US v. Rashaun Taylor - Affirmance of conviction in part, dismissal in part

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24 - 6117 UNITED ST ATES OF AMER ICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RASHAUN ANTONIO TAYLOR, a/k/a Diablo, a/k/a Blo, a/k/a Bosston Blo, a/k/a Bubba, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United S tates District Court for the Eastern D istrict of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, S enior District Judge. (2:19 - cr - 00036 - RA J - RJK -1; 2:23 - cv - 00487 - RA J) Submitted: November 24, 2025 Decided: March 3, 2026 Before WYNN and R ICH ARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by un published per curiam opinion. Rashaun Ant onio Taylor, Appellant Pro Se. Luke Bresnahan, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, V irginia, James Reed Sawyers, OFFICE O F THE U NITED ST ATES ATTORNEY, A lexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Rashaun Antonio T aylor of conspiracy to commit racketeering, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrup t Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1); use of a firearm, resulting in death, du ring the RICO conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), (j) (Co unt 3); possession of a firearm as a felon, i n violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922 (g)(1), 924(a)(2) * (Count 5); and distribution of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (Count 6). Th e district court sentenced Taylor to 420 mo nths’ im prisonme nt on Co unt 1, 12 0 months’ concur rent impr isonme nt on Cou nt 5, and 240 months’ concurrent imprisonment on Count 6. Additionally, the district co urt sentenced Taylor to 120 months on Count 3, to be served consecutively, for a total term of 540 month s’ impris onment. Taylor appealed, and this cou rt affirmed the criminal judgment. United States v. Taylor, No. 20 - 4395, 2021 WL 3666679, at *1 - 2 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2021). Taylor subsequently filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion raising several grounds for relief. The district court granted Taylo r’s motion as to his claim that his § 924(c) conviction lacked a valid predicate crime o f violence and, accordingly, v acated his conviction on Count 3 and its attendant 120 - month consecutive sentence. The court otherwise denied relief on Taylor’s motion, and Taylor appealed. We previously granted a partial certificate of appealability and d irected informal briefing on th e issue of whet her, in light o f * Section 924(a)(2) was amended following Taylor’s conviction and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g) convictions. See Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117 - 159, § 120 04(c), 13 6 Stat. 1313, 1329 (202 2).

3 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Taylor’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the district court could not sentence Taylor to more than 20 years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit racketeering. As a preliminary matter, we grant Taylor’s motion s to file supplemental informal reply brief s. Upon review of the parties’ submission s and the record, we affirm in part and dismiss in part. To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Taylor was required to show that (1) his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, and (2) he was prejudiced by the deficient perfo rmance. Strickland v. Washingt on, 466 U. S. 668, 68 7 (1984). To satisfy the p erformance prong, Taylor h ad to “ show that counsel’s representation fell below an ob jective standard of reasonableness. ” Id. at 688. To satisfy the prejudice prong, Taylor w as required to demonstrate “a reasonable prob ability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional err ors, the result of the pro ceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. The district court concluded that Taylo r’s racketeering offense carried an enhanced statutory maximum of life imprisonment. Taylor argues that his counsel shoul d have objected to this conclusion und er Apprendi because the jury failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt the facts sup porting the application of the enhanced statutory maximum. Specifically, he contends that it is n ot clear that the jury found he committed first - degree murder, a s oppose d to second - degree murder, as part of the underlying racket eering activity. See United States v. Huskey, 90 F.4th 651, 674 (4th Cir.) (holdin g that, pur suant to Appr endi, RICO violator is subject to increased maximum sentence only if jury finds his

4 violation was based on racketeering activity pun ishable by life imprisonment), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 25 44 (2024), and cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2546 (2024); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2 - 32 (West, Westlaw through 2025 Sess.) (specify ing that second - degree murder is punishabl e by maximum of 4 0 years’ impriso nment). A ssuming that counsel’s performance was deficient, we conclude that Taylor has not made the required showing of prejudice. Applying the generally applicable 20 - year statutory maximum to Taylor’s racketeering o ffense, s ee 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), T aylor’s 420 - month sentence still falls within the combined 600 - month statutory maximum for his remaining three convictions. Therefore, th e district court cou ld have imposed the same total sentence, while still remaining within both the combined statutory maximum and the 20 - year statutory maximum for the RICO conspiracy offense, by imp osing a shorter sentence for that offense and ru nning the sentences on each of the offenses consecutiv ely to each other. Furthermore, t he district court thoroughly explained the chosen sentence in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and nothing about the court’s assessment of those factors suggests that it would have imposed a differen t sentence had counsel argued that App rendi limited the statutory maximum on the racketeering o ffense to 20 years. Because the record thus demonstrates that the court would have imposed the same sentence, regardless of counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, b y running the terms for ea ch of Taylor’ s convictions consecutively to each oth er, we discern no reversible error in the district court’s denial of Taylor’s Apprendi - based ineffective assistance claim.

5 The remainder of the district co urt’s order is not ap pealable unless a circuit judge or justice issues a certificate of app ealability. See 2 8 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of th e denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the distric t court denies relief on t he merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s assessment o f the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 - 17 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 14 0 - 41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDan iel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (200 0)). We have reviewed the record and conclude that Taylor has not made the requisite showing with regard to the remaining claims he pursues on appeal. Thus, we deny a certificate of appealability as to th ose claims. Accordingly, we affirm in part as to the district co urt’s denial of Taylor’s Apprendi - based ineffectiv e assistance claim, and we d ismiss the re mainder of the appeal. We dispense with oral argumen t because the facts and legal contentio ns are adequately presented in the materials befo re this court and argument w ould not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN P ART