Bohatikov v. Bohatikova - Hague Convention Child Abduction

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25 - 2389 OLEKSII B OHATIKOV, Petitioner - Appellee, v. YEVHENIIA BO HATIKOVA, Respondent - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Co urt for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judg e. (3:25 - cv - 00182 - MO C - SCR) Submitted: February 6, 2026 Decided: March 4, 2026 Before HARRIS and RICHARDS ON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Yevheniia Bohatikova, Appellant Pro Se. Katherine Emiko Coyle, Baltimore, Maryland, Stephen Jo hn Cullen, Kelly Ann Powers, Washingt on, D.C., James A. Sullivan, Jr., MILES & STOCKBR IDGE PC, North Bethesda, Maryland; Brione Berneche Pattison, TOUCHSTONE FAMILY LAW, Charlotte, North Carolina, fo r Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: Yevheniia Bohatikova (“Moth er ”) appeals the district court ’s order granting Oleksii Bohatikov ’s (“Father”) petition to return two o f their children to Wales from th e United States under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, (“Hague Convention”), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99 - 11 (Treaty Doc.), and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001 - 9011. T he district court found that the children w ere habitual residen t s of Wales immediately before Mother removed them to the United States. The district court also found that Mother did not establish by clear and conv incing evidence that the children would be placed in grave risk of harm if returned to Wales. On appeal, Mother challenges the district court’s habitual residen ce finding and the rejection of her g rave risk defense. She also faults the district court fo r not consider ing the well - settl ed defense. For the reasons stated below, w e reject Mother’s con tentions of error and affirm. We begin with Mother’s challenge to the district court’s h abitual residence finding. Mother argues that the district court should have found that th e children’s habitual residence was the United States. 1 A child ’ s habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact. Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68, 84 (2020). “The inquiry begins with a legal question: What is the appropriate st andard for habitual residence?” Id. “O nce the trial court correctly identifies the governing totality - of - the - circumstances standard, however, 1 Mo ther seems to abandon this argument in her informal reply brief. But giving her the benefit of the doubt, we review the merits of the issue.

3 what remains for the co urt to do in applying that stand ard . . . is to a nswer a factual question: Was the child at home in the particu lar country at issue?” Id. “The habitual - residence determination thus presents a task for factfin ding courts, not app ellate courts, and should be judged on appeal by a clear - error review standard deferential to the factfind ing court.” Id. Notably, a child’s habitu al residence is “[t]he place where a child is at h ome, at the time of removal.” Id. at 77 (emphasis added). Contrary to Mother’s argument on appeal, the children’s habitual residence cannot be the United States because Mother relocated the children here after she removed them from Wales. See id. Moreover, we con clude that the district court applied th e correct legal standard and did not clearly err in finding that t he children’s habitual residence was Wales at the time that Mother removed the children to the United States. Mother next contends that the district court erred in rejecting her grave risk defense. She mainly argues that the district court did not adequately consider that the ch ildren’s United Kingdom visas have expired and that the children’s immigration documents have been lost, so they cannot obtain new United Kingdom visas. Mother thus fears that she and the children will be forced to return to the United Kingdom without the required document s and will be stopped by imm igration authorities, separated at the b order, and placed in detention. The Hague Convention “ p rovides that return [of a child] is not required if ‘there is a grave risk that return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.’” Golan v. Saada, 596 U. S. 666, 670 - 71 (2022) (alteration s omitted) (quoting Hague Convention, art. 13(b)). “A respondent

4 arguing that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm must establish that this exception applies by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Golan, 596 U.S. at 67 2 (quoti ng 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A)). We conclude that the district court correctly ru led that Mother failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the ch ildren would be in g rave risk of harm if they were returned to Wales. Put simply, the hypo thetical scenario underlying Mother’s grave risk argument on appeal is almost certainly unlikely to materialize because the district cour t ordered the return of th e children to Wales only after “the parties have retained all of the sufficient documents needed to have the minor children returned to the United Kingdom.” Bohatikov v. Bohatikova, No. 3:25 - cv - 00182 -MOC- SCR (W.D.N.C., PACER No. 23 at 7). The district court also reasonably ordered Mother to produce the children’s necessary immigration documents, and insofar as Mother claimed th at she lost those documents, to cooperate with Father in obtaining new documen ts for the children. 2 Finally, Mother criticizes the district court fo r failing to consider the well - settled defense. But that defense was not available to Mother because Father filed his petition for return within one year of Mother wrongfully removing the children from Wales. See Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 39 2, 402 n.14 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that well - settled defense had no application when petition for return was filed within one year of wro ngful removal). 2 Mother also argues on appeal that the child ren will be at grave risk of psychological harm if forced to relocate again. Fo r support, Mother relies on two opinion letters from the children’s physician th at she filed in the district court about two months after the district court entered its order. Even considering those letters, we are satisfied that Mother did not meet her burden o n the grave risk defense.

5 Accordingly, we affirm the d istrict court’s order. We disp ense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the d ecisional process. AFFIRMED