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Feb. 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Tyrone Dillard II v. City of Chicago, et al.

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:24-cv-04396

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (51)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

TYRONE DILLARD II, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 24-cv-04396

)

v. ) Judge John Robert Blakey

)

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

       MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                               

Plaintiff Tyrone Dillard II sues pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Defendants, Officer Clifford Martin Jr., Officer Mayklae Ingram, and the City of
Chicago, violated his Fourth Amendment rights when the Officer Defendants stopped
him, searched his bag, took his weapon, and subsequently arrested him, [1].

Defendants collectively move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see [25]. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants
Defendants’ motion.

I. Background

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

On August 25, 2023, Plaintiff crossed South Wentworth Street in front of his
house in Chicago, and then he went to speak with his brother and his brother’s wife,
who were sitting in a car parked at the curb. [1] at 2–3; [32] at 2. At the time, Plaintiff
wore a crossbody bag with its strap across his shoulder. [1] at 3; [32] at 3.

Officers Martin and Ingram, driving down South Wentworth at the time,
spotted Plaintiff, who was standing in the street, and “initiated a Terry stop without
probable cause” as they approached. [1] at 2. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the

officers stopped their unmarked car and approached Plaintiff, [32] at 3, and even
though he behaved “lawfully” and was not engaged in “criminal activity,” Officer
Martin requested Plaintiff’s identification. [1] at 2. Plaintiff further alleges that he
handed over his ID because he did not think he was “free to go,” and the officers then
began to pat Plaintiff down; one of the officers reached into Plaintiff’s bag and found
a black Glock 27 handgun. Id. at 2–3. The officers ran a criminal check on Plaintiff

at the scene, which revealed that Plaintiff was a convicted felon. Id.; [32] at 3.

Plaintiff submitted a pro se complaint on May 29, 2024, claiming that the
officers’ search and seizure violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment, [1].

Plaintiff’s complaint also mentions malicious prosecution and cruel and unusual
punishment (both tied to the allegedly unlawful search and seizure), and he seeks $1
million in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages from each
Defendant. Id. This recitation comprises the sum total of the allegations in Plaintiff’s
complaint [1], as clarified in his response to the motion to dismiss, [32].1

1 As discussed below, however, the August 25, 2023 incident was also captured by the Officers’ body
worn cameras, and the Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, [25], in large part, based
upon the video and audio footage, which they attach to their motion, see [26], [27].

B. The Officers’ Body Worn Camera Footage

Before turning to the merits of the parties’ arguments on dismissal, the Court
must discuss the Officers’ body worn camera (BWC) footage, including the propriety

of considering it at this stage of the proceedings.

On a motion to dismiss, a court must accept allegations as true and “construe
all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Forrest v. Universal Savings Bank, F.A., 507
F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2007). In doing so, a court may also “consider any facts set
forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff’s claim.” Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705
F.3d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 2013). This includes exhibits attached to the complaint or

referenced therein, “if they are central to the claim.” Id. In some cases, determining whether a video or exhibit remains “central to the
claim” can be challenging. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Chi., 21-cv-1397, 2022 WL
865796, at *3–5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2022) (declining to consider body camera footage
that plaintiff did not attach to his complaint and that does not show the entire
incident); Hyung Seok Koh v. Graf, No. 11-cv-2605, 2013 WL 5348326, at *9 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 24, 2013) (considering footage of a police interrogation on a motion to dismiss

where the footage captured most of the questioning and the interrogation was central
to the plaintiff’s claims). This matter, however, is not one of the challenging cases.

Here, Plaintiff’s entire complaint remains predicated upon his brief encounter
with the Defendant officers (which he describes in his allegations), and the BWC
depiction of those events remains central to his claim (Plaintiff even mentions the
video himself, [1] at 3). Indeed, to prevail at this stage, Plaintiff must make a
plausible showing that in this encounter the officers lacked a constitutionally
sufficient basis to approach him, ask for his ID, and/or later retrieve his gun.2

Consequently, in this case, the BWC footage documenting the encounter may

properly be considered, even on a motion to dismiss. See 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus.,
Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the aim of the exception
allowing courts to consider documents central to a claim “is to prevent parties from
surviving a motion to dismiss by artful pleading or by failing to attach relevant
documents.”).

Moreover, this Court may also take judicial notice of “facts in the public record

that are ‘not subject to reasonable dispute’ and ‘can be accurately and readily
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’” Johnson
v. McDonald, No. 23 C 3200, 2025 WL 965703, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2025) (quoting
Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2)). Thus, even at this early stage of the proceedings, where the
officers’ body worn camera footage “utterly discredits” the plaintiff's account, the trial
court need not “afford customary deference to the non-movant’s averments.” Id. (quoting Luczynski v. Joroan, No. 23-cv-17184, 2024 WL 3106101, at *2 (N.D. Ill.

June 24, 2024); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007)). The Seventh Circuit
has explicitly instructed that “when the evidence includes a videotape of the relevant
events, the Court should not adopt the nonmoving party’s version of the events when
that version is blatantly contradicted by the videotape.” Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d

2 Even though Plaintiff alleges that he committed no crime and that the officers approached him and
searched his bag without probable cause, such allegations remain legal conclusions, which this Court
need not accept. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009).

936, 942 (7th Cir. 2016). As a result, the Court may also take judicial notice of the
video when assessing the plausibility of Plaintiff’s claims. See also Bogie, 705 F.3d
at 609 (if “an exhibit incontrovertibly contradicts the allegations in the complaint, the

exhibit ordinarily controls, even when considering a motion to dismiss.”) (citing
Forrest, 507 F.3d at 542); Esco v. City of Chicago, 651 F. Supp. 3d 917, 919–20 (N.D.
Ill. 2023), aff'd, 107 F.4th 673 (7th Cir. 2024) (courts remain “free to consider any
facts set forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff's claim, including
documents or other materials referenced in the pleading if they are central to the
claim, including video footage that shows in real time the content and context of the

alleged wrongs.”).

In his response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff suggests that the submitted
BWC footage remains incomplete and fails to show “the incident before the arrest,
where officers were violating citizens right the entire day by jumping out the car
without probable cause violating citizens rights without probable cause.” [32] at 2.

But any recordings showing the officers’ conduct in earlier encounters with unnamed
individuals who are not parties to this case, even if they exist, have no bearing on the

question of whether the officers violated Plaintiff’s rights in the encounter from which
Plaintiff’s claim stems. And this Court’s careful review of the officers’ BWC footage
(which consists of recordings from all three officers’ cameras) confirms that the
exhibits capture the entire encounter, including the audio, from the moment the
officers’ car pulled up, through the moment Plaintiff was handcuffed and placed into
the squad car, to the moment when the officers got back into their vehicle. In short,
to the extent Plaintiff challenges the completeness or accuracy of the relevant footage,
his challenge remains unfounded.

Having determined that it may properly consider the BWC footage, this Court

turns to the substance of the recordings themselves, which directly contradict many
of Plaintiff’s allegations and undermine his Fourth Amendment claim.

First, the BWC footage confirms Plaintiff’s allegation that the Officers
conducted a Terry stop3 on August 25, 2023. The footage shows that, at 11: 19 a.m.
on August 25, 2023, Officer Ingram was riding in the front passenger seat, and Officer
Martin was riding in the back seat, of a vehicle being driven by Officer Parker (who

Plaintiff has not sued). Officer Ingram’s BWC footage shows the Officers’ car turned
onto Wentworth, where Plaintiff is immediately visible, standing in the street (where
car traffic would flow) while leaning into a car without a handicapped placard, which
was itself parked at the curb between signs designating the spot as a handicapped-
only parking spot. Plaintiff wore what appears to be a Louis Vuitton crossbody bag
and is seen holding his phone in his hand. Based upon the apparent traffic violations,
the officers approached.

Next, the BWC recorded the ensuing encounter. Specifically, Officer Parker
asked the individual sitting in the driver seat of the parked car (Plaintiff’s brother)
whether he had a handicap placard, and the individual answered, “no.” Officer
Martin immediately asked Plaintiff if he had an ID on him; Plaintiff pulled out his
wallet and flipped it open. Officer Martin then asked him to remove the ID from his

3 The Court defines and discusses Terry stops below.

wallet, and he also asked Plaintiff if he had a weapon on him. In response, Plaintiff
indicated that he did and moved his hand toward his bag retrieve it; Officer Martin
then said, “no” and instead asked Plaintiff if he’s got something in his bag, to which

Plaintiff said, “yes sir.” Officer Martin then placed Plaintiff in handcuffs for safety
purposes, unzipped the bag, and retrieved the gun exactly where Plaintiff indicated
it would be. Officer Martin then asked Plaintiff if he had anything else on him,
Plaintiff said, “no,” and Officer Martin told Plaintiff that he appreciated Plaintiff’s
honesty. The Officers and Plaintiff remained civil and conversational throughout the
encounter.

Finally, the BWC recorded the officers’ immediate follow-up investigation.
Based upon the recovery of the firearm, Officer Martin provided Plaintiff’s ID number
to other law enforcement personnel on his radio and, while he waited for information,
he asked Plaintiff if he was on parole; Plaintiff indicated that he was not on parole.

Via the radio, however, the dispatcher then relayed that Plaintiff had “no valid DL,”
and that he was, in fact, on parole and was a convicted gun offender who needed to
register annually. At this point, the Officers then placed Plaintiff under arrest,

allowed him to remove his jewelry (giving it, along with his car keys, to Plaintiff’s
female companion, who arrived on the scene while the officers were still speaking to
Plaintiff). Officer Ingram placed Plaintiff in a squad car, at 11:27 a.m., and returned
to the officers’ car at 11:29 a.m. The entire encounter lasted no more than ten
minutes.

Based upon the BWC footage, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claim fails as a matter of law and should thus be dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6), [25]. They also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity, id. II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must provide
a “short and plain statement of the claim” showing that the pleader merits relief, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that the defendant has “fair notice” of the claim “and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A court accepts all well-pleaded

allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint
must contain “sufficient factual matter” to state a facially plausible claim to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570). A plaintiff need not plead “detailed
factual allegations” but still must provide more than mere labels and conclusions or
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action for the complaint to suffice.

Id.; see Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581–82 (7th Cir. 2009). Courts also liberally

construe pro se complaints and hold them to a less stringent standard than filings
drafted by counsel. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2017). In addition to the proper consideration of the BWC
as discussed above, this Court has applied the requisite standard.

III. Discussion & Analysis

Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person” who, while acting under color of
state law, deprives an individual of federally protected rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See

also Sabo v. Erickson, 128 F.4th 836, 845 (7th Cir. 2025) (to state a claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege that his constitutional rights were violated by a state
official acting under color of law). Plaintiff’s allegations confirm that the Defendant
Officers acted, at all times relevant, under color of state law. For present purposes,
therefore, the relevant question is whether his allegations plausibly claim a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.

A. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff claims that the Defendant Officers violated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment when they approached him, asked for his ID, searched him,
seized his gun, and thereafter arrested him, all allegedly without probable cause. See
[1]. The Fourth Amendment establishes the “right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This amendment, of course, does not proscribe all searches

and seizures, but rather only the unreasonable ones. U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
682 (1985).

Generally, a search or seizure is unreasonable if not based upon probable
cause. United States v. Eymann, 962 F.3d 273, 282 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)). The Supreme Court created an exception to
this rule in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), however. Under Terry, “police officers
may briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes based on the less exacting
standard of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Eymann, 962 F.3d
at 282 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22). “Reasonable suspicion demands ‘only a

minimal level of objective justification,’ which is something ‘more than a hunch but
less than probable cause’ and significantly less than a preponderance of the evidence.”

United States v. Olson, 41 F.4th 792, 800 (7th Cir. 2022) (United States v. Richmond, 924 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir.
2016); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000)). “Reasonable suspicion
amounts to an ‘objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be,

engaged in criminal activity.’” United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir.
2003) (quoting United States v. Swift, 220 F.3d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2000)). To
determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, courts “look at the ‘totality of the
circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized
and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273 (2002).

Viewing the allegations and the BWC footage in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, there can be no question that the Officers conducted a Terry stop, and then
later a full custodial arrest. But the audio and video captured in the BWC footage
also show that the initial investigative stop, and the resulting probable cause arrest,
were both reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Under Terry, the constitution permits an “investigative stop” and “brief
detention” to give officers a “chance to verify (or dispel) well-founded suspicions that
a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.’” United States v.
Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1014–15 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Vega, 72
F.3d 507, 515 (7th Cir.1995)). For an “investigative stop based upon reasonable

suspicion to pass constitutional muster, the investigation following it must be
reasonably related in scope and duration to the circumstances that justified the stop
in the first instance so that it is a minimal intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests.” Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 30 F.3d 774, 784 (7th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1985)). Legitimate
purposes of a Terry stop may include “ensuring the safety of the officers or others.”

Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 2013).

In this case, the BWC footage undermines Plaintiff’s suggestion that the initial
investigative stop violated the Fourth Amendment. As discussed above, when the
officers pulled onto Wentworth, they saw a car (without a handicapped placard)
parked in a handicapped spot, between two signs designating that specific spot as a
handicapped spot. They also saw Plaintiff standing in the street obstructing traffic,
as he spoke with individuals in that car. Furthermore, upon approach, Officer Parker

asked Plaintiff’s brother, who was sitting in the driver’s seat, if he had a placard, and
Plaintiff’s brother admitted that he did not.

Based upon the objective facts, the Officers possessed reasonable suspicion to
believe that Plaintiff (and his brother) were violating the law. For example, the
officers had reason to believe that Plaintiff was, among other things, violating
Chicago Municipal Code § 9-80-180, which provides that:

“any person who shall willfully and unnecessarily hinder, obstruct or
delay or who shall willfully and unnecessarily attempt to hinder,
obstruct or delay any other person in lawfully driving or travelling along
or upon any street or who shall offer to barter or sell any merchandise
or service on the street so as to interfere with the effective movement of
traffic or who shall repeatedly cause motor vehicles travelling on public
thoroughfares to stop or impede the flow of traffic shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than
$200.00 or imprisoned for not more than ten days, or both, for the first
offense . . . .”

Likewise, the officers reasonably believed Plaintiff’s brother was violating Illinois
law, which prohibits parking:

“any motor vehicle which is not properly displaying registration plates
or decals issued to a person with disabilities, as defined by Section 1-
159.1, pursuant to Sections 3-616, 11-1301.1 or 11-1301.2, or to a
veteran with a disability pursuant to Section 3-609 of this Act, as
evidence that the vehicle is operated by or for a person with disabilities
or a veteran with a disability, in any parking place, including any

private or public off-street parking facility, specifically reserved, by the
posting of an official sign as designated under Section 11-301, for motor
vehicles displaying such registration plates.”

625 ILL. CMP. STAT. 5/11-1301.3(a). Under both theories, the Officers reasonably
approached Plaintiff (and his brother) to investigate the apparent violations.
Thereafter, during the stop, the officers’ initial conduct remained reasonable
under Terry,4 and this included the police officers asking basic safety questions about
the presence of dangerous weapons on the scene and running warrant checks. United
States v. Snow, 656 F.3d 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Terry recognizes the authority of

4 Contrary to the Plaintiff’s theory, merely “asking for identification does not amount to a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.” Hall v. City of Chicago, 953 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2020). Indeed, in “the
ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth
Amendment”; and “interrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for identification by the police
does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of
Nevada, Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 185–86 (2004) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)).

an officer conducting an investigatory stop to take reasonable steps to assure the
safety of himself and others.”); Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015)
(“Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes

‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop’” and such questioning can “involve
checking the driver’s license,” and “determining whether there are outstanding
warrants” [among other topics].); United States v. Walls, 759 F. Supp. 3d 858, 867
(N.D. Ill. 2024) (“For officer safety, officers routinely ask about the presence of a gun
at a traffic stop without the need of Miranda warnings.”); United States v. Lyons, 856
F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 (C.D. Ill. 2012) (officer “was entitled to ask Defendant if he had

a gun” during a traffic stop); United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“as part of the stop, police may ask the vehicle’s occupants ‘a moderate number of
questions’ and request their identification.”).

Moreover, once Plaintiff voluntarily admitted that he was currently in
possession of a weapon, the police officers remained justified in placing him in
handcuffs, searching the location Plaintiff indicated, and securing the gun
themselves. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 n.1 (1985)

(recognizing the special law enforcement need of conducting a protective weapons
search based upon reasonable suspicion) (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)); United States v. Edwards, 161 F.4th 1088, 1097 (7th Cir. 2025) (“when officer
safety is in question or a weapon may be present,” officers may draw their weapons
and use a degree of force—including handcuffing the suspect—without converting a
Terry stop into a de facto arrest”) (citing United States v. Olson, 41 F. 4th 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2022)); United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1994) (court
found the use of handcuffs and drawn weapons did not convert a Terry stop into an
arrest, and then held that to “require an officer to risk his life in order to make an

investigatory stop would run contrary to the intent of Terry v. Ohio.”); United States
v. Wilson, 2 F.3d at 231 (upholding use of handcuffs in investigatory stop); Tom v.
Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 957–58 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding use of handcuffs in
investigatory stop); United States v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 1989)
(handcuffing was permissible as part of a Terry stop where police dispatch indicated
defendants were in possession of weapons).

After the lawful recovery of the weapon, the police officers possessed probable
cause to arrest Plaintiff when, moments later, the ID check confirmed his status as a
convicted felon. See Gonzalez v. Vill. of W. Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir.
2012) (Probable cause to arrest exists if an officer “has reason to believe, in light of
the facts known at the time, that the suspect has committed or is about to commit a
crime.”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24–1.1(a) (“It is unlawful for a person to knowingly
possess on or about his person . . . any weapon prohibited under Section 24–1 of this

Act or any firearm or any firearm ammunition if the person has been convicted of a
felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction.”); Ill. Admin. Code tit.
20 § 1610.20 (providing that only those convicted of felonies are eligible for parole).

See also 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.”); United States v. Gay, 98 F.4th 843, 844 (7th Cir. 2024), reh’g denied, No.

23-2097, 2024 WL 3816648 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024) (“Because of his felony
convictions, Gay is forbidden to possess either firearms or ammunition.”).

The existence of probable cause at this point in the encounter dooms the
Plaintiff’s case. See Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998) (If probable
cause exists for a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim, a defendant may assert it to defeat
the cause of action) (citing Jones by Jones v. Webb, 45 F.3d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1995));

Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Probable cause acts as
an absolute bar to a claim for false arrest.”) (citing Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City
of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2010)).

In short, considering the totality of the circumstances, the initial Terry stop
and routine questioning, as well as the lawful recovery of the gun and Plaintiff’s
resulting arrest based upon probable cause, all pass constitutional muster; and
Plaintiff’s constitutional claim to the contrary remains implausible.

B. Qualified Immunity

Even though this Court finds the police officers possessed the necessary
reasonable suspicion to justify their initial Terry stop, Plaintiff’s claim would still fail
based upon qualified immunity, even if they were mistaken about their initial
determination that Plaintiff (or his brother) were committing traffic violations.5

5 There is no dispute between the parties that later, after recovery of the firearm and confirmation of
his status as a convicted felon, the police officers would certainly possess probable cause to arrest
The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity functions as a defense to suit, rather than just
liability, and must be addressed as early as possible. Rusinowski v. Vill. of Hillside, 835 F.Supp.2d 641, 650 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Although a plaintiff need not plead around
the defense in his complaint, see, e.g., Rosas v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 652
F.Supp.3d 951, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2023); Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 736 (7th Cir.

2021), once a defendant raises qualified immunity, a plaintiff bears the burden of
disproving the defense. Euring v. City of Chicago, No. 25-cv-3322 2025 WL 3210397,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2025). A plaintiff may do this only by plausibly alleging in
his complaint a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Id. As explained above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any
violation of the Fourth Amendment. As Defendants state in their motion, the officers
had “reasonable articulable suspicion that Plaintiff was obstructing traffic (a

violation of the Chicago Municipal Code) and that the vehicle he was standing next
to was unlawfully parked,” a violation of Illinois law. [25] at 5. Nevertheless, even if
the Officers were wrong in these assessments, they remain immune from suit.

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. (“immunity covers mere mistakes in judgment, whether the

Plaintiff for a firearms offense. Instead, here, Plaintiff disputes the lawfulness of the officers’ initial
approach, which he claims, constituted the moment of arrest (an alleged version of events undermined
by the BWC recordings, as discussed above).

mistake is one of fact or one of law”). Thus, even if Plaintiff was not, in fact, violating
Chicago Municipal Code § 9-80-180, and even if his brother’s car was not illegally
parked, the Defendant Officers remain entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law.

C. Plaintiff’s Other Claims

While the crux of Plaintiff’s complaint lies in his Fourth Amendment claim, he
also alleges malicious prosecution and violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments; he also seeks indemnification from the City of Chicago. These claims,
however, fail as well.

First, the allegations in support of his malicious prosecution and cruel and
unusual punishment claims remain tethered to Plaintiff’s flawed Fourth Amendment
claim. He alleges, for example, that his detention in Cook County Jail, after being
arrested on August 25, 2023, constituted cruel and unusual punishment and
malicious prosecution because he was arrested unconstitutionally. [1] at 3; [32] at 9.
Because Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment theory fails, these claims fail too.

Plaintiff also claims the Defendant Officers (who are African American) singled

him out because of his race. The Fourteenth Amendment, among other things,
assures that all persons will enjoy “equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. An equal protection violation in the Fourteenth Amendment involves the
singling out a person for different treatment with no rational basis typically due to a
particular protected characteristic, such as race, national origin, or sex. Swanson v.
City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 2013). To state a claim of racial profiling,
a plaintiff must allege facts to suggest that defendants were motivated by a
discriminatory purpose and had a discriminatory effect. Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 635 (7th Cir. 2001). In his complaint, Plaintiff simply writes “I’m a

young African American male and both officers racially profile….” [1] at 3. These
allegations, however, remain conclusory, and “unsupported conclusory factual
allegations do not state a § 1983 claim.” Mong v. McKenzie, No. 21 CV 2420, 2023
WL 7629667, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2023). See also Bilek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 8 F.4th
581, 586 (7th Cir. 2021) (“A claim is plausible where a plaintiff ‘pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.”) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Finally, because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s substantive claims against the
Officers, it also dismisses any indemnification claim against the City. See 745 ILCS
§ 10/2–109 (“a local public entity is not liable for any injury resulting from an act or
omission of its employee where the employee is not liable”); Kailin as next friend of
Kailin v. Metcalf, No. 19 C 4703, 2020 WL 1139259, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2020)
(dismissing respondeat superior and indemnification claims against the Village

because all underlying claims were dismissed).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, this Court grants Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, [25], and dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint. Additionally, because the record
(including the body worn camera footage) demonstrates that any further amendment
would be futile, this Court declines to grant Plaintiff further opportunity to amend,
and dismisses this case with prejudice. See, e.g., Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl
Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 520 (7th Cir. 2015). Civil
case terminated.

Dated: February 19, 2026 Entered:
“ae Robert Blakey A
nited States District Judge

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