United States v. Brian K. Griffey - Affirmation of Conviction

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25 - 4154 UNITED ST ATES OF AMER ICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. BRIAN K. GRIFFEY, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for th e Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (1:18 - cr - 00058 - T SK - MJA -1) Submitted: February 26, 202 6 Decided: March 3, 2026 Before NIEMEYER and QUATTLEBAU M, Circuit Judges, an d FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ON BRIEF: Tracy Weese, Shepherdstown, West Virginia, for Appellant. William Rhee, Assistant U nited States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNI TED STATES A TTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: Brian K. Griffey admitted to violating th e terms of his supervised release b y failing to follow his probation officer’s instructions, failing to participate in a substance abuse treatment program, committing new criminal condu ct, and using and possessing con trolled substance s. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment with no additional supervised release to follow. Griffey ’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), conceding that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the 24 - month sentence imposed by the district court is plainly un reasonable. Alth ough notified of his right to do so, Griffey has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm th e district court’s revocation judgment. “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a senten ce upon revocation of supervised release.” United S tates v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 64 0 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United State s v. Slappy, 8 72 F.3d 20 2, 207 (4th Ci r. 2017) (cit ation modified). In determining whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, “we first must determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreaso nable.” Id. In so doing, we are guided by “the same procedural and substantive considerations that guide our review of original senten ces,” but we take “a more deferential app ellate posture than we do when reviewing orig inal sentences.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation mod ified).

3 “A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court ad equately explains the chosen sentence after co nsidering the Sentencing Guid elines’ nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) factors.” Unite d States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (ci tation modified); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing sentencing factors applicable to rev ocation proceedings). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the cou rt states an appropriate basis for c oncluding that the defendant shou ld receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (citation modified). We presume that a sentence within the applicable revocation policy statement rang e is reasonable. Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373. Our review of the record reveals t hat Griffey ’s sentence is reason able. The district court heard arguments from counsel for G riffey and the Government, and the court listened to Griffey ’ s allocution. The co urt further considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and explained that the sentence was necessary b ecause Griffey had breached the court’s trust on multiple occasions by committing m ultiple violations. The court also emphasized the need for deterrence and protecting the public. Finally, we conclude that Griffey fails to rebut the presumption of substantive reason ableness accorded his sentence with in the policy statement range. In accordance with Anders, we hav e reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious ground s for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment and, at this junctu re, deny counsel’s motion to withdraw. This cou rt requires that counsel inform Griffey, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United S tates for further review. If Griffey requests that a petition be filed, b ut counsel believes that such

4 a petition would be frivolous, then coun sel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Griffey. We dispense with oral argument because the facts an d legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED