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Feb. 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Pablo Munoz, Jr. v. Dart Container Corporation of Illinois

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-08707

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (6.4K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

PABLO MUNOZ, JR.,

      Plaintiff,                                                     
                                  No. 25 CV 8707                     
  v.                                                                 
                                  Judge Manish S. Shah               

DART CONTAINER CORPORATION OF

ILLINOIS,

      Defendant.                                                     

             MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                            

Plaintiff  Pablo  Munoz,  Jr.,  was  employed  by  Defendant  Dart  Container 

Corporation of Illinois for over nineteen years. He was terminated in 2024 shortly
after complaining of harassment and discrimination. Plaintiff brings claims for race
discrimination, national origin discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff
has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and has failed to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons discussed below, defendant’s motion to dismiss
is denied.

I. Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs dismissals based on failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
the complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The complaint must contain
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In evaluating a complaint’s sufficiency, courts

“accept as true all well-pled facts and make any reasonable inferences in the non-
movant’s favor.” Brant v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 43 F.4th 656, 664 (7th Cir. 2022).
Exhaustion is “a condition precedent to bringing a claim.” Teal v. Potter, 559
F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2009). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an
affirmative defense, Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1999), and
affirmative defenses are typically not resolved under Rule 12(b)(6). Walker v.

Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2002). But when a defense is apparent from
the allegations of the complaint, it can be adjudicated on a motion to dismiss. Id. II. Background

Plaintiff Pablo Munoz, Jr., was hired by defendant Dart Container Corporation
of Illinois in 2005 and was employed as a maintenance mechanic at the time of his
termination. [1] ¶ 10.1 Plaintiff’s race is Hispanic and his national origin is Mexican.
[1] ¶¶ 11–12. Defendant was aware of Munoz’s race and national origin. [1] ¶ 14.

Plaintiff’s direct supervisor and the second in charge of the facility where he 

worked harassed and discriminated against Munoz and created a hostile work
environment. [1] ¶¶ 15–16. These individuals disciplined Munoz with write-ups in
relation to what white employees did, meaning Munoz was disciplined for conduct

1 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers
are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings. The facts are taken from the
complaint, [1].

committed by white employees, not Munoz. [1] ¶¶ 16, 19. On September 12, 2024,
Munoz complained about the harassment and discrimination. [1] ¶ 17. On September
18, 2024, Munoz was terminated. [1] ¶ 18.

In April 2025, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination alleging national origin 

discrimination and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
against defendant. [1] ¶ 5. In July 2025, plaintiff filed a second EEOC Charge of
Discrimination alleging both national origin discrimination and retaliation, as well
as race discrimination. [1] ¶ 6. Munoz received a Notice of Right to Sue from the
EEOC for both of these charges. [1] ¶ 7–8. Munoz then sued Dart for counts of race

discrimination, national origin discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII. [1]
¶¶ 21–45.

III. Analysis

A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

A plaintiff may only bring claims that were included in his EEOC charge or
are “like or reasonably related” to the allegations in his charge. Scroggin v. Universal
Prot. Serv., LLC, 2025 WL 3493946, at *2 (7th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025). Claims are like or

reasonably related “when (1) there is a reasonable relationship between the
allegations in the charge and the claims in the complaint, and (2) the claim in the
complaint can reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the
allegations in the charge.” Id. The charge and complaint must “describe the same
conduct and implicate the same individuals.” Id. Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
because the allegations in the complaint do not relate back to his EEOC charge. [12]
at 4–6. Munoz’s July charge ([12-1] at 2) stated as follows:

I began my employment with Respondent, on or around August 5, 2005.  
My most recent position was Level III Maintenance Mechanic. During   
my employment with the Respondent, I was subjected to discrimination, 
harassment and discipline. I complained to Respondent. On or around  
September 18, 2024, I was discharged.                                
I believe I was discriminated against because of my race (Hispanic), 
national origin (Mexican), and in retaliation, in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1963, as amended.                            
In contrast to his April charge, which was prepared pro se, Munoz does not 

suggest that his July charge was prepared without the assistance of counsel. [17] at
2. Therefore, he does not benefit from liberal construction. Scroggin, 2025 WL
3493946, at *2.

The purpose of the same conduct, same individuals standard is to provide
adequate notice to the employer of the conduct that the plaintiff was challenging. See id. Dart argues that Munoz’s July charge fails to describe any conduct or implicate
any individuals. [12] at 5. But unlike the plaintiff in Scroggin, Munoz did check the
appropriate boxes on the form to signify the nature of the discrimination he was
alleging. [12-1] at 2. He also specified that he “was subjected to discrimination,
harassment and discipline,” which is less vague than Scroggin’s allegation that he
“engaged in a protected activity.” Compare [12-1] at 2, with Scroggin, 2025 WL
3493946, at *2. Munoz’s charge identified his position with Dart, allowing the EEOC
and Dart to reasonably identify the chain of supervisors at issue. See [12-1] at 2. The
charge mentioned discipline as the complained-of conduct and identified a narrow
window for the conduct (August 12, 2024 to September 18, 2024). See [12-1] at 2.
Munoz had not filed other charges with the EEOC, such that the EEOC or Dart

would not know what conduct Munoz was challenging (or which individuals were
implicated by the charge in question). In Geldon v. South Milwaukee School District,
for example, the plaintiff had previously complained about failing to land a separate
job, so the EEOC and the defendant were not put on proper notice with respect to her
complaint about being denied the particular position in question. 414 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, Munoz’s charge—in the context of the current procedural

posture—sufficiently described the conduct he was challenging: discriminatory and
harassing discipline occurring while he was a Level III Maintenance Mechanic
between August and September 2024 and subsequent retaliation for complaining
about the conduct.

Defendant’s reliance on Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., 966 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir.
1992), is unpersuasive. [18] at 4–5. In Rush, the plaintiff filed a complaint asserting
five forms of race-based discrimination, including denial of promotion and employee

benefits, despite her EEOC charge referencing only her discharge. Rush, 966 F.2d at
1108. Further, the plaintiff’s charge did not mention any conduct beyond her
conclusion—that she believed she was discriminated against because of her race. Id. Munoz, in contrast, does mention being subjected to discriminatory conduct during
his employment, and does not merely include a line about discrimination at the end
of his charge. [12-1] at 2.

Millirons v. Illinois Department of Human Services, 2025 WL 2324263 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 12, 2025), is also different. In Millirons, the plaintiff filed her EEOC charge
while still employed by the defendant and her charge did not mention a protected

activity. Id. at *3. After she proceeded to file a complaint for constructive discharge
and retaliation, the court found that her employer could not have been put on notice
for these two claims in the context of the case. Id. Here, the timeline of events does
not preclude Munoz’s claims for discrimination, and the charge makes clear that the
protected activity at issue in the retaliation claim was his decision to complain to
Dart about the discrimination that he had been subjected to.

While  Munoz’s  argument  for  liberal  construction  of  his  EEOC  charge  is 

“weaken[ed]” by the fact that he was seemingly not acting pro se, see Teal, 559 F.3d
at 691, the “like or reasonably related” standard is still “a liberal one in order to
effectuate the remedial purposes of Title VII.” Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d
857, 864 (7th Cir. 1985). Munoz’s charge was sufficient to put the EEOC and Dart on
notice of the conduct he was challenging. He has not failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.

B.   Failure to State a Claim                                        
In the alternative, Dart argues that Munoz has failed to state claims upon 

which relief can be granted. [12] at 6–9. The ordinary rules for assessing the
sufficiency of a complaint apply to Title VII cases. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 511 (2002). A Title VII complaint need only provide “enough detail to give
the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008).

1. Discrimination

A complaint alleging discrimination under Title VII “need only aver that the 

employer instituted a (specified) adverse employment action against the plaintiff on
the basis of [his race or national origin].” Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d
1014, 1028 (7th Cir. 2013). Dart argues that Munoz has failed to plead the causation
requirement of this standard. [12] at 7. But under the Title VII causation standard
for race (or national origin) discrimination claims against private employers, race (or

national origin) need only be a “motivating factor.” Freeman v. Eaton Corp., 2024 WL
4200580, at *3 (7th Cir. Sept. 16, 2024). Munoz’s complaint says enough to pass the
“relatively low bar for pleading discrimination.” Id. An adverse employment action “must materially alter the terms or conditions
of employment” and “must be ‘more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an
alteration of job responsibilities.’” Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 954 (7th
Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Munoz alleged that he was subjected to a hostile work

environment while other non-Hispanic and non-Mexican workers were not. [1] ¶¶ 26,
34. Specifically, Munoz alleges that he was disciplined “with write-ups in relation to”
what white employees did (and provides the name of one such employee) and
disciplined for the acts of white employees. [1] ¶¶ 16, 19. A complaint need not include
additional details surrounding the nature of the discipline or establishing a
discriminatory motive. At the motion to dismiss phase, “a plaintiff need not allege
facts aligning with [his] claim’s every element.” Kaminski, 23 F.4th at 777.
Further, as pleaded in the complaint, it is plausible that the harassment and

discipline faced by Munoz materially changed the conditions of his employment by
denying him a safe and free workplace. And, unlike in Sowers v. VVF Illinois Services,
LLC, where the challenged conduct was a one-time occurrence, it is plausible that the
discrimination and harassment faced by Munoz was severe or pervasive and thus
capable of creating a hostile work environment. 2019 WL 1923407, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 30, 2019). Munoz’s EEOC charge, cited in his complaint, reports a month-long

period of discrimination. [1] ¶ 6; [12-1] at 2. Munoz has sufficiently pled that he was
treated differently on account of his race and national origin.

2. Retaliation

To plead a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that he
“engaged in statutorily protected activity and was subjected to adverse employment
action as a result of that activity.” Luevano, 722 F.3d at 1029.

Defendant cites Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis for the proposition that

“[m]erely complaining in general terms of discrimination or harassment, without
indicating a connection to a protected class” is insufficient to prove retaliation. 457
F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2006). But Tomanovich reviewed a motion for summary
judgment, not to a motion to dismiss, where a plaintiff need only produce enough
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Here, it is plausible that Munoz engaged in protected
activity when he complained about the harassment and discrimination. Further,
losing his job a week later constitutes an adverse employment action that plausibly
could have been a result of his complaint, as supported by the short temporal
proximity between complaining and being terminated. See, e.g., Lang v. Ill. Dept. of
Child. & Fam. Servs., 361 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that close temporal
proximity supports the inference of a causal link). Although Munoz will be required
to prove more than mere suspicious timing, see Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909 F.3d 182,
188 (7th Cir. 2018), he has sufficiently pled that he was retaliated against in violation
of Title VII.
IV. Conclusion
Dart’s motion to dismiss, [11], is denied.

ENTER:
fA SSAA
Manish 8. Shah
Date: February 18, 2026 United States District Judge