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Feb. 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Tara Hudson v. Buehler Moving and Storage, et al.

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:24-cv-09646

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.8K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

TARA HUDSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 24 C 9646

)

BUEHLER MOVING AND STORAGE, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

  ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT                

On September 30, 2025, the Court entered an order dismissing plaintiff Tara 

Hudson's case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Since that date, Ms. Hudson, who
is unrepresented by counsel, has made numerous filings in an effort to persuade the
Court to vacate the judgment. The Court has given Ms. Hudson several opportunities to
attempt to get a viable proposed amended complaint on file. She proved to be unable
to do so or to comply with the Court's guidance. The Court has now reviewed Ms.
Hudson's most recent attempt at an amended complaint. This version, like the others,
does not state any viable claims. The Court therefore denies Ms. Hudson's motion to
vacate the judgment.

The Court first reviews the procedural history of the case. Ms. Hudson filed a pro
se lawsuit against Buehler Moving Companies on October 7, 2024. She alleged she
had worked for Buehler as a driver. Ms. Hudson alleged discrimination based on her
race (Black) and gender (female) and retaliation for complaining about discrimination,
and she also asserted a claim for discrimination based on her former military service
under a statute whose acronym is USERRA. Ms. Hudson alleged that she had received
a notice of right to sue from the EEOC on June 28, 2024, which appeared to make
certain of her claims about 10 days late. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Buehler
moved to dismiss or to require a more definite statement. It argued that the

discrimination and retaliation claims were untimely because she had not filed suit within
90 days after receipt of the EEOC notice of right to sue; the USERRA claim was
deficient; and the complaint was vague and confusing and did not clearly spell out how
Ms. Hudson contended Buehler had violated the law.

The Court held a telephonic hearing on June 12, 2025 and attempted to clarify
whether October 7, 2024 was the date the EEOC sent the notice of right to sue or the
date Ms. Hudson received it. Ms. Hudson did not recall the date on the notice but said
she believed she had received the notice by mail. At the conclusion of the hearing and
in the order entered after the hearing ended, the Court directed Ms. Hudson to file the
EEOC notice with the Clerk. Ms. Hudson then filed a partial response to Buehler's

motion to dismiss. She contended that she had sent her complaint to the Clerk via the
online pro se filing portal within 90 days after she received the EEOC's notice of right to
sue, but the Clerk did not accept the filing, so she refiled the complaint a few days later.

Ms. Hudson's submission also attached the EEOC notice, which was issued on June
28, 2024, making it nearly impossible for her to have received it on that same date.
The Court held another telephonic hearing on July 28, 2025. The Court indicated
that there was likely a factual dispute that precluded finding the Title VII claims untimely,
at least on a motion to dismiss. The Court then brought up Buehler's argument that the
complaint was so vague that it was hard to tell what Ms. Hudson claimed Buehler had
done or failed to do. The Court, after inquiring about Ms. Hudson's efforts to retain
counsel, suggested that she consider filing a motion to appoint counsel and directed the
Clerk to send her the necessary forms for such a motion.

Ms. Hudson did not file a motion to appoint counsel. At the next telephonic

hearing, on August 21, 2025, she advised the Court that she did not want counsel
appointed and wished to continue to proceed pro se. Ms. Hudson also said she was
working on an amended complaint and asked for another week to file it. The Court
gave Ms. Hudson until August 29 to file an amended complaint, gave Buehler until
September 19 to file a response, and set the case for a telephonic hearing for
September 30. But Ms. Hudson did not file an amended complaint within the time the
Court had allotted and did not request an extension of time. And she failed to appear
for the September 30 hearing. On that date, the Court directed the entry of judgment
dismissing the case for want of prosecution.

On October 12, 2025, Ms. Hudson filed a motion to vacate the judgment. She

said that she had missed the September 30 hearing date because she had written down
the date wrong. She also said that she had completed a proposed amended complaint.

Ms. Hudson filed her proposed amended complaint the next day. Unfortunately, the
proposed amended complaint was at the opposite extreme from the bare-bones original
complaint she had filed. Specifically, it was 51 pages long, plus 90 exhibits, and it
contained—literally—a day-by-day narrative of her experiences working for Buehler
from June through November 2023.

The Court entered an order on Ms. Hudson's motion to vacate the judgment on
December 27, 2025. The Court reviewed the proposed amended complaint under 28
U.S.C. §1915 (e)(2) to determine if it was frivolous or failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. In the proposed amended complaint, Ms. Hudson sought to add
four new corporate or entity defendants, none of which she alleged had been her
employer. The Court reviewed these allegations and determined that Ms. Hudson could

not assert claims against these entities under the statutes she cited in her proposed
amended complaint. See Dec. 27, 2025 Order at 4-5. As for Ms. Hudson's asserted
claims against Buehler, the Court concluded that these allegations largely failed to state
viable claims. See id. at 5-6. The Court then stated:

The fourth and equally important problem with the amended complaint
involves its prolix and discursive nature—including, in particular, the day-by-day
narrative that it includes. One can't tell from the amended complaint how any
particular day's events fit into Ms. Hudson's claims against Buehler. That is the
problem when a plaintiff does not provide a "short and plain statement" of the
plaintiff's claims: it's impossible to tell what goes where. After reading the
narrative, one is left wondering what Ms. Hudson contends Buehler did that
violated her rights under any of the cited statutes. The proposed amended
complaint is subject to dismissal on this basis alone. See, e.g., Cable v. Kuraray
Am., Inc., No. 24-1244, 2024 WL 4499766, at *2 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2024)
(collecting cases). Id. at 7.

The Court denied Ms. Hudson's request to file the proposed amended complaint
but did not, at that point, deny her motion to vacate the judgment. Rather, the Court
stated that it would "give Ms. Hudson one final chance—one—to get a viable proposed
second amended complaint on file." Id. The Court then provided Ms. Hudson with the
following guidance:

The proposed second amended complaint needs to spell out clearly, for each of
the statutory violations that Ms. Hudson alleges:

     - when each act alleged to have violated the law took place;    

     - who on the part of Buehler was involved; and                  
     - exactly what Buehler or its employees did that Ms. Hudson alleges 
violated her rights.                                                 

If Ms. Hudson's proposed second amended complaint does not comply with 
these requirements, the Court will deny leave to file the amended complaint and 
will deny her motion to vacate the judgment. Id. at 7-8.                                                               
Ms. Hudson filed a proposed second amended complaint on January 26, 2026, 

but it attempted to incorporate material from her previous voluminous filings. This was
inappropriate; a complaint itself needs to include a short and plain statement of the
plaintiff's claims and cannot appropriately incorporate earlier filings. The Court could
have ended matters right there; it had expressly given Ms. Hudson just one final
chance. But the Court gave her yet another opportunity to get a viable complaint on file,
entering an order that stated:

Plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint repeatedly attempts to
incorporate allegations and material from her first amended complaint, which was
dismissed. This is inappropriate; a complaint has to be a self-contained
document that does not incorporate material from separate filings. The second
amended complaint is stricken. The Court give[s] plaintiff until 5:00 PM on
Monday 1/26/2026 to file a corrected second amended complaint that complies
with this order and the Court's prior directives (see, e.g., dkt. no. 56). If plaintiff
does not do so, the Court will enter judgment against plaintiff.

See dkt. 60 (order of Jan. 24, 2026).

Ms. Hudson filed a revised second amended complaint on January 26, but the
next scheduled hearing was the following day, January 27. The Court had not had
sufficient time to review her submission before that, so after a brief hearing the Court
continued the matter to February 3. During that hearing, Buehler's counsel stated the
following (the Court derives this from its rough transcript of the January 27 hearing):
[I]n my . . . reading all of these versions, I don't see that Ms. Hudson is actually
claiming that she's an employee of Buehler companies, she was not an
employee and I don't see that claim and a lot of her claims and allegations, a lot
of her claims are related to employment issues where you would need to be an
employee to bring the claim. So I'm wondering if she's suggesting she is or is
not. That's not evident in any of the versions of any of the complaints.

Ms. Hudson responded as follows:

Your Honor, if I may, per the FLSA, how the employee is defined there, I meet the
requirements to be it -- I am an employee or I was an employee of Buehler
moving and storage at the time that the incident occurred.

The Court said it would consider this in reviewing Ms. Hudson's proposed second
amended complaint. Ms. Hudson thereafter filed, without seeking leave of court, a
supplemental submission setting forth her views of the law regarding her status as an
employee or independent contractor and including additional allegations. See dkt. 63.
The proposed second amended complaint, like at least one of the earlier
attempts, provides a list of dates and events and then appears to translate each of
these into a separate claim for relief. Ms. Hudson asserts 35 separate purported claims
for relief, each of which appears to involve a single one of the events alleged in the
"statement of facts" section of plaintiff's filing. Most of the claims invoke Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964; others cite the federal Fair Labor Standards Act; and at least
one is based on the federal Equal Pay Act. Most, but not all, of the federal claims also
reference a parallel state law claim. Some claims reference only state law.

1. Claims under FLSA

In 10 of Ms. Hudson's proposed claims—Counts 7, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, 20, 24, 25,
and 32—she asserts as violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act claims that, as she
describes them, involve delays in paying her (Counts 7, 16, and 17), erroneous payroll
deductions (Count 9), a pay decrease (Count 10), lower-than-expected pay (Count 12),
and unexplained chargebacks against her pay (Counts 20, 24, 25, and 32). None of
these allegations come close to plausibly alleging violations of the FLSA. The pertinent
provisions of the FLSA requires an employer to pay its employees a wage of at least
$7.25 per hour (i.e., the minimum wage), and one-and-one-half times the employee's

regular hourly rate for hours worked over 40 in a single week. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 (a),
207(a). That's it. The FLSA does not govern payroll deductions or chargebacks, the
timing of payment of wages, or unfulfilled expectations regarding pay. The proposed
second amended complaint alleges nothing within the scope of the FLSA's

requirements—even assuming that Hudson was an "employee" of Buehler, as opposed
to an independent contractor.

2. Claims under Title VII / parallel state statutes

A significant number of the "counts" in Hudson's proposed second amended
complaint involve, under various headings, what appear to be attempts to assert claims
of a hostile work environment based on race and/or gender violative of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and parallel state statutes. This includes the following 13
counts: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 15, 18, 22, 23, 27, 28, and 29. Based on the factual
allegations made by Hudson, most of these "counts"—all but 2, 4, and 28—involve
allegations of harassment by persons who would not be considered supervisors of
Hudson under established hostile work environment law: dispatchers, other drivers,
payroll personnel, an "operations assistant," etc.

To sustain a hostile work environment claim based on the conduct of non-
supervisors, an employee (assuming that is what Hudson was) must show that (1) she
was subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on her race or
gender; (3) the harassment was severe or pervasive; and (4) there is a basis to hold the
employer itself liable. See, e.g., Scaife v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 49 F.4th 1109,
1115-16 (7th Cir. 2022); Gates v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 916 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2019). In determining whether the conduct is severe or pervasive, courts

consider all the circumstances, including: "(1) the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; (2) how offensive a reasonable person would deem it to be; (3) whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating conduct as opposed to verbal abuse; (4) whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance; and (5) whether it is
directed at the victim." Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1116. And for there to be a basis for
employer liability, a supervisor must have been a participant in the harassment or the
employer must be "negligent in discovering or remedying co-worker harassment." Liu v.
Cook County, 817 F.3d 307, 318-19 (7th Cir. 2016).

In her separate proposed claims alleging a hostile work environment, Ms.
Hudson describes a handful of incidents over a period of about six months of

employment (late May through late November 2023) involving problems with particular
work assignments (Counts 2, 5, 22, and 23); delays in paying her on two occasions
(Counts 18 and 27); a female worker (identified as an "operations assistant") recording
Ms. Hudson at a worksite (Count 15); a conversation in her supervisor's office where the
same female operations assistant "treated and spoke to me with contempt and hostility"
(Count 28, see also Compl. ¶ XXVIII); unspecified "sexist misogynistic behaviors, body
shaming and demeaning speech" by co-workers in Colorado on a particular date (Count
6); a single comment by a co-worker that Ms. Hudson characterizes as "a racially
demeaning comment which implied that I either look like or act like a man" (Count 3);
unspecified "physical touching" by a co-worker (Count 29); and comments by a male
supervisor on a single date regarding the size of Ms. Hudson's nose (Count 4)
Even though in separate "counts," the Court considers all this conduct together.

Most of the incidents are not tied—by Ms. Hudson in her proposed second amended

complaint—to her race or gender. That aside, the conduct cited by Ms. Hudson does
not amount to "pervasive" misconduct of the sort needed to give rise to a viable hostile
work environment claim. In the overall scope of the five-month period when Ms.
Hudson worked for Buehler, the actions she cites cannot reasonably be characterized
as "frequent." And Ms. Hudson cites only one incident that can plausibly be
characterized as physically threatening. Finally, though the conduct may have been
unwelcome and offensive to Ms. Hudson, from an objective standpoint, it does not add
up to a hostile work environment that is actionable under Title VII or parallel state law.
As for supervisor-based harassment, Ms. Hudson cites only an incident on a
single date when she contends her supervisor made adverse comments about the size

of her nose (Count 4). This was verbal commentary only; Ms. Hudson does not allege
any tangible adverse consequences. And though the Court certainly understands why
Ms. Hudson might consider this incident as indicative of racial bias, she cites nothing
overly racial about the supervisor's comments. This alleged inappropriate conduct by
the supervisor does not give rise to a plausible claim for relief—even if Buehler was in
fact Ms. Hudson's "employer" as the law uses that term.

In addition, this conduct does not violate the Illinois Human Rights Act any more
than it violates Title VII. The standards under the two statutes are the same. See, e.g.,
Reed v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., 869 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2017); Volling v. Kurtz
Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016); Zaderaka v. Ill. Human Rights
Com., 131 Ill. 2d 172, 178, 545 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1989).

This leaves three Title VII/IHRA claims asserted by Ms. Hudson in the proposed
third amended complaint. The first is Count 1, alleged as a retaliation claim. Ms.

Hudson alleges that when she interviewed with Buehler in May 2023, the operations
manager mentioned her previous employment—where she had made a complaint about
discrimination—and suggested she find a job elsewhere. But a retaliation claim
requires adverse action by the employer, see Gnutek v. Ill. Gaming Board, 80 F.4th 820,
824 (7th Cir. 2023), and on Count 1 Ms. Hudson alleges none: despite the manager's
comments, Buehler did hire or contract with her at that time.

Ms. Hudson also asserts retaliation in Count 35, in which she says Buehler "has
refused to verify my employment for two years" after she stopped working for Buehler.

But Ms. Hudson does not identify any dates or particular incidents, despite the Court's
specific directive in its December 27 order. That aside, the materials submitted to the

Court reflect that Ms. Hudson has not administratively exhausted these post-
employment claims by filing and pursuing charges before the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and/or the Illinois Department of Human Rights. At an earlier
juncture, Ms. Hudson submitted, under Court order, what was represented to be all of
the EEOC/IDHR charges she had filed. None of these made any reference to post-
employment retaliation by Buehler.

Finally, in Count 33, Ms. Hudson asserts a constructive discharge claim under
Title VII and the IHRA. A constructive discharge claim requires a work environment that
is more severely adverse than what is required for a hostile work environment claim:

"[a] hostile-environment constructive discharge claim entails something more: A plaintiff
who advances such a compound claim must show working conditions so intolerable that
a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign." Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004). Because Hudson's underlying allegations are insufficient to

give rise to a viable hostile work environment claim, they are necessarily insufficient to
give rise to a viable claim for constructive discharge.

3. State law claims regarding infliction of emotional distress

Next are Ms. Hudson's 4 proposed claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED)—Counts 8, 26, 30, and 31—and a single proposed claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress (NIED)—Count 19. Here are the bases for each of these
claims as alleged in the proposed second amended complaint:

• Count 8: A dispatcher "routed me to a location tied to past service-related
trauma."

• Count 26: A supervisor "made a sarcastic comment about the location of my

mother's death."  (Actually, as more specifically described in ¶ XXVI, Ms. Hudson 
alleges that the supervisor made a "sing-song" reference to Pensacola, Florida, 
which is where her mother had recently died.)                        

• Count 30: A dispatcher assigned Ms. Hudson to a shipment that delivered to a
warehouse about 3 miles from the company from which she leased her tractor;
• Count 31: A dispatcher routed Ms. Hudson to 3 destinations "associated with my
mother's death."

• Count 19 (NIED): Because of delayed or withheld pay by Buehler, Ms. Hudson

got a repossession notice from her tractor leasing company for nonpayment. 
A claim of IIED under Illinois law requires proof of three elements:  the 

defendant's conduct was truly extreme and outrageous; the defendant intended to inflict
severe emotional distress or knew there was a high probability that his conduct would
cause such distress; and the conduct in fact caused severe emotional distress.

Schweihs v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 2016 IL 120041, ¶ 50, 77 N.E.3d 50, 63 (2016).

Liability exists only when "the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. ¶ 51, 77 N.E.3d at 60.

A claim of NIED likewise requires proof of extreme and outrageous conduct by the
defendant. See, e.g., Scheidt v. Floor Covering Assocs., Inc., No. 16 C 5999, 2018 WL
4679582, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2018). IIED (and thus NIED) claims arising from
actions in the employment context are generally disfavored, and liability exists only
where the employer's actions have been "truly egregious." See Richards v. U.S. Steel, 869 F.3d 557, 567 (7th Cir. 2017); Vickers v. Abbott Labs., 308 Ill. App. 3d 393, 410, [719

N.E.2d 1101, 1115](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2067663/vickers-v-abbott-laboratories/#1115) (1999).

Each of Ms. Hudson's IIED/NIED claims fails on the requirement of "extreme and
outrageous" conduct. Each involves a single incident that although, perhaps troubling
to Ms. Hudson, do not meet the definition of "extreme and outrageous" conduct. At
least three of the claims suggest the notion that there were particular geographic areas
that Ms. Hudson—an over-the-road driver who was being dispatched to move peoples'
belongings—evidently considered off-limits. There is no indication in the proposed
second amended complaint that there was any common understanding between her
and Buehler that she would not have to drive to Florida, Georgia, or anywhere near the
company from which she had leased her tractor. And even if so, this alleged
misconduct by Buehler is not in any way comparable to cases in which IIED or NIED
claims have been upheld.

4. Equal Pay Act / parallel state claims / Count 14

This leaves three (or four) last claims in which Ms. Hudson appears to assert a 

violation of federal law: Counts 11, 21, perhaps 34, and 14. In the first two of these
claims, Ms. Hudson cites the federal Equal Pay Act. A claim under the Equal Pay Act
requires a plaintiff to show: "(1) that different wages are paid to employees of the
opposite sex; (2) that the employees do equal work which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility; and (3) that the employees have similar working conditions." Fallon
v. State of Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1989).

That is not what Ms. Hudson alleges in Count 11: her claim there is that other
drivers got preferential assignments, not that they were paid at different rates for
substantially the same work. (And as previously discussed, this does not state a claim

for violation of the FLSA, which involves a requirement to pay the minimum wage and
time plus one-half for overtime work.)

This is also not what Ms. Hudson alleges in Count 21, in which she again alleges
that she got worse assignments than other workers. That does not give rise to a claim
under the federal Equal Pay Act. And because claims under the Illinois Equal Pay Act
are analyzed under the same standards claims under the federal statute, see, e.g., Loos
v. County of Perry, No. 3:20-CV-1107, 2023 WL 6382364, at *10 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 30,
2023), Ms. Hudson's reference to the state statute in these claims does not change the
analysis. These are not viable claims.

Count 34 cites the Illinois Equal Pay Act and alleges failure to provide Ms.
Hudson with "financial statements," by which she appears to mean itemized pay
statements. That does not implicate the state Equal Pay Act, which like the federal
state involves a requirement to pay men and women the same rate for performing the

same or substantially the same work, not a requirement to document this in pay
statements.

In Count 14, Ms. Hudson alleges a gender discrimination claim based on a
female operations assistant providing her with extra large uniform shirts and saying "I'm
not going to show everything that I've got." See 3rd Am. Compl. ¶ XIV. Though that is
arguably a demeaning comment, it doesn't amount to a violation of Title VII, as Ms.
Hudson contends. "Title VII protects against discrimination, not ‘personal animosity or
juvenile behavior." Brown v. Advoc. S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir.
2012) (cleaned up). Being asked to wear a larger-size uniform shirt does not amount to
"harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment," as required.

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024).

5. Remaining claims

The only proposed claims the Court has not addressed thus far are Ms. Hudson's
state-law claims under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act regarding allegedly
improper deductions or holdbacks from her pay or failure to pay her at an allegedly
agreed-upon rate. Ms. Hudson may be able to assert a state-law claim or claims based
on these points, but not in federal court. These are state-law claims that, taken
together, do not meet the threshold amount for diversity jurisdiction—assuming the
parties are of diverse citizenship, which the Court does not know. Thus the Court's
denial of Ms. Hudson's motion to vacate the default judgment does not preclude her
from pursuing in state court state-law IWPCA claims for the deductions and holdbacks
and pay cuts referenced in Counts 9, 10, 12, 20, 24, 25, and 32 of the proposed second
amended complaint.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies plaintiff's motion to vacate
judgment [dkt. 33] and also concludes that all of plaintiff's proposed claims in her
second amended complaint, aside from the possible state-law IWPCA claims found
within proposed Counts 9, 10, 12, 20, 24, 25, and 32, fail to state viable legal claims.
Any IWPCA claims must be pursued, if at all, in state court.
Date: February 19, 2026

                                           United States District Judge 

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