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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Steven B. Silverstein v. Jeffrey A. Wolf, Jean Wolf, Kiva LLC, Wheatley Irrevocable Trust, Meshakai Wolf, Rapid Park Holding Corp, Patush, LLC, 183 West Alameda, LLC, Madison Family Enterprises, LLC, Joshua Rey, Evergreen Family Irrevocable Trust, and Foundation for Arts Culture & Education Ltd.

District Court, D. Colorado

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-01817

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (16)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (25.5K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer

Civil Action No. 22-cv-01817-PAB-NRN

STEVEN B. SILVERSTEIN,

Plaintiff,                                                           

v.

JEFFREY A. WOLF,

JEAN WOLF,

KIVA LLC,

WHEATLEY IRREVOCABLE TRUST,

MESHAKAI WOLF,

RAPID PARK HOLDING CORP,

PATUSH, LLC,

183 WEST ALAMEDA, LLC,

MADISON FAMILY ENTERPRISES, LLC,

JOSHUA REY,

EVERGREEN FAMILY IRREVOCABLE TRUST, AND

FOUNDATION FOR ARTS CULTURE & EDUCATION LTD.,

Defendants.                                                          

                        ORDER                                        

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

against Jeffrey Wolf and Madison Family Enterprises, LLC [Docket No. 220]. The Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Steven Silverstein registered a judgment against Jeffrey Wolf, Jean Wolf,
JTG Ventures, LLC, and ORD Ltd. in the District of Colorado on January 21, 2022.

Silverstein v. Wolf, No. 22-rj-00001-PAB-NRN, Docket No. 1. Mr. Silverstein filed the
present action on July 22, 2022. Docket No. 1. Mr. Silverstein has named a number of
defendants in this action, see Docket No. 125 at 1, but moves for summary judgment
only as to Jeffrey Wolf and Madison Family Enterprises, LLC (“Madison”). Although the
order refers to arguments made by Mr. Wolf, those arguments were also made on
behalf of Madison.

On June 21, 2023, Mr. Silverstein filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction,
levy of execution, or receivership prohibiting the transfer of Mr. Wolf’s stock in Rapid
Park Holding Corp. (“Rapid Park”). Docket No. 72. On July 28, 2023, the Court denied

that motion, finding that the then-operative complaint failed to state any causes of action
upon which the Court could grant injunctive relief. Docket No. 113 at 6-8.

Mr. Silverstein filed an amended complaint on August 18, 2023, alleging claims
under the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“CUFTA”). Docket No. 125 at 12,
17, 20, 23, 25-27. On September 18, 2024, Mr. Silverstein filed the present motion,
again seeking an injunction, a levy of execution, or a receivership over Rapid Park stock
controlled by Mr. Wolf. Docket No. 181. On August 19, 2025, the Court held an
evidentiary hearing on the motion. Docket No. 247. On August 21, 2025, the Court
granted the motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining Mr. Wolf and Madison from
transferring, selling, encumbering, or otherwise disposing of the shares of Rapid Park

stock that were owned by Mr. Wolf and then transferred to Madison. Docket No. 248 at
23-24. The Court also found that it was necessary to appoint a receiver to take
possession of the Rapid Park stock.

On March 2, 2026, the Court appointed Randel Lewis as receiver. Docket No.
260 at 2.

II. UNDISPUTED FACTS1

Two judgments were entered against Mr. Wolf and in favor of plaintiff on October
11, 2021 and March 3, 2022, respectively (collectively, the “judgment”). Docket No. 220
at 2, ¶ 1.2 The cumulative base amount of the judgment as of March 3, 2022 was
$1,703,725.91. Id., ¶ 2. This amount was ordered to earn interest at the rate
established by Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 727.1 from March 4, 2022. Id. Mr. Wolf has not paid
any portion of the Judgment. Id., ¶ 3.3 A receivership action resulted in a payment on
behalf of JTG Ventures, LLC (Wolf’s co-defendant) in the amount of $600,920.50 on

June 18, 2024. Id. The amount of $1,564,396 remains unpaid. Id. Mr. Wolf started a company called Rapid Park in New York. Id., ¶ 4. He grew
the company and eventually allowed members of his family into the ownership. Id. As
of the filing of this case, Mr. Wolf was the owner of 25% of the stock in Rapid Park. Id.;
see also Docket No. 224 at 4, ¶ 20. On December 29, 2022, Mr. Wolf transferred (the
“transfer”) all of his stock in Rapid Park to Madison. Docket No. 220 at 2, ¶ 5; Docket
No. 224 at 5, ¶ 23. Mr. Wolf was the owner and manager of Madison. Docket No. 220
at 2, ¶ 5. The stock was worth approximately $35,239,331. Id. Mr. Wolf transferred his
stock in Rapid Park to Madison for zero consideration. Id., ¶ 6.4 On December 31,

1 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.         
2 Defendants respond that they “admit that two judgments entered against Jeffrey 

Wolf on October 11, 2021 and March 2, 2022,” but that they “deny these are final
judgments.” Docket No. 224 at 2, ¶ 1. The Court finds this to be nonresponsive and
deems this fact admitted.

3 Defendants dispute this fact, stating that, “[o]n June 14, 2024, a payment of
$600,920.50 was applied to the judgments in the Oklahoma litigation. . . . Wolf has also
attempted to file a bond by having liens filed by Plaintiff released in order to do so.”

Docket No. 224 at 2, ¶ 3. The Court finds this to be nonresponsive and deems this fact
admitted.

4 Defendants dispute this fact, stating that “Wolf received tax and estate planning
benefits and benefits to charitable causes.” Docket No. 224 at 2, ¶ 6. For reasons the
2022, Madison donated 990 membership units (99 percent of the total membership
units) to The Verity Charitable Fund (“Verity”), a 501(c)(3) charitable organization, as an
unrestricted donation. Docket No. 224 at 5, ¶ 24.

Immediately prior to the transfer, the March 4, 2022 judgment was entered
establishing the amount Mr. Wolf owed, an April 7, 2022 Writ of Execution was issued
seeking to attach Mr. Wolf’s stock in Rapid Park, and the immediate case was filed
against Mr. Wolf on July 22, 2022. Docket No. 220 at 3, ¶ 7.5

Upon completing the transfer, Mr. Wolf had transferred substantially all of his 

assets out of his name. Id., ¶ 8.6 According to Mr. Wolf’s sworn interrogatory response,
after transferring his stock worth $35,239,331, Mr. Wolf was left owning nothing more
than “cuff links, a tie clip, gold collar stays, some cashmere sweaters, [and] a Swatch
watch.” Id. According to Mr. Wolf, he was already impoverished before the transfer, as

Court will discuss in the analysis section of this order, benefits such as those identified
by Mr. Wolf are not regarded as consideration for purposes of a CUFTA claim, so Mr.
Wolf’s response fails to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he
received any consideration in exchange for transferring the stock. The Court deems
this fact admitted.

5 Defendants dispute this fact, stating that “Plaintiff did not serve the writ of
execution, though it was issued by the Court on April 7, 2022, in the related case of 22-
rj-00001-PAB-NRN. . . . Plaintiff did not take action on the Rapid Park stock until he
filed a foreign judgment in Delaware Superior Court on February 6, 2023, in Silverstein
v. Wolf et al., N23J-00229, seeking to attach the stock.” Docket No. 224 at 2, ¶ 7. The
Court finds this to be nonresponsive and deems this fact admitted.

6 Defendants deny this fact, stating that “Plaintiff relies upon interrogatory
responses signed on December 9, 2023, which is nearly one year after the subject
transfer to Madison Family Enterprises and to The Verity Charitable Fund. Exhibit 7 to
the Motion requests information that Wolf has ‘owned personally.’” Docket No. 224 at 2-
3, ¶ 8. In support of his denial, Mr. Wolf points to a statement in his May 27, 2025
declaration. See id. (citing Docket No. 225 at 5, ¶ 29. For the reasons the Court will
discuss in the analysis section of this order, it finds that Mr. Wolf’s effort to deny
plaintiff’s asserted fact constitutes a “sham fact issue.” The Court therefore deems this
fact admitted.

an email from Mr. Wolf to Judge Drummond in the underlying Tulsa County District
Court case in which Mr. Wolf claims he has no money to pay attorney fees. Id., ¶ 11.7
Mr. Wolf disclosed the transfer in a public court filing in Delaware on May 15,
2023. Docket No. 224 at 7, ¶ 36.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when
the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–50 (1986). A disputed fact is “material” if,
under the relevant substantive law, it is essential to proper disposition of the claim.

Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2001). Only disputes
over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial and preclude summary judgment.

Faustin v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). An issue is
“genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997).

Where “the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial,
it may satisfy its burden at the summary judgment stage by identifying a lack of
evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.”

Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations
omitted). “Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

7 Defendants dispute this fact based on the fact that the exhibit cited by plaintiff 

comes from an email sent more than two years before the transfer at issue in this case.

Docket No. 224 at 3, ¶ 11. Defendants do not challenge the authenticity of the evidence
cited by plaintiff, but instead appear to challenge the relevance of the evidence. The
Court finds this to be a legal question and addresses the import of this evidence in the
analysis section of this order. The Court deems this fact admitted.

party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter.” Concrete Works of
Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994). The
nonmoving party may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings, but instead
must designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quotations omitted). “To avoid summary
judgment, the nonmovant must establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of
each element essential to the case.” Bausman, 252 F.3d at 1115. When reviewing a

motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. IV. ANALYSIS

Mr. Silverstein’s complaint alleges that Mr. Wolf and the other defendants
engaged in various fraudulent transfers in violation of CUFTA. Docket No. 125 at 12,
17, 20, 23, 25-27. The motion for summary judgment is focused on the claim that Mr.
Wolf and Madison violated CUFTA when Mr. Wolf transferred Rapid Park stock to
Madison in December 2022. See, e.g., Docket No. 220 at 1, 6-10.

“CUFTA's purpose is to protect a debtor's estate from certain depletions that
prejudice the debtor's unsecured creditors.” CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. CLGP, LLC, 251
P.3d 523, 529 (Colo. App. 2010) (citing Leverage Leasing Co. v. Smith, [143 P.3d 1164,

1167](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2626453/leverage-leasing-co-v-smith/#1167) (Colo. App. 2006)). “Under CUFTA, a ‘creditor’ is a ‘person who has a claim,’ and
‘claim’ means ‘a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, . . . contingent, . . . disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured.’” ND Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Two G-Ventures, LLC, 2020 WL 14045346, at
*10 (Colo. App. Apr. 2, 2020) (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102 (3), (5)). Under
CUFTA, a “debtor” is a “person who is liable on a claim.” Id. (quoting § 38-8-102(7)).

Judgments were entered against Mr. Wolf and in favor of Mr. Silverstein on October 11,
2021 and March 3, 2022. Docket No. 220 at 2, ¶ 1. Thus, under CUFTA, Mr.
Silverstein was, at the time of the alleged transfer of Rapid Park stock in December
2022 from Mr. Wolf to Madison, see id.2, ¶ 5; Docket No. 224 at 5, ¶ 23, a creditor with
a claim against Mr. Wolf.

Mr. Silverstein specifically brings his claim pursuant to Sections 38-8-105(1)(a)
and 38-8-105(1)(b) of CUFTA. Docket No. 125 at 12, 17, 20, 23, 25-27.8 Those

provisions state that:

(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor,
whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the
obligation:

     (a) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 
       debtor; or                                                    

     (b) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the 
       transfer or obligation, and the debtor:                       

       (I)  Was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a    
            transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were 
            unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or  

       (II)  Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have 
            believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's 
            ability to pay as they became due. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105 (1)(a)–(b).  Section 38-8-105(1)(a) requires that the 

defendant act “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud.” In analyzing such a claim,
courts rely on “badges of fraud” since “the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is
seldom susceptible of direct proof.” See Schempp v. Lucre Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 18 P.3d

8 Mr. Silverstein does not explain why he should prevail at summary judgment 

under Section 38-8-105(1)(b). See Docket No. 220 at 4. The Court therefore does not
analyze Mr. Silverstein’s claims under that provision.

762, 764 (Colo. App. 2000), as modified on denial of reh'g (July 20, 2000) (“Schempp
I”). These badges of fraud are:

(a) The transfer or obligation was to an insider;

(b) The debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the 
  transfer;                                                          

(c) The transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;           

(d) Before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been 
sued or threatened with suit;                                        

(e) The transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets;       

(f) The debtor absconded;                                            

(g) The debtor removed or concealed assets;                          

(h) The value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably 
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation 
incurred;                                                            

(i) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred;                                 

(j) The transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was 
incurred; and                                                        

(k) The debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor that 
transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105 (2)(a)–(k).  “While a single badge of fraud may only create 

suspicion of fraud, several badges of fraud considered together may infer intent to
defraud.” Schempp I, 18 P.3d 762 at 764. The Court will discuss each of the badges
that it finds relevant to this case.

A. Badges of Fraud

1. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105 (2)(a): Transfer of the asset to an
insider

Under CUFTA, the term “insider” includes relatives of the debtor or of general
partners of the debtor, a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner, or a
corporation in which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control. Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 38-8-102 (8)(a). At the time of the transfer of Rapid Park stock from Mr. Wolf to
Madison, Mr. Wolf was the owner and manager of Madison. Docket No. 220 at 2, ¶ 5.

The Court finds that a debtor’s transfer of stock to a limited liability company that he
controls fits the definition of a transfer to an “insider.” The Court therefore finds that Mr.

Wolf transferred the stock to an insider, namely, Madison.

2. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105 (2)(b): Debtor retains possession or
control of the asset post-transfer

Under this factor, the court considers whether the debtor retained some degree
of possession or control over the transferred property. Schempp v. Lucre Management
Group, LLC, 75 P.3d 1157, 1162 (Colo. App. 2003) (“Schempp II”). At the time of the
December 2022 transfer, Mr. Wolf was the owner and manager of Madison. Thus, Mr.
Wolf retained control over the Rapid Park stock after the transfer to Madison.
3. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105 (2)(c): Concealment of the transfer
Under this factor, the court considers whether the parties to the transfer
disclosed the transfer or if they sought to conceal it. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105 (2)(c).

Courts consider whether the parties agreed to keep the transaction from the public,
whether they complied with any public recording requirements, and whether they
revealed the transaction to trustees and creditors of the debtor. Schempp II, 75 P.3d at
1162. There is no evidence that the transfer had to be publicly reported. It is
undisputed that Mr. Wolf disclosed the transfer in a public court filing in May 2023.

Docket No. 224 at 7, ¶ 36. Mr. Wolf argues that this disclosure shows that this badge of
fraud cannot be met. Id. at 12. Mr. Wolf does not cite, and the Court is not aware of,
any authority supporting the proposition that was an allegedly fraudulent transfer cannot
be considered concealed merely because the transferring party discloses the transfer
months after the transfer occurred. However, because Mr. Silverstein has not identified
any undisputed facts showing that Mr. Wolf concealed the transfer, the Court finds that
this badge of fraud has not been established.

4. Colo Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105(2)(d): Lawsuit preceding the transfer
For this factor, the court considers whether a lawsuit, or the threat of a lawsuit,

preceded the transfer at issue. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105 (2)(d). At the time of the
transfer in December 2022, Mr. Wolf had judgments entered against him on October 11,
2021 and March 3, 2022. Docket No. 220 at 2, ¶ 1. The Court also takes judicial notice
of the fact that Mr. Wolf appeared in Silverstein v. Wolf, No. 22-rj-00001-PAB-NRN, the
action in which Mr. Silverstein registered his judgment against Mr. Wolf. See, e.g., id., Docket No. 6 (Mr. Wolf’s February 15, 2022 pro se response to application for writ of
garnishment); Docket No. 31 (Mr. Wolf’s Juny 10, 2022 pro se “objection” to discovery
requests by Mr. Silverstein). The Court finds that a lawsuit preceded the transfer, and
that Mr. Wolf was aware of the judgment and associated collection efforts at the time of
the December 2022 transfer.

       5. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105 (2)(e): Transfer is substantially all of 
       the debtor’s assets                                           
For this factor, the court considers whether Mr. Wolf transferred substantially all 

of his assets in the transaction. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105 (2)(e). In December 2022,
Mr. Wolf transferred approximately $35 million in Rapid Park stock that he owned to
Madison. Docket No. 220 at 2, ¶ 5. In July 2020, Mr. Wolf represented to the court in
the case that led to the judgment against Mr. Wolf that he had no money to pay for an
attorney. Id. at 3, ¶ 11. In a December 2023 response to an interrogatory in this case,
Mr. Wolf stated that all he owned was “cuff links, a tie clip, gold collar stays, some
cashmere sweaters, a Swatch watch.” Id., ¶ 8. In response to Mr. Silverstein’s motion
for summary judgment, Mr. Wolf attempts to create a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether he transferred substantially all of his assets by providing a declaration in
which he states that, “[a]fter making [the transfer to Madison], I still had assets through

my ownership interests in other entities, including a home in Steamboat, and this was
not substantially all of my assets. I did not become insolvent after the transfer-
donation.” Docket No. 225 at 5, ¶ 29 (declaration of Jeffrey Wolf). Mr. Silverstein’s
reply notes the inconsistency between Mr. Wolf’s interrogatory statement and his
declaration. Docket No. 227 at 1. The Court finds the declaration falls within the “sham
affidavit” rule and cannot serve to create a genuine dispute of material fact.
In response to the interrogatory question “Identify each and every asset
(including but not limited to real property, deposit accounts, brokerage accounts,
accounts receivable, stock, membership in a limited liability company, art, personal
property, vehicles, and jewelry) You have owned personally, in whole or in part, during

the last five (5) years,” Mr. Wolf responded that he “personally owns cuff links, a tie clip,
gold collar stays, some cashmere sweaters, a Swatch watch.” Docket No. 220-7 at 1-2.

Mr. Wolf signed the interrogatory on December 9, 2023, underneath the statement “I,
Jeffrey A. Wolf, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing second amended
and supplemental answers to interrogatories are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge, information, and belief.” Id. at 6.

“There is authority for the proposition that in determining whether a material issue
of fact exists, an affidavit may not be disregarded because it conflicts with the affiant's
prior sworn statements.” Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986). “In
assessing a conflict under these circumstances, however, courts will disregard a
contrary affidavit when they conclude that it constitutes an attempt to create a sham fact
issue.” Id. (collecting cases). In evaluating the potential existence of a sham fact issue,
courts consider “whether the affiant was cross-examined during his earlier testimony,

whether the affiant had access to the pertinent evidence at the time of his earlier
testimony or whether the affidavit was based on newly discovered evidence, and
whether the earlier testimony reflects confusion which the affidavit attempts to explain.” Id. The factors articulated in Franks contemplate an affidavit that makes contrary
assertions to prior deposition testimony. See id. However, the Court finds these factors
also apply in a case like the present one, where a declaration makes an inconsistent
statement with a previously submitted interrogatory. See Donohoe v. Consol. Operating
& Prod. Corp., 736 F. Supp. 845, 861 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (citing Franks and finding that
“there is surely no reason to treat answers to special interrogatories as less deserving of

credence than depositions”), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 982 F.2d 1130, 1136 n.4 (7th
Cir. 1992) (“The [district] court's refusal to consider the affidavit was appropriate.”); see
also Bowles v. Grant Trucking, LLC, 842 F. App'x 236, 241 (10th Cir. 2021)
(unpublished) (analyzing a sham fact issue in the context of a supposed conflict
between an affidavit and an interrogatory); Prince v. Claussen, 173 F.3d 864, 1999 WL
152282 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming district court’s finding of a sham fact issue in the
context of two inconsistent interrogatories). The Court finds that Mr. Wolf’s May 27,
2025 declaration attempts to create a sham issue of fact. Mr. Wolf’s December 9, 2023
interrogatory was made under oath and did not identify any ownership interests, in
whole or in part, in entities such a home in Steamboat Springs, Colorado, even though
the scope of the interrogatory included “stock” and “membership in a limited liability
company”. See Docket No. 220-7 at 1-2. There is no reason to believe the declaration
is based on new information, such as Mr. Wolf learning years later that he actually held
an ownership interest in the Steamboat house at the time of the December 2022

transfer to Madison. There is also no basis to find that the declaration is attempting to
clarify some confusion in the interrogatory. The Court therefore will not consider the
assertion in Mr. Wolf’s declaration that the transfer of Rapid Park stock did not
constitute substantially all of his assets.

Mr. Wolf also argues that his July 2020 statement about lacking the funds to pay
an attorney and his December 2023 statement about only owning a few items of
clothing and jewelry should be discounted because neither statement was made in
close temporal proximity to the December 2022 transfer to Madison. Docket No. 224 at
12-13. Mr. Wolf cites no authority in support of this position; more importantly, he cites
no evidence that would account for the supposedly significant changes in his financial

status between 2020 and 2022.9 The Court finds that no reasonable juror could
conclude that Mr. Wolf’s transfer of stock to Madison did not constitute a transfer of
substantially all of his assets.

9 The Court notes that, at an August 19, 2025 evidentiary hearing on Mr. 

Silverstein’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Mr. Wolf testified that his interrogatory
statement about owning only a few items of clothing in jewelry was true at the time he
made the statement and was still true as of the time of the evidentiary hearing. See
Docket No. 247 at 2.

6. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105 (2)(h): Value of consideration
received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of
the asset transferred

For this factor, the court considers whether “[t]he value of the consideration
received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred
or the amount of the obligation incurred.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105 (2)(h). Under
CUFTA, the term “[r]easonably equivalent value . . . is not wholly synonymous with
market value.” Schempp I, 18 P.3d at 765. The term includes both direct and indirect
benefits to the transferor-debtor, even if the benefit does not increase the transferor’s
net worth. Leverage Leasing Co. v. Smith, 143 P.3d 1164, 1167 (Colo. App. 2006).

Intangible, non-economic benefits do not, however, constitute reasonably equivalent
value. Fifth Third Bank v. Morales, No. 16-cv-01302-CMA-STV, 2017 WL 6492108, at
*4 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2017). “Consideration having no utility from a creditor's viewpoint
does not satisfy the statutory definition [of reasonably equivalent value].” Id. (quoting
§ 38–8–104, cmt. 2). In considering the concept of value, a court must keep in mind the
purpose of CUFTA, which is to protect the debtor estate from being depleted to the
prejudice of the debtor’s unsecured creditors. Id.

Mr. Wolf transferred the Rapid Park stock to Madison for “zero consideration.”

Docket No. 220 at 2, ¶ 6. Mr. Wolf argues that the Court should not consider the

transfer from Mr. Wolf to Madison alone, but should instead view it as part of a broader
transaction that ultimately resulted in a charitable donation from Madison to Verity.

Docket No. 224 at 13-15. Mr. Wolf believes the Court should consider the benefits he
received from making that donation to Verity. Id. As Mr. Silverstein correctly points out
in his reply, Docket No. 227 at 5, the transfer at issue is the transfer from Mr. Wolf to
Madison, not the transfer from Madison to Verity. Mr. Wolf received no consideration
for that transaction. Docket No. 220 at 2, ¶ 6.

Even if the Court considered the Wolf-Madison transfer as part of a larger
transfer meant to donate the Rapid Park stock to Verity, Mr. Wolf still fails to create a
genuine dispute as to whether he received reasonably equivalent value for the transfer.

As the Court explained earlier, benefits that are of no value to a creditor do not count as
“consideration.” Fifth Third Bank, 2017 WL 6492108, at *4. Mr. Wolf does not explain

the nature of the estate planning benefits he obtained and does not indicate the extent
to which any tax obligations he had were reduced. Moreover, Mr. Wolf offers no
evidence or argument that the benefits that he obtained would have any value to a
creditor such as Mr. Silverstein. As such, the benefits Mr. Wolf claims to have received
do not constitute “consideration” for purposes of CUFTA. The Court therefore finds that
Mr. Wolf did not receive reasonably equivalent value for his transfer of Rapid Park stock
to Madison.

B. Application of Badges of Fraud at Summary Judgment

The Court has found that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to five
badges of fraud.10 The presence of five badges supports a finding that Mr. Wolf
violated CUFTA by making a transfer with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any

creditor of the debtor.” See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105 (1)(a); see also Schempp I, 18

10 Both parties offer brief arguments as to other badges of fraud.  See Docket No. 

220 at 8-10, 13; Docket No. 224 at 15-16. It is not clear whether some of these factors
are relevant to the present case, and given that a successful fraudulent transfer does
not require the presence of all of the badges of fraud, or even a majority of them, the
Court does not reach these arguments. See Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt.
Assocs., Ltd., 419 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the badges of fraud are
“not additive” and that “one would hardly expect” to find every factor met in the same
case).

P.3d 762 at 764 (“several badges of fraud considered together may infer intent to
defraud”). The question, then, is whether, when the undisputed facts establish the
presence of five badges of fraud, the Court may enter summary judgment on the behalf
of a plaintiff.

Mr. Wolf argues that the nature of a CUFTA claim, which requires a

determination of fraudulent intent, does not lend itself to summary judgment. Docket
No. 224 at 8-9. However, a number of appellate courts have affirmed the granting of

summary judgment in favor of a plaintiff on a fraudulent transfer claim. In Lewis v.
Taylor, 375 P.3d 1205, 1212 (Colo. 2016), the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and reinstated a trial court’s grant of summary judgment to a plaintiff on
a CUFTA claim. In Hafen v. Howell, 121 F.4th 1191, 1197 (10th Cir. 2024), the Tenth
Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment to a plaintiff on a claim
brought under Utah’s counterpart to CUFTA.

Both Lewis and Hafen involved Ponzi schemes and thus involved a “Ponzi
presumption” by which all payments made by the operator of a Ponzi scheme are
presumed to be fraudulent transfers. Lewis, 375 P.3d at 1208; Hafen, 121 F.4th at
1200. The present case, however, does not involve a presumption of a fraudulent

transfer.

But other courts of appeals, applying fraudulent transfer laws similar to CUFTA,
as well as a District of Colorado case applying CUFTA, have approved or granted
summary judgment where five or more badges of fraud were established and the
defendants offered no real defense for the transfer. See F.D.I.C. v. Anchor Props., 13
F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying Massachusetts law and holding that, “[g]iven the
presence of multiple badges of fraud, and [defendant’s] inability to produce even a
single properly documented fact casting any doubt on [plaintiff’s] position, we too can
see only one conclusion, namely, that the transfer was fraudulent.”); Klein v. Weidner, 729 F.3d 280, 284-86 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying Pennsylvania law and affirming the grant
of summary judgment when six badges of fraud were undisputed); BMG Music v.
Martinez, 74 F.3d 87, 90 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Texas law and affirming the grant of
summary judgment when six badges present); Attebury Grain LLC v. Grayn Co., 721 F.
App'x 669, 671 (9th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (applying California law and affirming the

grant of summary judgment when six badges present); Fifth Third Bank v. Morales, No.
16-cv-01302-CMA-STV, 2017 WL 6492108, at *5 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2017) (applying
Colorado law and granting summary judgment when five badges present).

The Court finds the reasoning of these cases persuasive and finds that, based on
the presence of five badges of fraud and the failure of Mr. Wolf to identify any genuine
dispute of material fact as to the fraudulent nature of the transfer, summary judgment is
warranted. The Court will therefore grant Mr. Silverstein’s motion insofar as it requests
that summary judgment be entered against Mr. Wolf on plaintiff’s CUFTA claim.11
When a fraudulent transfer under CUFTA occurs, the first transferee is also liable
to the creditor. Nd Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Two G-Ventures, LLC, 2020 WL 14045346, at

*11 (Colo. App. Apr. 2, 2020) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-109 (2)(a)). The only

11 Mr. Wolf argues that Mr. Silverstein’s CUFTA claim may be “premature” due to 

the fact that Mr. Wolf still has an appeal pending regarding the judgment in the
Oklahoma case that gave rise to the case before this Court. Docket No. 224 at 9. Mr.
Wolf made this argument in his brief filed on May 27, 2025. See generally id. On
August 15, 2025, the Court of Civil Appeals of the State of Oklahoma rejected Mr.
Wolf’s contentions of error and affirmed the judgment. See generally Docket No. 242-1.

The Court understands that Mr. Wolf has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
Oklahoma Supreme Court and is awaiting a ruling. The Court finds that Mr.
Silverstein’s pursuit of this case is not premature.

exception to this rule is if the first transferee can prove that “it took in good faith and for
a reasonably equivalent value.” Id. (citing Schempp II, 75 P.3d at 1165). Mr. Wolf
transferred the Rapid Park stock to Madison, see Docket No. 220 at 2, ¶ 5; Docket No.
224 at 5, ¶ 23, which makes Madison the first transferee. Madison offers no argument
why it accepted the transferred stock for good faith and for reasonably equivalent value.

Therefore, the Court finds that Madison is also liable for a violation of CUFTA and will
grant Mr. Silverstein’s motion insofar as it requests that summary judgment on plaintiff’s

CUFTA claim also be entered against Madison.

C. Damages Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-108 provides that a creditor in a CUFTA action may
obtain:

(a) Avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the
creditor's claim;

(b) An attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or 
other property of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by 
the Colorado rules of civil procedure;                               

(c) With respect to a transfer made or obligation incurred that is voidable under 
section 38-8-105(1)(a), a judgment for one and one-half the value of the asset 
transferred or for one and one-half the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's 
claim, whichever is less, together with the creditor's actual costs; Id. § 38-8-108(1)(a)-(c).  Mr. Silverstein asks the Court to void the transfer of stock from 

Mr. Wolf to Madison and to award Mr. Silverstein $2,346,594, which is 1.5 times the
outstanding judgment of $1,564,396. Docket No. 220 at 11-12. The Court has already
enjoined the transfer or disposition of the Rapid Park stock held by Madison and has
appointed a receiver to hold that stock and receive any proceeds or distributions
associated with the stock. Docket No. 248; Docket No. 260 at 2-5. Given that, the
Court believes that voiding the transfer is unnecessary because the receiver will be able
to provide for the satisfaction of the judgment through the assets already controlled by
the receiver. The Court will enter judgment against Mr. Wolf and in favor of Mr.
Silverstein in the amount of $2,346,594.
V. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against Jeffrey Wolf
and Madison Family Enterprises, LLC [Docket No. 220] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that judgment shall enter in favor of plaintiff Steven B. Silverstein and
against Jeffrey A. Wolf and Madison Family Enterprises, LLC in the amount of
$2,346,594. It is further
ORDERED that the injunction issued by the Court on August 21, 2025 shall
remain in effect pending the satisfaction of the judgment. It is further
ORDERED that the receiver appointed by the Court on March 2, 2026 shall
remain in that role until the satisfaction of the judgment.
DATED March 2, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
wie < Le
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge

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