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Feb. 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Manoj Papa v. Edward J. Green and Community First Healthcare of Illinois, Inc. d/b/a Community First Medical Center

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:23-cv-01221

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (26)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (6.8K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MANOJ PAPA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 1:23-cv-01221

)

v. )

) Judge John Robert Blakey

EDWARD J. GREEN and )

COMMUNITY FIRST HEALTHCARE )

OF ILLINOIS, INC. d/b/a )

COMMUNITY FIRST MEDICAL )

CENTER, )

Defendants. )

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                               
Plaintiff Manoj Papa claims that Defendants Edward Green and Community 

First Health Care of Illinois, Inc. d/b/a Community First Medical Center violated 42
U.S.C. § 1981 by allowing his supervisor Michael Cherny to racially harass him.

Before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, [41]. For the
reasons explained below, the Court grants the Motion.

I. Background

A. Factual Summary1

Plaintiff, who is of Indian descent, served as the Director of Materials for
Defendant Community First Medical Center (the “Center”) beginning in late July
2019. [43] ¶¶ 1, 6. Michael Cherny served as the Center’s Chief Financial Officer

1 The Court draws these facts from parties’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts and responses [43], [48], 50, where supported.

and, at least for a time, supervised Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff worked at the Center
for approximately fifteen months. Id. ¶ 22.

Plaintiff’s main interactions with Cherny occurred in daily finance meetings. Id. ¶ 14. In addition to Plaintiff and Cherny, several directors from other
departments would attend these meetings. Id. On rare occasions, the two would
have one-on-one meetings regarding the organization’s finances. Id. ¶ 16.
Cherny used unprofessional and profane language, and he acted aggressively
and short-temperedly in the workplace. Id. ¶ 17; [49] at 7. Cherny behaved this way
around Plaintiff and other employees of varying races. [43] ¶ 18. Plaintiff claims

Cherny began behaving this way around him early in his employment. Id. ¶ 21.

According to Plaintiff, Cherny also directed racial remarks at Plaintiff.
Plaintiff estimates this occurred on approximately twenty-five to thirty occasions
during his employment. Id. ¶ 22.2 Cherny would pass Plaintiff in the hallway and
greet him by saying statements such as “hey, you Hindu” or “hey, you Indian.” Id.
¶ 25. Sometimes Plaintiff would walk in the halls with another co-worker, Faisal
Master, who was of Pakistani descent. Id. When Cherny saw them together, he

greeted both men based upon their ethnicities or assumed religions, such as saying
“hey, you Pakastani” or “hey you, Muslim.” Id. At least once, Cherny asked why they
were walking together, referring to the historical conflict between Pakistan and

2 Plaintiff claims that this number was just an estimate and does not represent a definitive recollection
of the total amount of times the comments took place. As support for his estimate, Plaintiff cites to his
deposition testimony where he claimed that, for the first three months of his employment, the
comments occurred two or three times per week. [48] ¶ 22.

India. Id. ¶ 26.3 Due to these hallway interactions, Plaintiff tried to avoid crossing
paths with Cherny. [47] at 3. Additionally, in one meeting where only the two were
present, Cherny referred to Plaintiff as a “red dot” Indian. [43] ¶ 30. The above-cited

incidents comprise the sum total of the alleged discrimination; Plaintiff identified no
other harassment and no one else complained about any racial remarks allegedly
made by Cherny about Plaintiff outside of Plaintiff’s presence. Id. ¶ 30, 31, 32.
In addition to the Center, Plaintiff Papa sues Edward Green, the Center’s
corporate president and fifty percent owner. Id. ¶ 49. Green relied upon other
corporate officers, including Cherny, to run the hospital. Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff never

informed Green personally of Cherny’s harassment, and Plaintiff makes no assertion
that Green condoned, approved of, or acquiesced in Cherny’s comments. Id. ¶ 59, 61.

Additionally, Green knew nothing of Cherny’s alleged racial comments. Id. ¶¶ 55,
56, 58, 59, 60, 61.4

At all relevant times, the Center observed an Equal Employment Opportunity
and Anti-Harassment and Anti-Discrimination Policy, which prohibited racial
discrimination. Id. ¶ 36. The Policy included an investigations protocol to be followed

when the Center received a complaint of racial harassment. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff claims
he reported Cherny’s hallway comments to Gabriella Diaz, employed in Human
Resources, in late 2019, which should have sufficed to trigger the Center’s

3 The record contains little to no evidence to corroborate Papa’s recollection of events, and Master had
no recollection of these events. See [43-7] ¶¶ 5–6.

4 Plaintiff disagrees with this fact, but he fails to properly contest it in the record. See [48] ¶¶ 60, 62
(confirming Defendants’ allegation that the only thing reported to Green was that Cherny used “foul
language.”). Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), the Court thus accepts this fact for the purposes
of the motion.

investigations protocol. See id. ¶ 39. But Diaz denies Plaintiff ever filed a report,
and the Center has no record of any complaint. Id. ¶¶ 41, 44.

Papa left the Center on October 9, 2020, when the company eliminated his

position in a reduction in force. Id. ¶¶ 46, 47. Three people, including Cherny,
participated in the decision to eliminate Papa’s position. Id. B. Procedural History

Plaintiff sued the Center and Green on February 27, 2023, [1], and he filed an
amended complaint on June 26, 2023. [20]. Defendants jointly moved for summary
judgment. [41]. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case

for § 1981 discrimination because the harassment was not objectively hostile, severe,
or pervasive. [42] at 8–12. Separately, they also deny that either Defendant is liable.

Id. at 6–8, 12–14. They also ask the Court to disregard comments Cherny allegedly
made about Plaintiff’s religion because § 1981 addresses only racial, not religious,
harassment. Id. at 14–15.

Plaintiff claims the Center remains liable for Cherny’s behavior and believes a
genuine issue of fact remains as to whether Defendant Green acquiesced as to

Cherny’s harassment. [47] at 2–6. He believes there is ample basis for the Center’s
liability. [47] at 6–8. Regarding the religious comments made, Papa acknowledges
that § 1981 claims pertain solely to race, but he maintains that these comments give
the Court a fuller picture of Cherny’s conduct toward Papa. Id. at 8.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment remains proper when no genuine disputes as to material
facts exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The moving party bears the burden of showing no genuine dispute of material
fact exists. Reverse Mortg. Sols., Inc. v. Am. Portfolio Mortg. Corp., 2023 WL 6198822,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 22, 2023). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the
Court evaluates the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
Nicholson v. City of Peoria, 860 F.3d 520, 522 (7th Cir. 2017); it “may not make
credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw

from the facts” but asks whether a material dispute of fact exists that requires a trial
in which a reasonable jury could possibly return a verdict for the non-moving party.

Johnson v. Advoc. Health and Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003)).

In response to the motion, the non-moving party must identify specific evidence
that shows a genuine dispute. Id. at 894 (citing Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d
562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017)). Inferences based upon speculation or conjecture remain

inadequate, id. (citing Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 721–22 (7th Cir.
2018)); nor will a “mere scintilla of evidence” suffice, id. (citing Grant, 870 F.3d at
571).

III. Analysis

Papa claims racial discrimination under § 1981.5 To survive a motion for
summary judgment on a § 1981 hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must show:

(1) the work environment was both objectively and subjectively offensive; (2) race was
the cause of his harassment; (3) the conduct was severe or pervasive; and (4) the
employer legally may be held liable. Clacks v. Kwik Trip, Inc., 108 F.4th 950, 957 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 544 (7th Cir.
2011)).6 As discussed below, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, there remains insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to hold Defendants

liable under § 1981.

To establish a hostile work environment, Plaintiff first must prove
offensiveness. Offensiveness includes both the plaintiff’s subjective view of the
workplace and a reasonable person’s perspective of the environment. A plaintiff’s
perception of the workplace as hostile is all that is required for the subjective element.

See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998)). When determining
objective offensiveness, however, the Court considers the frequency of the conduct, its

5 In passing, Plaintiff mentions McDonnell Douglas, [47] at 2, but does not develop any arguments
using the burden-shifting framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Regardless, the Court considers the evidence presented as a whole to determine if a reasonable
factfinder could find the defendants liable. Li v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC, 110 F.4th 988, 994 (7th
Cir. 2024); see Ortiz v. Werner Enters., 834 F.3d 760, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the “convincing
mosaic” standard and reiterating that evidence should be evaluated holistically).
6 Courts analyze § 1981 and Title VII the same manner. Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532,
544 (7th Cir. 2011). So, the Court cites to both § 1981 and Title VII cases. Similarly, hostile work
environment claims based upon racial harassment and sexual harassment are analyzed using the
same standard. Paschall v. Tube Processing Corp., 28 F.4th 805, 813 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 n.10 (2002)). So, the Court cites sexual harassment
cases as well.

severity, whether it was physically threatening or humiliating or merely offensive,
and whether it interfered with the employee’s performance. Hilt-Dyson v. City of
Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787–88).

Next, a plaintiff must show that race was the cause of his discrimination.  To 

be clear, a § 1981 hostile work environment claim need not show that the harassment
is explicitly racial, but it “must show it had a racial character or purpose.” Yancick, 653 F.3d at 544. And, fundamentally, discrimination requires a person with a
particular trait to be mistreated in a way that is uniquely shared by people with that
same trait. See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000).

The third element of the test involves the requisite pervasiveness and severity 

of the complained-of conduct, and essentially, the same factors used to evaluate
objective hostility are analyzed here. See Lambert v. Peri Formworks Sys., Inc., 723
F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307
F.3d 535, 552 (7th Cir. 2002)). Ultimately, for misconduct to be actionable, it must
be so pervasive or severe that it “alter[s] the conditions of employment and create[s]
an abusive working environment.” McPherson v. City of Waukegan, [379 F.3d 430,

438](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/787324/leslie-d-mcpherson-v-city-of-waukegan/#438) (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 462–63).

A. Hostile Work Environment

Here, Plaintiff’s statements that he felt stressed and belittled and
uncomfortable in his work environment satisfy the element of subjective
offensiveness. See [43-1] 113:4–12. But Cherny’s conduct falls short of satisfying the
objective element; the record evidence does not describe an objectively hostile work
environment under the law.

The record shows that, over the course of fifteen months, Cherny greeted Papa

approximately thirty times in an off-color manner that implicated Papa’s ethnicity.

But even by Papa’s own account, most of the comments were not made in front of
others; none were aggressive or threatening; and the majority were not even
derogatory. Section 1981 does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the
workplace, Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 463, and no reasonable person would consider
Cherny’s occasional, crass comments to be legally intolerable under controlling

precedent.

Moreover, the record also shows that Cherney behaved offensively and
belligerently toward employees irrespective of race, and to win on his claim, Plaintiff
would have to show that Cherny harassed him because of his race. See Yancick, 653
F.3d at 546 (“section 1981 does not cover the ‘equal opportunity’ harasser”) (citing
Holman, 211 F.3d at 403). The record, however, fails to show that Cherny’s conduct
toward Papa had anything to do with racial animus. Therefore, no reasonable jury

could find that Cherny “harassed” Plaintiff because of his race.

Plaintiff also argues that Cherny was instrumental in his firing and claims his
termination constitutes evidence of racial harassment. But the record contains no
evidence to support this theory; Papa does not claim, for example, that Cherny got
him fired for complaining about Cherny’s harassment, see Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d
888, 895–96 (7th Cir. 2012); nor does he claim that his firing had anything to do with
his race. Speculation alone cannot create a dispute of material fact. See Beverly v.
Abbott Lab’ys, 107 F.4th 737, 747 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Speculation about colleagues’ ill
motives is too conclusory to create an issue of material fact.”) (citing Sauzek v. Exxon

Coal USA, Inc., 202 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2000)); Circle City Broad. I, LLC v. AT&T
Servs., Inc., 99 F.4th 378, 384 (7th Cir. 2024).

In sum, even when considering Plaintiff’s evidence as a whole, no reasonable
jury could find that the environment was objectively hostile. The racial harassment
Papa faced was not severe, let alone severe enough to have altered the conditions of
his employment under the law. Further, the complaints of Cherny’s abusive speech

cannot be attributed to Papa’s race because Cherny behaved this way toward other
employees regardless of race. Considering the overall context and the totality of the
circumstances, the record precludes any finding that Plaintiff’s workplace remained
objectively hostile. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787.

Nor were Cherny’s harassing comments otherwise so pervasive or severe as to
be actionable. To be sure, there is no strict formula for determining when harassment
becomes actionable, and no specific number of offensive comments needed to

automatically trigger liability. Paschall v. Tube Processing Corp., 28 F.4th 805, 815 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 288 F.3d 1040, 1047 (7th Cir.

2002)). Even one act or statement may suffice if it is sufficiently egregious. Yancick, 653 F.3d at 547; see, e.g., Paschall, 28 F.4th at 815. Here, however, given the nature
and relative infrequency of Cherny’s statements, a reasonable jury could not find that
the harassment was severe or pervasive. For example, the record confirms that,
despite Cherny rude remarks, Plaintiff remained able to work normally. He never
feared for his safety and never felt threatened; he simply tried to avoid crossing
Cherny’s path in the hallway. More is required to show a hostile work environment.

Yancick, 653 F.3d at 544 (“We will not find a hostile work environment for mere
offensive conduct that is isolated, does not interfere with the plaintiff’s work
performance, and is not physically threatening or humiliating.”); Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 788 (“These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure
that [§ 1981] does not become a ‘general civility code.’”). The evidence falls far short
of demonstrating pervasive or severe harassment, and no reasonable jury could find

Defendants liable under § 1981.

B. Employer Liability

Although no reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff on his § 1981 claim, the
Court will nonetheless address the issue of employer liability.

As Plaintiff’s supervisor, the Center would be strictly liable for Cherny’s
discriminatory conduct if the harassment resulted in a tangible employment action;
however, it would be able to assert an affirmative defense if Cherny’s harassment did

not culminate in a tangible employment action. Vance v. Ball State University, 570
U.S. 421, 429 (2013). Termination is a tangible employment action. Trahanas v.
Northwestern Univ., 64 F.4th 842, 853 (7th Cir. 2023). Strict liability, however, does
not attach simply because an employment action occurs, but rather that action must
constitute a culmination of harassment. Vance, 570 U.S. at 423. As explained above,
nothing—other than speculation—connects Cherny’s harassment or Papa’s race to
his ultimate termination. In short, the record provides no basis to hold Defendants
liable under § 1981.
Defendant Green, as a corporate officer of the Center, may potentially be liable
for Cherny’s harassment. A corporate officer can only be personally liable under
§ 1981 if he participated in, directed, consented to, or acquiesced to the discriminatory
behavior. See Musitkiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 753-55 (7th Cir. 1985). And
here, the record contains no evidence to suggest that this was the case. Although
Green knew Cherny used “foul language,” he had no idea Cherny commented upon
employees’ ethnicity and no idea Plaintiff subjectively felt discriminated against.
Therefore, even if Plaintiff could get to a jury on his § 1981 claim, he has no legal
basis to hold Green personally liable.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could
find Defendants liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. As a result, the Court grants
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [41] and directs the Clerk to enter
judgment in Defendants’ favor. Civil case terminated.

Date: February 18, 2026 Entered:

                                       pole     2 
                                  Cite Blakey 
                                      United States District Judge 

                                  11