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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Terrianne Paige Hiehle, in her individual capacity and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Katrina Lile, in her individual capacity and on behalf of all others similarly situated; and Kimberli Lashaway, in her individual capacity and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Edward Aber, in his individual capacity and official capacity as Jail Commander of the La Plata County Jail; La Plata County, Colorado; La Plata County Sheriff’s Office; Sean Smith, in his individual capacity and official capacity as Sheriff of La Plata County; Michael Slade, in his individual capacity; Jacob Harris, in his individual capacity; and John/Jane Does #1-10, in their individual capacities.

District Court, D. Colorado

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-02763

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.5K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 25-cv-02531-GPG-KAS

Consolidated with Civil Action No. 25-cv-02763-GPG-KAS

Civil Action No. 25-cv-02531-GPG-KAS

TERRIANNE PAIGE HIEHLE, in her individual capacity and on behalf of all others
similarly situated;

KATRINA LILE, in her individual capacity and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
and

KIMBERLI LASHAWAY, in her individual capacity and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EDWARD ABER, in his individual capacity and official capacity as Jail Commander of
the La Plata County Jail;

LA PLATA COUNTY, COLORADO;

LA PLATA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE;

SEAN SMITH, in his individual capacity and official capacity as Sheriff of La Plata
County;

MICHAEL SLADE, in his individual capacity;

JACOB HARRIS, in his individual capacity; and

JOHN/JANE DOES #1-10, in their individual capacities,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 25-cv-02763-GPG-KAS

C.B.;

R.C.;

J.E.;

S.H.;

A.H.;

A.H.;

M.J.;

J.L.;

M.N.;

E.P.;

S.R.;

M.S.;

A.S.;

N.T.;

K.T.;

R.W.;

I.W.; and

J.W., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EDWARD ABER, in his individual and official capacity as Jail Commander of the La
Plata County Jail;

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF LA PLATA;

JACOB HARRIS, in his individual capacity;

MICHAEL SLADE, in his individual capacity; and

SEAN SMITH, in his official capacity as Sheriff of La Plata County,

Defendants.

---

ORDER ON MOTION TO PROCEED ANONYMOUSLY USING INITIALS

---

ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHRYN A. STARNELLA

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Proceed Anonymously Using
Initials #13, which was filed by Plaintiffs in Case No. 25-cv-02763 prior to
consolidation (“Pre-Consolidation Plaintiffs”). The Pre-Consolidation Defendants did not
file a response to the Motion [#13]. The Motion has been referred to the undersigned. See
Order Referring Motion [#19]1. The Court has reviewed the Motion [#13], the entire case
file, and the applicable law. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion
[#13].

1 Unless otherwise noted, the docket citations refer to pre-consolidation docket entries in Case
No. 25-cv-02763-GPG-KAS.

I. Background

In this class action lawsuit, Plaintiffs assert various constitutional and state causes
of actions against Defendants. See Compl. [#1] at 32-51. Plaintiffs are females who were,
at one point or another, incarcerated at the La Plata County Jail (the “Jail”). Id. at 3.

According to the Complaint, during jail intake, Plaintiffs were subjected to invasive strip
searches prior to entering the Jail. Id. at 11. During these searches, deputies visually
inspected and physically manipulated all parts of Plaintiffs’ bodies, including their breasts,
buttocks, and genitals, ostensibly in the search of contraband. Id. at 12. Per Jail policy,
the deputies wore and activated body cameras while they performed the strip searches.
Id. The body camera footage was recorded and later uploaded to the Jail’s internal
database. Id.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Aber, in his position as Jail Commander, accessed
the Jail’s database and viewed recorded strip searches of approximately 115 female
inmates over three thousand times. Id. at 15-16. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant

Aber accessed these recordings in the early hours of the morning and late at night from
his own home, hotel rooms, and other non-Jail locations. Id. at 16-17. Plaintiffs contend
that Defendant Aber accessed these recordings for his own sexual gratification. Id. at 17.
In addition to his frequent viewing of these highly sensitive recordings, Plaintiffs also
allege that Defendant Aber “would take select inmates on inappropriate excursions[,]”
“visit their cells without a legitimate purpose,” and “would bring them to his office to coerce
them into conducting sexual acts[.]” See id. at 16-17. Plaintiffs bring claims against
Defendant Aber for his conduct, and against the remaining Defendants for enabling such
conduct. Motion [#13] at 3. In the Motion [#13], Plaintiffs request the Court to allow them
to proceed in this matter using their first and last initials. Id. at 8. They argue that such
relief is warranted because (1) this case involves matters of a highly sensitive and
personal nature, (2) the public interest in accessing Plaintiffs’ identities is significantly
outweighed by Plaintiffs’ privacy interests, and (3) Defendants will suffer no prejudice if

such relief is granted. See id. at 4.

II. Applicable Law

“Lawsuits are public events.” M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir.
1998) (quoting Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992)). “Courts are public
institutions which exist for the public to serve the public interest” and “secret court
proceedings are anathema to a free society.” Id. at 800. Therefore, “[o]rdinarily, those
using the courts must be prepared to accept the public scrutiny that is an inherent part of
public trials.” Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000). The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not contemplate party anonymity. Zavaras, 139 F.3d at 800.
Rule 10(a) requires that a complaint “name all the parties,” and under Rule 17(a), “[a]n

action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” FED. R. CIV. P.
10(a), 17(a); Raiser v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 182 F. App’x 810, 811 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that “there is no explicit congressional grant of a right of a party
to proceed anonymously”); Coe v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Colo., 676 F.2d 411, 415 (10th
Cir. 1982) (“There is no provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for suit against
persons under fictitious names, and there are likewise no provisions for anonymous
plaintiffs.”).

Following these general principles, in the Tenth Circuit, plaintiffs are generally
allowed to proceed anonymously only in “exceptional cases” that fall into one of three
categories: (1) cases “involving matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature”; (2)
where the plaintiff is threatened with “real danger or physical harm”, or (3) “where the
injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff’s
identity.” Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 603 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1018-19 (D. Colo.

2022) (quoting Zavaras, 239 F.3d at 803). Ultimately, the decision whether to allow a
plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously is within the court’s sound discretion. See Luo v.
Wang, 71 F.4th 1289, 1296 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing Zavaras, 139 F.3d at 803-04).

III. Analysis

A. Plaintiffs’ Asserted Need for Anonymity

Plaintiffs first move for anonymity because Defendant Aber’s alleged sexual
conduct involves a matter of “a highly sensitive and personal nature.” Motion [#13] at 5.
They also contend they will incur further psychological harm if their identities are
disclosed. Id. at 6. Plaintiffs assert numerous claims involving serious allegations of
sexual exploitation, harassment, and misconduct. The Complaint [#1] further includes

allegations of physical sexual abuse involving other female inmates. For instance, at least
one inmate reported that Defendant Aber approached her in her cell, pinned her up
against the wall, and told her he “own[ed] her.” Compl. [#1] at 9. The Complaint [#1] also
includes an allegation from at least one female inmate that Defendant Aber harassed her
in his office, and on a separate occasion, a Jail employee “discover[ed] [Defendant Aber]
sitting at his desk while a female inmate crouched underneath it near his crotch.” Id.

1. Matters of a Highly Sensitive and Personal Nature

When considering what constitutes matters of a “highly sensitive and personal
nature,” courts in this District have permitted pseudonymous litigation under situations
involving, for example, “birth control, abortion, homosexuality or the welfare rights of
illegitimate children or abandoned families[.]” Does 1 through 11 v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Colo., No. 21-cv-02637-RM-KMT, 2022 WL 43897, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 5, 2022)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Similarly, plaintiffs alleging that they were

sexually abused as minors may often proceed pseudonymously. See, e.g., Does 1-51 v.
U.S. Olympic Comm., No. 19-cv-00737-PAB-KMT, 2019 WL 2992031, at *1 (D. Colo. July
9, 2019) (collecting cases). However, courts “have generally required adult plaintiffs to
proceed in their own name” even when their allegations relate to sexual assault or sexual
harassment. See, e.g., Doe H. v. Haskell Indian Nations Univ., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1277,
1289 (D. Kan. 2017); Doe v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., No. 20-1207 JB/JHR, 2021
WL 4034136, at *1 (D.N.M. Sept. 4, 2021) (“Doe is not a minor—a status which confers
heightened anonymity protections—and the only cases Doe cites from the Tenth Circuit
dealing with ‘allegations of a sexual nature’ involve minors.”). Ultimately, the Court
recognizes that “[a]llowing an adult party to proceed under a pseudonym in federal court

is, by all accounts, an unusual procedure.” S.E.S. v. Galena Unified Sch. Dist. No. 499,
No. 18-2042-DDC-GEB, 2018 WL 3389878, at *1 (D. Kan. July 12, 2018).

Plaintiffs cite many authorities to support their assertion that the allegations
present a matter of a highly sensitive and personal nature. For instance, they cite to Doe
v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. No. RE-2, which involved sexual misconduct and sexual
assaults against minor students by an individual in a position of trust. No. 11-cv-02107-
PAB, 2011 WL 3820781, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 30, 2011); Motion [#13] at 5. When they
sought anonymity, at least one plaintiff was a minor, and the others had recently reached
the age of majority. Id. at *2-3. Based on that, among other things, the court granted
pseudonymity, finding that the case involved matters of a highly sensitive and personal
nature. Id. Plaintiffs further cite to Doe v. Farmington Municipal Schools, which involved
a plaintiff who was raped on school grounds. Doe v. Farmington Mun. Schs., No. 21-103
SCY/KK, 2021 WL 1390777, at *1 (D.N.M. Apr. 13, 2021); Motion [#13] at 5. The plaintiff

was a minor at the time of the sexual assault, and the court granted anonymity because
her “allegations that she was sexually assaulted as a minor clearly concern highly
personal and sensitive matters.” Id. at *3. Finally, Plaintiffs cite to Casseaopeia v. Brown.
No. 2:22-cv-00251, 2022 WL 1606520, at *1 (D. Utah May 20, 2022); Motion [#13] at 5.
The plaintiffs in Brown were victims of child pornography or conservators and next friends
of those victims. Id. Some plaintiffs were minors, and others were adults. Id. The court
granted their anonymity request, reasoning that “[c]hild pornography offenses implicate
the same concerns as child sexual abuse offenses.” Id. The court found preservation of
anonymity appropriate, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs were adults, because
they continued to suffer psychological harm, including from the knowledge that their

images remained available online. Id. The cases relied upon by Plaintiffs are distinguishable in a key respect: Plaintiffs
do not allege they were minors at the time of the alleged misconduct. Many courts have
recognized that a sexual abuse victim’s minor status easily constitutes an “exceptional
circumstance” such that the victim’s privacy interests outweigh the public’s interest. See
U.S. Olympic Comm., 2019 WL 2992031, at *1 (collecting cases). Courts are less apt to
apply this reasoning when the plaintiff is an adult at the time the alleged abuse occurred.
See Haskell Indian Nations Univ., 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1289 (denying adult sexual assault
victim’s request to proceed under pseudonym). For instance, in H.A. v. Blue Valley Unified
School District 229, the court expressly rejected an adult plaintiff’s request to proceed
anonymously in a case where she was sexually assaulted and harassed. No. 20-2559-
JAR, 2020 WL 6559425, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 9, 2020). Another court reached the same
conclusion, based on the same reasoning, in Doe v. Weber State University. No. 1:20-

cv-00054-TC-DAO, 2021 WL 5042849 (D. Utah Oct. 29, 2021). There the court
commented that the plaintiff’s “allegations of sexual assault do not automatically
constitute an exceptional circumstance” because she was an adult at the time of the
misconduct. Id. at *4.

Ultimately, however, while a plaintiffs’ adult status “weighs against anonymity . . .
[it] is not dispositive.” Williams v. N.M. State Univ., 348 F.R.D. 694, 702 (D.N.M. 2025).
The Court has identified a few cases where adult plaintiffs alleging sexual abuse were
granted leave to proceed anonymously. In Doe 1 v. Eastern New Mexico University Board
of Regents, the plaintiffs were student athletes between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
one years old. E. N.M. Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. 23-cv-0362-GBW-JHR, 2024 WL 36060,

at *3 (D.N.M. Jan. 3, 2024). They alleged they were physically and sexually abused by
their athletic trainer, who was the husband of their coach. Id. at *1. Though recognizing
those plaintiffs “[fell] on the younger end of the adult age range[,]” the court focused its
analysis primarily on the power dynamics involved in that particular case, noting that such
a dynamic “augment[s] [the case’s] delicate nature, particularly so when the alleged
abuser is a person who occupies a position of trust (trainer) and is enabled by a person
holding a position of power (coach).” Id. at *3. In Roe v. Minguela, incarcerated female
plaintiffs sued certain sheriff’s deputies as a result of those deputies’ offensive and
sexually inappropriate conduct. No. 16-cv-02744-MSK-KMT, 2018 WL 4148261, at *1-2
(D. Colo. Aug. 30, 2018). The court initially rejected the plaintiffs’ request to seal the entire
case; however, the court granted the plaintiffs anonymity, finding that their privacy
interests outweighed the public’s interest in identifying them by name. Id. at *11.
Importantly, the court noted, “[v]ictims of rape and other forms of sexual assault are often

stigmatized in a manner that affects their educational, employment, and social prospects.”
Id. (citation omitted).

The Court finds that this case presents the unusual circumstance in which the
Plaintiffs’ privacy interests are so highly sensitive and personal in nature that anonymity
is warranted. Like the court recognized in E. N.M. Univ. Bd. of Regents, this case also
presents the unique situation where certain power dynamics are at play because Plaintiffs
are female inmates who suffered abuse by someone in a position of power over them. As
inmates, Plaintiffs were dependent on Defendants, particularly Defendant Aber, for basic
needs, safety, and access to privileges, and could have been subject to discipline at
Defendants’ behest. That imbalance of power magnifies the vulnerability inherent in the

alleged misconduct and distinguishes this case from others where there is no such
dynamic. Publicly disclosing Plaintiffs’ identities would risk compounding that vulnerability
by exposing them to stigma, retaliation, or further harm, especially in light of the sexual
nature of the allegations and the coercive custodial setting in which the conduct allegedly
occurred. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated this
case involves matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature, thereby warranting
anonymity.

2. Whether Plaintiffs Would Continue to Incur Injury

In addition, Plaintiffs contend they suffered severe emotional distress, humiliation,
and psychological trauma arising out of their sexual abuse. Motion [#13] at 6. They claim
that disclosure of their identities would only exacerbate that psychological harm. Id.
Plaintiffs further argue that La Plata County is a small, rural community, and Plaintiffs’
public identification could further contribute to this harm. Id. at 6. In essence, Plaintiffs
argue that they would continue to be injured if their identities are disclosed, which would
also constitute an exceptional circumstance.

While “[t]he possibility of embarrassment does not qualify as an injury that can
outweigh the presumption in favor of openness[,]” psychological harm itself “is sufficient
to outweigh the public interest in disclosure.” See Galena Unified Sch. Dist. No. 499, 2018
WL 3389878, at *2 (citing Zavaras, 139 F.3d at 803). However, courts recognize that
allegations of psychological harm, without more, are insufficient to warrant anonymity.
See Blue Valley Sch. Dist. 229, 2020 WL 6559425, at *2. For instance, in Williams v. New

Mexico State University, the plaintiffs, who were victims of sexual harassment, sought to
proceed in their lawsuit anonymously. 348 F.R.D. at 696-97. Among other things, they
argued that the psychological harm caused by the abuse warranted anonymity, and
disclosure of their identities would further exacerbate that harm. Id. at 703. To support
that argument, the plaintiffs submitted evidence demonstrating the psychological harm,
in addition to their detailed allegations. Id. at 700-01. Considering this in its analysis, that
court ultimately granted the plaintiffs’ request. Id. at 702. Conversely, in C.S. v.
EmberHope, Inc., the court rejected a plaintiff’s conclusory statement that she would
suffer further psychological harm absent anonymity. No. 19-2612-KHV, 2019 WL
6727102, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 11, 2019). In doing so, the court explained she “supplie[d]
no particularized facts or ‘evidentiary support for [her] claims [of emotional suffering] in
conjunction with her motion to proceed by pseudonym.’” Id. at *2 (quoting Haskell Indian
Nations Univ., 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1289).

Here, Plaintiffs assert that La Plata County is a small rural county with a population
of approximately 55,638 people. Motion [#13] at 6. They further intimate that disclosure
of their identities would subject them to shame and ridicule, given that they lodge claims
against Defendant Aber, who, as Commander of the La Plata County Jail, holds a position
of significant influence in the community. Id. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
met their burden of establishing continued injury if their identities were revealed at the
pretrial stage of the suit. However, Plaintiffs are reminded that their identities will likely
become known at the time of trial because the trial will likely be open to the public.

B. Other Considerations

The Court must also consider “the public’s interest in access to legal proceedings

and prejudice to the defendant from allowing public anonymity.” Williams, 348 F.R.D. at
703. Plaintiffs argue their privacy interests significantly outweigh any interest the public
may have in these proceedings. Motion [#13] at 4. In addition, they argue that Defendants
will suffer no prejudice if this Motion [#13] is granted. Id. The Court takes each argument
in turn.

1. The Public’s Interest

“Identifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness”
because “people have a right to know who is using their courts.” Doe v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit has
recognized “it is proper to weigh the public interest in determining whether some form of
anonymity is warranted.” Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1246.

A clear public interest in this case exists. This case involves claims against the La
Plata County Board of Commissioners, the Sheriff, and various Jail employees. Certainly,

the public has an interest in understanding what alleged misconduct is occurring within
their community and publicly funded jails. See Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. M.O., No. 21-2164-
DDC-ADM, 2021 WL 4476783, at *6 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2021) (recognizing suits involving
public figures may heighten the public’s interest); see also Roe v. Cath. Health Initiatives
Colo., No. 11-cv-02179-WYD-KMT, 2012 WL 12840, at *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2012) (suit
against a private rather than public employer lessened public interest). Plaintiffs’ claims
to relief also “clearly involves the use of public funds, and the public certainly has a valid
interest in knowing how state revenues are spent.” Zavaras, 139 F.3d at 803. Plaintiffs
argue that anonymity would only impose a minor burden on the public’s right to access
because all filings will nonetheless remain open to public inspection. See Motion [#13] at

6-7. Indeed, courts recognize that pseudonymity “is the least imposition on the public’s
ability to view the case while accounting for Plaintiffs’ privacy” as opposed to sealing entire
proceedings. E. N.M. Univ. Bd. of Regents, 2024 WL 36060, at *5; see also Minguela, 2018 WL 4148261, at *11 (denying request to seal entire case but granting request for
anonymity and noting that anonymity will be lifted if case proceeds to trial).

Plaintiffs also identify another public interest at stake: encouraging other
incarcerated victims of sexual abuse to report sexual misconduct. Motion [#13] at 7.
Historically, the denial of anonymity deters victims of sexual assault from coming forward,
holding bad actors accountable, and vindicating their constitutional rights. Put differently,
publicly disclosing a victim’s identity creates a deterrent effect. Doe K.G. v. Pasadena
Hosp. Ass’n, Ltd., No. 2:18-CV-08710-ODW, 2019 WL 1612828, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15,
2019) (“[A]llowing sexual assault victims to proceed anonymously serves a strong public
interest in protecting their identities so that other victims will not be deterred from reporting

such crimes.”).

The sexual allegations underlying this lawsuit are serious and appalling. Moreover,
although Plaintiffs share the status of being female inmates, they come from diverse
backgrounds and bring with them distinct personal histories, cultural contexts, and
experiences with trauma, abuse, or marginalization. Public identification could have
uneven and severe consequences for each Plaintiff, including damage to familial
relationships, future employment prospects, or personal safety, both during incarceration
and after release. Allowing Plaintiffs to proceed anonymously acknowledges these
individualized risks while ensuring access to justice, and it does so without undermining
the public’s ability to understand the nature of the claims and the underlying misconduct.

Moreover, if victims of sexual abuse know that pursuing legal action against their alleged
wrongdoer will require them to publicly associate their names with deeply personal and
traumatic experiences, many will choose silence over accountability. The Court finds that
Plaintiffs’ privacy interests outweigh the public’s interest in open court proceedings.

2. Prejudice to Defendants

The Court must also consider the prejudice to Defendants. Plaintiffs assert that
Defendants will suffer no prejudice because they are already aware of Plaintiffs’ identities.
Motion [#13] at 7-8. Courts have recognized this sentiment. Doe B.A. v. USD 102, No.
18-2476-CM, 2019 WL 201741, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 15, 2019) (noting defendants would
not be prejudiced by plaintiff's continued anonymity because “they already know her
identity”). Moreover, Defendants did not respond to the instant Motion [#13], which
suggests that they either do not oppose or, at the very least, do not take a position on the
Motion [#13].
Furthermore, rather than request to seal the entire case, Plaintiffs have opted for
less-restrictive means by pursuing anonymity at this juncture. Motion [#13] at 7 n.4. They
also indicate they are willing to file sealed notices on the docket, should Defendants be
unaware of Plaintiffs’ identities. /d. at 8; see Farmington Municipal Schs., 2021 WL
1390777, at *2 (noting that defendants suffered no prejudice where they knew of plaintiff's
name and would also “have access to a sealed notice that discloses her true identity”).
The Court finds that Defendants’ lack of response to the instant Motion [#13], in
conjunction with Plaintiffs’ readiness to accommodate Defendants, demonstrates minimal
prejudice, if any, to Defendants. Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor weighs in
favor of anonymity.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion [#13] is GRANTED. Plaintiffs may
continue to remain anonymous in this litigation using their first and last initials during
pretrial proceedings.
Dated: March 2, 2026 BY THE COURT:

                                         Kathryn A. Starnella 
                                         United States Magistrate Judge 

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