.
C
A final equitable concern cuts in favor of vacating the dis-
trict court’s order. In ordinary cases under Munsingwear, ap-
pellate courts worry about a winning party taking advantage
of the preclusive effects of a judgment. See Arizonans for Off.
Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71–72 (1997). The district court’s
handling of the motion to voluntarily dismiss risks partiality
toward the plaintiffs.
Recall that the plaintiffs asked the district court for an or-
der voluntarily dismissing the case with prejudice pursuant
to Rules 23(e) and 41(a). That ruling would bind the whole
class, which is why the district court held a hearing and had
the parties notify the class, as Rule 23 requires. No class mem-
bers or lead plaintiffs objected to dismissing this case with
prejudice. Nor did anyone request an opt-out.
Yet the district court on its own accord chose to decertify
the class, and then it dismissed the eighteen named plaintiffs’
case without prejudice. The court provided no rationale for
these deviations from the parties’ requests, saying only that it
14 No. 25-3023

chose to decertify the class because “the preliminary injunc-
tion now is no longer in effect.”
This decision presents several difficulties. First, the ab-
sence of reasoning does not conform to this circuit’s rules. See
Circuit Rule 50 (“Whenever a district court … terminates the
litigation in its court … the judge shall give his or her reasons,
either orally on the record or by written statement.”). Second,
the district court’s power to “alter[] or amend[]” orders grant-
ing class certification, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C), applies
only “if it appears that the suit cannot proceed consistent with
Rule 23’s requirements.” Jacks v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 118 F.4th
888, 895 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting All. to End Repression v. Roch-
ford, 565 F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1977)). Because the district
court gave no reason for decertifying the class, no appellate
court could review whether it did so because Rule 23’s re-
quirements were no longer satisfied or for another reason.
It is especially important that district courts strictly adhere
to Rule 23’s requirements after Trump v. CASA, Inc. As the Su-
preme Court made clear, class actions are now the preferred
vehicle for obtaining widespread relief, in lieu of disfavored
universal injunctions. CASA, 606 U.S. at 849. One key reason
for this preference is that Rule 23 offers “procedural protec-
tions” that universal injunctions do not. Id. The Court cau-
tioned against these injunctions because they “circumvent
Rule 23’s procedural protections” and “allow courts to create
de facto class actions at will.” Id. (citation modified). Such
“class-action workaround[s]” are inappropriate. Id. at 850.
This case represents the flip side of that coin. Even as
Rule 23 protects non-parties, it creates consequences for those
who take advantage of the class-action vehicle. Most parties
who seek class certification understand those tradeoffs. When
No. 25-3023 15

district courts certify expansive classes and then decertify
them at the first sign of trouble, they upset the balance struck
by Rule 23. The class action vehicle would offer endless bene-
fits to plaintiffs with no commensurate costs.
Of course, the order dismissing the case is not before us in
this appeal. But the fact that this case has been dismissed
without prejudice impacts the equities of granting vacatur.
The practical upshot of the district court’s decision is that the
named plaintiffs and members of the class can refile in federal
court tomorrow and try to reimplement the injunction anew.
This procedural windfall for the plaintiffs thwarts Rule 23.
III
All told, vacatur is the right remedy for this extraordinary
case. The better course would have been for the district court
to dismiss the underlying case with prejudice, but that did not
occur. The next option is to vacate this otherwise “unreview-
able decision,” preventing it “from spawning any legal conse-
quences, so that no party is harmed by” this “preliminary
adjudication.” Camreta, 563 U.S. at 713 (citation modified). Va-
catur is the best way to wipe the slate clean.
For these reasons, we grant the government’s motion. We
VACATE the district court’s order granting the preliminary in-
junction. And we DISMISS this appeal under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 42(b)(2).
16 No. 25-3023

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Article III of the
Constitution limits federal courts to cases and controversies.
This litigation once met that description, but it does no longer.
The plaintiffs have dismissed their complaint. None of the
class’s members sought to intervene to carry on the litigation.
The defendants have moved to dismiss their appeal. No one
wants to continue litigating.
If the parties had filed a stipulation of dismissal under
Fed. R. App. P. 42(b)(1), we would have had no choice but to
dismiss the appeal without ado. This rule says that “[t]he cir-
cuit clerk must dismiss a docketed appeal if the parties file a
signed dismissal agreement specifying how costs are to be
paid and pay any court fees that are due.” (Emphasis added.)
Because the motion to dismiss is a unilateral one under Rule
42(b)(2), however, dismissal is not compulsory—though, as I
read Rule 42(b)(2), the court’s only role is to resolve the terms
of dismissal, such as the allocation of costs. The authority
claimed by some panels of this court (and relied on by my
colleagues) to keep an appeal alive for other purposes is hard
to trace to the language of Rule 42, to the commentary issued
by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, or to
the fact that, when both sides desist, the court’s job is done.
As you can’t have a suit without a plaintiff, you can’t have an
appeal without an appellant. By now this suit has neither a
plaintiff nor an appellant.
I suppose one could say that we do have an appellant, be-
cause defendants seek an order vacating the judgment under
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). Perhaps
calling the motion one to dismiss the appeal is a misnomer. It
seems best to me, however, to take the Department of Justice
at its word: it wants us to dismiss the appeal (which is what it
No. 25-3023 17

promised plaintiffs to do). If we vacate the district court’s or-
der, we can’t then dismiss the appeal; vacatur ends the appeal
without dismissal. By contrast, if we dismiss the appeal as the
motion proposes we cannot vacate or otherwise affect the dis-
trict court’s judgment. A losing party’s decision not to pursue
an appeal does not support or permit vacatur of a district
court’s order. Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 83 (1987) (“The con-
troversy ended when the losing party … declined to pursue
its appeal. Accordingly, the Munsingwear procedure is inap-
plicable to this case.”).
When one party confesses error on a district court’s deci-
sion but the other still seeks relief, judges are entitled to re-
solve what remains of the conflict. See, e.g., Young v. United
States, 315 U.S. 257, 258–59 (1942). But when all parties declare
that they do not want judicial aid, the litigation should end
forthwith.
My colleagues are troubled by some of the events in this
litigation, and I share those concerns. But appellate judges’
dissatisfaction with the district court’s handling of a suit
should not matter unless at least one of the parties is dissatis-
fied—and none of the parties to this case now expresses dis-
satisfaction. In recent years the Supreme Court has stressed
the importance of adhering to the party-presentation princi-
ple. See, e.g., United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371
(2020); Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7 (2025). Today’s decision
goes well beyond what the parties are contesting (for they are
no longer contesting anything). We should have left in place
whatever the district judge left in place, see Karcher and U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18
(1994), and committed to the future the resolution of any
questions about what force, if any, the district judge’s
18 No. 25-3023

opinions and orders have after all litigants abandon the field
of battle.